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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines the Royal Navy's war planning and strategic 
evolution from the late Victorian era into the First World War. It demonstrates that a 
definitive planning trend existed throughout the period which was consistently 
legitimised by several factors: the study of naval history. manoeuvres, European power 
politics, procurement, and individual talent. The technological/strategic challenges 
posed by a perceived Franco-Russian naval threat during the late nineteenth century led 
to the evolution of a strategy entailing the observational blockade of an enemy's ports 
and offensive operations between 1888-1905. Based in the Naval Intell igence 
Department (NID), planning was influenced by the historical revitalisation of Britain's 
naval past and its application to contemporary technical/strategic dilemmas. As de facto 
planning staff until 1909, the NID modified this dual observational/offensive strategy 
for war against Wilhelmine Germany. Under Admiral Sir John Fisher, planning aimed 
at Germany's naval and commercial assets in the Baltic intensified and was utilised as 
a deterrent to counter aggressive German foreign policy after 1904. Conversely, the 
Scandinavian neutrality dilemma, 1905-1908, exerted a strong influence on the 
Admiralty'S strategic policy. Responding to the potential closure of the Baltic entrances, 
Fisher initiated the Admiralty's first "official" war plans in 1907-08. The primary 
contingencies involved a distant/observational blockade or an offensive Baltic descent 
which ensured the Navy could still pursue a direct campaign against Germany's 
economic and naval assets. Despite internal dissension, external probes into Admiralty 
policy, and increased centralisation in strategic matters after 1908. this dual strategy 
remained in place into the First World War. During the war, operational realities 
associated with the North Sea stalemate and German submarine depredations, ironically, 
rejuvenated offensive designs from the 1904-1908 period alongside the stable economic 
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VI. 
INTRODUCTION 
Surveys of late Victorian and Edwardian naval policy have examined Britain's 
rivalry with the Dual Alliance, the revolution in materiel, the reforms instituted by 
Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Fisher, the naval competition with Imperial Germany, anfl 
the Service's subsequent performance in the First World War. Few of these studies, 
however, have considered whether the Navy underwent a strategic transfonnation 
during this period of rapid technological change. Many monographs and biographies 
explore the Admiralty's war planning and staff development within the broader context 
of the Fisher administration's naval policy but neglect the influence of studies 
conducted earlier during the late nineteenth century. Little attention has been paid to the 
Service's strategic preparations from the establishment of the Naval Intelligence 
Department (NID) in 1887 until Fisher's appointment as First Sea Lord in October 
1904.1 Sources analysing the Royal Navy's operational planning and staff formation 
throughout 1904-1918 narrowed their f~cus to specific contingencies without reference 
to contextual influences nor the entire course of war planning during the period. No 
study has yet detennined if a definitive planning trend existed at all. A belief has thus 
persisted that the Navy's plans for war were puerile, ill-informed, and based on the 
whims of senior officers such as Fisher.2 Are-interpretation of these sources and the 
archival evidence, however, presents a different picture altogether. Many assumptions 
about the Admiralty's strategic abilities overlooked the existence of a legitimate, 
) An exception is R. E. Mullins, "Sharpening the Trident: The decision of 1889 and the 
creation of modem sea power", University of London DPhil dissertation, 2000. 
2 A. J. Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Policy in the 
pre-Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905, (New York, 1940); op cit, From the Dreadnought to ScIIpQ Flow: 
The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919,5 Volumes, (London, 1961-1970); R. Mackay, Fisher 
ofKilverstone, (Oxford, 1973); N. Summerton, "The Development of British Military Planning for a 
War Against Gennany, 1904-1914", (University of~ndon: DPhil. Dissertation, 1970); P.K. Kemp 
(ed), The Papers of Admiral Sir John Fisher, Volume 2., (London, 1965); P .Haggie, "The Royal Navy 
and War Planning in the Fisher Era" in P .Kennedy (ed), The War Plans of the GreIlt Powers, 1880-
/914, (Boston, 1989), pp. 118-30; P. Hayes, "Britain, Germany, and the Admiralty's Plans for 
Attacking Gennan Territory" in L. Freedman (eel), War, Strategy, and IntemotiOMl Po/ilia: E.uays 
in Honoru of Sir Michael Howard. (Oxford, 1992), pp. 95-116; M.S. Partridge, "The Royal Navy aDd 
the End of the Close Blockade, 1885-1905: A Revolution in Naval Strategy.", The Mariner's M",.or, 
75 (May 1989), pp. 119-136. 
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progressive, and innovative approach to naval planning which effectively met the 
international challenges confronting Britain at the zenith of its imperial/world power. 
This dissertation seeks to redress this gap in the historiography of the Royal 
Navy's strategic development by examining the Admiralty's war planning from the late 
1880's to the end of the First World War. A combined study analysing the origins, 
nature, and relevance of the Admiralty's planning will address several points: (1) The 
Service's war planning into the First World War followed a discernable developmental 
path originating with the NID's work in the late 1880's; (2) Contingency plans 
developed throughout 1887-1905 to counter a perceived Franco-Russian naval threat 
formed the basis of later operational plans between 1905 and 1914 for a war against 
Germany; (3) The Admiralty's strategic planning after 1904 was influenced by prewar 
European balance of power struggles such as the questions surrounding Scandinavian 
neutrality and status quo in the Baltic, 1905-1909. In order to determine the nature and 
origins of the Admiralty's operational plans against the Dual Alliance and later 
Gennany, it is necessary to evaluate the means by which various strategic proposals 
were tested, authenticated, and consider whether these designs accounted for 
technological advances in naval warfare during the late nineteenth-early twentieth 
centuries (e.g. submarines, torpedo-craft, mines). 
An analysis of the Royal Navy's war plans and manoeuvres conducted from 
1888 to 1914 reveals that the Admiralty did not view operational planning as an idle 
pursuit. Indeed, it seriously evaluated the viability of each design with the recognition 
that a conflict might become unavoidable, The need for more detailed contingencies 
became more acute in the immediate prewar period when Germany's aggressive foreign 
policy and naval programme were viewed with increasing trepidation in Great Britain. 
The few sources which have examined the Navy's war planning against Germany 
concluded that these plans were dangerously outdated and produced solely to buttress 
3 
Fisher's reform policy from further attacks by his opponents.3 Strong evidence that the 
Navy's 1887-1914 planning was neither amateurish nor formulated on ulterior 
political/personal agendas does exist. This includes: similarities between the 
Admiralty's strategic preparations for a war with the Dual Alliance and later plans 
against Germany; the Navy's traditional role as an "offensive" deterrent to the rise of 
any hegemonic European power or bloc; the inter-relationship between war plans, Fleet 
manoeuvres/exercises, and Foreign Office diplomacy; the Admiralty's vessel 
procurement policies; and the role played by a select coterie of talented officers within 
the NlD. The Admiralty'S war planning was, in fact, the product of a carefully 
constructed process, developed overtime by some of the sharpest minds in the Service. 
Fisher's political problems aside, the ultimate aim of the Admiralty's plans was to 
provide the most effective method of employing the Royal Navy's traditional naval 
preponderance against any adversary intent on threatening British and imperial security. 
An important factor in the development of prewar Admiralty strategic planning, 
which has been largely ignored, was the role played by the academic study of British 
naval history throughout the 1880's-1890's, coupled with the formation and expansion 
of the NIl) as the Service's de facto staff system. British naval historians such as Sir 
John Knox Laughton and Vice-Admiral Philip Colomb, along with intellectual forums 
such as the Royal United Service Institution (RUSI) and the Navy Records Society 
(NRS), applied the lessons of the past to contemporary strategic, tactical, and 
technological issues. This movement's effect on the more erudite officers associated 
with the NID and war planning was far-reaching. All of the Directors of Naval 
Intelligence (DNI) in the 1887-1905 period were either former pupils of Laughton at the 
Royal Naval College or colleagues of the historian prior to and after his fonnation of 
the NRS in 1893. After 1905. Laughton'S protege, Sir Julian Corbett became involved 
3 Kemp, Fisher Papers v.2. , pp. 316-7; Summerton, "British Military Planning", Chapter 5; 
Haggie, "War Planning", pp. 120,124-5,129-30; Hayes, "Admiralty's Plans", pp. 95-1 16; N. d' 
Ombrain, War Machinery and High Policy: Defence Administration in Peacetime Britain. 1902-
1914. (Oxford, 1973), p. 157; Nicholas A. Lambert, Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution, (Columbia, 
) 999), pp. 179-82. 
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with the Admiralty's war planning through his work at the Naval War Course and his 
employment as the Fisher regime's historical "propagandist". 
Since the Admiralty's prewar planning was centred exclusively in the NID until 
its demise as a "staff' in 1909, it is necessary to briefly examine key planners as well 
as the issue of a naval staff system. The DNl's, their staffs at NID. officers associated 
with the Naval War College/Course, and others influenced the Service's strategic 
progression throughout the 1887-1909 period. The NID's early studies led to the 
development and adoption of an offensive "observational" blockade strategy. along with 
direct assaults against an enemy's bases and vital points, as a counter to the French 
Jeune Ecole doctrine in the late I 880's-1890's--a strategy later adopted for a possible 
war against Germany. After 1897, the majority of these offensive contingencies and the 
evolution of the distant blockade strategy were the products of the NID's unofficial 
planning sections and one officer in particular, Admiral George Ballard. Loosely 
affiliated with the historical revitalisation of the Service begun by Laughton, Colomb, 
and DN!' s such as Admirals Sir Cyprian Bridge and Reginald Custance, Ballard's 
contribution to Admiralty planning was made possible through the precedent set by that 
movement. The formation, organisation, and duties of the NID are also considered, as 
they had a direct bearing on the formulation of the Navy's strategic designs throughout 
the period. The department's demise as the Service's de/acto naval staffand questions 
surrounding the creation of other "staff' bodies under Fisher are also addressed as these 
issues affected the nature and contents of planning conducted well past the outbreak of 
the war in 1914. 
During the First World War, the Royal Navy's operational realities differed 
substantially from earlier plans for forays against the German North Sea littoral and in 
the Baltic to contain or destroy the High Seas Fleet and Germany's extensive overseas 
commerce. Nevertheless, several of the earlier provisions were rehabilitated and 
reconsidered during the conflict. Accordingly, an assessment of certain wartime 
contingencies is necessary to evaluate to what extent prewar offensive plans were 
duplicated. In particular, Fisher's and Churchill's promotion ofinshore and amphibious 
5 
operations along Germany's North Sea coast and in the Baltic during 1914-15 share an 
affinity with designs formulated throughout 1902-09, if not earlier. Other operations 
considered at the height of Germany's unrestricted submarine campaign in 1917, such 
as blocking the German North Sea estuaries, mine blockading their entrances, and 
seizing Heligoland, originated withinNID in 1904-07--themselves byproducts of studies 
carried out in the late 1880's-1890's. A comparative appraisal of the Navy's wartime 
proposals with their prewar counterparts reveals that a definitive trend in offensive 
planning persisted well into the First World War. It also proves that the designs created 
between 1887 and 1914 were legitimate and not mere "foils" to assuage opposition to 
Admiralty policy. These earlier offensive proposals were not adopted during the war due 
to the technological realities posed by submarines, mines, and torpedo craft in the North 
Sea. Six months into the conflict, the operational dictates imposed by these weapons 
caused the onset of a defensive mentality throughout the ranks of senior flag officers 
within the Grand Fleet and Admiralty. Ironically, however, aspects of the planning 
begun in the 1890's held on, fuelled by the very technological factors that had 
purportedly made prewar observational blockade/inshore designs obsolete. Alhough 
these plans were never implemented, for thirty years the Admiralty's strategic 
preparations remained coherent, professional, and attuned to the efficient projection of 
the Royal Navy's power to settle any conflict which threatened the security of the 
British Empire. 




The late Victorian Navy has been portrayed as a collection of colonial gunboats 
and freakish ironclads. commanded by "spit and polish" officers possessing little 
intellectual acuity beyond their own narrow technical training. Forttmately, this 
"grotesque parody"l has been challenged by studies highlighting the intellectual, 
strategic, and technological accomplishments carried out before Admiral Sir John 
Fisher's "modernisation" of the Royal Navy after October 1904.2 While conservatism 
and a squashing of command initiative were retrenched following the Victoria disaster 
in June 1893,3 two factors emerged to enhance the Service's strategical progression: the 
establishment of the Naval Intelligence Department (NID) in 1887, and the rise of a 
"scientifically" based study of the Navy's past led by Sir John Knox Laughton, John and 
Philip Colomb, and "intellectual" officers such as Cyprian Bridge, Reginald Custance, 
and Prince Louis Battenberg. Created to facilitate mobilisation, the NID remained the 
Navy's de facto planning staff through its links with history, officer education, and 
mandate to craft manoeuvres based on existing strategic realities until 1909.4 The NID's 
1 A. Lambert, The Foundations of Naval History: John Knox Laughton, the Royal Navy and 
the Historical Profession, (London, 1998), p.12. 
2 Ibid.; D. Schurman, The Education of a Navy: The Development of British Naval Strategic 
Thought, 1867-1914, (London, 1965); M. Allen, "The Foreign Intelligence Committee and the 
Origins of the Naval Intelligence Department of the Admiralty", Mariner's Mirror, Volume 81., No. 
I. (February] 995), pp. 65-78; A. Preston, "The End of the Victorian Navy", Mariner's Mirror, 
Volume 60. (November 1974), pp. 363-81; N.A.M. Rodger, "British Naval Thought and Naval 
Policy, 1820-1890: Strategic Thought in an Era of Technological Change" in C. L. Symonds (ed), 
New Aspects of Naval History; Selected Papers Presented at the Fourth Navaillistory Symposium, 
United States Naval Academy, 25-26 October 1979, (Shrewsbury, 1980), pp. 140-52. 
3 A. Gordon, The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Policy, (Annapolis, 1996), 
Chapters 10-15. 
4 This is the dominant theme throughout the Admiralty's internal historical appreciation of 
the Naval Statl~ Naval Staff Monograph (Historical), The Naval Stailofthe Admiralty. Its Work and 
Development. (Naval StajJ), Naval Staff, Training and Staff Duties Division, September 1929, BR 
1875, Naval Library, Ministry of Defence, (NLMD). 
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inter-relationship with the historical movement created by Laughton and Philip Colomb 
influenced a planning trend that continued into the First World War. By the late 1890's. 
junior officers such a<; George Ballard were applying axioms drawn from this 
intermeshing of history, tactics, strategy, and technology to a re-interpretation of the 
Service's traditional close blockade strategy. 
Since the seminal study of the late Victorian-early Edwardian Navy paid scant 
attention to the relationships between the NID, war planning, scholarly naval history, and 
a procurement policy aimed at inshore operations, an accurate depiction of the Service' s 
strategic policy during this period remains incomplete.5 A belief that the Admiralty 
abandoned the traditional close blockade strategy due to the realities created by steam. 
torpedo-craft, and the submarine, has persisted. 6 A re-consideration of the evidence 
reveals that the case against the close blockade after 1888 is not that deflnitive. Reflected 
in manoeuvres after 1887, the strategic, tactical, and technological problems of 
maintaining a blockade were consistently appraised and modifled to meet a projected 
naval war against France and, after 1892, the Dual Alliance. What emerged after 1888 
was a variation on the traditional strategy, involving the "observational" blockade of an 
enemy's main bases through the establishment of advanced flotilla bases. This fulfllled 
the Admiralty's primary objectives: defeating the enemy's main fleets, preventing 
invasion, and protecting Britain's seaborne commerce. Manoeuvres and procurement 
were an extension of the Admiralty'S strategic preparations and the perceived threat to 
overseas trade posed by the Jeune Ecole. Solidifying Britain's naval supremacy, the 
Naval Defence Act and Spencer Programmes of 1889 and 1894 included torpedo-
gunboats and their derivative, the destroyer, to counter the torpedo-craft of France's 
defenses mobiles and facilitate the Admiralty's principal offensive strategy: an 
observational blockade on French bases. Not all the 1888-1904 exercises dealt with 
5 Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre-
Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905, (New York, 1940). 
6 Ihid., pp. 107-12,367-70; M.S. Partridge, 'The Royal Navy and the End of the Close 
Blockade, 1885-1905: A Revolution in Naval Strategy?", Mariner's Mirror, Volume 73., No.2. 
(May 1989). pp.119-36. 
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blockade, but related aspects associated with the torpedo-boat question remained a 
prominent component. Enhancing the Fleet's anti-torpedo counter measures, manoeuvres 
were inversely applicable to conditions simulating inshore operations off the French 
coasts. The relationship between naval history, the NID's early war plans, manoeuvres, 
and procurement proved the foundation for a definitive offensive planning trend 
continuing past Fisher's alleged "reform" of the Service after 1904. 
II. 
The creation of the NID and its predecessor, the Foreign Intelligence Committee 
(FIC, 1882-87), reflected the Admiralty's realisation that the increasingly complex 
strategic environment in the late 1870's required enhanced systematic planning and new 
solutions. By 1880, the need for up-to-date intelligence increased with the prospect of 
a possible naval war with either France or Russia and the protection of Britain's 
expansive overseas commerce.7 The Fleet's slow trial mobilisation during the 1885 
Russian War Scare, coupled with the navalist furor generated by W.T. Stead's 1884 "The 
Truth About the Navy" articles, increased public agitation for the refonnation of the 
Navy's readiness for war, especially its mobilisation and planning arrangements.8 The 
FIC's expansion was sparked by agitation from Captain Lord Charles Beresford, Junior 
Naval Lord in the new Admiralty administration established under the First Lord, Lord 
George Hamilton (1886-1892) and Senior Naval Lord, Admiral Arthur W. A. Hood 
(1886-1889) in August 1886. Based on a 1 st October memorandum by Beresford and 
reports by the head of the FIe, Captain W. Hall, during the 1885 War Scare, Hood 
concluded the department required enlargement.9 
7 J.C.R. Colomb, "Naval Intelligence and Protection of Commerce in War", JRUSI, (1881), 
pp.553-78; B. Ranft, "The Protection of British Seaborne Trade and the Development of Systematic 
Planning for War, 1860-1906" in B. Ranft (ed), Technical Change and British Naval Policy, /860-
1939, (London, 1977), p. I; See: Allen, "Origins", p.65-71. 
8 .. lnatomy, pp. 120-3; Mackay, Fisher, pp. 179-184; A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for 
Mastery in Europe, /848- /918, (Oxford, 1988), pp. 298-30 I. 
9 Beresford to Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey Phipps Hornby, August 24,27, 1886, Hornsby 
MSS, PHII120(B), NMM.: Memorandum by Lord Charles Beresford, "War Organisation" , October 
1, 1886, ADM 116/3106, Formation of Naval Intelligence Department. Reorganisation of Foreign 
---------', 
9 
Despite resistance from within the Board, Hood pushed a proposal to establish 
an intelligence department at the end of October. 10 Hall's assistant at the FIC, Captain 
Reginald Custance, was designated to prepare a mobilisation scheme with input from 
foreign station C-in-C's on their intended actions in the event of war. A new Director of 
Naval Intelligence (DNI) would complete a similar design for home waters and prepare 
plans for potential campaigns in the Baltic, an attack on Cherbourg, and trade protection 
in the Western Approaches. I I Appointed to the FIC in October 1888, Custance played 
a prominent role not only in the new department's fonnation but later as DNI ,12 and was 
a member of an officer coterie associated with the intellectual revitalisation of British 
naval history. An interim report by Hall stressed that naval strategy fonn a chief function 
in the new body. Strategic/war planning was included amongst its duties, but only under 
the Board's direction. The DNI's initiative in strategic planning was limited to an 
advisory status and was wholly contingent on the Senior Naval Lord's dictates. 13 
Restricting the DN!' s strategic prerogative, Hall's recommendations hamstrung the new 
department's development into a full-fledged naval planning staff. 14 
As constituted in January 1887, the NID included Hall as DNI with two Assistant 
DNI's (ADNI), Captains Eadley Wilmont and Custance (ADNl's, 1887-1890) 
respectively, heading the Intelligence (Section I) and Mobilisation (Section II) Divisions. 
Intelligence Committee, 1886-1888. Case 0074; Lord Charles Beresford, The Memoirs of Admiral 
Lord Charles Beresford, Volume 2, (London, 1914), p. 344-9; Minutes by Hood, September 27, 
October 2; Minute by Hamilton, October 11, 1886, ADM 116820 (a), Admiralty, October 1886; 
Allen, "Origins", p. 72-5. 
10 Minutes by Vice-Admirals Hoskins and Graham, October 26-27, 1886, ADM 116/3106. 
II Minute by Senior Naval Lord, October 28, 1886, ADM 116/3106. 
12 Naval Staff, Appendix B, p. 120; Matthew AHen, "Rear Admiral ReginaJd Custance: 
Director of Naval Intelligence", Mariner's Mirror, Vol. 78. No.1 (February 1992), pp.61-75. 
\J Preliminary report on a Naval Intelligence Department, November 4, 1886, ADM 
1/6820(a); Instructions for Director ofNavallntelligence, Proposals by Captain W. Hall and final 
version, January 1887, ADM 116868 (a); Appendix II. Instructions for the DNl, Report on the Work 
of the Department During the Year 1887, NID Report No. 155., February 1888, ADM 231112. 
14 Allen, "Origins", pp. 73, 75. 
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The department's "purely advisory" status entailed "Preparation for War" under the 
supervision of the Senior Naval Lord and his staff, Military ("M" Branch). and the 
dissemination of infonnation required by the other Naval Lords. Its primary duties 
entailed: collection, analysis, and recording of all infonnation related to "maritime 
matters" for the Board's perusal in the event of war: preparation of "complete" 
mobilisation plan for the rapid deployment of the Empire's naval forces; and all points 
affecting "Preparation for War" without dictating policies regarding construction, 
annaments, etc., unless asked by the Board. Intelligence on foreign warships, fast foreign 
and British mercantile steamers, foreign naval personneL European coastal defences, and 
the state of British coaling station defences would be made "immediately" available to 
the Board. 15 
Although the NlD's duties included war planning, "when directed", it was a 
significant omission that a separate division was not established to plan operations and 
consider strategical issues. Prerogative in operational planning remained centred in the 
Senior Naval Lord. 16 A case for broader staff work could not be made when Service 
chiefs such as Hood and his predecessor, Admiral Sir Astley Cooper-Key (1879-1885), 
regarded strategic conceptions as their exclusive preserve. 17 This situation permeated the 
NID's existence and worsened under Fisher's overlordship in 1904-09. 
A "fruit" of the new organisation was its responsibility for the creation, 
institution, and evaluation of naval manoeuvres initiated after the Jubilee Review in July 
1887. Manoeuvres called attention to contemporary strategical/tactical questions,18 but 
were a poor substitute for a proper planning section and the DNI's executive 
15 Report on the Work of the Department During the Year 1887, NID Report No. 155. 
Appendix I. Office Memorandum. Intelligence Department., Appendix II. Instructions for the DNI, 
January 24, 1887, ADM 231/12, NID Reports, 1887-1889. 
16/bid, Appendices I and II. 
17 Allen, "Origins", p. 75; P. Colomb, Memoirs o/Sir Astley Cooper Key, (London, 1898), 
p. 491; N.A.M. Rodger, "The Dark Ages of the Victorian Navy", Mariner's Mirror, No. 62. (1976), 
pp. 123-6; Schunnan, Education, p 103. 
18 See: Naval Staff. p. 38-42; Naval Manoeuvres 1887, NID Report No. 137, ADM 231111. 
1 1 
representation on the Board. Its advisory status meant that the NID's work on 
manoeuvres became the only real outlet for the consideration of strategic issues and the 
construction of "war plans". A full scale expansion did not occur until Custance's term 
as DNI (March 1899- November 1902) when, through his direction and the work of 
Captain (later Admiral of the Fleet) Prince Louis of Batten berg (ADNI 1899-1900), two 
Assistant DNI's were added and the department was reorganised into four separate 
divisions: Mobilisation, War (Defence), Foreign (Intelligence), and Trade. A fifth, 
Coastal Defence, division was added in 1905.19 Significantly, the WarlDefence Division 
was added in 1900 to serve as the Service's de/acto planning staff handling all questions 
of strategical policy, Fleet War Orders (plans), and manoeuvre reports. When Battenberg 
became DNI in November 1902 the NID, already regarded "as a staff in itself', had 
reached the "zenith of its career".20 
Apart from organisational restrictions placed on the new department, fiscal 
constraints and a dearth of personnel restricted its maturation as a "staff"-type 
organisation. The Treasury refused to endorse the Admiralty's request for additional 
funding to pay for the new department. The dispute revolved around provisional salaries 
for the new staff which were higher than the Treasury would accept. After consulting 
Hamilton and his predecessors in office, W. H. Smith, and George Goschen, Prime 
Minister Salisbury backed the First Lord's decision to assign a lower pay scale to the 
NID.21 The entire episode indicated the Admiralty's casual approach to the 
intelligence/strategy issue and the low priority assigned to the new department. 
Accepting the need for the organisation, the Board was unwilling to give the NID the 
support it needed to become a fully effective "staff" organisation. 
A shoestring budget and minuscule staff translated into decreased effectiveness 
19 See: Appendix I. 
20 Naval Staff, pp. 41-2; Custance to Bridge, March 6, 1901, Bridge MSS, BRl/15, NMM; 
"Naval Intelligence Department. Distribution ofWork.-March 1905", NID Report No. 789. Volume 
45, ADM 231/45;; Kerr, Battenberg, pp. 161-3, 165. 
21 Allen, "Origins", pp.74-5. 
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in dealing with strategic questions and operational planning, despite the best efforts of 
the ON!' s and their staff.22 The department could not provide accurate infonnation 
regarding the French Fleet's mobilisation at Toulon during the naval "scare" in January-
February 1888. The Admiralty had to rely on Foreign Office contacts with the Italian and 
Gennan governments for intelligence on French naval activity throughout the crisis.23 
Unlike Hall, the next ONI, Captain (later Admiral Sir) Cyprian A. Bridge (1888-1894), 
found the restrictions on the department frustrating. One of the Service's more capable 
intellectuals, Bridge advocated a staff and a proper naval college as early as 1870. A keen 
student of strategy, tactics, and history he would, along with his friends Custance and 
John Laughton, playa significant role in the development of the scholarly study of 
Britain's naval past and strategic "doctrine" throughout the 1890's--much of this work 
occurring during his tenure as ONI. 24 What little time the NID actually spent on strategic 
matters was subsumed by other, usually mundane, tasks. Bridge complained to Custance 
in December 1891: 
Even in your time you must have noticed how more and more impossible it was 
becoming for the D.N.1. himself to keep conversant with the minute details of the 
Foreign Intelligence coming into that Department. The case is stronger now than 
ever. ... The special subjects referred to the D.N.I. to be dealt with by him 
personally continue to increase in both number and importance; and occupy even 
more than the hours of the usual official day. I could say to you what it would not 
do to say to every-one; and that is, that the D.N.1. can only manage to get through 
even a perfunctory examination of the papers and subjects referred to him by 
coming earlier and staying later than anyone else at the Admiralty and by taking 
work home with him.25 
Despite under-funding, overwork, and the purely technical nature of foreign 
22 Naval Staff, Appendix B, p. 120; "Instructions for the ONI", January 1887, Appendix B., 
NID Report No. 155, February 1888, ADM 231112. 
23 Anatomy, pp. 126-8. 
24 C.A.G. Bridge, "On the Necessity of forming a Naval Staff", Naval Science, (London, 
1870); A. Lambert, Foundations. pp.II-2,20,32,37,41-3,101, 103, 110,113, 119, 138,142-4,162 
(and footnote # I 0 I). 185. 
25 Bridge to Custance, December 7, 1891. Bridge MSS. BRIll 8. Part 4. (Bridge to Custance 
1890-1894), NMM. 
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intelligence, strategic issues were being considered by the NID. In April 1892. Bridge 
alluded to Custance's role in ensuring that strategy and planning remained a vital 
component of the department's functions: "In our own service the unfortunate extent to 
which mere drillists and specialists have had their way-to the complete expulsion of all 
strategical and tactical interest till you and others got a chance of showing what could be 
learned from manoeuvres is to be attributed to a fulL if not redundant. peace 
establishment." 26 Indicating the role of manoeuvres/ exercises to teach strategic/tactical 
lessons, Bridge identified the other major hurdle restricting the department as an 
operational planning body-a profusion of technically trained "drillists and specialists" 
within the officer establishment. 
By the early 1880's, technology, science, and discipline dominated the junior 
officer education from their rudimentary initial instruction in HMS Britannia to later 
study at the Royal Naval College and specialised branch training (i.e. Gunnery. Torpedo). 
Throughout the 1860's-early 1870's, naval, technical, and practical sciences governed the 
curriculum of the "naval university" at Portsmouth and later Greenwich.27 In 1877, 
Bridge condemned the Navy's educational process and the over-reliance on mathematics 
which produced "exam" lieutenants who were useless at sea.28 As such, the Navy's 
educational structure was detrimental to the successful meshing of "theoretical" and 
"practical" training and antithetical to the "brainy" work associated with the NID. 29 The 
naval past was viewed by many officers to be irrelevant in the modern steam age. History 
26 Bridge to Custance, April II, 1892, Ibid.~ Custance to Bridge, July \8, 1903, BRI/18, Part 
3. 
27 See: Lambert, Foundations, pp. 22-3, 31-2,34-8; H. W. Dickinson, "Educational 
Provision for Officers of the Royal Navy, 1857-1877", (unpublished University of London, Ph D 
thesis, 1994). 
28 37 Lambert. p. . 
29 Lambert, p. 192; J .R. Thursfield, "The Training and SuppJy of Officers" (September 13. 
1894 and October 20, 1894) in Sir George S. Clarke and James R. Thursfield, The Navy and the 
Nation, (London. 1897), pp. 243-68. 
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merely offered the continuity of tradition and patriotic inspiration.30 This environment 
quashed the very processes which could improve the officer cadre' s higher training. 
overcome their inexperience with actual combat, and clarify the application of new 
technology.31 In the 1870's, views on history's role in the Service began to change. led 
from within by intellectuals such as John Knox Laughton and Philip Colomb.32 Linked 
to "progressive" DNI's such as Bridge, Custance, and Battenberg , Laughton' s 
'scientific' study of naval history provided a more rounded educational system by the 
1880's and laid the foundation for the development of strategic "doctrine" within the 
Navy under Julian Corbett and others.33 
TIL 
John Laughton and the Colomb brothers had a lasting impact on scholarly British 
naval history, officer education, and the Service's strategic development in the 1880's-
90'S.34 The seminal study of the late Victorian/early Edwardian Navy, however, 
overlooked the methods through which Laughton and the Colombs influenced a strategic 
planning system which remained in place, arguably, into the First World War.35 
As a shipboard Naval Instructor (1853-1866), lecturer/instructor at the Royal 
Naval College at Portsmouth (1866-1873). and head of the Meteorology and Marine 
Surveying department when the College moved to Greenwich (1873-1885), Laughton 
developeq an interest in history in the 1860's. By the 1870's, he argued that Jessons from 
a "scientific" study of naval history could be applied to contemporary naval education 
30 Schwman, Education, pp.3-5. 
31 Rodger, "British Naval Thought", pp. 140-1,145-9; Gordon, Rules of the Game, pp. 155-
91. 
32 A. Lambert, pp.21-40. 
33 Ibid, pp. 39-41,44-5,47-8,50,162-3,232, 190,220-23; Schurman, Education, pp. 10-
14. 
34 For Laughton's achievement and the Colomb's influence. see: Lunbert, Foundations, 
passim; Schunnan, Education, Chapters 1-3, and 5 . 
.15 See: Lambert, pp.143, 193, 229; Schurman, Education, p. 36. footnote #2; Gordon. 
Rules, p. 186. 
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and policies, including tactical and strategic principles. Presented in a June 1874 Royal 
United Service Institution (RUSI) paper, "The Scientific Study of Naval History" and 
reiterated in 1875, Laughton lobbied to include naval history in officer education at 
Greenwich. His arguments impressed the Naval College President. Admiral Sir Astley 
Cooper Key (1873-6), a naval history course was added to the College curriculum with 
Laughton beginning lectures in 1876.36 As First Naval Lord (1879-1885), Key helped 
Laughton gain access to the Admiralty records reposited in the Public Record Office in 
1879. Setting the precedent, Laughton obtained wider scholarly access to the documents 
by 1886: "This was critical, enabling naval history to move into the academic 
mainstream, and this, in turn, ensured that it could meet the Navy's needs."J7 
Through his role as a lecturer at the Naval College, Professor of Modern History 
at King's College (1885-1914), his extensive archival experience, and a strict adherence 
to "quality control" in his historical writings and reviews in the Dictionary of National 
Biography (DNB), The Edinburgh Review, the Journal of the Royal United Service 
Institution (JRUSI), and other periodicals, Laughton established an esteemed reputation 
among senior Service members and the academic community by the 1890's.38 Within the 
Navy, his influence and contacts were impressive, which apart from Bridge, included 
intellectually progressive officers such Philip Colomb, Battenberg, and Admirals Sir R. 
Vesey Hamilton (Senior Naval Lord 1889-91), Sir A. Hoskins (Senior Naval Lord, 1891-
93), Sir G. Phipps Hornby, and Sir E. Fanshawe. Drawing from this base, important 
political patrons, and influential academic/media contacts, Laughton garnered strong 
support for his and Bridge's fonnation of the Navy Records Society (NRS) in June 1893 
36 J.K. Laughton, "The Scientific Study of Naval History", JRUSI, Volume XVIII (1874), 
pp. 508-27; op cit, "Scientific Instruction in the Royal Navy", JRUSI, Volume XIX (1875): pp. 217-
41; "The Study of Naval History", JRUSI, Volwne XXXX, (1896), pp. 795-820; "The NatIonal Study 
of Naval History", Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Volume XII, (London, 1898), pp. 81-
93; A. Lambert, pp. 35-51,114-41,163-4,166-7,187-91; Schurman, Education, pp.85-90. 
37 A. Lambert, pp. 74-5; Schurman, 87-8. 
38 Ibid, pp.84-5, 89-92, 96-7, 194-6; A. Lambert, pp. 54, 80, 88-92, 96-8, 185-6, passim and 
Bibliography for Laughton's extensive works, pp 239-44. 
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to promote the study of naval history. Its achievement in promoting the serious study of 
naval history, strengthening the naval case in national defence, and its expansion into the 
historical profession was unparalleled. 39 
The impact of Laughton's work, and the NRS, and RUSI's roles as intellectual 
forums, were important for the NIO's examination of strategic issues as the Service's 
original naval "staff',.40 Bridge's recruitment of other "cerebral" officers such as 
Custance, ensured that the institutional contact between the NRS and NID remained long 
after his term as ONI expired in 1894. Battenberg, a former student of Laughton's and 
NRS charter member, maintained the connection between the department and Society 
when he became ONI in 1903. Along with Bridge, the strong link between the two 
bodies was exemplified by Reginald Custance who, as another founding member of the 
NRS, alternately played an integral administrative role in its affairs as Councillor and 
Vice-President between 1899 and 1914.41 
Laughton's influence on Custance and their NRS collaboration was evident in the 
ONI's push to further strategic/tactical study within the War College and Admiralty 
itself. In early 1900, Custance proposed the creation of a "maritime operations"course 
at Greenwich that included: the preparation of operational plans, the study and 
investigation of tactical/strategic questions, and naval history. The scheme received the 
Board's final approval on 31 st May 1900 with Captain Henry May appointed Director 
of the new Navy War Course which commenced at the College in September. Not under 
the NIO's direct supervision it only lasted eight months, neglected officers below 
Commander's rank, and was not a "staff" college per se. Nevertheless, the Course 
familiarised officers with the conduct of maritime operations, historical instruction being 
a key component. 42 It continued Laughton's original history and strategy lectures at 
39 Lambert, pp. 142-72; Schunnan, pp. 91-6; Laughton, "Naval History", pp. 795-820; 
Anatomy, pp. 44-65; footnote 35 above. 
40 Schunnan, pp. 7-9. 
41 Lambert, pp. 33,142-4,149-50,171,197,200,223-4. 
42 Naval Stall: pp. 41-2. 
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Greenwich first under Philip Colomb until 1895, and May afterwards.43 Like Custance, 
May too was a NRS Councillor as was his successor as the War Course Director. Captain 
(later Rear-Admiral) E.J.W. Slade, who served as DNI between 1907 and 1909.44 The 
closest link between Laughton's legacy and the War Course, however, was Julian Corbett 
who began lecturing at the College in 1902. Corbett, who owed his professional 
development as a historian to Laughton and the NRS, remained an integral I ink between 
the War Course/College and war planning during Fisher's first period as First Sea Lord.45 
If the Navy War Course was a rudimentary NID staff college, it is clear from 
Laughton's close association with Bridge, Custance, and Battenberg, that the NRS was 
the department's unofficial "historical section".46 This was crucial for the future 
development of planning and strategic thought within the NID itself. The lack of 
methodical historical education within the Navy curtailed the creation of an effective 
staff system prior to 1914. Without trained officers to collate, assess intelligence, and 
produce analytical studies on naval policy and strategy, the Admiralty was reliant on 
those predisposed to such work who had benefited from private study. Given the Navy's 
educational structure, there were too few such men available even after the establishment 
of the NID in 1887. Invariably, those possessing the necessary talents within the 
department were linked to Laughton, who had recognised their abilities and encouraged 
their studies.47 The department's appropriation of talent increased through its affiliation 
with the naval historical movement. By 1902, if not earlier, capable junior officers not 
generally associated with the NRS, such as George Ballard, continued strategic concepts 
born from the intellectual re-awakening within the Service stimulated by Laughton and 
43 D. Schwman, Julian S. Corbett, 1854-1922: Historian o/British Maritime Policy from 
Drake to Jellicoe, (London, 1981), p. 32. 
44 Lambert, pp. 142, t 87, 197-200, and Appendix, pp. 235-7. 
45 Ibid., pp. 147, 150-1. 156-8, 198-200,216-7,219,223-4: Schunnan, Education, Chapter 
7; op cit., Corbett, Chapters, 3, 5. 
46 Lambert. pp. t t, 142,223,229. 
17 Ibid, pp. 186-7. 
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Philip Colomb. 
The theory underpinning Philip Colomb's subsequent works, was outlined in his 
brother John's 1867 pamphlet, The Protection ofour Commerce and Distribution ofour 
Naval Forces Considered. Analysing contemporary shipping/trade statistics, he argued 
that Britain's unique global position was wholly attributable to naval power whic~ in 
turn, functioned through sea communications. The vulnerability of these communications 
could only be protected through Britain's panoply of world-wide naval bases.48 In 1881, 
John Colomb had advocated the creation of a naval intelligence department where 
strategic information was assessed to produce realistic plans for the protection of 
Britain's vast overseas commerce. With no factual basis for his claim, he also believed 
that the traditional blockade of an enemy's ports remained the best strategy to protect 
England's commercial trade.49 
Philip Colomb's service career was that of an atypical technical officer which, 
despite his accomplishments in signalling and steam tactics, led to his categorisation as 
an "armchair expert". Retiring from active service in 1886, he assumed Laughton's 
lecture series at Greenwich and made Vice-Admiral in 1892--a year before becoming a 
founding member of the NRS. Presenting various technical papers throughout the 1860's, 
it was not until the 1870's that Colomb's exposure to the RUSI and Laughton affected 
his formative development as a Service intellectual.5o 
Infl uenced by Laughton' s ~'Scientific Study" paper and their regular contact at the 
RUSI, Colomb integrated the former's methodology into his work by the late 1870'S.51 
The shift in approach was evident in his 1878 RUS I Gold Medal Essay, "Great Britain's 
Maritime Power" where he infused historical examples to flesh out his brother's theories 
48 Schunnan, Education, pp. 24-6. 
49 Colomb, "Naval Intelligence and Protection of Commerce in War", pp.553-78; B. 
Semmel, Liberalism and Naval Strategy: Ideology, Interest, and Sea Power During the "Pax 
Britannica ", (Boston, 1986), pp. 89-90. 
50 Schunnan, Education, pp. 36-8: Gordon, Rules. pp. 184-91. 
51 Lambert, p. 106; Schunnan. Education, pp. 40-1. 
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on trade protection and imperial defence. Three dominant themes emerged, backed by 
historical "facts": (1) Britain traditionally based her naval force on her special 
requirements as a maritime state rather than as a response to foreign construction; (2) 
Britain's naval role was traditionally defensive (i.e.), invasion and trade protection; (3) 
the Navy should adopt certain broad principles, equally applicable to war and peacetime 
conditions, before adhering to "absolute" theories of naval power. Conceptually linked 
to Laughton's 1874 work, it was the first example of a Service professional basing his 
case on historical examples. 52 
Colomb's conversion was discemable in two 1887 RUSI papers: one on 
blockade, the other, convoys, and both synonymous with his brother's views on 
imperial/trade defence. His method utilised the "real" past to reach general 
principles/rules applicable to contemporary naval conditions. Colomb identified three 
different· blockade types: the "sealing-up" of an enemy port, "masking" an enemy force 
in its base, and "observing" an enemy fleet in port or adjacent to it. From the evidence, 
he sunnised that there had never been a successful example of the first category of 
blockade in the past. The blockade concept was not, however, inapplicable to modem 
conditions of steam and the torpedo. Steam, if anything, enhanced blockade under the 
"masking" and "observational" categories, while effective anti-torpedo drill and 
inclement weather would deter torpedo-craft attacks on a blockading fleet. 53 Colomb's 
blockade categorisation and Laughton's similar views resurfaced in the strategy 
developed by the NID between 1888-1904. Colomb's most influential works appeared 
in 1888-89, inaugurating the "blue-water school" of naval strategy which, along with 
Alfred Thayer Mahan's and Laughton's work, became the intellectual base for increased 
naval expenditure in national defence. 54 The "blue-water" approach, again integrating his 
52 P.lI. Colomb, "Great Britain's Maritime Power", JRUSI (1878); Schurman, Education, 
pp.39-41. 
53 P.H. Colomb, "Blockade: Under existing conditions of Warfare" and "Convoys: are they 
any longer possible?", Naval Warfare, (London, 1891), pp. 194-229,230-57; Schunnan, Education, 
p.45. 
54 Anatomy, pp. 45-61; Semmel, pp. 88-9.91-3,95,102; Lambert. pp. 114-16. 
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brother's theories. appeared in a May 1888 RUSI paper, "The Naval Defences of the 
United Kingdom". Colomb argued for a purely naval conception of national defence 
against invasion and deprecated the financial waste incurred by shore defences. Utilising 
historical precedents, he demonstrated that there were two traditional methods of 
curtailing invasion: (1) the Earl St. Vincent method of a close blockade on an enemy' s 
port or, (2) Lord Howe's defensive waiting posture with the fleet intact. Either system 
would protect Britain from invasion and safeguard seaborne trade in the south western 
approaches. With adequate naval dispositions, there was no need to fortify British 
harbours or ports. 55 
At the RUSI in March 1889, Colomb again used historical examples to destroy 
the Army's counter argument for fortifications. He furthered his "blue-water" thesis 
using history to reveal truisms in Britain's traditional naval defence against invasion. 
When the soldiers attempted to invalidate the historical method, Colomb defended 
history as the basis for strategic studies and was backed up by Laughton in the audience. 
The latter's support revealed Colomb's maturation as a historian and the growing 
confluence of their strategic views. 56 
From the introduction of the "blue-water" debate until his death in 1899, Colomb 
promoted the naval case in national strategy. A collection of his essays were published 
in 1891 as Naval Warfare which was, next to his biography of Cooper Key, perhaps his 
most influential historical piece.57 Colomb's theme was that sea power would only 
benefit a nation if "command of the sea" was assured. Citing the seventeenth century 
Dutch Wars as proof that decisive fleet actions guaranteed "command of the sea", it was 
a natural progression that commerce was safeguarded and ancillary operations against 
an enemy's communications or territory made possible. Examining projected invasion 
55 P.IL Colomb, "The Naval Defences of the United Kingdom", JRUSI, (1888), pp.565-
60 I; Ranft, "Protection", pp. 1-2; Schunnan, Education, pp.46-9. 
56 P.H. Colomb. "The Relations between Local Fortifications and a Moving Navy", JRUSI, 
(1889). pp. 149-202; Schunnan. Education, 48-51; Lambert, pp. I06~07, 111-2. 
57 Gordon, Rules, p. 186; Sclmnnan, Education, pp. 52-3; Lambert. pp. 126-30. 
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attempts between 1690 and 1805, he concluded that a "fleet-in-being" had secured 
Britain's inviolability. 58 Naval Warfare was significant because it utilised history as a 
credible source from which to elucidate principles surrounding the nature and 
applications of sea power. 59 
Laughton endorsed Colomb's work in a June 1893 RUSI summation which 
reviewed Naval Warfare alongside Mahan's two Influence of Sea Po"'er works. 
Laughton supported Colomb's argument that fixed fortifications were wasted 
expenditure better spent on the Navy. Analysing the "fleet-in-being" concept, Laughton 
argued that although the historical appreciations were abstract, Colomb's basic intent 
was sound.60 The conjoining of their views was evident in the NRS and associated 
academic endeavours such as Laughton's From Howard to Nelson as a "text" for the 
Naval College.61 Their use of the past to elucidate underlying tenets and shared strategic 
views, such as the relevance of a modem blockade, had a lasting impact. 
Given Colomb's adoption of Laughton 's methodology, it was not surprising that 
the latter should back the former's "blue water" thesis, especially since the past had 
conclusively demonstrated the necessity of a fleet (i.e. the Armada's defeat). At 
minimum, Britain required a battle fleet equal to Colomb's "fleet-in-being".62 Another 
axiom shared by Laughton and Colomb was the concentration of force against an 
enemy's most vulnerable points. Laughton had explored and developed this theme in his 
1874 "Scientific Study" paper by utilising the historical examples of Suffren, Rodney, 
and Nelson. Related to "concentration" was the creation of strategic plans to force a 
reluctant enemy into battle to ensure a decisive defeat. For Laughton, traditional methods 
58 P. Colomb, Naval Warfare, pp. 1-2,24,46,81, 107-221; Schurman, Education, pp.53-
4. 
59 Schwman, Education, pp. 55-7; Lambert, pp. 126-7,231. 
60 Ibid, pp. 108, 126-7, 130-1, 144. 
61 Lambert, pp. 149,186-7; Marder, Anatomy, pp 68-78; Kerr, Ballenberg, pp. 116-21; J.K. 
Laughton (ed), From Howard to Nelson: Twelve Sailors. (London, 1899), pp.399-468, 
(,} I ,am bert, pp. 107-08, 125, 130-1. 
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of blockade and trade protection were the best methods of attaining a fleet action and 
destruction of an enemy's fleet. This equated with Colomb's maxim that ""the frontier of 
our Empire is the enemy's coast", or more specifically an enemy's main naval bases.63 
While the "concentration"principle was well known, it had some import on the debate 
over the Navy's offensive role in the I 880'-90's and remained the central tenet behind 
arguments for a blockade strategy. Laughton and Colomb provided a reliable impetus 
for the adoption of that particular strategy. 
Laughton endorsed Colomb's 1887 contention that there were distinct forms of 
blockade, only some that were applicable to modern conditions. Since a "close" blockade 
had never occurred in the past, Laughton believed that future "observational" blockades 
by scouts and smaller inshore squadrons off an enemy's base were feasible if the main 
fleet were kept at an appropriate distance to intervene.64 With suitable forces, an enemy's 
fortified harbours could be blockaded by a superior fleet. Alternately, until that fleet were 
defeated or removed, invasion and enemy depredations on commerce were impossible. 
In keeping with Colomb's "blue-water" theory, heavy local fortifications were a needless 
extravagance.65 The meshing of Colomb's "blue-water" concepts, Laughton's views on 
"command of the sea", and the blockade's viability emerged in his review of Royal 
Engineer Major George S. Clark's book Fortifications in 1891. Agreeing with Clark's 
main argument a 'fa Colomb, Laughton dismissed forts as necessary if the fleet were 
decoyed or drawn away. History had disproved the last possibility. If sustained, 
"command of the sea" ensured the conduct of all forms of naval operations--bereft of 
enemy interference. The attainment of "command" and its concomitant operations was 
only possible through a powerful fleet "masking" the enemy in its bases; the same 
blockade category he and Colomb had identified as a timeless axiom in their historical 
63 Ibid., 44-6, 106-08; Schurman, Education, p. 105. 
M J.K Laughton, "Recent Naval Literature", JRUSI, Vol. 37 (November 1893), pp. 1161-
82.: op cit., review of J. Leyland's, The Blockade of Bresl. 1803-1805, The Edinburgh Review, 
(January 1903), pp. 1-33; Colomb, Naval Warfare, pp. 194-229; Lambert. pp. 22,131-2,207-08. 
65 Lambert. pp. 107-08; J.K. Laughton, "Naval Supremacy and Naval Tactics", The 
Edinburgh Review. (January 1890), pp. 146-78. 
work.66 It was not coincidental that this strategy became the dominant theme in N I 0-
designed fleet manoeuvres between 1888 and 1904 when Laughton's and Colomb's 
colleagues, Bridge, Custance, and Battenberg, served as successive ON!' s. During this 
period, the "observational" blockade emerged as the Admiralty's primary strategy against 
France. 
IV. 
The rise of the Jeune Ecole doctrine after 1885 led to the Admiralty's reappraisal 
of its strategic options to counter perceived threats posed by the cruisers and torpedo-
craft espoused by the French Aube Ministry of Marine. Believing that Britain could not 
effectively protect its vast overseas commerce from attack and maintain a traditional 
blockade, the Jeune Ecole theory struck at the core of British strategic conceptions.67 
Implemented as a response to the new French theorem, the 1889 Naval Defence Act 
remedied the Royal Navy's material problems by reapplying the old Two Power Standard 
in shipbuilding against foreign competitors and met the challenge of a guerre de course 
against British trade through a large cruiser construction programme.68 Strategically, 
however, the Navy's ability to implement an offensive blockade remained questionable. 
The Admiralty's first manoeuvres, during the 1885 Russian "war scare" and after the 
1887 Jubilee Review, did not clarify how torpedo-craft and the Jeune Ecole would affect 
the Navy's traditional strategy. Apart from the torpedo ram HMS Polyphemus's exploits 
at Berehaven in 1885 and an unrealistic torpedo-craft attack against anchored ironclads 
at Spithead and Portland in 1887, manoeuvres did not address strategic problems 
associated with a blockade under modem conditions. 69 
66 Lambert, pp. 1 to-12; 1.K. Laughton, "Forts and Fleets", The Quarterly Review, (April 
1891), pp. 351-79. 
67 T. Ropp, The Development of a Modern Navy: French Naval Policy, 187/-J 904, 
(Annapolis, 1987), pp. 155-80. 
68 Mullins, "Sharpening the Trident"; Anatomy, pp. 125-43; Ropp, Development, pp. 205-
to; Preston, "Victorian Navy", pp. 374-8. 
69 Thursfield, The Navy and the Nation, pp. 68-9; Naval Manoeuvres 1887, NID Report No. 
\37 November 1887, ADM 23 III I, NID Reports, 1887. , 
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The NID's first exercise to address a specific strategic question, the July-August 
1888 Manoeuvres examined a close blockade on an enemy's base under conditions 
resembling a war with France. The blockade emphasis was timely given its exploration 
of Jeune Ecole tenets and followed Colomb's 1887 paper on blockades. 70 Coincidentally, 
he served as a Fleet Umpire during the exercise. The manoeuvres' premise involved a 
superior British fleet, "A", commanded by Vice-Admiral 1.K.E. Baird, blockading two 
separate squadrons of "B" Fleet (French) under Rear-Admiral Sir George Tryon at 
"strongly fortified" anchorages at Berehaven (Brest) and Lough Swilly (Cherbourg) in 
Ireland. Tryon's "Bl" and "B2" Squadrons would attempt an escape from their bases to 
conduct three operations: attacks on "B's" commerce, his ports. or troop landings on 
"British" territory. Baird would contain Tryon's forces, but should they escape, "A" was 
tasked to hunt them down and protect commerce. The exercise was meant to clarify the: 
"Relative advantages and disadvantages of keeping the main body of a fleet off the port 
to be blockaded, with an inshore squadron; and of keeping the main body of the 
blockading fleet at a base, with a squadron of cruisers and torpedo-boats off the port. 
with means of rapid communication with a fleet." Torpedo-craft employment and the 
"Special dangers" attending blockading squadrons off an enemy's port were subsidiary 
concerns. Baird initially conducted a successful close blockade with an inshore squadron 
of torpedo-boats and torpedo-gunboats ("catchers") at Berehaven but Tryon effected a 
successful "break-out" of heavy ships from both locales in early August. Baird raised 
both blockades to prevent ajunction between "B'''s squadrons and moved back to protect 
the Thames, while Tryon's united fleet "raided" Liverpool and Britain's north-east 
coast. 71 The outcome appeared to invalidate the "sealing-up" blockade categorised by 
Philip Colomb. 
Despite the failure to"seal in" Tryon's squadrons, summations by senior officers 
involved with the manoeuvres did not dismiss the blockade concept. Baird believed that 
70 Ropp, p.210. 
71 Naval Manoeuvres 1888, NID Report No. 179, October 1888. ADM 231114, pp. 6-8, and 
passim. 
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these operations were still feasible, provided that ironclad and cruiser dispositions on the 
outer blockade line were strengthened and a Reserve Fleet stationed "at all times" in the 
English Channel. Since "B"'s "break-out" occurred at night under poor visibility, Baird 
maintained that his blockade dispositions were sound, apart from a lack of inshore 
torpedo-boats due to breakdowns, coal shortages, and crew fatigue. To overcome these 
deficiencies, a "refuge" should be established near the blockade to refuel, rest, and refit 
the inshore squadrons. Baird preferred torpedo-gunboats over torpedo-boats on the 
inshore line and saw them as essential for all blockading purposes.72 A Manoeuvre 
Umpire, Rear-Admiral A. Butler, was "unhesitatingly" sure "that the days of effectually 
blockading a port are at an end", but did not rule out other forms of blockade. Future 
blockades would involve an "observation" system with enemy ports watched by inshore 
cruiser-"catcher" flotillas, supported by the main fleet in reserve.73 Another Umpire, 
Rear-Admiral N. Bowden-Smith, also deprecated the blockade because of the torpedo-
boat menace, "a source of constant annoyance and anxiety to the blockading force at 
night", but believed that fast cruiser squadrons attached to the blockaders would offset 
liabilities in lying off an enemy's base.74 
To clarify these inconsistent appraisals, the Admiralty appointed a special panel 
of three senior officers, Admirals Sir W.M. Dowell, Sir R. Vesey Hamilton, and Rear-
Admiral Sir Frederick W. Richards, to investigate "lessons" from the summer exercise. 
Establishing a norm in required fleet strength that influenced the Naval Defence Act, the 
"Three Admirals" confirmed that "close" blockades were possible with a certain ratio of 
superiority. 
Under the altered conditions which steam, and the development of the 
locomotive torpedoes, have introduced into naval warfare. it will not be found 
practicable to maintain an effective blockade ofan enemy's squadron in strongly 
72 Ibid, Appendix V., Report of Vice-Admiral in command of "A" Squadron ... .in connection 
with the Naval Manoeuvres, September 12, 1888., pp. 159-61. 
73 Ibid, Appendix VII., Summary of Notes, &c., taken by Umpire. 20th August, 1888. pp. 
175-8. 
74 Ihid., Swnmary of Notes taken by Umpire, 2200 August. 1888. pp. 179-81. 
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fortified ports, by keeping the main body of the fleet off the port to be blockaded 
without the blockading battle-ships being in the proportion of at least 5 to 3, to 
allow a sufficient margin for casualties-to which the enemy's vessels in a secure 
harbour would not be exposed-and the necessary periodical absence of a portion 
of the blockading squadron for the purpose of replenishing fuel, making good 
defects &c. A still larger proportion might be necessary if the area to be covered 
by the blockaders was extensive. 
The admirals surmised that a suitable anchorage near the blockade, an advanced base, 
and a swift inshore squadron in good communications with the main fleet, would reduce 
the ratio to 4 to 3. Like Baird, they agreed that the blockade's weakness was the torpedo-
boats which, because of poor endurance and sea keeping qualities, were suited to the 
defence but "would inevitably prove a cause of embarrassment and anxiety" to the 
blockaders. Conversely, torpedo-gunboats with good speed and coal capacity remained 
the core ofthe inshore squadron and of "incalculable value" in thwarting enemy torpedo-
craft attacks and scouting for the main blockading fleet. 75 Confmning that blockade of 
an enemy's ports was not impossible but that "the methods of blockade adopted in 1888 
must be modified in accordance with the experience thus gained" 76, the "Three Admirals 
Report" became the basis for further manoeuvres to test the strategy and the related 
torpedo-boat question. 
The 1889 Manoeuvres followed the premise of Colomb's "masking" and 
"observational" blockade categories. Reversing the 1888 exercise, Tryon, commanding 
"A" (British) Fleet masked Baird's smaller "B" (enemy) Fleet in two divisions at 
Berehaven and Queenstown. Operating from Milford Haven, Tryon would maintain "a 
vigilant watch" over "B'" s ports with cruisers/scouts and distribute his forces to intercept 
Baird should he sortie from his Irish bases. After "breaking out", Baird sent a fast raiding 
squadron towards the Thames. Tryon had, however, placed his fleet in the vicinity of 
75 Admiralty. Extractsfrom the Report o/the Committee on the Naval Manoeuvres. 1888: 
Together with the Narrative o/the Operations and the Rules Laid Down/or Conducting the Same, 
(London: HMSO, February 1889), pp. 5-6., NLMD;Anatomy, pp. 107-10; Ropp, p.212. 
76Thurfielcl Navy and the Nation, pp.74-5. 
27 
Falmouth-Ushant and defeated Baird's squadron which retired back to Queenstown.n 
While these manoeuvres had apparently shown that the "masking blockade" had 
"completely failed in its aim", such an assessment is not that clear-cut. 78 Tryon had 
complete latitude to dispose his fleet as he saw fit and with intelligence from his inshore 
cruisers/scouts was able to forestall the passage of "B"'s raiders up the Channel. 79 A 
superior "fleet-in-being" and "masking" blockade had facilitated Tryon's dispositions 
by giving him a clear indication of Baird's intentions. 
Throughout 1890-1894, fleet exercises/manoeuvres focussed primarily on the 
torpedo-craft issue rather than examining blockade systems per se. Designed by Bridge 
and the NID, these scenarios were nonetheless relevant to the blockade question in 
assessing anti-torpedo counter measures by "core" vessels on the inshore lines: torpedo-
gunboats and their later derivative, the destroyer. 80 The manoeuvres also examined the 
utilisation of "advanced" flotilla bases against an enemy's port suggested in the 1888 
manoeuvres and "Three Admirals" report. This first occurred during the August 1890 
Manoeuvres which simulated British trade defence against an enemy' s guerre de course. 
Utilising Aldemey as a "distant base", cruisers and torpedo-craft of Vice-Admiral Sir 
Michael Culme-Seymour's "C" Fleet launched an "ably planned and admirably 
conducted" attack on Tryon's "A" Fleet in Plymouth Sound, but were unsuccessful 
against the "British" Reserve Squadron, "B", at Portland. Tryon effectively protected the 
trade route from "C'''s depredations by withdrawing to the Scillies and employed 
scouting cruisers to detect the enemy's movements.81 Emulating "French" 
tactics/strategy, Culme-Seymour's use of Aldemey and his opening attack on "A" Fleet 
n Manoeuvres 1889, NID Report No. 215., December 1889, ADM 231116. 
78 Partridge, " Close Blockade", p. 125. 
79 Thursfield, Navy and the Nation, pp. 79-81. 
80 A. Cowpe, "The Royal Navy and the Whitehead Torpedo" in Ranft (ed), Technical 
Change, pp. 33-4. 
81 1890 Manoeuvres. NID Report No. 252., ADM 231118, pp. 12-20,30-9. 
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could have equally simulated a British flotilla attack on a French fleet at Cherbourg or 
elsewhere along the Brittany/Normandy coasts. 
"Special" torpedo-craft exercises associated with the 1891 Manoeuvres were a 
clear demonstration of the potential ineffectiveness of the torpedo-boat when confronted 
by an offensive British response. The exercise involved an attack by torpedo-boats from 
Irish ports in the St. George's Channel on a "British" ironclad squadron with supporting 
cruisers and torpedo-gunboats based at Milford Haven. The commander of the latter 
squadron, Captain S. Long, accosted enemy flotillas off their bases where his gunboats 
did "uncommonly well", accounting for nearly 90% of the torpedo-boats destroyed, 
captured, or disabled. Although the manoeuvre rules were somewhat skewed against the 
"enemy" torpedo-craft, the torpedo-gunboats' performance in an active defence role 
confirmed the earlier observations by Baird and the "Three Admirals" that they were a 
vital component in any successful inshore "watch" off an enemy base.82 
Over the next three years, manoeuvres examined disputed "command of the sea" 
scenarios but paid close attention to the torpedo-boat threat and British counter-
measures. The objective of the August 1892 Manoeuvres was the junction of two 
separate divisions of Red Fleet, defended by a squadron of " catchers" and torpedo-boats, 
in "narrow waters" against Blue, an enemy squadron comprised of cruisers, a torpedo-
boat flotilla, and coast defence vessels based on the eastern and southern Irish coasts. 
Red successfully united its divisions through the intervention of its anti-torpedo 
squadron, while Blue's flotilla attacks "such as might be taken in actual warfare" were 
beaten off. The balance of Red's claims against Blue's torpedo-craft were "clearly in 
favour" ofits supporting torpedo-gunboats. Deductions from the exercise, however, still 
realised the torpedo-boat danger in narrow waters and cautioned that any fleet operating 
wi thin their vicinity in a strait or channel would have its movements seriously curtai led. 83 
82 1891 Manoeuvres, NID Report No. 228., ADM 231/17; F. T. Jane, The British Battle 
Fleet: Its Inception and Growth Throughout the Centuries to the Present Day. Volume 11, (London, 
1915), pp. 77-8; Thursfield, Navy and the Nation, pp. 86-8. 
83 1892 Manoeuvres, NID Report No. 332., March 1893, ADM 231122; Bridge to Custance, 
August II, 1892, Bridge MSS, BRI/ 18, Part 4. (1890-94). 
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For Bridge, the 1892 Manoeuvres were a "most instructive" validation of British 
anti-torpedo tactics which "practically settled the position of the torpedo-boat in war." 
Remaining a "nuisance that cannot be disregarded", he believed that torpedo-boats "will 
have no determining effect upon the course of a war." While Britain required a certain 
number of boats for offensive purposes, he stressed the acquisition of "a very large 
number of' catchers' of small size". An increase in torpedo-gunboats and base defences 
ensured: "that we have done all that can be done to defend our fleets against torpedo-boat 
attack.,,84 The DNI's views were fairly representative of the Admiralty's own assessment 
of the torpedo-boat "threat", but like Bridge it was cognizant that this "weapon of the 
weaker naval powers" still had to be countered.85 
The 1893-94 Manoeuvres also simulated the junction of fleet divisions 10 
"narrow seas" within range of hostile torpedo flotillas based on an opposing shore. 
During the 1893 evolutions, Blue Fleet's torpedo flotilla performed rather well despite 
Red Fleet's re-employing boats that had been labelled out of action. The Umpire's report 
stressed that torpedo-craft should not be under-rated, especially in a loose blockade 
scenario as: "it would seem impossible for a fleet, situated as the Red Fleet was, to obtain 
command of a sea whose hostile shore is covered with a torpedo flotilla, unless these 
were destroyed or captured;".86 This assessment was, however, offset by torpedo-boat 
performance in the 1894 manoeuvres. All the boats of Red '51 flotilla, save one, were 
successfully intercepted during their attack on "D" Blue Fleet's passage through the 
"narrow waters" of the North Channel between Scotland and Ireland. Blue's flotilla 
operations were "practically nif' owing to bad weather, another factor to which torpedo-
craft were particularly susceptible.87 The 1890-1894 exercises implied that successful 
84 Bridge to Custance, August 18, October 3, 1892, Bridge MSS, BRI/18, Part. 4. 
85 Ana/omy, pp. 165-7. 
86 1893 Manoeuvres, NID Report No. 372, February 1894, ADM 231/23. 
87 1894 Manoeuvres, NID Report No. 40 I, November 1894, J. R. Thursfield MSS, 
THUll/I., Papers and Correspondence with Sir John Fisher, Box 2. 
30 
torpedo-boat attacks on a fleet "masking" or "watching" an enemy base were 
questionable due to the effectiveness of British counter-measures and limitations with 
the boats themselves. 
Related to a "watch" on an enemy's debouches was the development of the 
advanced base theme throughout the 1890's. Alluded to in the "Three Admirals" report 
and employed during the 1890 manoeuvres, the concept was examined by the NIO as 
part of a Mediterranean strategy against the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Bridge proposed 
a plan to seize either Lemnos Island in the north-eastern Aegean or Suda Bay in Crete 
to watch the OardanelleslLevant for moves by the Black Sea Fleet into the 
Mediterranean.88 Another combination considered by Bridge and Philip Colomb was 
Minorca's use as a forward base against a Franco-Russian Mediterranean combination. 89 
From 1892 to 1896, Bridge; his successor as ONI, Captain (later Admiral Sir) Lewis 
Beaumont (DNI 1894-99); and the First Naval Lord, Admiral Sir Frederick Richards 
(1893-99) all viewed Lemnos as a viable forward base to counter a Russian coup de main 
on Constantinople, the Dardanelles, and to exclude the Black Sea Fleet from the 
Mediterranean.9o With the growing threat to British commerce posed by the development 
of France's defenses mobiles, its new 'armoured' cruiser programme, and French bases 
in the Channell Atlantic after 1890 91, the advance base theme remained a central 
component in the NIDI Admiralty's strategic formulations. 
88 Bridge to Custance, February II, October 20, 1890, Bridge MSS, BRI/l8, Part 4. 
89 Bridge to Custance, February 18, 1890, Ibid.; Anatomy, pp. 144-61; Ropp, pp. 200-S, 
246-8. 
90 "DNJ's Copy-Letter by Evan Macgregor (Admiralty Secretary), May 20, with enclosure of 
joint report of March 18, 1892 by DNI, Captain Cyprian Bridge, and the DMI, E.F. Chapman, on 
question of Russian coup de main on Constantinople"; Memorandum by DNl, Lewis Beaumont, 
February 29, 1896; DNI, Lewis Beaumont, "Memorandum on Naval Policy viewed under the existing 
conditions-given to Sir F. Richards", October 28, 1896, ADM 116/866B, Naval Staff Memoranda, 
1889-1912. "Questions by Arthur Balfour on the Mediterranean Question and Replies by Admiral Sir 
Frederick Richards.", November 19, 189S, ADM 116/3089, Mediterranean Station Naval Strategy 
and Policy, Views of Various C-in-C's and Others, 1888-94. Memoranda, \895-96; Anatomy, pp. 
246-S1. 
91 Ibid, pp. 164-S; Ropp, pp. 232-8, 254-9, 293-8. 
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The Admiralty's procurement programmes also indicated an offensive blockade 
strategy against the Dual Alliance in the 1890's and early 1900's. Introduced after the 
1885 Russian War Scare, torpedo-gunboats were smaller, faster derivatives of 
contemporary cruisers and a deliberate response to increased Franco-Russian torpedo-
craft construction and the threat posed to the British blockade strategy. During the 1888-
92 manoeuvres, the earlier types (Rattlesnake, Grasshopper and Sharpshooter Classes) 
proved themselves particularly effective in the latter role and their original mission of 
"catching" enemy torpedo-boats despite boiler problems which limited their effective 
speed. The "prototype" for the modem destroyer after 1902, the Admiralty was obviously 
content with the "catchers" performance during the manoeuvres and its capabilities in 
an inshore blockading role. Thirteen improved gunboats (Sharpshooter and Alarm Class) 
were provided for under the Naval Defence Act, with an additional six (Halcyons) laid 
down before the supplementary Spencer Programme in 1894, all remaining in service 
into the late 1890's alongside their successors, the early destroyers.92 
Endorsing "catchers" in 1892, Bridge had recommended a faster, more 
diminutive version for fleet defence and inshore flotilla work--a sentiment shared by 
others at the Admiralty. The development of the torpedo-boat destroyer has long been 
associated with Rear-Admiral John Fisher's inspiration as Admiralty Controller (1892-
96) and his collaboration with the torpedo-craft firm of Alfred Yarrow and the Director 
of Naval Construction (DNC), Sir William White, (1886-1902).93 The doctrine that the 
"torpedo boat is the answer to the torpedo boat" was, however, frrst explored by 
Germany and Austria in the 1880's. In Britain, Yarrow and the other leading torpedo-
craft firm, Thomycroft, designed "torpedo-boat destroyers" long before they were 
92 R. Gardiner ( ed), Conway's A /I the World's Fighting Ships, 1860-1905, (London, 1979), 
pp. 87-90; Jane, British Baule Fleet v.2., pp. 57,60-1, 76-81, 90-8; Preston, "Victorian Navy". p. 
372. 
93 Conway 's, 1860-1905, p. 87~ E. J. March, British Destroyers: A History of 
Development. 1892-1953, (London, 1966), pp. 24-6; F. Manning, The Life a/Sir William White. 
(London. 1923), pp. 323-4; Mackay, Fisher, pp 204-5; Anatomy. pp. 167-8. 
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officially sanctioned by Whitehall.94 Fisher's interest in countering larger and faster 
French torpedo-craft dated from 1891 when he was still Director of Naval Ordnance 
(DNO). 
Based on information from Bridge, Fisher outlined the strategic exigencies 
demanding a new vessel type. In the event of a war with France, a "watch" on Cherbourg 
and Brest were difficult given French torpedo stations in the Channel. As this also 
endangered British merchant traffic: "it would be absolutely necessary at any cost either 
to destroy the torpedo-boats and .... the stations of Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk, or so 
watch them as to paralyse the torpedo-boats." The "destroyers" Fisher proposed were 
faster than "catchers" and larger than torpedo-boats giving them better seagoing 
characteristics than their intended prey. With powerful quick-firing armament and 
torpedo-tubes, the new vessels were handier and considerably cheaper than torpedo-
gunboats. Apart from "Channel protection", the duties of these larger torpedo-boats 
included: the "hunting down" of an enemy's torpedo-craft, "watching" their stations, and 
inshore observational work offCherbourg and Brest. The strategic requirements for these 
operations was clearly stipulated: "as our real line of defence lies on the French side of 
the Channel". Since torpedo-boats lacked the necessary sea-going qualities and cruisers 
would have to retire at night due to enemy flotillas, Fisher endorsed the wholesale 
construction of the new type for inshore tasks.95 
In collusion with White, Yarrow, and Thornycroft, Fisher introduced and 
successfully tested the first "destroyers", Havock and Hornet, in 1893-94.96 Under Lord 
Spencer's expansive five year construction program initiated in March 1894, expenditure 
94 Conway's, 1860-1905, p. 87; Jane, British Battle Fleet v.2., pp. 128-9. 
95 DNo. Fisher, "Increase in French Torpedo-boat Harbours and Distribution of Torpedo-
boats in the Channel and on the French Coast, with Suggestions as to the best way of meeting these 
Tactics", February 1891. Admiralty Print in Notes for the Navy Debates, 1896-97, pp. 111-4., 
NLMD. 
96 Refer to footnote 94 above; Jane, 128-9. 
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on the new destroyers rose substantially.97 The introduction of36 27-knot boats in 1893-
4 was followed by 66 larger and more seaworthy 30-knotters laid down or purchased 
between 1 894 and 1899.98 With the adoption of the destroyer type in the mid-1890's, the 
Admiralty was strengthening the materiel basis for its offensive blockade strategy off the 
French northern ports. It has been argued that the destroyer construction policy in the 
1890's was a self-Iegitimising excuse for continuing the blockade strategy when it should 
have been more seriously evaluated or discarded.99 The introduction of improved 
destroyers and replacements for the torpedo-gunboats after 1902, war orders, flotilla 
distribution/organisation, 1900-04 "blockade" exercises, and the use of manoeuvres to 
evaluate these new vessels, however, contest the above argument and other assessments 
that the close blockade was dead by 1904. 100 
The 1895-99 Manoeuvres again examined the torpedo boat issue and evaluated 
the new destroyers' effectiveness. Yet unlike the 1890-94 exercises, the dominance of 
British anti-torpedo measures was not always clear. Tactical torpedo-boat exercises in 
1895 confirmed that destroyers were best employed in a patrolling, "hunting" type 
blockade role and were unsuited to fleet escort due to their inability to sustain constant 
cruising speeds. 101 Their weaknesses in fleet scenarios was apparent during the 1896 
Manoeuvres--an exercise specifically designed to test destroyers against torpedo-boats. 
A defending "British" fleet, "A-B", with a strong destroyer force, could not prevent the 
junction of "C-D" fleet, supported by torpedo flotillas. The results of the flotilla 
engagements were mixed, with "C-D" losing half of its torpedo craft primarily to a 
second class cruiser, indicating the "impossibility" of a flotilla attack against a fast, well 
97 For the 1893 Naval Scare and the institution of the Spencer Programme see: Anatomy, pp. 
174-205; J.T. Sumida, In Defence of Naval Strategy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy, 
1889-1914, (London, 1989), p. 352, Table 10. Admiralty destroyer expenditure, 1889-1914. 
98Conway's. 1860-1905, pp.90-7. 
99 Cowpes, " Whitehead Torpedo", in Ranft (ed), Technical Change, pp.34-6. 
100 Patridge, "Close Blockade"., pp. 127-33. 
101 Torpedo-boat Tactical Exercises, 1895, NID Report No. 446, ADM 231/26. 
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armed cruiser in broad daylight. "A-B's" destroyers were a negligible component. all but 
one being "captured" in the evolutions. 102 Simulating an enemy fleet's ("A'") attempted 
interdiction of a convoy ("C") escorted by a slow, but superior "British" fleet ("B"), the 
1899 Manoeuvres were a better demonstration of the destroyers' effectiveness against 
torpedo-boats. While the C-in-C "A" Fleet, Vice-Admiral H. H. Rawson, complained 
that the manoeuvre rules gave destroyers "a charmed existence" against battleships and 
cruisers, the work of "B" Fleet's destroyers was "very satisfactory" and "exceptionally 
good". None of "A's" torpedo-boats could move without being captured or 
incapacitated. to3 Although the outcomes of these manoeuvres varied, they again 
highlighted the questionable nature of the torpedo-boat threat, were valuable '"test-beds" 
for the new destroyers, and indirectly validated that the Navy's anti-torpedo counter 
measures could sustain a "watch" on an enemy's bases.104 
By early 1896, it was evident that the Admiralty's primary strategy involved close 
"observational" or "masking" blockades against French Atlantic/Channel ports. In a May 
1896 NID report examining the blockade's feasibility off French naval bases, a 
Cherbourg operation was surprisingly ruled out due to the strong currents in its vicinity 
which made flotilla coaling bases "within easy distance" , (Channel Islands), 
impracticable. It could only be maintained "under circumstances of great and constant 
danger". If a blockade were attempted, vessels would have to relieve each other to coal 
at either Portland (63 miles) or Plymouth (72 miles ),denuding the blockading force's 
strength for periods up to two days. Operations off Toulon were likewise rejected due to 
enhanced defensive works in the nearby Hyeres roadstead. Conditions for a blockade of 
the Brittany ports were, however, "more favourable". A coaling base on Ushant or Les 
Saintes gave a British blockading fleet control over the entrance to Brest. As for Lorient, 
102 Naval Manoeuvres 1896, NID Report No. 474, December 1896, (61 pp.) ADM 231127. 
103 Naval Manoeuvres 1899, NID Report No. 556, December 1899, (99 pp.) , Thursfield 
MSS, THUII/l, Box 2., passim and pp. 37-9,64-7. 
104 The 1897 Manoeuvres were concerned with the work of cruisers in a tleet scouting role, 
while the 1898 Manoeuvres were cancelled due to coal shortages. Naval Manoeuvres 1897. NID 
Report No. 498, January 1898, Thursfield MSS., THUll 11 , Box 2; Anatomy, p. 315. 
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possession of HIe de Groix made the blockaders task "a comparatively easy one" since 
a blockading fleet or inshore squadron could safely coal anywhere near Hie de Groix and 
Bellisle. 105 
After 1 &95, a vast Naval Works programme was undertaken to strengthen 
Channel bases at Portsmouth, Portland, and Plymouth and tum them into protected 
anchorages for British fleets operating off French northern bases. With the extension of 
the nearby facilities at Devonport and Keyham, Plymouth became the centre of an entire 
system orientated towards offensive operations off Brest. New secondary bases were 
built west of Plymouth at Falmouth and in the Scilly Islands to extend British operations 
fifty miles closer to Brest. Despite the 1896 NID report on French bases, the Channel 
Islands were projected as extensions of Portland for a ''watch'' on Cherbourg--a scenario 
outlined in the August 1890 Manoeuvres. 106 These developments, along with manoeuvres 
and procurement, indicated that the Admiralty was incorporating the advanced base 
concept as an integral part of the NID's offensive blockade strategy against France. The 
fusion of the two strategic themes, however, was the outcome of an essay by Commander 
George A. Ballard. 
A student of naval history his entire life, Ballard was marginally connected with 
Laughton, Colomb, and the historical revival in the Service having been briefly exposed 
to the fonner's lectures during a six month stint at Greenwich in 1882. 107 Respectively 
commanding the 27-knot destroyer Janus and torpedo-gunboat Renard in the Channel 
Squadron from 1895 to 1897, Ballard was obviously familiar with aspects of the strategy 
105 "General Aspect of the Naval Bases Viewed Strategically.", France and Corsica 
(Including Naval Bases, and Commercial and Torpedo-Boat Ports.) Coast Defences &c., 1896 
(Revised), NID Report No. 405, May 1896, ADM 231125. 
106 Ropp, pp. 311-2; Great Britain, Laws, Statutes, etc., Naval Works Acl, /896,59 Viet., 
c.6. 
107 Lambert, p. 52-3: Admiral Sir George Ballard, "Admiral Ballard's Memoirs. Part four", 
The Mariner's Mirror, Volwne 62 (1976), pp. 249-50. 
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against French northern bases. J08 His 1897 RUSI Gold Medal Prize Essay, "The 
Protection of Commerce During War", brought the blockade and commerce protection 
themes together under a single system and codified the central tenets of the Admiralty's 
offensi ve strategy against the Dual Alliance. 
Ballard recognised that the 1888-9 Manoeuvres had shown that a "perfect" 
blockade was impossible and that the escape of individual enemy vessels intent on a 
guerre de course was a likelihood. Blockade, however, was still a viable strategy. His 
system to protect British seaborne commerce was twofold: offensive, involving the 
"observational" blockade or "masking" of French bases and torpedo stations by the 
seizure of islands as advanced bases; defensive, with commerce protection ensured by 
intensive cruiser patrols of the inbound-outbound North Atlantic, South Atlantic, 
Gibralter, and Azores trade routes. A powerful British cruiser reserve stationed at 
Plymouth would deal with their Franco-Russian contemporaries that slipped past the 
blockades. Another component involved closing, "without a great display of force", the 
Mediterranean and Baltic. By "sealing" both seas, Russia was removed from the equation 
and France limited to its Channel and Atlantic ports which were under observational 
blockade. 109 Ballard's proposals to "seal in" the Baltic and related aspects of his paper 
would re-emerge in Admiralty war plans nearly a decade later. 
As the crux of Ballard's commerce protection system, observational bluckades 
were contingent on the advanced base theory. Masking Cherbourg, Lorient, Brest. and 
torpedo stations at Dunkerque and Calais required "the utmost possible vigilance" to 
prevent the breakout of French cruisers and torpedo-craft. Out of 129 British cruisers, 
torpedo-gunboats, and destroyers involved, only the inshore squadrons watching 
Dunkerque, Calais, and Havre would use Dover and Portsmouth. For a Cherbourg 
blockade, a larger squadron would use Alderney as an advanced base. As in the past, the 
1011 G.A. Ballard, The Black Battlefleet, (Lymington and Greenwich, 1980), pp. 7,9: 
Obituary. Admiral G.A. Ballard, The Times (early edition), 28.9. 1948. 
109 G. A. Ballard, Gold Medal Prize Essay 1897, "The Protection ofCornmerce During 
War", JRUSI, Volume XLII.. April 1898. No. 242, pp.366-86. 
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blockade of Brest was "an undertaking of the utmost importance" due to the presence of 
large French cruisers, making the task of any British blockading squadron, "a veT) 
onerous duty to perform." To facilitate a "watch" on Brest and Lorient Ushant and Isle 
de Groix would be seized as secondary advanced flotilla bases for the blockading forces. 
Submarine telegraph cables would be run between the two islands to Plymouth to 
coordinate the blockades and communicate French movements. Destroyer flotillas based 
at S1. Helier on Jersey would cover estuaries on the northern Brittany coast. Ballard also 
proposed blocking the Gironde estuary, twelve miles north of Bordeaux, with mines and 
sunken hulks so it could not be used by smaller French cruisers. 110 This "blocking" 
provision too, would reappear in later Admiralty plans. 
If the Dual Alliance concentrated their principle forces in the Mediterranean. 
Ballard advocated closing the Straits of Gibralter, the Suez Canal, and a dual cordon 
cruiser "watch" on the Dardanelles. Since a Toulon blockade was too risky, the Balearic 
Islands would be taken as advanced observation points to warn of a French fleet sortie 
towards Gibralter--a scenario reminiscent of Bridge's and Colomb's 1890 Minorca plan. 
French torpedo-boat stations at Algiers and Bizerta would be blockaded through the 
seizure of the Habibas Islands west of Algiers and Zembra Island as secondary bases to 
Gibralter. Two separate groups of 26 British cruisers would maintain the Gibralter 
cordon and patrol the main commercial route in addition to supporting the British fleet 
. A force of8 cruisers, 10 destroyers, and 6 torpedo-boats disposed on narrow lines in the 
Belts, Sound, and Kattegat, would close the Baltic exits to any Russian cruisers intent 
on commerce raiding. III Demonstrating that an observational blockade was feasible with 
advanced island bases off an enemy's ports, Ballard was the first to mould the various 
strategic themes bandied about since the late 1880's into a solid, coherent plan. The 
impact of his proposals were felt immediately. The French back-down over Fashoda in 
July-November 1898 was motivated not only by the lack of a definitive campaign plan 
110 Ibid. pp. 386-93 and Appendix, pp. 401-05. 
III Ibid., pp. 393-40 I. 
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and materiel/organisational difficulties within the French Navy, but its inability to 
effectively counter the Admiralty's main strategy, which closely matched Ballard's 
blockade provisions for France's northern ports. The French, impressed by the Royal 
Navy's "new" strategy, labelled it the systeme Ballard. 112 
This observational blockade system was the Admiralty's de facto strategy by 
1902-04,as revealed In: manoeuvres, Fleet War Orders/plans, the 
organisation/dispositions of British home flotillas, and procurement. A renewed 
emphasis on the French fleet's efficiency, commerce destruction, and the torpedo-craft 
of the defenses mobiles under the Lanessan Ministry of Marine (1899-1902) prompted 
the NID, now under Custance, to re-examine the "close" blockade strategy.113 Like 
Bridge, Custance advocated the offensive "hunting and catching" approach to the French 
torpedo threat as defined in manoeuvres during the 1890'S.114 With the French re-
emphasizing the torpedo-craft's role against a British blockading fleet, the 
manoeuvres/exercises designed by the NID throughout 1900-02 measured the projected 
"watch" on French bases and the defenses mobiles effectiveness against the strategic 
system detailed in Ballard's paper. While the1900 Manoeuvres examined another 
disputed "command of the sea" scenario, its secondary object was meant to discern the 
suitable distance to establish a "temporary" base for squadrons "watching" a hostile 
fortified port. Neither objective was met, although the evolutions showed that cruisers 
had "a very considerable power" in hunting down enemy torpedo craft. A key suggestion 
by the Umpires and the ""B" Fleet commander, Rear-Admiral Sir G. Noel, was that in 
future, destroyer flotillas should be closely supported by cruisers--a recommendation 
essential to the organisation of any inshore blockading squadron. liS 
During late July-early August 1901 combined Home Fleet Manoeuvres, 
112 Ropp, pp. 306-8. 310, 318-23; Anatomy, pp.324-33. 
1\3 Ropp. pp. 326-36, 341-7. 
114 Allen, "Custance", pp. 60,64-6, 
lIS Naval Manoeuvres 1900, NID Report no. 596, November 1900. ADM 231/32. 
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Alderney, Guernsey, and the Scillies served as fortified bases for detachments of "X" 
Fleet (Channel) under Vice-Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson. Based on the northern Irish 
coast, Wilson's objective was to secure the English Channel and prevent Noel's "8" 
Fleet (Reserve) from attaining the same end. Noel maintained a "close watch" on 
Alderney, but was defeated when Wilson raised the blockade by attacking "8"s" 
blockading squadrons. It has been claimed that this proved the ineffectiveness of a close 
blockade unless all an enemy's ships were contained. I 16 Noel, however, was at a distinct 
disadvantage in fighting power and speed given the composition of his fleet, old Reserve 
ironclads (i.e., Admiral and Trafalgar Classes), when compared to Wilson's "X" Fleet 
comprised of modem Majestic Class battleships. Moreover, during the "engagements" 
opportunities for torpedo-craft attacks on a battle fleet proved inconclusive. 117 It is 
unlikely that had their roles been reversed, "B" Fleet would have raised the Channel 
Islands' blockade. The exercises highlighted the vulnerability of any French fleet 
counter-blockading British flotillas in the Channel Islands to a decisive defeat by the 
Channel Squadron. Indirectly, the scenario indicated one advantage of an observational 
blockade on Cherbourg. 
Along with the 1888 and 1901 Manoeuvres, the September 1902 Combined 
Mediterranean and Channel Squadron Manoeuvres purportedly demonstrated the 
impossibility of a "close" blockade under modem conditions. 118 The exercise's "special" 
object would assess: "what risks are involved in keeping such a close watch on a fleet 
in a defended port, as to ensure bringing it to action if it issues therefrom." Two British 
Fleets, "A" (Mediterranean) commanded by Admiral Sir Compton Domville. and "B" 
(Channel) under Wilson, would blockade "X" Fleet (French) under the command of 
Captain Prince Louis Battenberg at the port of Argostoli on Cephalonia. which 
represented Toulon. Kos and Sardinia respectively depicted Malta and Gibralter. On the 
116 Partridge. " Close Blockade", pp. 127-8. 
117 Naval Manoeuvres 1901. NID Report, No. 641, November 190 I. ADM 231 J ~. 
118 Partridge. pp. 128-30; Anatomy. pp. 368-70. 
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night of 5-6 October, Battenberg's cruisers escaped as part of a deliberate feint to draw 
"8's" forces off the blockade. Taking the bait, Wilson's cruisers left their pickets in 
pursuit but could not return in time to prevent the break-out of"X's" battleships. Prince 
Louis thus obtained his object without serious loss or interference. For the Sea Lords, the 
outcome of the manoeuvres had apparently indicated: 
1. That the difficulty already recognized in maintaining the close blockade of a 
port furnished with torpedo-boats and destroyers is fully corroborated, even when 
the blockading force is respect of cruisers and destroyers far superior. 
2. The advantage possessed by the blockaded force in taking the offensive against 
the blockaders by their power of concentration for attack, and in choosing their 
time and mode of making it. 
3. The comparative ease with which the blockaded force evaded the enemy's 
system of lookout and attained their purpose of escape. 
4.The difficulty that was experienced by the blockading cruisers and destroyers 
in communicating to each other and the Commander-in-Chief the news of the 
escape of X Fleet after it had become known to them. 119 
Despite Battenberg's escape and the Board's conclusions, the alleged "end" of the close 
blockade was not clear-cut. 
If anything, the "Argostoli" exercise demonstrated that the old "sealing-up" 
category of close blockade circa 1888-9 was obsolete, not the newer observational 
strategy gradually developed throughout the 1890's and codified in 1897. The design. and 
thus the results, of the 1902 Mediterranean manoeuvres were not representative of the 
advanced base-offensive "watch" system off the French northern and Mediterranean 
ports as elaborated by Ballard. The scenario actually proved that Ballard's earlier 
recommendation not to blockade Toulon but to establish an observational base in the 
8alearics was correct. Strategic war games conducted at the Naval College between 
January and May 1902 also suggested that a British Mediterranean blockade strategy 
against Bizerta and Oran would be unsuccessful. Neither "game", however, contained 
provisions for advanced bases or cruiser patrols as outlined in the observational strategy. 
Like the "Argostoli" exercise, the blockade's failure in these simulations proved that the 
119 Report on the Combined manoeuvres of the Mediterranean. Channel. and Cruiser 
Squadrons. 1902, NID Report No. 690., May 1903. ADM 231/37; Kerr, Battenberg. pp. 153-6. 
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"Three Admirals" recommendations for a 5 to 3 ratio of blockaders to blockaded was 
correct, not necessarily that a "watch" on the enemy's base itself was infeasible. 120 In 
another October 1903 Naval College scenario simulating a Mediterranean campaign 
between Britain and the Dual Alliance, "fear of the torpedo exercised a most important 
influence" in preventing the British from observing enemy ports. Ironically, the game 
alluded to the need for advanced coaling bases for flotillas operating on an enemy's 
coast. The overall realism of these "blockade" and "evasion" simulations was 
questionable as the War Course Director, Rear-Admiral Henry May, dismissed them as: 
"of no use whatever in familiarising us with the conditions of a prolonged naval war."121 
The close blockade's "demise" even worked its way into an NID report on the 1902 
French Naval Manoeuvres which concluded that: "the blockade of a port defended hy 
torpedo boats and submarines is almost impossible.,,122 Months before the "Argostoli" 
exercise, the observational blockade, vis a vis Ballard's provisions, had already been 
confirmed as the Admiralty's primary strategy in a potential war with France. 
April and July 1902 War Orders issued to the C-in-C Home Fleet outlined the 
fleet's duties in the event of a war with France. His principal responsibilities were: 
(l)Watching the French fleet and bringing it to action if it sortied; (2) Preventing the 
junction of the Russian Baltic and French Northern Fleets; (3) Defeating any French 
attempt to take the Channel Islands; (4) Capturing or destroying French cruisers leaving 
Channel and Biscay ports. The defence of Alderney and Guernsey and assembly of Home 
Fleet flotillas/cruisers at Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Portland to await Admiralty orders 
to "observe" the enemy connoted an offensive "watch" on French northern bases utilising 
advanced bases. Since the "assembly of a large number of French cruisers in their 
120 Strategical War Games carried out at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich. January to 
May 1902., NID Report No. 675, November 1902, ADM 231/37. 
121 "Strategical War game carried out at Royal Naval College, Greenwich, in the early part 
of 1903.", October 1903, NID Report No. 706, ADM 231/38. Partridge, pp. 130-1 omits May's 
dismissal of the game's practicality. 
122 Foreign Naval Manoeuvres, 1902. II. France., NID Report, No. 692, June 1903, pp.37-
67 at p. 52, ADM 231/37. 
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northern ports indicated that their intention was to attack British trade.", the orders 
stipulated that a "fast and powerful" squadron of British cruisers be concentrated in the 
Channel approaches. This repeated Ballard's 1897 recommendation that a similar 
squadron be stationed at Portsmouth to intercept French cruisers that slipped past the 
blockades. The Home Fleet would be positioned so that it could deal with the French 
Northern Squadron if it sortied--possibly against British blockading squadrons as 
intimated in the 1901 Manoeuvres. 123 
The NID confrrmed that an observational blockade off French bases was the plan 
communicated in the War Orders. In a December 1903 report on French coastal 
defences, the department advocated a "watch" on France's Atlantic and Channel bases 
as the most effective means to destroy the French fleet by preventing the junction of its 
various squadrons. While the defenses mobiles and submarines might cause the 
blockading fleet to keep its distance, they did not preclude operations off an enemy' s 
base nor prevent the blockaders from curtailing a French sortie. The "chief difficulties" 
lay in supplying the blockading squadrons which could be solved by the establishment 
of "extemporary bases" near "the sphere of action", (i.e.) Cherbourg, Brest, and Lorient. 
Interference from French flotillas was viewed as negligible. 124 It was not coincidental that 
Ballard's appointment to the NID's War Division in January 1902 predated both the War 
Orders and the report on France's northern naval defences. 125 
By early 1904, the reorganisation of British home flotillas indicated that their 
initial wartime deployment would be in inshore squadrons off the French northern bases. 
Replacing Custance as DNI in October 1902, Battenberg restructured flotilla 
123 "War Orders 1902", "M" Branch to DNI, April 18; "M" Branch to DNI, July 3,1902, 
"Orders for the Home Fleet upon Mobilisation for War.", ADM 116/9008, 1889-\907 War Orders, 
Case 640. 
124 "France. Coastal Defences. Volume I.-Channel and Atlantic, 1903.", December 1903 .. 
NID Report No.688., "General Remarks on Blockade", pp. 8-9. ADM 231137. 
125 The NOl:V List, January & April, 1902, (London: HMSO, 1901-02), "Admiralty-Naval 
Inte lligence Department." 
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arrangements to conform to the Admiralty's strategic policy. In May 1904 he argued that 
a preliminary organisation was needed so that on receipt of the "Warning Telegraph". 
destroyer/gunboat flotillas could "automatically" move to "selected strategic points" to 
begin operations. Under the C-in-C Home Fleet's existing arrangements, flotillas were 
scattered amongst half a dozen ports and wholly contingent on his directions. Battenberg 
recommended that an "Order of Assembly" be instituted for flotillas to concentrate at 
Portland~ Devonport, and Harwich. The underlying purpose of this distribution facilitated 
the rapid concentration of inshore squadrons for a war with France, Germany, or both. 126 
Verification of these arrangements came in a 4th July paper by the DNI entitled, 
"The Organisation for War of Torpedo Craft in Home Waters." Dealing with a possible 
war against either France or Germany, the document constituted. in effect, the NID' s first 
real "war plan" and mirrored the observational blockade/advanced base themes 
advanced by Ballard in 1897. Assuming a war against France, three separate formations 
comprising the new Scout Class cruisers, torpedo-gunboats, and destroyer flotillas would 
be based at Falmouth, Portland, and Dover. These inshore squadrons would conduct a 
close "watch" of French naval units at Brest, Cherbourg, and Dunkirk. A further 
provision for Ushant's seizure as an advanced base for the Falmouth flotilla was included 
since their base was nearly 150 miles from Brest. 127 Drafted by Battenberg, the Ushant 
option disclosed that the plan's authorship lay with the NID's War Division and its new 
Director, Ballard, who had been promoted to Captain and Assistant ONI in December 
1903. 128 Confirming that the basic tenets of the systeme Ballard were at the core of the 
Admiralty's strategic policy against France, the plan's flexibility meant that, with slight 
126 "Torpedo Craft and Torpedo Gunboats-Disposal ofoo receipt of 'Warning Telegram' .. 
C-in-C Home Fleet to Admiralty, April 14, 1904. Remarks by the DNI, May 4,1904 and DNJ. 
"Revision of Arrangements for the constitution and concentration of Torpedo Craft flotillas in War.", 
March 9, 1905, ADM 117725, From Admirals "D" Home Fleet, 1904. 
127 "The Organisation of Torpedo Craft in Home Waters:', DNI, Battenberg, July 4, 1904 
(Amended in August), Naval Necessities. Volume 11., 1905, ADM 116/3093, pp. 509-19. 
128 Ballard, "Record of Business Letters &c.", Entry for 31. 12. 1903., Ballard MSS, 
MS80/200, NMM. 
modifications, it was equally applicable to Germany. 
Home Fleet torpedo-craft manoeuvres in mid-August 1904 tested the NIO's July 
plan and validated that the Admiralty's strategic policy in a war remained a close watch 
on French or German bases. Conducted in the Irish Sea, the exercise simulated a superior 
British fleet (Blue), supported by strong destroyer flotillas, operating near powerful 
enemy torpedo flotillas (Red): a scenario conforming to an observational blockade ofT 
either the French northern bases, the Elbe estuary, or in the vicinity of the Skaw. The 
manoeuvres' "special object" was: "to ascertain as far as possible the extent of the 
danger which threatens a fleet compelled by strategical exigencies to move within the 
radius of action of strong hostile torpedo craft flotillas .... ". Blue battle squadron would 
attempt to retain its freedom of action with minimal loss while Red flotillas aimed at 
destroying as many Blue ships as possible. Another option open to Blue involved seizing 
the Scillies as an advanced base to support operations off Red's main bases at Loch 
Ryan, Milford Haven, and Falmouth. Remaining virtually unscathed, Blue sustained a 
corresponding heavy loss in destroyers which still indicated that a fleet could 
successfully defend itself against attacks by enemy torpedo-craft off their bases. The 
presence of Red submarines off Milford Haven, however, made a "close" blockade by 
Blue "more difficult" and caused "fear" that additional enemy submarines lay in wait at 
Blue's base at Queenstown. Rear-Admiral C.G. Robinson, C-in-C Red, observed that 
close blockade under such conditions was impossible. Although the period of 
"hostilities" was too short to conclusively demonstrate the dangers of fleet operations 
near enemy flotillas, a fleet could not be adequately covered by its own destroyers since 
hostile torpedo craft could not be effectively contained at night. 129 
For some, these manoeuvres are final proof that the close blockade and 
observation of an enemy's ports was extinct. 130 A strong counter-argument, however, can 
be made from the fleet War Orders, flotilla organisation/deployment, and even the 1900-
129 British Torpedo Craft Manoeuvres, 1904, December 1904, NID Report No. 754. ADM 
231/43. 
130 Anatomy, pp. 367-70; Partridge, pp. 130-32. 
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04 manoeuvres themselves. Given his experience as the "French" commander during the 
~~Argostoli" exercise, Battenberg, of all senior officers at the Admiralty, should ha\'c 
been the fiercest critic of a blockade strategy. By summer 1904, the ONI challenged the 
notion that a blockade of hostile ports was dead. Battenberg believed that not only were 
remarks on previous British manoeuvres exaggerated, recent actions off Port Arthur in 
the Russo-Japanese War had not yet proven the superiority of blockaded torpedo flotillas 
against a fleet engaged in a close watch on an adversary's bases.l31 Apart from 
Robinson's remarks, the very implementation of the August 1904 Torpedo Manoeuvres 
to test the NIO's July war plan indicated that the observational blockade was the 
cornerstone of the Admiralty's strategic preparations against France. 
Overlooked or misinterpreted by historians examining the blockade concept 
during the 1888-1904 period is procurement's habitual role as an extension of the 
Admiralty'S strategy and its inter-relationship with other factors, especially 
manoeuvres.132 Sustaining an inshore watch off an enemy's base was greatly enhanced 
by the evolution of the torpedo-gunboat into the Scout Class cruisers and 27-30 knollers 
into the River Class destroyers after 1902. The Scout concept originated with Vice-
Admiral C.C.P. Fitzgerald around 1901. In an Institute of Naval Architects paper, he 
argued that a small, fast cruiser with good sea keeping qualities and endurance was 
required to support destroyers on the inshore watch of an enemy's ports. 133 Criticised as 
too small and expensive, the Admiralty nonetheless issued specifications for a new 
vessel in 1902-03 which owed much to Fitzgerald's conception. An "intermediate" 
between the destroyer and the cruiser, Scouts were larger derivatives of the torpedo-
gunboat designed to fulfill the same role as flotilla supports for attacks on enemy 
131 Anatomy, p. 369, footnote # 24; J. S. Corbett, Maritime Operations in the Russo-
Japanese War, 1904-1905, Volume One, (Annapolis, 1994 reprint), pp. 169-71, 178-9, 185-6,214-
16,222-27, 232-40, 292-3, 298-309, 358-62. 
\J2 Refer to footnotes 99-100, 130 above. 
133 Vice-Admiral C.C.P. Fitzgerald, "A Design for a Fast Scout", Transactions of the 
Institute of Naval Architects, London Spring 190 I. 
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torpedo-craft-entailing operations off French bases. Eight Scouts were provided for in 
the 1902-03, 1903-04 Estimates with four pairs laid down between 1903-04 and 
completed by 1905. In early service, the new Scouts proved excellent sea-boats in all 
weather conditions due to their high forecastles and were more than capable of "running 
down" destroyers, excepting 30-knot boats in a flat calm. Weaknesses with the 
Admiralty's original design specifications included light armament and smaller 
displacement/coal storage which reduced endurance. Re-armed in 1911-12 with heavier 
guns, the Scouts were successful in their intended role and served as models for a further 
evolution of the light cruiser-type after 1905. 134 
The destroyer type first suggested by Bridge in 1894 was realised with the 
completion of the 35 vessel River Class in 1904-05--the first significant evolution of the 
type into the modem destroyer. Experience with earlier destroyers had shown their 30-
knot trial speed could not be met due to their low freeboard which limited their speed in 
a seaway, especially in poor weather. This, combined with their small size and light 
construction, reduced their overall effectiveness as fighting vessels under all conditions. 
Influenced by the performance of the German S90 Class, the Admiralty issued 
specifications for a larger, more seaworthy boat. Although the Rivers only had a contract 
speed of 25-knots, their higher freeboard and larger displacement meant that their sea-
going qualities, endurance, and ability to maintain speed in all weather conditions was 
significantly better than the 27-30 knotters . The Rivers enhanced sea keeping qualities 
meant that their forward guns could be worked under adverse conditions. 135 These 
attributes also realised the destroyer requirements Ballard had recommended as a vital 
134 C.C.P. Fitzgerald, "The New Scouts", Transactions of the INA, April 4, 1906, pp. 1-8, 
14-18; D.K. Brown, Warrior to Dreadnought, (London, 1997), pp. 163-4; Jane, British Battle Fleet, 
pp, 127-8; Conway's, 1860-1905, pp.84-5. The Admiralty's Ships Covers at the Brass Foundry, 
Woolwich were also consulted: ADM 1381189 A-B, Fleet Scouts. Adventure, Forward, Pathfinder, 
Sentinel Classes. Proof that the Scouts were still able to hold their own in 1910 against their 
successors, the Boadicea Class light cruisers, can be found in: Commodore (T), E. Charlton to 
Admiralty, March 13,1910. No. 5111013, ADM 138/1898. 
135 Ships Covers, ADM 1381184a and I 84b-e, River Class Destroyers, Woolwich; Brown. 
Warrior, pp. 193-5: Jane, pp. 129-30; Gardiner (ed), Conw~r's, 1860-1905, pp. 87, 99-100. 
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"adjunct" to any blockading fleet in his second RUSI Gold Medal essay from 1899. 136 
Confirmation of the River Class's suitability for an observational blockade off 
enemy bases came during the very manoeuvres touted as verifying the "end" of the close 
blockade. 137 Ostensibly, the "Special Object" of the August 1904 Torpedo Craft 
Manoeuvres was to test a fleet's ability to protect itself in a close watch on an enemy port 
defended by flotillas. The other main purpose of the exercise, however. was to test the 
behaviour and anti-torpedo capabilities of the new River Class in comparison to the older 
30-knotters.138 Attached to Blue Fleet (British), the Rivers proved themselves markedly 
superior to the older boats in overall efficiency, sea keeping, endurance. and speed. 
Reports from Captain (D) E. Charlton, and the commanders of the six Rivers attached 
to Blue during the manoeuvres, praised the newer destroyers' performance over the older 
boats, especially their all-weather, anti-torpedo-boat capabilities. 139 The Rivers' 
superiority over the earlier destroyers in sea-going characteristics and endurance in the 
manoeuvres, (procurement) vindicated the feasibility of the very strategy again under 
exarnination--an "observational" blockade. The exercise confirmed that the Navy 
possessed even better "kit" to do the job. The new destroyers, Scouts, and advanced 
bases were all an integral part of the Admiralty'S plan for an inshore "watch" ofT 
France's northern bases aimed at the elimination of the French fleet andgue"e de course 
threat to Britain's overseas commerce. Substantiated by the historical/theoretical work 
136 G.A. Ballard, Gold Medal Prize Essay (1899), "Considering the Changes made in Naval 
Construction During the Past Twenty Years, and in View of the Experience Gained During the China-
Japanese and Spanish-American Wars, What Are the Best Types of War Vessels for the British Navy, 
Including Annour, Annament, and General Equipment for Ships of all Types?, JRUSJ. Volume 
XLIV, April 1900., No. 266., pp. 359-394 at 360,391-92. 
137 Refer to footnote 129, above. 
138 "River" Type and 30 knotters, Comp~spn between., Admiralty to C-in-C Home Fleet, 
(Vice-Admiral Sir A.K. Wilson), July 16, 1904., CN.1.13532., p. 114, ADM 144119. Admiralty: 
Channel Squadron and Fleet: Correspondence, 1867-1907. Destroyers and Torpedo Boats, May 1903-
June 1907. 
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of Laughton and Colomb in the late 1880's-1890's. developed by the NID through 
manoeuvres from 1888 on, and codified by Ballard and the DNI's after 1897, this 
strategy likewise formed the basis of planning against Britain's newest naval rival by 
1904. 
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Chapter Two: Early Planning Against Germany, 1902-1906. 
I. 
Between 1892 and 1905, the Admiralty focussed on the threat posed by the 
Dual Alliance navies. Through annual fleet manoeuvres, exercises, and academic 
debates, a particular "doctrine" or strategy had emerged to deal with the Franco-Russian 
fleets. The Royal Navy's "strategists" proposed a close "watch" on, and direct attacks 
against, an adversary's main bases as the most expedient method to destroy an enemy 
fleet while protecting British seaborne trade. Weaknesses in this strategy led to the 
adoption of the advanced base concept as a viable component in the successful 
blockade of enemy ports. Coupled with new, more seaworthy vessels for inshore 
squadrons, the observational blockade strategy was a reality by 1902. Even with the 
gradual dissipation of the Dual Alliance threat after 1904-05, these strategic themes 
were continued as Britain prepared to meet the new naval challenge posed by Germany. 
By 1901-02, the Admiralty was attentive to the rapid growth of the Kaiser's 
risliflotte and its underlying raison d' etre, especially after the Reichstag endorsement 
of Grand Admiral Tirpitz's Second Naval Bill in 1900. Despite a lessening of Britain's 
Far Eastern commitments by the January 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the NID began 
to carefully monitor the rise ofthe German fleet alongside the Dual Alliance threat. Over 
the next four years, planning for a possible naval war with Germany increased 
dramatically and resulted in the creation of the Admiralty's frrst ever "official" war 
plans. Despite this development, there has been no comprehensive examination of the 
Admiralty's early war planning against Germany, apart from Arthur Marder's study of 
pre-1906 British naval policy. I Some historians have even argued that there was a gap 
in Admiralty war planning during this period because, "the stimulus of a crisis in 
international affairs" was lacking.2 A closer evaluation of primary and secondary sources 
I Anatomy, pp. 456-67, 475-82, 489-511. 
2 Haggie, "War Planning", p. 120. 
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demonstrates that this was not the case. The creation of strategic contingencies in the 
Fisher administration's early years were the direct result of tensions in European and 
international affairs. The diplomatic/strategic upheavals caused by the Anglo-French 
Entente, Russo-Japanese War, Norwegian independence from Sweden, and the first 
Moroccan Crisis (March 1905-ApriI1906), shaped the Admiralty's planning and shifted 
its strategic inclinations towards the North Sea. The plans were variations, if not 
continuations, of themes examined since 1887. The same strategic axioms behind war 
preparations against France and Russia--including economic warfare and deterrence--re-
emerged in stratagems against a new target: Wilhelmine Germany. 
The NID's North Sea studies and contributions from C-in-C's afloat throughout 
1902-06, did not merely repeat contingencies developed to meet the Dual Alliance, but 
were specifically adapted to the conditions of a naval war with Germany. These designs 
aimed at utilising the Navy's offensive potential to threaten or attack an enemy's 
vulnerable points. Admiralty planning during the Moroccan Crisis sought better inter-
service cooperation for large-scale amphibious operations against key targets. lnter-
service rivalry, divergent priorities, and the British Army's quest for a more independent 
role, however, marred the emergence of the Navy's amphibious schemes as Britain's 
national strategy. Based on sound principles and experience, the Admiralty's war plans 
remained, nonetheless, highly innovative and informed. 
British naval planning against Germany centred on offensive, inshore, 
observational blockade and combined operations along the North Sea and Baltic 
littorals. These were the only areas where the Royal Navy could exert direct pressure 
on Germany via the destruction of her fleet, ports, and seaborne trade, then the second 
largest in the world behind Britain. The Baltic balance of power and the status of its 
entrances became priorities once German diplomacy attempted to restrict British access 
to the region throughout 1905-08. Plans developed between 1902 and 1906 were not 
"Schlieffen-type" preventative strike contingencies but were portrayed as such to 
moderate Germany's aggressive foreign policy. While Fisher's pronouncements about 
sweeping down on the German Fleet were carefully amplified theatrics, the plans behind 
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his threats were not. Like previous contingencies aimed at countering the Dual 
Alliance, the Admiralty's early war plans against Germany were realistic appraisals 
reflecting Britain's traditional use of sea power as offensive intent against an enemy 
fleet and the jugulars of its most strategically vulnerable areas. Just as Brest. Cherbourg. 
Toulon, Bizerta, and the Dardanelles were the focus of British naval planning during the 
Franco-Russian rivalry: Kiel, the Canal, Schleswig Holstein, Heligoland. 
WilheLmshaven, Cuxhaven, and the Baltic entrances became the Royal Navy's new 
strategic targets by 1904. 
II. 
While the Admiralty'S attention concentrated on the Dual Alliance and the 
increased efficiency of the French fleets under the Lanessan Ministry of Marine (1899-
1902), Germany's fleet expansion was also attracting concern by late 1901. The German 
Naval Bills of 1898 and 1900 had not gone unnoticed. The First Lord, Lord Selbome. 
alluded to Germany's "definite" and "persistent" naval policy and Wilhelm II's 
determination to use the fleet's "power" to push German interests allover the world. 
The Tirpitz Plan's hidden intent was not lost on Selbome. German naval policy was 
clearly directed against Britain: 
Of necessity it follows that the German naval strength must be raised so as to 
compare more advantageously than at present with ours. The result of this policy 
will be to place Germany in a commanding position if ever we find ourselves 
at war with France and Russia. and at the same time to put the Triple Alliance 
in a different relative position to France and Russia in respect of naval strength 
to that which it has hitherto occupied.3 
Suspicions about German naval aspirations originated with the NID and its 
Director. Captain Reginald N. Custance. By 1900, the department had concluded that 
Germany was Britain's most probable future enemy.4 In mid September 1901, Custance 
3 Lord Selbome, "The Navy's Estimates and the Chancellor of the Exchequer's 
Memorandum on the Growth of Expenditure", 16 November, 1901, in D. G. Boyce (ed), The Cri.'1is 
o/British Power: The Imperial and Naval Papers of the Second Earl ofSelborne. 1895-1910. 
(London, 1990). p. 136. 
4 Anatomy, p. 463. 
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lobbied for the Home Fleet's frequent exercise so it could be, "on a par with the 
formidable Gennan force which is being rapidly developed in the North Sea." 
Considered premature by Selborne and the First Naval (Sea) Lord (1899-1904), Admiral 
Lord Walter Kerr, Custance's evaluation of the 1901 Manoeuvres recommended a 
greater home fleet concentration to counter the French Northern Fleet and cover the 
uncertain position of Gennany. 5 By 1902, the Admiralty was convinced that the High 
Seas Fleet was being specifically built for a war with Britain. In October. the First Lord 
expressed his concern over the restricted cruising radius and cramped crew quarters of 
German battleships which indicated that they were designed exclusively for the North 
Sea.6 Some, however, disagree with standard interpretations of Admiralty concerns over 
the Gennan fleet and attribute continued British naval expenditure to the Franco-
Russian threat. 7 
Rudimentary Admiralty preparation for war with Germany began in April-May, 
1902. Unconvinced that Wilhelm II was building his fleet solely against Britain. Kerr, 
nonetheless, added the German "factor" into strategic dispositions in home waters and 
the suitability of East Coast bases. In late April 1902, he instructed Custance to outline 
the existing strategic situation in the North Sea, including reference to Germany.8 The 
ONI welcomed the request to air his contention that the Navy alter its concentrations 
due to the High Seas Fleet's growth. In a May 1902 letter to Cyprian Bridge, then C-in-
C China Station, Custance wrote, " We [NID] are getting on a little. After pounding 
away for a long time the German menace has been at least brought partially home, and 
I am sanguine about its being completed so. One of the questions which has been 
5 Ibid, pp. 463-64; Allen, "Custance", p. 70. Also: ADM 1 16/900B, "1889-1907 War 
Orders". 
6 Marder, Anatomy, p. 464 and From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in 
the Fisher Era, 1904-1919, Volume I, The Road to War, 1904-1914. (London, 1961), p. 107. 
(Hereafter referred to as, FDSF v. 1.) 
7 N. Lambert, Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution, (Columbia, SC, 1999), pp. 4-6; Sumida, 
In Defence, pp. 20-1,23-4. 
8 Kerr to Selborne, 28 April 1902, Boyce. Crisis, p. 144. 
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constantly before me in connection with this was the organisation of the Home Fleet. 
Between ourselves this has at last been decided on.,,9 
To clarify the Home Fleet's correct disposition in a war with Germany, Custance 
engaged the assistance of another NRS colleague: the Director of the Naval War Course, 
Captain Henry J. May.1O Between the 1 st and 3rd May 1902, a strategical war game was 
played out at Greenwich. The premise involved a North Sea campaign where British 
fleets were opposed by combined Russo-German naval forces in the Baltic and North 
Sea. While the British had the advantage in numbers of annoured ships, the "allies" 
were superior in speed. The "Allied" strategy included a foray from the Baltic into the 
North Sea where they divided into a "fast" fleet which moved to raid Scotland and a 
"slow" fleet moving north along the Norwegian coast. The British split their fleet into 
comparable divisions with cruiser squadrons watching the northern and southern 
portions of the North Sea to find and engage the "Allied" fleets. The Southern cruiser 
squadron was extended from Yannouth to the Elbe estuary while the Northern squadron 
covered a line from Kinnaird Head to Bommel Fiord on the Norwegian coast. Although 
the Allied "fast" fleet carried out an ineffectual raid on Scotland, it was detected by the 
northern British cruisers. After destroying the "slow" Allied fleet, the "fast" British 
Fleet (Channel) attempted to engage the fast Allied fleet which escaped intact. The 
"slow" British fleet achieved nothing in the simulation. 
Emphasising the importance of annoured cruisers on the observational lines, the 
simulation brought out other relevant points for future North Sea operational plans. The 
lack of defended East Coast ports for North SealBaltic operations was a liability, as was 
ignorance ofthe Danish and Norwegian coasts. The game's precis stressed the strategic 
importance of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal in any prospective British campaign against 
the German Fleet: "With regard to the dispositions on either side, the British Admiral 
was bound, at the outset, to set a watch on the Elbe in case the Allies should debouch 
9 Custance to Bridge, May II, 1902, Papers of Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, BRUIS, NMM. 
10 Refer to Chapter One above; A. Lambert, FOllndations, pp. 142-43, 196-20 I. and 
Appendix, 235-37. Also: Custance to Bridge, October 17,1902. Bridge MSS. BRI/IS. NMM. 
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from the Kiel Canal."" This innocuous evaluation would later become a key factor in 
future British naval planning against Germany. Operations aimed at containing or 
destroying the High Seas Fleet would have to include a dual "watch" on both the Elbe 
and the Skagerrak/Kattegat in conjunction with Baltic excursions. 
Kerr's request to evaluate the North Sea strategic situation was examined in 
some detail by the NID and the War Division's rising "strategist": Commander George 
A. Ballard. Evidence linking Ballard with the "creation" of the Admiralty's early 
contingencies came in a paper he prepared to shore up Fisher's case regarding the war 
plans issue during the infamous Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) "Beresford 
Inquiry" in 1909.12 According to Ballard, Custance approached him with the North Sea 
strategic question and asked for a memorandum on the subject. This included the recent 
findings of the War College's North Sea war game for the brief included, "reference to 
the development of the German Fleet and completion of the Baltic Canal." The report 
revised a study by the former ADNI, Captain Charles J. Briggs in 1901, which reflected 
aspects examined of the War Course simulation, namely: "the conditions that would 
arise should the Germans adopt an aggressive attitude at a time when Great Britain was 
already occupied in a war with France and Russia; an aspect of the general question 
which had caused some apprehension after the Fasohda Crisis." The completed 
memorandum was turned over to Ballard's immediate superior in the NID's Defence 
Division, Captain H.L. Heath, who concurred in its [mdings and passed it on to the DNI. 
Custance informed Ballard that the suggestions contained within his report were worthy 
of further attention. It thus remained in NID and became, "the basis of subsequent 
papers which came under the notice of Prince Louis of Battenberg and Sir Charles 
11 "Precis of North Sea Campaign, May 1902. (Captain H.J. May, August 25,1902), 
Strategical Games carried out at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich. January to May 1902." NID 
Report No. 675, ADM 231/37. 
'2 "Remarks on the Framing of Certain Plans for War With Germany Now at the Admiralty", 
G.A. Ballard. May 1909. 10 pp, ADM 1/8997, "War Plans. Historical Statement." Admiralty 38. 
1938. 
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Ottley .... and were in general approved."13 While Ballard's 1902 North Sea 
memorandum does not survive,14 it reflected the same strategic concerns from the War 
College game, such as the significance of the Kiel Canal, the Baltic, and Germany's 
western exits to the North Sea. It too served as a foundation for future NID war plans 
against Germany throughout 1904-07. 
Evidence of Ballard's work and the May 1902 War College "campaign" can be 
found in the DNI's 28th May report to Kerr and Selborne. Custance's "Memorandum on 
the strategic position in the North Sea" laid out the proper strategic distribution of 
British fleets in Home Waters facing a potential Franco-Russian-German naval 
concentration. Given geographical constraints, Russo-Gennan fleets (Wilhelmshaven) 
had only two available routes to effect a concentration with the French (Brest) in the 
North Sea via either the Straits of Dover or ''North about", meaning the 
SkagerrakiKattegat. Although there was no direct allusion to the Kiel Canal, Custance 
observed that if the British Home Fleet(s) remained undefeated, the "Northern Powers" 
were restricted to the northwestern Baltic egresses. Accordingly, the Home Fleet's 
"strategic centre" was in the neighbourhood of the Dover Straits. A powerful British 
force: "thus centrally placed could be thrown as a whole on to either hostile fleet before 
the other could arrive to assist it. The two hostile Fleets could not effect a junction 
without running this risk unless one or both went North about." To cover the Channel 
and the East Coast, Custance believed the British Fleet should be concentrated at the 
Nore to engage any hostile fleet, "before returning to the Weser or passing the Skaw." 
Vessels requiring repair could utilise the Thames Dockyards or Channel bases. As it 
was necessary to keep the Home Fleet concentrated at the Nore, no battleships could be 
sent to northern British ports as they ran the risk of being cut off from the main body. 
Instead, the DNI suggested basing a powerful force of cruisers at the Firth of Forth and 
13 Ibid, pp. 1-3. 
14 In the case of the NID, there is no complete sequence or digest ofrecords. except the 
Intelligence Reports and the War Plans scattered throughout ADM I, ADM 137. ADM 116 and 
ADM 231. See: A. Offer. The First World War: An Aworian Interpretation, (Oxford, 1989), p.227. 
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its development as a base. IS 
The DNI's recommendation to base the Home Fleet at the Nore anticipated that 
a German or combined Russo-German fleet might issue from either the Elbe or 
Wilhelmshaven instead of the Baltic. Custance's proposal for a fleet concentration in 
the North Sea and the Forth's value as an East Coast base were based on the War 
College scenario, Ballard's work in the Department, and his own contention that, "The 
magnitude of the force which may be required in the North Sea will be practically 
determined by the power of the German Navy.,,16 Orders transmitted to the C-in-C 
Home Fleet in July 1902 contained the directive that a strong fleet be centrally 
positioned to prevent the junction of the French and Russian northern fleets. The C-in-
C's duties also included: "(ii) to watch the French Fleet and bring it to action, if it puts 
to sea; (iii) To be prepared to bring to action any Russian ships appearing in the North 
Sea from the Baltic-be it battleships or cruisers.,,17 These orders easily countered the 
presence of a hostile German fleet. The NID's 1901-02 North Sea studies and their 
recommendations were later mirrored by policies implemented by Fisher's 
administration. 
Despite amended naval dispositions in Home Waters and concerns over the 
efficiency of Germany's flotillas, coastal defences, and ordnance by the Admiralty's 
Parliamentary Secretary, Hugh Arnold-Forster, and the NlD, Kerr was unconvinced that 
an immediate anti-German concentration in the North Sea was required. 18 In principle, 
15 "Memorandum on the strategic position in the North Sea", Captain R.N. Custance, May 
28, 1902., in Boyce, Crisis, pp. 144-45. 
16 Ibid, p. 145. 
17 From Military Branch to DNI Reginald Custance, July 3, 1902, "Orders for the Home 
Fleet upon Mobilisation for War.", ADM 116/900B, "1889-1907 War Orders", Case #640; Anatomy. 
p. 467, footnote #33. 
18 "Notes on a Visit to Kiel and Wilhelmshaven, August 1902" and "General Remarks on the 
Gennan Navy and Naval Establishments", H.O. Arnold-Forster, October 18, 1902, (34 pp.), ADM 
116/940B, "Anglo-German Relations, 1902-1914"; "Germany. Coast Defences and Defence 
Ordnance, &c. (Revised.) 1902.", September 1902. NID Report No. 579. (163 pp.), ADM 231131, 
Nos. 567-62. 
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however, he sided with Custance on basing a fleet in the Nore and was supportive of 
establishing a northern East Coast base in the Firth of Forth. 19 In early 1903. the 
Admiralty decided to develop Rosyth on the Forth as the main operational base for a 
potential war with Germany. Aware of the arguments for a North Sea concentration 
against Germany in 1902 and the establishment of an East Coast base, Fisher. then C-in-
C Mediterranean, took interest in Arnold-Forster's August 1902 visit to Kiel and urged 
the Parliamentary Secretary to print his report on the German Fleet. This sudden 
attention to Arnold-Forster's and Custance's recommendations for a home re-
concentration may have been the paradigm that influenced Fisher's fleet re-distribution 
policy in late 1904 which brought the bulk of British naval power closer to the North 
Sea. Rosyth and the East Coast base issue re-emerged during Fisher's administration in 
his fleet concentration policy and war plans developed in 1905-07. The project, however, 
languished and was never pushed to completion until well into the First World War.20 
Along with the East Coast base issue, Custance's successor as DNI, Captain 
Prince Louis of Batten berg (November 1902-February 1905), continued to restructure 
the Home Fleet against Germany. Battenberg's scheme entailed a more homogeneous 
fleet by allocating battleships and cruisers under Coast Guard assignment to the Home 
Fleet C-in-C. He also proposed a clearer delineation of command responsibilities 
between the latter and the C-in-C Coast Guard and Naval Reserves. Another key point 
of Batten berg's platform followed Custance's recommendations and "lessons" from the 
War College's May 1902 game to familiarise the Home Fleet with the area of its 
intended future operations. To enhance its operational effectiveness, "The Home Fleet 
(was) to cruise in British waters and North Sea (includ. Scandinavia).,,21 
A 20th February 1903 Admiralty announcement heralded the implementation of 
19 Note by Lord Walter Kerr on Custance's memorandum, May 29. 1902, in Boyce, Crisis, 
pp. 146-47. Mackay, Fisher. p.314. 
20 FDSFv.I., pp. 216, 421-424; Anatomy, pp. 466-67; Mackay, Fisher. pp. 265. 306-07, 
314.317-18,337-38,401. 
21 Battenberg to King-Hall. December I, 1902. in Kerr. Battenberg, pp. 157-59. 
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the DNI's suggestions. The release proclaimed that the Home Fleet was becoming a 
powerful and efficient force through continual cruising and exercise at sea.22 
Reiterating the NID's estimations of the North Sea strategic situation, Battenberg's 
proposals anticipated the Fisher administration's November-December 1904 fleet 
redistribution scheme, the creation of a "new" Home Fleet in 1906, and Fisher's 
despatch of the Channel Fleet to cruise Scandinavia waters at the height of the 
Moroccan Crisis in 1905. The strategic/diplomatic implications of that Baltic cruise will 
be examined below. 
In addition to the Home Fleet issue, studies on combined operations and Gemlan 
fleet manoeuvres in late 1903 influenced Admiralty war plans developed throughout 
1904-08. On 24th November 1903, Ballard delivered a paper to the Aldershot Military 
Society evaluating the future of amphibious operations and planning. The paper stressed 
lessons from recent overseas conflicts due to the modified strategic requirements caused 
by modem technology and tactical revolutions on land and sea. Utilising instances from 
the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and the Spanish-American War, Ballard argued that 
successful combined operations were possible with properly coordinated and detailed 
planning between the two services. He cautioned that these "analogies" did not imply 
amphibious attacks against Continental powers, "Unless under very exceptional 
circumstances, it is doubtful if we should attempt to invade the enemy's home territory, 
and if our existing naval superiority is maintained, it is even more doubtful if they 
would attempt to invade ours." Again, "under very exceptional circumstances", Ballard 
thought it unlikely that Britain could invade an enemy's territory with the expressed 
intent of attacking a fleet at its home base. The examples of the Japanese at Wei-hai-
Wei and the Americans at Santiago, however, indicated that the question was still 
worthy of "serious attention" for it was not unlikely that similar circumstances could be 
22 Anatomy. p. 467. 
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encountered.23 Giving the "green light" to amphibious forays against an enemy's 
outlying dependancies, Ballard did not rule out descents on an adversary's main territory 
or naval facilities. His contentions foreshadowed future proposals by the NID, Admiral 
Sir Arthur Wilson, and Fisher throughout 1904-08 for amphibious landings in 
Schleswig-Holstein, near the Elbe entrance, and Denmark. 
NID evaluations of the High Seas Fleets' 1902-03 naval manoeuvres revealed 
the feasibility of operations examined in Ballard's paper such as attacks on an 
adversary's main base. The department's reports noted that while the 1902 Manoeuvres 
included successful "British" attacks on the mouth of the Elbe and the Kiel Canal's 
western exit, the 1903 exercise simulated a direct assault on Kiel harbour. Although a 
sizable "German" squadron was in the estuary during the British attack in the Elbe 
scenario, it was annihilated.24 This simulation repeated on a smaller scale the 1900 
German Fleet exercises when a "British" attack on the fleet at Cuxhaven resulted in its 
destruction.25 The significance of three successful "British" attacks on the Imperial 
Navy's vulnerable areas was not lost on the German Admiralty Staff nor the NID. Like 
the May 1902 War College game, the report clarified the high priority targets in a naval 
war against Germany: 
Should Germany be engaged in a Naval War it is clearly a matter of the highest 
importance for the enemy to seize either the Elbe or Kiel Harbour, for owing to 
the existence of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, these two strategical points are 
mutually interdependent.. .. The construction of the canal has then clearly made 
it necessary to strengthen the defences both ofKiel and the mouth of the Elbe, 
in order to keep the possession of it as long as possible, and to hinder its being 
23 "Naval and Military Co-operation in War", lecture by Commander G.A. Ballard, NID to 
Aldershot Military Society, November 24, 1903. Papers on Naval Subjects. 1903. Volume 11., pp. 
123-47. NID Report No. 701, February 1904. ADM 231138, Nos. 693-706. 
24 "Gennany. Naval Manoeuvres, 1903.", Foreign Naval Manoeuvres, 1903. NID Report 
No.719., pp. 7-19., ADM 231140, NID Reports 1903-1905, Nos. 716-727. 
25 Ivo Nicholai Lambi, The Navy and German Power Politics. /862-/9/4, (London, 1982), 
p.215. 
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used as a means of communication by an enemy.26 
Indicating that Germany was testing the strengths and weaknesses of its strategically 
vital points, the High Seas Fleet manoeuvres clarified to the Admiralty that the 
prosecution of a determined attack against those areas had a high probability of success. 
Through analysis of the German Naval Manoeuvres, the NID had not only had a clearer 
picture of Germany's North Sea and Baltic defences, they became aware of Kiel, the 
Elbe estuary, and the Canal's vulnerability to determined assaults. These observations, 
Ballard's amphibious study, and the NID's North Sea recommendations were 
harbingers, if not the progenitors, of the Admiralty's offensive planning against 
Germany in early 1904. 
III. 
The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War on 8th February 1904 heightened 
Admiralty concerns over German naval policy. Besides the diplomatic complications 
arising from Britain and France's alliance to the principal combatants, early Russian 
losses in the Far East altered the existing naval balance between the Royal Navy and 
Dual Alliance fleets. Although the war's outcome was far from decided, the Admiralty 
revised its estimates of potential adversaries under the Two Power Standard. In late 
February, Selbome intimated that because of Russian losses at Port Arthur, the standard 
would be thereafter calculated in reference to France and Germany. The First Lord 
made it clear that the German fleet was the more serious threat: "the great new German 
navy is being carefully built up from the point of view of a war with us" 
727. 
.... The more the composition of the new German fleet is examined the clearer 
it becomes that it is designed for a possible conflict with the British fleet. It 
cannot be designed for the purpose of playing a leading part in a future war 
between Germany and France and Russia. The issue of such a war can only be 
decided by armies on land, and the great naval expenditure on which Germany 
has embarked involves a deliberate diminution of the military strength which 
Germany might otherwise have attained in relation to France and Russia. 
26 "Gennany. Naval Manoeuvres, 1903", NID Report, No. 719, ADM 231/40, Nos. 716-
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Moreover, the High Seas Fleet's strategic concentration at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven 
proved Germany's intention of contesting the North Sea with BritainY The settlement 
of Anglo-French colonial enmities, the Far Eastern war, and aggressive Gennan foreign 
policy placed the German naval "menace" at the forefront of the Admiralty's strategic 
priorities. 
The Entente Cordiale 's creation in April 1904 improved Anglo-French relations 
and lessened British anxieties regarding the French fleets. Strategically, the Entente 
gave the Admiralty the flexibility to concentrate on matters closer to home but did not 
include a sudden abandonment of policy regarding the French Navy. The possibility 
remained that Britain and France may become embroiled in the Russo-Japanese conflict 
on the sides of their respective allies. This uncertainty ensured that French fleet 
dispositions were factored into Admiralty evaluations until at least mid 1905, even 
though the immediate fallout from the fonnation of the Entente had identified Gennany 
as the Royal Navy's future adversary.28 
While the Entente was not directed against Germany, the twin spectres of 
"encirclement" and a curtailment of Weltpolitik haunted the Wilhelmine hierarchy. The 
Kaiser viewed the Far Eastern war as the ideal opportunity to form a continental alliance 
based on a solid understanding with Russia. A rapprochement with Nicholas II over the 
Baltic would eliminate the Dual Alliance's expansion into an anti-German coalition that 
included Britain. Wilhelm II believed the Russo-Japanese War would weaken both 
Russia and France, forcing the former into an alliance and the latter to comply with the 
Russo-German grouping to avoid isolation. Britain, the one power that potentially 
barred Germany's Weltpolitik aspirations, would then be at the mercy of this new 
continental bloc. The Emperor responded to the Anglo-French understanding by 
courting Russia and scheming to undennine the new Entente. Under Chancellor Bernard 
27 "Cabinet Memorandum by Lord Selbome", February 26, 1904, in Boyce, Crisis, pp. 170-
73. 
28 "Naval and Military Policy in the Event of War With France", July, 1905, ADM 
116/3111, War Plans for Mediterranean and Channel Fleets based on French Naval Policy, Case # 
0093; Anatomy. pp. 474-75. 
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von BUlow and the "Grey Eminence" of the Auswartiges Amt, Senior Councillor 
Friedrich von Holstein, Gennan diplomacy began a precipitous two-year journey where 
it, "staggered from one crisis to another, teetered on the brink of war with no fewer than 
three great powers, and pennanently antagonised a fourth. ,,29 
By summer 1904, Gennany's foreign and naval policies increased Foreign 
Office concerns over a possible Russo-Gennan association. Speculation over German 
motives was compounded by the Hamburg-Amerika Line's supply of coal to the 
Russian Baltic Fleet en route to the Far East and the Kaiser's pledge to protect that fleet 
on its passage through Scandinavian waters.30 Along with these overtures, the German 
naval threat became the focus of British perception after Edward VII's state visit to the 
Kiel regatta in June 1904. Reports from British warships accompanying the King 
provided the NID with first-hand accounts on the German fleet's efficiency to 
complement press reports emphasizing the growing rival in the North Sea. 31 Within a 
month, the Admiralty had compiled the first war plan with specific reference to 
Germany: a plan based the NID's 1901-03 North Sea studies and proposals dating back 
to 1888. 
In his 4th July paper, "The Organisation for War of Torpedo Craft in Home 
Waters", Battenberg outlined the Admiralty'S strategic policy in a war with either 
France or Gennany which included close "watches" on French naval units at Brest, 
Cherbourg, and Dunkirk.32 Facing Gennany, British flotillas would be harder to supply 
29 J. Steinberg, "The Copenhagen Complex", The Journal o/Contemporary History, Volume 
1., No.3., (July 1966), p. 31; J. A. White, Transition to Global Rivalry: Alliance Diplomacy and the 
Quadruple Entente, /895-/907, (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 99-102; N. Rich, Friedric~ von Holstein: 
Politics and Diplomacy in the Era o/Bismarck and Wilhelm II, Volume Il., (Cambndge, MA. 1965), 
pp.678-82. 
30 Steinberg, "Copenhagen", p. 32; Z. Steiner, Britain and the Or~g!,ns oflh~ First.Wor.id 
War, (New York, 1977), p. 30; L. J. Cecil, "Coal for the fleet that had to die. American HIstorical 
Review, LXIX, No.4., (July 1964), pp. 993-1005. 
31 Reports from HMS Dido and Bedford: NID Report No. 745. January 1905. Foreign 
Naval Affairs, /904-05, ADM 231/42, Nos. 740-53; Anatomy. pp. 476-79. 
32 Refer to Chapter One above, footnote 127. 
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due to the greater distances between the enemy' s ports and home bases. The pauci ty of 
suitable advanced bases along the German North Sea littoral was a particular problem 
as, excepting Heligoland, nearly all the Frisian islands were within artillery range of the 
coast and could be retaken quite easily. While Heligoland was an obvious choice. its 
capture was unlikely due to strong defences. Thus, a destroyer watch ofIthe mouth of 
the Elbe and Wilhelmshaven, would involve operating from British bases. The 
disadvantage was not prohibitive, even though Harwich was 285 miles from the Elbe. 
destroyers could rest and economise on coal by anchoring in shallow waters during the 
day.33 
Maintaining a watch on Kiel, especially the Baltic exit, was more problematic. 
A vigil on the Canal's western end involved a flotilla off Wilhelmshaven. whereas a 
close watch on the Baltic side entailed "pushing" a flotilla through the Belts. This 
required the support of the main fleet and exposed it to German torpedo craft attacks in 
narrow waters despite British destroyers. The main difficulty, drawn from "previous 
papers dealing with the subject of a war with Germany", lay in effectively sealing the 
Canal's Baltic egresses and stopping a German fleet sortie near its principal base. The 
solution was to block the mouth of the Elbe with sunken hulks during an early phase in 
the war. Described as "a perfectly feasible operation", it alleviated the problems 
associated with maintaining a direct watch on Kiel and would: 
force the enemy's battleships and cruisers to use the Baltic exit, and simplify the 
duty of the fleet waiting in the North Sea to engage him. Moreover, it would 
force him to fight at such a distance from his base that his smaller torpedo boats 
could not assist him. Lastly, and most important of all. It would compel him to 
spend a night at sea within reach of our own destroyer flotillas before he 
engaged. If our fleet was lying somewhere to the westward of the Skaw, say on 
the Jutland Bank (at anchor if need be), the enemy would have to steam some 
250 miles to meet them, .... and so his avenue of approach would be known with 
certainty to our destroyers, he would encounter very serious risks. 
The blocking of the Elbe with the German fleet at Kiel was, "a good foundation for our 
33 "The Organisation of Torpedo Craft in Home Waters." ONI, Battenberg, 4 July, 1904 
(Amended in August), Naval Necessities. I'olume /I.. 1905. ADM 116/3093, pp. 508-19. 
general strategical policy", for with the main British fleet positioned within thirty miles 
of the Skaw, it placed the Germans at a disadvantage. German torpedo-craft and main 
unit effectiveness from Kiel were nullified by destroyers positioned between the Skaw 
and opposite coasts in support of the British fleet. Without a fixed base. these flotillas 
could find sheltered anchorages by going east or west of the Skaw, close to the island 
ofLaeso, or along the Swedish coast. The British destroyer force would be divided into 
two main groups: one at Harwich-Dover watching the North Sea littoral, the other 
operating with the main fleet as its base of supply near the Skaw. The North Sea 
flotillas, double the size of the others, would employ large. fast ships since they had to 
watch the Elbe and Jade for any hostile torpedo craft that circumvented the block ship 
obstructions, while operating further from their bases. Accordingly, 21 divisions. 
including the larger River Class destroyers, would cover the Gennan North Sea Coast 
while 11 divisions of 30-Knot destroyers accompanied the main fleet in the Skaw.34 
Drafted by the DNI, the July 1904 war plan was the obvious product of the War 
Division under Ballard, who had been promoted Assistant DNI in December 1903. 
There were strong similarities between the Elbe plan and his proposal to obstruct the 
estuary of the Gironde River with sunken hulks and mines outlined in his 1897 RUSI 
essay. This paper had also dealt in detail with the British flotilla operations in the Belts, 
Sound, and Skaw, to prevent Russian cruisers slipping into the North Sea and the 
establishment of "flying bases" for destroyers on observational duties off an enemy's 
portS.35 The August 1904 Torpedo Craft Manoeuvres confonned to the NID's July plan 
for an observational blockade of the French northern bases and stressed positioning the 
main British fleet near the Skaw or in support of a flotilla watch on the Elbe.36 A 
further examination of the advanced base concept was conducted within Ballard's 
division by Royal Marine Artillery Captain Maurice P. A. Hankey. 
34 Ibid. pp. 5) 2-) 7. 
35 Chapter One above, pp. 34-6. footnotes 109-) ) I. 
36 Torpedo Craft Manoeuvres. ) 904, December 1904, NID Report No. 754. ADM 231/43 
and Chapter One above. 
65 
Attached to the NID shortly after Ballard in April 1902, Hankey was employed 
as the War Division's coastal defence analyst throughout 1902-06.37 His promotion of 
the Royal Marines as a "rapid response force" envisioned raids and landings on an 
enemy's coast and harbours to establish advanced bases for a blockading fleet. Based 
at naval ports and aboard ships, a trained body of Marines could be rapidly despatched 
to occupy important tactical positions on a hostile coast as a covering force for a larger 
expedition.38 In early May 1904, Hankey drafted a paper, "Advance Bases for the Fleet". 
which addressed questions surrounding the maintenance of destroyer "watches" on 
French and German bases. Islands were the best sites for advanced bases as they could 
be easily defended by a properly equipped small force. Such operations provided a base 
near an enemy to avoid detaching vessels a considerable distance for coal, ammuni tion. 
and supplies. A Royal Marine force, ifprovided with quick-firing artillery, searchlights, 
wireless, and an improvised boom defence, could adequately defend against attempts 
to retake the island. An advanced base would also facilitate navigation for the fleet and 
secure a bridgehead for a larger expeditionary force. 39 Although not included with the 
July 1904 war plan, Hankey's study revealed that the advance base concept was 
examined in considerable detail within the War Division. especially proposals to take 
Ushant and Heligoland. His proposals, along with the scheme to block the Elbe, would 
influence further Admiralty war plans after 1904. 
The premise that the Elbe could be successfully obstructed was, however, 
"blown to bits" by the Navy's Hydrographic Department. A 6th July report by the 
Hydrographer ruled out employing sunken hulks in the estuary as "doomed to failure" 
37 For Hankey's employment in the NID's War Division and his work refer to: The Navy 
Lists, /902-/906, "Naval Intelligence Department"; Lord Hankey, The Supreme Command, /914-
1918. Volume One, (London, 1961), pp. 24-5; S. Roskill, Hankey: Man o/Secrets, Volume I 1877-
19/8, (London, 1970), pp. 61-2, 66-7; "Naval Intelligence Department. Distribution of Work-March 
1905. War Division.", ADM 231/45, NID Report No. 789. 
38 Hankey, Supreme Command, v.I., pp. 24-5. 
39 "Advance Bases for the Fleet", May 2, 1904, draft by Captain Maurice P.A. Hankey, 
HNKY 6/3, Hankey Papers, Churchill College, Cambridge. 
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owing to the Elbe's distance from the sea and the constantly shifting channel comprised 
of mud and sand flats. Similar doubts were expressed by Kerr and Rear-Admiral Alfred 
F. Winsloe, commanding torpedo and submarine flotillas, who condemned the scheme 
as "absolutely impracticable.,,40 Despite these foibles, the Elbe proposal figured 
prominently in later Admiralty war planning and, arguably, into the First World War 
along with the advanced base theme along Germany's North Sea littoral. 
IV. 
The Russian Baltic Fleet's sinking of Hull fishing trawlers on the Dogger Bank 
on 22nd October 1904 led not only to a threat of war between Britain and Russia but 
again directed British attention towards the North Sea and German Fleet. As the crisis 
intensified, the Admiralty prepared to destroy the Russian fleet. Having replaced Kerr 
as First Sea Lord two days prior to the North Sea incident, the recent C-in-C 
Portsmouth, Sir John Fisher reinforced the Home Fleet and ordered the concentration 
of the Channel and Mediterranean Fleets to intercept the Russians should the diplomatic 
situation worsen. Even as a British fleet shadowed the Baltic Fleet, the new Service 
chiefwas convinced of German complicity in fomenting the crisis. Reflecting a general 
suspicion in British official circles, Fisher wrote to his wife, "Things look very serious. 
Its really the Germans behind it all.. .. Peace seems assured tonight, but one never knows, 
as the German Emperor is scheming all he knows to produce war between us and 
Russia." 41 
German fears of being pulled into a Anglo-Russian conflict prompted the Kaiser, 
BUlow, and Holstein to approach the Tsar with a mutual defence treaty proposal. The 
intervention of the French Foreign Minister, Theophile De1casse, in pacifying Anglo-
Russian animosities and the Tsar's insistence that the French be informed of any Russo-
40 Anatomy, p.481. 
41 Fisher to Lady Fisher. October 28, 30, 1904, Marder (ed), Fear God and Dreadnought: 
The Correspondence of Admiral of the fleet Lord Fisher ofKilverstone. Volume 1. tHereafter 
referred to as, FGDN), (London, 1952). p. Ill. 
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German negotiations quashed the Kaiser's initiative.42 Further incidents, such as the 
French allowing the Russians to use their harbour at Karnranh Bay in April 1905 
heightened Admiralty's concerns that Britain might be drawn into a wider contlict on 
the side of her ally Japan, against France. Battenberg's successor as DNL Captain (later 
Rear-Admiral Sir) Charles E. Ottley (February 1905-August 1907), believed as late as 
1 st May 1905 that there was a "considerable chance" that Britain would be drawn into 
a war against a Franco-Russian-German coalition.43 
Given the uncertainty of Britain's position, Fisher implemented a substantial 
redistribution of naval resources which, though not directed specifically at Germany, 
increased the number of battleships in home waters. Based on Battenberg' s estimations 
that the Royal Navy would face either a Russo-German or a Franco-Russian 
combination, a flexible strategic contingency was adopted. In December 1904, the main 
British fleets were reconstituted with the former Home Fleet increased to 12 battleships 
and renamed the Channel Fleet. This fleet could be reinforced by the 8 battleships of the 
new Atlantic Fleet (former Channel) based at Gibralter. The logic behind this 
"Gibralter-based strategy" allowed the Admiralty to react to threats in home waters or 
to back up the Mediterranean Fleet should tensions caused by the Russo-Japanese War 
lead to a war with France.44 While not the primary focus of the Admiralty's strategic 
redistribution, the First Sea Lord's hostility and his strategic intent towards Germany 
hardened because of the diplomatic upheavals generated by the war in the Far East. 
Increased tension in Anglo-German relations during and immediately after the 
Dogger Bank crisis had a profound effect on the other side of the North Sea. Fisher's 
fleet re-concentration was accompanied by stories in the British press calling for a 
sudden pre-emptive strike upon the German fleet, similar to Admiral James Gambier's 
42 Steinberg, "Copenhagen", pp. 33-4; White, Transition, pp. 105-116. 
43 FDSF, vol. I., pp. 110-11. 
44 Cabinet memorandum by Lord Selbome, "Distribution and Mobilisation of the Fleet. ... 
December 6, 1904 .. in Boyce. Crisis, pp. 184-90; R. Mackay, "The Admiralty, the German Navy and 
the Redistribution of the British Fleet, 1904-05 .... The Mariner's Mirror, Vol. 56. (1970), pp. 341-46. 
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attack on the Danish fleet at Copenhagen in 1807. The cumulative effect created a 
serious war scare in Germany during the winter of 1904-05. The German Admiraltv 
Staff feared a surprise attack on their fleet as early as 1897 and had subsequently 
factored this "Copenhagen complex" into annual naval exercises from that period on.45 
August/September 1904 naval manoeuvres simulated a British attack on a German fleet 
in the Elbe and included the secondary objective of forcing the passage at Cuxhaven to 
close the western exit to the Kiel Canal. During the exercise, the "British" fleet 
(Yellow) successfully prevented the junction of the German fleet in the Elbe and a 
second squadron coming to its relief from Norway. The manoeuvre parallelled 
provisions from the Admiralty's July 1904 war plan, and again confirmed that 
operations aimed at defeating German forces in the Elbe and the closing its entrance 
were feasible.46 
Official concerns that the British may attempt a Baltic thrust prompted the 
Kaiser to order plans for an invasion of Denmark to occupy and close the Belts to the 
Royal Navy in early December 1904. The Imperial edict was, however, vetoed in 
February 1905 by the Chief of the German General Staff, Count Grafvon Schlieffen. 
The two Army Corps slated for the Denmark operation could not be spared from 
Schlieffen's main plan for a sweep into Belgium, Holland, and France.47 German naval 
and military evaluations of a war with England during the winter of 1904-05 reflected 
a real fear within the Kaiser's retinue that the British intended a sudden coup de main 
against the High Seas Fleet. This paranoia was intensified by loose talk emanating from 
Whitehall. On 5th February, 1905, the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, Arthur Lee, 
publically proclaimed that the Royal Navy, "would get its blow in fITst before the other 
side had time even to read in the papers that war had been declared." With the recent 
45 Steinberg, "Copenhagen ", pp. 23-31,37-9,41-4; Anatomy, pp. 496-98. 
46 "Foreign Naval Manoeuvres, 1904. Gennany.", NID Report No.758., March 1905, pp. 5-
19. ADM 231143, Nos. 754-771.; Steinberg, "Copenhagen Complex", pp. 34-5. 
47 P. Kennedy, "The Development of Gennan Naval Operations Plans against England", in 
War Plans of the Great Powers, pp. 180-81. 
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surprise Japanese attack on the Russians at Port Arthur in the immediate background--
not to mention "British" successes in the German manoeuvres of 1900-04--the Civil 
Lord's pronouncements heightened German anxieties and invoked a harsh rebuke from 
Wilhelm 11.48 In all likelihood, Lee's statement was directly attributable to another 
Admiralty source: Fisher. 
The First Sea Lord deliberately provoked German fears by continually 
advocating a "Copenhagen" attack on the fleet at Kiel. By his own admission, he had 
openly suggested such a course of action to Edward VII in late 1904.49 The seriousness 
of Fisher's rhetoric was imparted by Selbome to Prime Minister Balfour on 26th 
December: " 1 told you his proposal about the German fleet at Kiel. It was no use of 
paradox, nor said to shock. He meant it." 50 Fisher took a similar line with Selbome's 
successor, Lord Cawdor, at the height of the Moroccan Crisis in May-June 1905 when 
he made the suggestion that he be allowed to "smash up" the German Fleet. 51 While 
some historians have ruled out Fisher's calls to "Copenhagen" the Gennan Navy and 
others doubt that he seriously considered such an action "on a subconscious level",52 
there is the very real probability that his convictions were legitimate and driven by an 
underlying purpose: deterrence. 
Evidenced by the 1889 Naval Defence Act and 1893-94 Spencer Programme, 
British naval policy was predicated on maintaining the Royal Navy's command of the 
sea as a deterrent to the rise of hegemonic states or blocs intent on disrupting the 
European balance of power. Fisher continued this dictum by insisting that the British 
Army become the Navy's amphibious strike force--a "projectile" to be hurled against 
48 Anatomy, p. 498; Steinberg, p. 39. 
49 Fisher to King Edward VII, late October, 1904 quoted in Marder (ed), FGDN. J '01. 2 .. 
(London, 1956), p. 20. 
50 Mackay, Fisher, p. 3)9. 
51 FDSF Vol. I., p. 113. 
52 FDSF Vo/.J, p. 113; Mackay, Fisher, pp.320-21. 
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an enemy's outlying possessions or strategically sensitive areas.53 This increased the 
Navy's ability to inflict irreversible damage as an effective deterrent. The Navy's 
offensive strategy against France's principal naval ports and colonies was clarified 
throughout 1887-1904 through the intellectual rejuvenation of the Service's past and 
work done by the NID, the C-in-C's afloat, and independent study such as Ballard's 
1897 RUSI paper. British naval manoeuvres during that period had continually tested 
these strategies and revealed what France could have expected had diplomatic crises 
such as the Fashoda imbroglio led to war. To act as a credible threat against Germany. 
the Admiralty required a similar offensive strategy that was taken seriously by the 
German hierarchy. Fisher's "Copenhagen" pronouncements, his Baltic "schemes", and 
amphibious plans against Schleswig-Holstein were all variations on the theme of 
applying pressure upon the enemy's most strategically vulnerable points as the basis of 
deterrence. 54 Arrived at independently, his views dovetailed with the NID's 1901-1903 
North Sea studies which resulted in the Admiralty's July 1904 war plan against 
Germany. 
Fisher's deterrence philosophy dated to his appointment as British naval 
representative at the 1899 Hague Peace Conference. In discussions with German 
delegates, Fisher became aware of their concern over the vulnerability of Germany's 
Baltic coasts, ports, and commerce, especially their substantive iron-ore trade with 
Sweden. 55 Later calls to "Copenhagen" the German fleet at Kiel, to conduct amphibious 
landings in Schleswig-Holstein, and other well-known Fisherisms such as "hitting first, 
53 Fisher to Lord Tweedmouth, December 23, 1905; Fisher to Edward VII, October 4, 1907; 
Fisher to Lord Esher, May 5, 1908, FGDN Vol. 2., pp. 65, 143. 
54 A. Lambert, "Great Britain and the Baltic, 1890-1914", (forthcoming), pp. 6-8. I am 
greatly indebted to Professor Lambert not only for his paper, but for our many discussions on the 
topic. Also refer to: Mackay, Fisher, pp. 216-24. 
55 Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher, Records, (London, 1919), pp. 55-6; Fisher to Lord 
Esher, April 25, 1912, FGDN Vol.2., pp. 454-5; Fisher to Lord Esher, November 19,. 1~03 ~~ 
Fisher to Esher, April 25, 1912 in Memories, pp. \ 66-7, 210-12; D. Sweet, "The Baltic In Bntlsh 
Diplomacy before the First World War", Historical Journal, Volume XIII, No.3., 1970, p. 455; 
Mackay, Fisher, pp. 219-24; A. Lambert, "Great Britain and the Baltic", pp. 2-4,6-8. 
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hitting hard and hitting everywhere" may have originated within the context of the 
conference. It is crucial to realise, however, that beneath the fire-breathing rhetoric lay 
the key to his deterrence theory. Fisher was not a war monger by nature. In conveying 
the impression that the Royal Navy would smash the Kiel fleet to the King, to Selbome. 
and his allies in the British press, he was signalling that the Admiralty had the means, 
the knowledge, and the will to strike without warning should Germany threaten 
Britain's vital interests. The purpose of Fisher's bombastic statements is obvious from 
his explanation of the Admiralty's November-December 1904 fleet reorganisation. 
My sole object is PEACE in doing all this [the fleet redistribution]! Because if 
you "rub it in" both at home and abroad that you are ready for instant war with 
every unit of your strength in the first line, and intend to be "first in" and hit 
your enemy in the belly and kick him when he's down and boil your prisoners 
in oil (if you take any!) And torture his women and children, then people will 
keep clear of you. 56 
At the height of the Moroccan Crisis in the summer of 1905, Fisher put the hidden 
agenda behind his words into active play by despatching the Channel Fleet under 
Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson on a timely late August cruise of the Baltic. Since, "Our drill 
ground should be our battle ground", he wrote to Julian Corbett, then lecturing at the 
Naval College at Greenwich, "I've taken means to have it whispered in the German 
Emperor's ear.,,57 
Fisher's 1904-05 deterrent-based threats to strike the High Seas Fleet were not 
new. His December 1903 contention that submarines be let loose in Toulon harbour to 
inflict a first strike and "ferret out" French ships for destruction by a British fleet otTthe 
port was similar to the treatment he later threatened to mete out to the German fleet at 
Kiel.58 Furthermore, his "Copenhagen" designs should be placed within the context of 
56 Fisher to?, February 22, 1905, FGDN Vol. 2., p. 51. Most likely the letter was to Fisher's 
journalist friend and ally, W.T. Stead. See: Mackay, Fisher, pp. 222-23. 
57 Fisher to Corbett, July 28, 1905, FGDN Vol. 2, p. 63; Admiral Sir E. E. Bradford, Life of 
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Knyvet Wilson, (London, 1923), pp. 199-201; Wilson to Noel, 
August 15, 1905, NOEl4.A, Noel MSS, NMM. 
58 Mackay, Fisher, pp. 302-04. 
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similar themes advocated, continually tested in manoeuvres, and ruminated over by the 
Admiralty, the NID, and Fleet C-in-C's throughout 1887-1904. The strategic studies 
initiated by Custance and expanded upon by the War Division throughout 1901-04 
mirrored Fisher's proposals to "smash up" the High Seas Fleet. The potential success 
of such operations were evident in the NID's reports on the Gennan naval exercises, 
while the Japanese attack on the Russian Pacific Squadron at Port Arthur proved that 
a pre-emptive strike was feasible. The correlation of Fisher's views with offensive 
themes already contemplated for the Dual Alliance adds credence to the notion that 
although the potential enemy may have changed, the Royal Navy's basic strategy had 
not. The work conducted by the NID throughout 1901-04 gave Fisher the offensive 
strategy which made his "Copenhagen" declarations a much more effective deterrent 
and provided the foundations for future operational planning against Gennany. 
In early 1905, the Admiralty'S war plans against Germany were re-examined 
within the context of technical questions arising from the Russo-Japanese War. The 
employment of blockade mines off Port Arthur, and corresponding ship losses by both 
sides, sparked an inquiry from Balfour regarding the Navy's use of mines and blockade. 
The DNI, responded that the war had so far revealed a switch in the use of offensive 
mines from sealing-in an adversary to an observational blockade which forced the 
enemy to indicate when a sortie was imminent. Supporting this new form of offensive 
mine laying, Ottley presented a variation on the July 1904 plan of blocking the Elbe as 
a means of countering the Gennan fleet and her seaborne trade to the CID. He believed 
that Gennany was particularly vulnerable to an observational mine blockade, "Thus 
Germany, with her outlet to the sea limited so far as heavy vessels are concerned by the 
narrow waters of the Belts, and the three great estuaries of the Elbe, Weser, and Jade, 
is far more liable to injury from the sowing of a thousand blockade mines than is the 
United Kingdom with her splendid length of deeply indented coastline." Ottley 
proposed that 2,000 mines laid 100 yards apart., in four lines of 20 miles each. would 
effectively block the entrances to all three estuaries. Sunken trawlers interspersed 
amongst the minefie1ds would impede sweeping operations and 1000 mines kept in 
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reserve to replenish lines that were successfully swept. Forcing the Germans to use the 
Baltic exit to the North Sea, the plan would "save" British ports from enemy 
minelaying, protect Britain from invasion, and impede Germany's oversea commerce. 59 
Fisher was unwilling to push the recommendations of a special Mining Committee. 
however, which supported Ottley's proposals given his dedication to "economy" and 
the growing opposition to his other reform policies.6O Ottley'S offensive mining report 
indicated the influence of the NID's earlier studies/plans to restrict the movements of 
the German Fleet so it could be advantageously engaged near or in the Baltic. Further 
plans along this theme emerged as the Admiralty responded to aggressive German 
foreign policy aimed at destroying the Entente. 
v. 
The Moroccan Crisis, and the von Biilow--Holstein bid to fragment the Entente 
had ramifications beyond strengthening the fledgling Anglo-French friendship. With 
De1casse's forced resignation in June 1905 and the abortive Treaty of Bjorko in July, 
the Kaiser's goal of an anti-English continental bloc, based on a Russo-German alliance, 
seemed close to realisation. This, combined with Germany's threat of a preventative war 
against a weakened France, clarified to British policy makers that Germany was now the 
principal threat to the Empire's security.61 The Admiralty responded to the crisis by a 
further re-distribution of British naval power to the North Sea and expanding its existing 
59 Balfour's queries, the Admiralty'S response "Floating Mines", and Ottley's subsequent 
memorandum, "Submarine Automatic Mines", February 12, 1905, can be found in P.K. Kemp (ed), 
The Papers 0/ Admiral Sir John Fisher Volume II, (London, 1964), pp. 90-106. Original copies of 
Ottley'S paper can also be found in ADM 116/866B, 1889-1912 Naval Staff Memoranda, Case 
#4173, dated November 12,1905 and CAB 17/24, CID Miscellaneous Correspondence and 
Memoranda, containing a chart diagramming the mining plan for the Elbe, Weser, and Ems estuaries. 
P. Halvorsen, "The Development of Mines and Mine Warfare in the Fisher Era, 1900-1914", M.Phil 
dissertation in Economic and Social History, Oxford, 1999, pp. 43-8; Naval Necessities Volume 1I 
1905., pp. 13-15, ADM 1/3093, Case #0026; Minutes of the 65th and 71" meetings of the CID, March 
8 and April t 9, 1905, CAB 2/2. 
60 Halvorsen, "Mine Warfare", p. 48; Mackay, Fisher, pp. 367, 370, 376-8. 
61 Kennedy, Antagonism. pp. 275-84; Taylor, Struggle, pp. 428-42; S. R. W~lIiarnson, The 
Politics o/Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare/or War. 1904-1914. (Cambndge. Mass .. 
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plans against Germany. Within a month of Wilhelm II's late March visit to Tangier. 
Fisher intimated to the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Lansdowne, that the time was 
ripe for a joint Anglo-French naval offensive in the Baltic: 
This seems a golden opportunity for fighting the Gennans in alliance with the 
French, so I earnestly hope you may be able to bring this about.. .. AlI I hope is 
that you will send a telegram to Paris that the English and the French fleets are 
one. We could have the German Fleet, the Kiel Canal, and Schleswig-Holstein 
within a fortnight. 62 
While the gist of the First Sea Lord's proposal cloaked his conviction that a threatened 
Baltic descent was the key to deterring Germany, Lansdowne failed to officially 
communicate Fisher's offer to the French.63 It nevertheless hinted that supplements to 
the Admiralty's existing offensive plans were already under consideration. 
The annihilation of the Russian Baltic Fleet at Tsushima in late May, profoundly 
effected the Royal Navy's future dispositions by removing Russia from the list of great 
naval nations. Overnight, the Two-Power Standard became irrelevant as among the 
other dominant naval powers: Japan was an ally, France a close friend under siege, and 
the United States congenial. Germany stood alone as the principal menace due to her 
instigation of the Moroccan predicament and the expanding High Seas Fleet. With the 
threat in Far Eastern waters removed, Fisher ordered 5 battleships from Admiral Gerald 
Noel's China Squadron home in early June. The battleship strength of the Channel Fleet 
was increased from 12 to 15, supported by the Atlantic Fleet's 9 ships at Gibralter.64 
While the Navy's North Sea redistribution constituted "a strategic revolution",65 the 
Admiralty conveyed the benign nature of the re-concentration, citing it in the November 
1905 Cawdor Memorandum as indicative of the "kaleidoscope nature of international 
62 Fisher to Lansdowne, April 22, 1905, FGDN VoI.lI.. p. 55. 
63 Lambert, "Great Britain and the Baltic", p. 1 t; Williamson, pp. 43-4. 
64 Ottley, "The Balance of Naval Power in the Far East", (late May-early June), 1905 in 
Kemp (ed), Fisher Papers Vol. 11.. pp. 79-84 and Naval Necessities Vol. 11.. 1905, ADM 1/3093, 
PRO; Anatomy, pp. 435, 51 1-14. 
65 P. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery. (London, 1976), p. 2 I 7, 
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relations" and not representative of "a permanent allocation ofnumbers~·.66 
The escalation of the Moroccan debacle in early June, prompted a reassessment 
of the Admiralty'S strategic options. On 24th June, Fisher ordered Ottley to draft a 
report on the current status of fleet dispositions should the Navy be forced to assist the 
French. The ONI replied that circumstances were "exceptionally favourable" since a 
combined Anglo-French fleet ensured that, "our maritime preponderance would be 
overwhelming" against Germany. As operational command rested with the Channel 
Fleet C-in-C, Sir A.K. Wilson, Ottley outlined the Admiral's general orders and 
guidelines to assist in the formulation of a campaign plan. Upon the outbreak of 
hostilities, Wilson would implement a commercial blockade of all German ports, 
including the Baltic coast by either a strong force sent through the Belts or a closure of 
the straits. The latter course was, however, contingent upon the reaction of the 
Scandinavian states. In addition to the blockade of German colonial possessions, 
detached cruisers would attack German overseas trade in South American waters and 
the Pacific. Ottley requested Wi Ison' s opinions on the proposals for the employment of 
blockade mines and the July 1904 plan to block the Elbe with sunken hulks. Any 
decision to undertake these operations would be based on the C-in-C's views and rest 
within his discretion.67 
The C-in-C Channel disagreed with the ONI's emphasis on economic warfare 
as the most effective means to assist France. Wilson felt that the capture or destruction 
of Germany's overseas trade and colonies would not materially affect the course of a 
war on the Franco-German frontier because Germany could compensate for her lost 
trade through neutral ports. A close naval blockade of Germany's commercial ports 
would not prevent her armies from overrunning France. Wilson argued that Britain 
could better aid France via amphibious operations against Germany's coasts to divert 
66 "Cawdor Memorandum''. November 30,1905, Naval Necessities Vol. 1/1.. /906, p.370, 
ADM 116/3094. 
67 Memorandum by Charles L. Ottley, DNI, "British Intervention in the Event of an Attack 
on France by Gennany", June 26, 1905, in Anatomy, pp.502-03. 
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troops from the French frontier. If Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and 
Russia remained neutral, Britain should attempt to capture the forts at the mouths of 
the Elbe and Weser by a combined military and naval expedition. He urged that other 
operations should aim at occupying Schleswig-Holstein and Kiel through landings on 
the coast of the Little Belt or Kiel Bay. To prepare for this, Wilson proposed: a re-
commissioning of all small craft (gunboats and sloops) withdrawn from foreign stations, 
the preparation of obsolete battleships (Admiral and Royal Sovereign Classes) for 
bombarding fortifications, and the collection of flat-bottomed, light draught vessels for 
operations in the shallow waters off the German North Sea littora1.68 The C-in-C 
believed, "Only by putting forth the whole military strength of the Empire that we can 
hope to succeed.'Xi9 Compatible with Fisher's "Copenhagen" pronouncements, 
Wilson's proposals mirrored the War Division's 1903-04 operational studies and 
remained at the centre of the Navy's offensive strategy throughout the Fisher 
administration. 
Although the DNI and Wilson differed over the "means" of assisting France, 
both supported combined operations along the German coasts. Agreeing with Corbett's 
assessment that these schemes were a vital projection of Britain's maritime supremacy, 
Ottley wrote, "We should have to throw an expeditionary force ashore on the German 
Coast somewhere, in addition to any naval action we might take." As he reasoned, "No 
other attitude would be worthy of our traditions, or would be acceptable to France.,,70 
Along with Fisher and the War Division, Ottley and Wilson adhered to the principal 
axiom underpinning all contemporaneous Admiralty war plans: offensive operations 
aimed at the enemy's most strategically vulnerable points-the "end" being the 
destruction of Germany's fleet and successive attacks on its overseas commerce and 
ports. This theme, with its antecedents in plans against the Dual Alliance, remained the 
68 Wilson to Fisher, March 9, 1906, Fisher MSS, FISR lIS, Churchill College, Cambridge. 
69 Memorandum by C-in-C Channel Fleet, Admiral Sir A.K. Wilson, June 27, 1905 in 
Anatomy, pp. 504-05. 
70 Ottley to Corbett. July 3, 1905, RIC/9, Richmond MSS, NMM. 
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apex of the First Sea Lord's deterrence policy. 
In early July 1905, Fisher dispatched the Channel Fleet on a planned mid-August 
Baltic cruise. The Fleet called at Ymuiden in Holland and proceeded to Graa Diep off 
Esbjerg on the western Jutland coast, an anchorage valuable for operations ofT the Elbe 
estuary or to support a British fleet operating off the Skaw in the Skagerrak. Intended 
to familiarise the Channel Fleet with operations near the Skagerrak and Baltic, the 
cruise's other agenda was revealed in Admiralty instructions for Wilson to be prepared 
for a sudden descent on the German coast. The deterrence effect of the "cruise" was not 
lost on the C-in-C who, prior to the fleet's departure, wrote to a colleague that, 
"Politically I think it will do good." 71 Non-officially, the Channel Fleet's August cruise 
imparted the gist of the First Sea Lord's deterrence policy towards Germany in the same 
waters outlined in Wilson's 27th June proposal for an amphibious attack on Schleswig-
Holstein. Should further German actions precipitate a conflict, the Admiralty's strategy 
to support France carried the very real probability of immediate implementation. 
Fisher's admission to Corbett in late July that, "Or drill ground should be our 
battleground", was both "bark" and "bite". 
VI. 
The examination of amphibious options continued throughout the remainder of 
1905. Based on consultations with Corbett and Wilson's Schleswig-Holstein proposals, 
Ottley drafted a CIO memorandum in mid-July 1905 on the desirability of combined 
operations against Germany. The complex arrangements attending joint planning 
between the services would involve considerable delay in taking immediate action on 
the outbreak of war. Therefore, the ONI suggested the establishment of a special sub-
committee on overseas operations. This body should include the CID's military and 
naval representatives and its secretariat to prepare plans for overseas operations. Such 
an organisation would enhance Britain's strategic response time to international crises. 
An overseas sub-committee would give service opinion the executive powers necessary 
71 Wilson to Noel, HMS Exmouth, Channel Fleet, August 15, 1905, NOE/4a., Noel Papers. 
NMM; Bradford, Wilson, pp. 199-20 I. 
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to fonn and coordinate their plans prior to the outbreak of a conflict. The urgency of the 
Moroccan crisis and the potential need to assemble an expedition against a major 
continental power made the necessity of a joint coordinating body all the more 
expedient. Hypothetically, the question was whether British action against Germany 
should be limited to sea operations or include an amphibious expedition to Schleswig-
Holstein to relieve pressure on the French frontier armies. The need for a coordinating 
body was essential since: 
To carry sixty thousand British troops through the labyrinth of sandbanks and 
shoals shielding the Gennan seaboard to a landing in Schleswig-Holstein would 
be an operation which might not be impracticable, but would certainly be 
arduous and would need careful study and high organisation. The danger of war 
had for the moment subsided. But the circumstances might recur, and even 
today the discussion can scarcely be regarded as purely academic. n 
Despite Ottley's recommendations, progress towards an inter-service planning body 
and combined operations was problematic given Fisher's actions and the War Office's 
attitude towards overseas expeditions. 
Fisher's support for combined operations along the Gennan seaboard was part 
of his dictum that the Anny serve as the Navy's "projectile" and a key component of his 
deterrent policy. Not surprisingly, he threw himself behind the DNI's call for an 
overseas sub-committee as it furthered the subordination of the Anny and amplified the 
deterrence factor in the Admiralty's war plans. With support from the CID Secretary, 
Sir George Clarke (1904-07), the DNI's suggestion was turned into a reality. In late July 
1905, the Committee accepted the fonnation of the joint planning body. Marking the 
"high point" of the Admiralty's influence over the Defence Committee, the overseas 
sub-committee never met and the CID never became a forum for inter-service/civilian 
planning because the Anny rejected the Navy's amphibious "schemes" while Fisher 
72 Memorandum by the DNI, "Preparation of Plans for Combined Naval and Military 
Operations in War", July 16,1905, ADM 116/8668, 1889-1912 Naval Staff Memoranda, CAB 17/5. 
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opposed the military's "continental strategy" to support France.73 
Before Morocco, the prospects for successful inter-service cooperation on 
amphibious projects had been favourable. Indirectly, the NIDI Admiralty had promoted 
amphibious projects and collaboration with the Anny through Ballard's lecture to the 
Aldershot Military Society in November 1903 and Hankey's 1904 work on advanced 
bases. Based on recommendations from Battenberg and the Captain of the War College, 
Edmond Slade, the Admiralty invited the General Staff to send officers to the 
Greenwich War Course in late 1904. Battenberg staunchly advocated such a venture for: 
"The more we can instil sound ideas of Naval War and the practical possibilities of joint 
action between the two Services into the minds of rising military men. the better. ,·74 This 
cooperative spirit was evident in September 1904 when the first joint inter-service 
manoeuvres occurred at Clacton in Essex. In a subsequent overseas expeditions 
conference-- with Ballard as Admiralty representative-- the exercise was rigorously 
examined for general principles to be adopted. Issues evaluated included: the 
equipment and despatch of large combined operations, individual responsibilities of 
each service, and the orders/staff work entailed by such operations. Secondary 
considerations dealt with transportation details, embarkation, and disembarkation. The 
Clacton manoeuvre was indicative of the proper methods for large-scale amphibious 
operations, although doubts were expressed over the opposed landing of troops under 
modem conditions. 75 
In late August 1905, Ballard began correspondence with Colonel C.E. Callwell, 
Assistant Director of the General Staff's Directorate of Military Operations (DMO) on 
the feasibility of combined Baltic operations. Within the Service community, Call well 
73 d' Ombrain, War Machinery, pp.68-72. 
74 "Attendance of Military and Royal Marine Officers at War Courses and of Naval Officers 
at the Staff College", War Office, June 2, 1905, Minute by Louis Battenberg, DNI, November 16, 
1904. ADM 117859, Admiralty. War Office. January-August 1905. 
75 "Report of the Naval and Military Conference on Overseas Operations", March 20, 190.". 
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was a proponent and authority on amphibious operations.76 Their discussion examined 
an amphibious landing in eastern Schleswig-Holstein as the first item for consideration 
by the CID overseas operations sub-committee. Initially, Callwell was receptive to the 
proposal which might divert 400,000 German regulars from the Franco-German 
frontier. Ballard was asked by the DMO to work out the naval aspects of the operation. 
Throughout September, however, the General Staff dallied in supplying the ADNI with 
the necessary information to complete the NID's end of the planning.77 The delay was 
caused by the summer holidays and opposition from other DMO staff officers to 
amphibious Baltic projects which they viewed as impracticable. Callwell's colleague, 
Major D. Fasson, deemed the proposal irrelevant to the main operational theatre and 
subject to failure. He cheekily referred to it as "Fisher's Invasion of Germany.,,78 As 
early as January 1905, the DMO had explored sending an expeditionary army to support 
the French on the Franco-Belgian border. By the time the Callwell-Ballard exchange 
had been initiated, that strategy was clearly in the ascendency at the War Office.79 
An interesting point emerges from these abortive NID-DMO discussions. The 
seriousness with which the Admiralty sought a consensus with the General Staff over 
a Schleswig-Holstein expedition was apparent since these negotiations coincided with 
the Channel Fleet's late summer cruise. Deterrence of Germany aside, the timing of 
Ballard's approach to the General Staff and Wilson's presence in the Baltic may have 
been Fisher's demonstration that successful operations could be conducted within this 
region and that the Army should "get on board" with the Navy's strategy. 
76 C. E. Callwell, The Effect of Maritime Command on Land Campaigns Since Waterloo, 
(Edinburgh, 1897); idem, Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance: Their Relations and 
Interdependence (Edinburgh, 1905; Annapolis, 1996-reprint). 
71 Ballard to Callwell, August 28, 1905, Minute by Callwell, August 29, 1905, W.O. 106/46, 
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78 "On Fisher's Invasion of Germany!", memorandum by Major D. Fasson, General Staff, 
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The General Staffs rejection of the Schleswig-Holstein proposal came in a 3rd 
October 1905 memorandum from Callwell, who apologised for having "misled" Ballard 
in his earlier support for a Baltic landing. The Army ruled out amphibious ventures due 
to the "overwhelming" strength of German land forces in the region. Call well did not 
entirely dismiss a landing in eastern Schleswig-Holstein provided that Alsen Island was 
seized as an advanced base. A Franco-British force would, however. be precluded from 
any other operations save the defence of its own beachhead. The hazardous nature of 
such a landing was underscored: "But the fact remains that an operation of this character 
could not be undertaken without running considerable risks and that it would do no very 
serious injury to the enemy ... .!t might conceivably end in disaster." Not only could the 
Germans secure Kiel, the Canal, and Wilhelmshaven from attack with some 850,000 
Landsturm reservists, they would successfully preserve their naval strength. Because of 
the "impracticable" nature of such an expedition, Callwell believed that the 120,000 
British troops required would be better employed in preventing German successes along 
the French frontier--the "continental strategy".80 While the DMO had made some valid 
points about the strength of German land defences in the Baltic, the Army's stance 
represented a fundamental misunderstanding of the Admiralty'S strategy. 
For far too long, historians have presented the Army's rejection of the 1905 
Baltic expedition, and later variants of this plan, as proof that the Navy's prewar 
planning was obsolescent, unrealistic, and poorly conceived.81 The Admiralty's strategy 
was, in fact, the opposite-the product of a carefully constructed process formulated after 
1887 as a response to the Dual Alliance, re-evaluated and modified by the NID and 
Fleet C-in-C's from 1901 onwards, and based on the traditional direction of British 
naval power at an enemy's strategic vitals as a deterrent. Should that fail, the same 
offensive strategy would expeditiously inflict such unacceptable damage that an 
80 Major A. Grant-Duff (DMO staff) to Captain G.A. Ballard (enclosure): Mem.orandum by 
Colonel Charles E. Callwell, Assistant DMO. "British Military Action in Case of War With 
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adversary would abandon the conflict. Once Gennany's fleet was destroyed. her 
commerce and ports were open to attack, a reality Ottley and Fisher knew only too well. 
An amphibious landing in Schleswig-Holstein would have diverted Gennan troops 
away from other eastern Baltic ports which would thereafter be vulnerable to attack or 
blockade. Had the DMO's misinterpretation of the Schleswig-Holstein expedition 
contained equally detailed evaluations of German naval and shore defences in the 
Baltic, their critique might have been more credible. 
The General Staff dismissal of the Schleswig-Holstein proposal was driven by 
another agenda: gaining Cabinet support for the "continental" plan as Britain's national 
strategy. Several inter-related factors spurred the Army to push this strategy at the 
expense of a more thorough appraisal of combined operations: it bolstered their position 
in relation to the government's defence expenditure allocation, improved military clout 
within the CID, and exorcised the ghosts of the Boer War which had diminished the 
military's reputation to the Navy's benefit. Moreover, the "continental" strategy 
prevented the Army from becoming a mere naval "projectile" and preserved its primacy 
as an independent organisation. Callwell was, despite his amphibious leanings, in the 
coterie of "new men" in the Anny; die-hard "continentalists" who wanted an 
independent role for the service and greater responsibilities. 82 It is not improbable, that 
the DMO corresponded with Ballard to obtain details of Admiralty planning to shore 
up CID support for their move towards the "continental" strategy by exposing 
weaknesses in the Navy's proposed Baltic operations. 
The General Sta:ffs critique of the Schleswig-Holstein proposal had little initial 
effect on the First Sea Lord. Fisher believed that the CID's overseas subcommittee 
would proceed and force the Army to work more efficiently under the Admiralty's 
leadership. Writing to Clarke, Fisher noted: "I look on this sub-committee as the one 
and only engine that will silently draw the War Office out of its present quagmire 'of 
one man waiting for another'. They are all of them each watching the other as to what 
82 d' Ombrain, War Machinery, pp. 142-43, and 9-11,75-9. 
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each are after." Fisher's concern that the Anny sought a more independent role by 
rejecting the Admiralty'S proposals was highlighted by the possibility that the overseas 
sub-committee could be negated should the government change after the 1906 General 
Election.83 The War Office position on amphibious operations and the primacy of its 
"continental" plan ensured the demise of the overseas sub-committee even before its 
fust meeting.84 From this point on, Fisher's futile attempts to secure the Admiralty's 
dominance over the Army, brought him to loggerheads with the War Office's 
"continental" plan and, in the process, the CID as well. 
Mounting tensions over Morocco, before the Algeciras Conference, spurred the 
CID Secretary to clarify possible intervention in support of France. With the overseas 
sub-committee a dead issue, Clarke used the CID as an informal staff to decide between 
the Admiralty'S amphibious designs or the Anny's commitment to France as the proper 
British response.85 From 19th December 1905 to 15 th January 1906, four conferences 
were held at the CID's office's in Whitehall Gardens. Although all of the participants: 
Clarke, Ottley, Lord Esher, and the C-in-C of Aldershot, General Sir John French, 
supported amphibious operations, the Anny's plans and its open conversations with 
French military authorities were slowly supplanting the Navy's offensive strategy. The 
first conference outlined the Admiralty's "actions": the destruction or "masking" of the 
German Fleet, capture of German commerce at sea, a commercial blockade on German 
ports, isolation of her colonies, Anglo-French coastline security, and safeguarding 
French North African communications. Combined operations could take several forms: 
a fleet and amphibious forces in the Baltic to "menace" the German coastline; seizure 
of Baltic islands as a preliminary to a mainland expedition; and landing a large Anglo-
French force to threaten Berlin or the communication lines of German armies operating 
against France. With French collusion, the Admiralty'S preparations centred on these 
83 Fisher to Clarke. October 12, 1905, FGDN Vol. 3., p.29. 
84 d' Ombrain, War Machinery. pp.78-81. 
85 Clarke to Esher, December 14, 1905 cited in Mackay, Fisher. pp. 350-1. 
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contingencies, the employment of blockade mines against Germany~ and the transport 
of British troops to Antwerp or northern French ports.86 This first meeting revealed the 
extent of the NID's work in fonnulating a cohesive strategy and the Admiralty'S 
adherence to its potential implementation. Ironically, six years later during the Agadir 
Crisis, the Navy would present many of the same contingencies before the CID, and 
receive a similar rebuff to its strategy to aid France. 
The Whitehall Gardens group did not depreciate the Navy's ability to land and 
support 200,000 Anglo-French troops in Schleswig Holstein. Unfortunately, such an 
operation could only proceed after the German fleet had been destroyed and would have 
no immediate impact on battles along the French frontier. An alternative proposal to 
seize Rugen Island was tabled as it could lead to the establishment of a strong pied a 
terre for the landing of a future expeditionary force. The considerable time delay in the 
Admiralty's plan to aid the French influenced Clarke's decision that the DMO's 
proposal to despatch a British anny to the Franco-Belgian frontiers warranted further 
consideration.87 Under the direction of Clarke and Lord Esher, Colonel Repington, The 
Times military correspondent, began conversations with the French military attache 
Victor Jacques Marie Huget and through him, the French General Staff, which preferred 
the support of British troops on the frontiers. These preliminary conversations led to 
official discussions between the French and British General Staffs and confinnation of 
the 'continental strategy".88 Fisher never consulted French naval authorities as he 
believed that the Royal Navy would handle all aspects of a naval war with Germany. 
The only exception was a brief conversation between himself and the French Naval 
Attache, Captain Mercier de Lostende on 2nd January 1906. It was the only time prior 
to 1908 that Anglo-French naval conversations occurred on the issue of joint 
86 Notes of a Conference held at 2, Whitehall Gardens, December 19, 1905, CAB 18/24, 
CID: Miscellaneous Reports & Papers. Unnumbered CID Papers, 1905-1912. 
87 Notes of a Conference held at 2, Whitehall Gardens, January 6, 1906, CAB 18/24, CID: 
Miscellaneous Reports & Papers, 1905-1912. 
88 Williamson, pp. 66-78; d'Ombrain, pp. 81-8. 
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cooperation in a possible war with Gennany.89 
When the CID and the War Office endorsed the DMO's plan for despatching 
100,000 British troops to the French Channel ports on 12th January 1906. Fisher took 
a decidedly belligerent stance.90 When Clarke inquired about the state of naval 
preparations, the First Sea Lord expressed his adamant opposition to sending a British 
expeditionary force to France. He refused the naval support necessary to transport the 
troops across the Channel, deriding it as a "nuisance" for the Navy to have to safeguard 
"the Ferry". Adhering to the Schleswig-Holstein plan, Fisher was convinced that the 
Navy would predominate in any conflict with Gennany. Ottley was pulled from the CID 
discussions and Clarke infonned that naval cooperation with the French was out of the 
question.91 
In correspondence with Esher, Fisher reiterated his opposition to Clarke's 
prodding by reaffinning that the Navy's preparations would remain exclusively its own 
preserve. 
What does Clarke's letter which you send me resolve itself into? There are no 
naval plans for war because he doesn't know them! He has pumped Ottley and 
finds he doesn't know them either! He can go on pumping all round with the 
same result! The French War Office haven't told the English War Office their 
plans-what fools if they did! To peril their military plans for the drop in the 
ocean that our military support signifies! So also the English Admiralty intend 
to keep their own council! But as to our Navy not being ready! HOW SILL y!92 
To a certain extent, Fisher was justified in removing Ottley from the CID meetings and 
opposing the Committee's acceptance of the Anny's "continental" plan. While some 
historians have defended Clarke's criticisms of the Admiralty's position, others claim 
that his actions were an unnecessary intrusion into the Navy's planning that deliberated 
89 Marder, FDSF Vol. /., pp. 117-18. 
90 Notes of a Conference held at 2. Whitehall Gardens, January 12, 1906, CAB 18124. 
91 Mackay, pp.352-55. 
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#57. 
86 
irritated Fisher.93 Esher certainly believed that Fisher was more than capable of dealing 
with strategic problems and supported Ottley's removal from the cm council. His 
reaction, however, had serious implications for the future of inter-service cooperation 
on combined operations by strategically isolating the Admiralty from the Anny. the 
Defence Commi ttee, and the French until Churchill's advent as First Lord in late 1 911 .94 
Fisher's opposition to the "continental strategy" and the Admiralty withdrawal 
from collaboration with the CID and Army was the result of several interrelated aspects. 
His objections to Clarke's interference and refusal to divulge the Admiralty's offensive 
plans to the Committee, the French, and the Anny was partially due to the growing 
instability surrounding his own position. By early 1906, the opposition to Admiralty 
policy had not yet jelled as it later would under the "leadership" of Lord Charles 
Beresford and Custance. It was, however, still potent enough to warrant a "clamp 
down", especially in the realm of strategic planning. During his tenure as Service chief, 
Fisher "was engaged in a constant battle with his surroundings.,,95 To openly reveal the 
Navy's offensive strategy before the CID or the French, in the face of growing Anny 
assertiveness, might have undermined any chance of its successful implementation and 
compromised the central tenet behind the Admiralty plans: deterrence through a first 
strike capability. The NID's planning from 1902 on, Fisher's "Copenhagen" views, and 
additional Baltic plans after 1905, all represented a potential "masterstroke", the main 
essence of which was secrecy.96 In concept and design, the "continental strategy" was 
the antithesis of the Admiralty's strategy as developed between 1902-05 and Fisher' s 
policy to use the Navy's offensive strength to deter Gennan ambitions or, if necessary, 
93 See: Mackay, p. 355; compare Williamson, p.80; d' Ombrain, pp. 10-14,81-9,158, 
207,214,218; and FDSF Vol. 1., pp. 342-3. 
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swiftly terminate a conflict. The General Staff's design was diametrically opposite to 
his philosophy that war should be conducted with the utmost speed and violence to 
avoid a prolongation that unnecessarily wasted lives and energy. It was a theme he 
reiterated consistently throughout his life and remained a key component of future plans 
developed under his supervision.97 
The emergence of the "military entente" in early 1906, conflicted with Fisher's 
beliefs and quashed initiatives begun by the NID in 1903-04 for improved inter-service 
cooperation based on Britain's traditional maintenance of maritime supremacy as the 
guarantor of security. Traceable to studies and manoeuvres conducted during the Dual 
Alliance rivalry, the Navy's proposals were, arguably, more advanced in concept. 
design, and application than the Army's plan to directly support France. While the 
despatch of a large expeditionary force to the Northwest Frontier had been considered 
since 1903, the contingency to sent the British Army to France did not emerge until 
January 1905.98 Amphibious Baltic operations dominated the Navy's plans for years but 
were, with a few exceptions, devoid of any constructive military input. Admiralty 
planning after 1906 augmented the offensive themes formulated throughout 1902-05 as 
a response to the growth of the Gennan fleet, the Russo-Japanese War, and the 
Moroccan imbroglio. Later contingencies also sought to counter Gennan foreign policy 
moves, but in a region vital to the Royal Navy's strategic interests: the Baltic. 
97 Fisher, Records, pp. 227-30. 
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Chapter Three: The Scandinavian Dimension and War Planning, 1906-1907. 
1. 
From June 1905 to April 1908, the Royal Navy's strategic interests were wedded 
to the debate over Norwegian and Scandinavian neutrality. At issue were the Baltic 
entrances and Russo-German attempts to turn the sea into a mare clausum. British 
policy hinged upon Foreign Office/Admiralty efforts to preserve the Navy's access to 
the Baltic in the event of war. The Admiralty'S response was to implement a series of 
operational plans against Germany in late 1906. Unlike their antecedents, however, the 
Ballard Committee's 1907 war plans were a deliberate reaction to the possibility that 
the Navy's freedom of action in the North Sea and Baltic, and Britain's influence on the 
European balance of power, was jeopardised by the uncertain status of the Baltic 
entrances. 
The Admiralty's 1907 War Plans reflected the same themes developed in the 
1890's, especially the projection of the Royal Navy's power against an enemy's 
vulnerable regions. By 1902-05, these areas included the Kiel CanaL the Baltic, and 
German North Sea littoral. Inshore, observational blockade, and amphibious operations 
against these points were repeated by the same planners involved in earlier 
contingencies. The 1907 plans also explored an offensive economic campaign directed 
at Germany's substantial overseas trade: an aspect marginally outlined in preceding 
studies. 
Analyses of the Fisher regime's war planning have paid little attention to the 
importance of the Scandinavian dimension or ignored it all together. The general 
consensus is that the1907-08 plans were obsolete, unrealistic, and manufactured at 
Fisher's behest to buttress his position from attack by opponents within the Service. 
Others have linked his failure to develop a proper naval staff with the whole planning 
process. I While there was overlap between staff and planning issues, the quality and 
I Haggie, "War Planning". pp. 120. 124, 128-30; Hayes. "Admiralty'S Plans" pp. 95-6; N. 
Lambert, Naval Revolution. pp. 179-81. 
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realism of the contingencies created throughout 1905-09 did not suffer because of the 
fratricidal dissension generated by the "Fisherites" and the "Syndicate of Discontent". 
That the plans coincided with a diplomatic crisis involving the Navy's possible 
exclusion from the Baltic presents grounds for a reappraisal. 
The planning conducted in 1906-07 was taken seriously by the Admiralty. This 
is established by several interrelated factors backed by examination of the evidence. The 
economic orientation of the contingencies was a realistic assessment based on the 
projection of sea power against areas vital to Gennany' s national existence: its massive 
overseas trade and chief commercial ports. Vigorous offensive operations aimed at 
cutting Gennany's Baltic trade, especially Swedish iron-ore, coexisted with more 
moderate methods of curtailing seaborne commerce through a distant blockade. The 
plans were not haphazard creations to prop up Fisher, but lucid and flexible alternatives 
based on current diplomatic realities and the vulnerability of Gennany's economy. An 
evaluation of the officers involved in the 1907 planning reveals that the Admiralty 
seriously reconsidered its existing operational designs for an Anglo-Gennan war. The 
main planners were, at the time, the Navy's leading specialists in the operational 
studies' realm through their earlier NID work between 1902-05. Had the plans been 
compiled solely for Fisher's personal motives, the Ballard Committee's selection would 
not have warranted such careful attention. 
Another factor overlooked in evaluations of the Navy's 1906-08 planning was 
the attention invested by the Admiralty in actively testing the war plans. The appraisal 
of operational plans through manoeuvres began in 1888 and remained throughout the 
Dual Alliance rivalry. During the latter part of 1907, the Channel and Home Fleets 
again conducted manoeuvres to test scenarios outlined in the Ballard Committee's work. 
Arrangements for the creation of proper coaling and flotilla bases on Britain's East 
Coast also demonstrated that an "observational" investment of Gennany"s North Sea 
littoral, before a Baltic campaign, was accepted Admiralty strategy. 
The Admiralty's procurement policy demonstrated that aspects of the 1907 Plans 
were legitimate. By early 1906, the Fisher regime was considering the construction of 
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fast light cruisers to support flotillas consisting of new, longer range destroyers, such 
as the River Class introduced in 1904-05. The decision was a deliberate volle face to 
Fisher's earlier reform to purge the Navy of old unarmoured cruisers. This sudden 
switch from a publically declared policy revealed that the Admiralty sought the requisite 
ships to conduct the inshore North Sea and Baltic operations projected in the war plans. 
These realities, coupled with diplomatic efforts to retain access into the Baltic , 
demonstrated that 1906-07 naval planning was more than a ruse to thwart opposition 
to Fisher's reforms. In fact, this issue came to dominate his policies. 
II. 
Free access to the Baltic was a traditional axiom in British naval/foreign policy. 
Scandinavian timber and supplies were the Royal Navy's lifeblood from the late 
seventeenth century to the end of the Napoleonic Wars. From 1815 to 1890. the Baltic 
remained a potential theatre for naval operations aimed at curbing Russian aggression 
in the Mediterranean, the Far East, or Central Asia. Evidenced by the Crimean War, the 
Baltic was Britain's only avenue for bringing direct pressure to bear on Russia itself. 
Denmark and the Straits were also crucial. While the Admiralty focussed on the French 
fleets in the 1890's, the potential for Baltic operations remained. This possibility 
underscored Russo-German fears and their desire to tum the Baltic into a mare clausum 
in the early years of the twentieth century.2 Wilhelm II played on Russian fears of a 
British Baltic descent to affect a Russo-German compact and a realignment of the 
European balance of power around Germany. The initial steps occurred at a meeting 
between Wilhelm and Nicholas II at Darmstadt in November 1902 to discuss the 
pennanent neutralisation of Denmark. If Danish neutrality could not prevent the Royal 
Navy from entering the Baltic via the Belts and the Sound, Nicholas believed Gennany 
2 A. Lambert, "Part of a long line of Circumvallation to confine the future expansion of 
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and Russia should to do so by utilising Danish forts.) In December 1903, the Kaiser 
broached the neutrality question with the Danish King Christian IX, and attempted to 
cajole Denmark into a Russo-German alliance to preclude British entry into the Baltic 
in an Anglo-Russian war. This approach foundered on Danish indecision and Gennan 
naval concerns. The Chief of the German Admiralty Staff, Admiral Blichsel, convinced 
the Kaiser to forgo a Danish alliance in favour of a plan to occupy the Belts. This would 
tempt the British fleet into Danish waters where Germany held the tactical advantage.4 
Biichsel's recommendations were symptomatic of the growing "Copenhagen complex" 
then gripping the German naval and political leadership. A simulated British coup de 
main against Kiel had formed the basis of the 1903 German Naval Manoeuvres.5 The 
Kaiser's loftier desire for a Russo-German alliance masked the real intent of the 
negotiations: the vulnerability of the German fleet to a sudden British naval offensive. 
The 23 rd_ 24th July 1905 Bjorko meeting marked the apogee of Germany's 
attempt at a Russian alliance and the end of the Kaiser's early intrigues to restructure 
Europe around the Gennan orbit. This "abortive" defensive treaty, like the alliance 
offered to Russia in 1903, was quashed by Russia's refusal to jeopardise its obligations 
to France.6 Following Norway's secession from Sweden in June 1905, the treaty again 
reflected Russo-German concerns over Denmark's strategic position and their goal of 
a Baltic mare clausum. Wilhelm hoped an alliance would become the basis for a new 
) J. A. Lepsius, A. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, and F. Thimme (eds), Die grosse Politik der 
eurpiiischen Kabinelle, 1871-1914, VolumeXVIll, 1, (Berlin, 1922-7), p.75; P. Salmon, Scandinavia 
and the Great Powers, 1890-1940, (Cambridge, 1997), p.66. 
4 Salmon, pp. 64-7; F. Lindberg, Scandinavia in Great Power Politics, /905-08, 
(Stockholm, 1958), pp. 5-7; Carl-Axel Gernzell, Organisation, Conflict, and In.novation: A Study of 
German Naval Strategic Planning, 1888-1940, (Lund, 1973, pp.65-6; Lambl, pp. 181,218-24; P. 
Kennedy, "The Development of German Naval Plans Against England, 1896-1914" in War Plans of 
the Great Powers, pp. 177-80. 
5 Refer to Chapter Two, above; Steinberg, " Copenhagen", pp. 23-46; "Germany. Naval 
Manoeuvres, 1903.", Foreign Naval Manoeuvres, 1903., NID Report No. 719., pp. 7-19, ADM 
231140, Nos. 716-727. 
6 Refer to Chapter Two, above; Salmon, pp. 67-8: Die grosse PoUtik. f'olume XL¥. 2, pp. 
435-528: White, Transition, pp. 158-9, 173-4; Taylor. Struggle, pp.432-34. 
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continental bloc, eventually including France. This "new great centre of gravity" would 
attract the Scandinavian states and exclude British influence from the Baltic. The Kaiser 
again played on the Tsar's apprehensions by suggesting that Norway's independence 
could lead to Britain's seizure of a Norwegian base at Christiansand, the loss of 
Nicolas' Munnan ports, and the elimination of Russian North Sea access via the 
Kattegat.7 Wilhelm was convinced that British influence over Norway was inevitable 
by the machinations of his uncle, King Edward VII, who championed the investiture of 
his son-in-law, Prince Carl of Denmark (Haakon VI), as the new Norwegian king.8 
When Wilhelm again attempted to co-opt Denmark into the Russo-German sphere, 
Danish suspicion and British hostility towards the all iance' s hidden agenda (the closure 
of the Belts) ensured that Gennany's case could not be made in Copenhagen. On 2nd 
August, 1905, Nicholas was informed that the Danish compact was a dead issue.9 
Fisher's despatch of the Channel Fleet on a mid-August Baltic cruise, also moderated 
Wilhelm's decision not to push the alliance/neutrality issue with the Danes. 10 After the 
failure to ratify the Bjorko Treaty, no further German initiatives involving an alliance 
with Denmark were undertaken. II 
The proclamation of Norwegian independence on 7th June 1905, precipitated 
a crisis that brought Norway and Sweden to the brink of war. For Britain, the main 
concern involved any agreement meant to replace November 1855IMarch 1856 treaties 
7 H. Bernstein (ed), The Willy-Nicky Correspondence: Being the Secret and Intimate 
Telegrams Exchanged Between the Kaiser and the Tsar, (New York, 1918), p. 191; Lindberg, p. 35; 
Salmon, pp. 68-9; White, pp. 226-32. 
8 Ibid. p. 69; S. Lee, King Edward VIl: A Biography, 2 Volumes, (London, ] 925-7), pp. 3] 5-
26. 
9 Salmon, p. 70; Lindberg, pp. 35-7; Bernstein (ed) Willy-Nicky, pp. ] 17-20. 
10 Refer to Chapter Two. above. 
II N. Rich, Friedrich von Holstein: Politics and Diplomacy in the Era of Bismarck and 
Wilhelm II. Volume 2. (Cambridge, 1965), pp. 718. 728. 
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which had guaranteed the Kingdom of Norway and Sweden after the Crimean War. 12 
The Norwegians desired that the Great Powers recognise Norway's independence, 
integrity, and neutrality. These issues, and the status of the Baltic entrances extended 
to Sweden and Denmark when the Norwegians asked for a reservation clause allowing 
them to assist the other states should either be attacked. 13 This benign request soon 
opened a "Pandora's box", placing the strategic and political status of the entire region 
in doubt. 
Initially, the Foreign Office and Admiralty were concerned over Norway's 
ability to resist foreign pressures to hand over territory which could strategically alter 
the existing power balance in the North Sea. Britain's Foreign Secretary, Lord 
Lansdowne, saw it as a "serious blow to British interests" if Norway's situation led "any 
other Power" , especially Russia, to acquire a port on the Norwegian coast. It was 
essential that either a general guarantee of Scandinavian integrity be settled by all the 
European powers, the 1855 Treaty be renewed, or Britain reach its own Scandinavian 
agreement. 14 
Admiralty apprehension over leaving Norway unguaranteed mirrored Foreign 
Office observations that Russia may attempt to annex Finmark and gain a North Sea 
port. The DNI, outlined the strategic implications of ignoring Norwegian requests for 
a neutrality agreement, warning that ''the slow glacial drift of Russian intrigue and 
Russian expansion" could not be ignoredY In February 1905, the Cll Secretary 
reiterated the Admiralty's view that Danish neutrality be guaranteed to prevent the Belts 
12 David Sweet, "The Baltic in British Diplomacy before the First World War", The 
Historical Journal, Volwne XIII., No.3., (1970), pp. 451-3; White, p.228. 
13 Salmon, pp.71-2. 
14 G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley, British Documents on the Origins o/the War, /898-/9/4: 
Volume VIII, Arbitration, Neutrality, And Security, (London, 1932), Lansdowne to Sir R. Rodd, May 
23, 1905, pp.94-5. Sweet, pp.458-9. 
15 Memorandum by the DNI to the CID, June 5, 1905, CAB t 7/59. CID: Miscellaneous 
Correspondence and Memoranda, Foreign Countries: Scandinavia, t 904- t 907. 
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from falling into Russian or German hands. 16 June 1905 discussions in Denmark and 
Sweden over the deepening the Sound for the passage of heavy commercial vessels 
added to British anxieties. The Admiralty believed it "ill-advised" to agree to any 
deepening of the Sound. The only benefit to the whole scheme was that the Sound 
presented a less vulnerable route into the Baltic in bypassing "the dangerous vicinity of 
Kiel.,,17 
Bjorko indicated that Germany was exploiting Scandinavian instability to 
establish a mare clausum in the Baltic. The Channel Fleet's Baltic cruise in August 
1905 was both an attempt to neutralise German predominance in the region and a 
demonstration of deterrence during the Moroccan debacle. IS The outbreak of the 
Scandinavian crisis also coincided with the revision of existing war plans against 
Gennany. Continuing the 1902-04 NID work, the Ottley-Wilson designs from June! July 
1905 established the importance of the Baltic entrances to the Navy's operational 
plans. 19 Alongside Morocco, these contingencies were a reaction to the strategic 
instability caused by Norwegian independence. 
Rumours over Swedish proposals to deepen the Sound in early 1906, again drew 
the Admiralty's attention to the importance of the Baltic entrances. In late February, the 
British Naval Attache in Berlin, Commander Philip Dumas, reported that while in 
Copenhagen he heard considerable discussion over a Swedish proposal to dredge the 
Sound's Flint Channel. The implications were beneficial for the Admiralty'S existing 
strategy as "it would open a fresh and unguarded approach to the Gennan Baltic Ports 
16 Clarke to Lansdowne, "The Perpetual Neutrality of Denmark", February 6,1905, CAB 
17/59. 
17 Confidential. Foreign Office, June 10, 1905. "Denmark. Proposed deepening of the 
Sound", Cover minute by DNI, C.L. Ottley, June 23, 1905, ADM 117841, Admiralty. Foreign Office. 
June 1905. 
18 Refer to Chapter Two, above; Sweet, pp.457-8; "British Naval Policy and German 
Aspirations", Fortnightly Review, September 1905 in Kemp (ed), Fisher Papers 1'.2., (London, 
1964), pp. 301-3. 
19 Refer to Chapter Two~ Anatomy, pp.502-5. 
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and might result, in case of war, in enabling England to close the Kiel Canal from both 
ends." While a deepened Sound would give the High Seas Fleet a third passage out of 
the Baltic, Dumas believed that in a war, Germany would seize Denmark "en masse" 
to close all the Baltic entrances. Unless a British or French force was positioned near 
the Skaw, nothing could be done. In the attache's estimation, Germany favoured the 
Swedish proposal as it furthered their strategic designs on Denmark.20 
Dumas's report mirrored Admiralty/Foreign Office fears of a potential Swedish 
drift towards Germany. Because the Sound was an alternative route into the Baltic, the 
Foreign Office avoided deliberately offending the Swedes by agreeing to any future 
Norwegian guarantee that endangered their interests. If the Swedes felt slighted or 
abandoned in the neutrality issue, they would be forced into an agreement with 
Germany, the only other power which could protect them from Russia. Although the 
new Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, continued Lansdowne's policy of supporting 
a Norwegian/Scandinavian neutrality agreement guaranteed by all the European powers, 
he hoped to promote a rapproachment between Norway and Sweden as an adjunct to 
any new arrangement. 2 I 
Foreign Office machinations to counter German influence in Scandinavian 
affairs were complemented by another Admiralty demonstration. Emulating the 
previous summer, Fisher despatched the Channel Fleet on another Baltic cruise from 
late July to early September 1906. The fleet's itinerary included visits to Swedish, 
German, and Russian portS.22 His thinly cloaked deterrence was a rebuttal to similar 
German naval demonstrations and diplomatic attempts to sway the Scandinavian states. 
As before, the cruise conveyed the Navy's intention to pursue Baltic operations in the 
event of war and was not mere pantomime. 
20 Report by Commander Philip Dumas, British Naval Attache to Berlin, February 23, 1906. 
GerrnanylN.A. Report 7/06 Confidential. ADM 117841, PRO. 
21 Sweet, p.460. 
22 Ibid; "Baltic Cruise, 1906.", ADM 144127. Admiralty: Channel Squadron and Fleet: 
Correspondence 1867-1907., pp.132-72. 
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Strategic preparations, too, served as the sub-text to Fisher's "diplomacy". In 
late March-early April 1906, the Admiralty redistributed its home destroyer flotillas in 
coorelation with the NID's earlier plans. Three separate divisions comprising the new. 
long-range River Class destroyers were created within Home flotillas by Rear-Admiral. 
(D) (C-in-C Destroyers/Torpedo Craft) Alfred Winslow. The reorganisation reflected: 
"the policy likely to be adopted in case of war" which was "to detach at least 12 river 
class boats to an advanced base, near the enemy's port to be watched.'·2} The 
arrangement conformed to the July 1904 plan for a close watch on the Elbe. British 
flotillas near the Skaw, and Ottley's June 1905 close blockade ofKiel and Gennany's 
Baltic portS.24 This was complemented by the issue of German Government coastal 
charts to the Channel Fleet in mid-April 1906. The Admiralty thought this prudent in 
"case of an emergency arising" which called for the replication of the larger Gennan 
charts "for purposes other than those of ordinary navigation. ,,25 Both policies were 
driven by the deeper strategic connotations associated with a potential naval war with 
Germany. 
When Norway verified the guarantee it desired at the end of 1906, the 
implications enhanced British doubts over the status of the Baltic entrances. On 13th 
December, Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, Norwegian Minister to London. communicated his 
government's first draft treaty to the Foreign Office. The document re-confirmed the 
Norwegian position outlined in 1905: Britain, France, Germany, and Russia would 
recognise Norway's neutrality and guarantee its independence and integrity. Moreover, 
the provisions stipulated that Norway be allowed to depart from its neutrality and assist 
23 Rear-Admiral (D) Alfred L. Winslow, HMS "SAPPHIRE II" at Portland to C-in-C 
Channel Fleet. April 6, 1906, ADM 144/19. Admiralty: Channel Squadron and Fleet: 
Correspondence, 1867-1907. Destroyers and Torpedo Boats, May 1903-June 1907, pp.267-72. 
24 Refer to Chapter Two, above; Anatomy, pp. 479-80, 502-05. 
25 "Secretary of Admiralty to C-in-C Channel Fleet, April \\, \906": "C-in-C Channel Fleet 
to the Flag Officers, Respective Captains, and Officers Commanding H.M. Ships and Vessels, 
Channel Fleet", April 21, 1906, ADM 144/26. Admiralty. Channel Squadron and Fleet: 
Correspondence, 1867-1907. Records Channel Fleet. Volume I., pp.344-5. 
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both Denmark and Sweden should either be attacked. It was this last qualification which 
had such potentially damaging consequences to the Admiralty's strategy for a naval war 
with Germany. The extension of neutrality to Denmark and Sweden implied the 
inclusion of their territorial waters and meant that the Belts/Sound would be closed to 
belligerent warships during a conflict. From this point on, this dimension became the 
key issue for the Foreign Office during the Norwegian neutrality debates.26 With the 
status of the Baltic entrances in further doubt, the Admiralty redefined its strategic 
options in the event of war with Germany. 
III. 
The day following the submission of the Norwegian draft treaty, 14th December, 
1906, Fisher created a secret committee to draft a series of war plans against Germany. 
Ballard, then commanding HMS Terrible in reserve at Portsmouth, was chosen to chair 
the pane1.27 The timing and Ballard's selection as committee president were no 
coincidence. Foreign Office minutes on the draft emphasised preserving the freedom of 
the "narrow waters" into the Baltic in a Scandinavian neutrality guarantee?8 Ballard's 
appointment was significant, for he had recently served as senior naval officer on 
General Owen's Imperial Coastal Defence Committee and was ADNI in charge of the 
NID's War Division from 1904 to July 1906. His intellectual acumen, War Division 
service, and his work on earlier war plans made him the Service's most experienced 
operational planner.29 This was certified when Fisher offered him the DNI's post only 
26 Sweet, pp.460-2; "First Norwegian Draft Treaty, Communicated by Dr. Nansen, 
December 13, 1906", BD, VIII, No. 88., pp. 98-101. 
27 G. A. Ballard, "Record of Business, letters, &c.", December 14, 1906 entry, Ballard 
Papers, MS80/200, Box I, NMM. 
28 "First Norwegian Draft Treaty", Minutes by Eyre Crowe and Sir Edward Grey, December 
28, 1906, BD VIII., pp. 99-10 1. 
29 Refer to Chapters One and Two above; Ballard, "Remarks. On the Framing of Certain 
Plans ... ", May 1909, ADM 118997; Ballard, Record of Business, Letters, &c .. Entry for 3 July, 1906, 
Ballard Papers, MS801 200. Box I., NMM. 
98 
two weeks after his being made planning committee chair.30 The powers accorded 
Ballard to create plans "as full and complete as possible" was also impressive. Fisher 
had directed the Sea Lords and Admiralty departmental heads to afford Ballard '"every 
facility in their power" in the pursuit of the planning work.3! Given the gravity of what 
a Scandinavian neutrality agreement entailed for Baltic operations, Fisher wanted the 
Service's best "strategist" at the helm of the new endeavour. 
The Ballard Committee's deliberations occurred at the Admiralty. but mainly, 
at the War College in Portsmouth from December 1906 to April-May 1907. The 
Committee's membership included the College's President, Captain E.J.W. Slade, and 
Julian Corbett, then a lecturer on the War Course. Slade's (and staft) role was mostly 
advisory; the College'S war games serving merely to test the feasibility of designs 
before final acceptance.32 Ballard's intimation of this, similarities with the NID's 1902-
05 plans, and the Scandinavian neutrality context in which they were drafted, indicates 
that the 1907 plans were not based on the "juvenile" war games conducted at the 
College.33 Corbett's role was to provide academic insights on some of the strategies 
outlined in the plans. Fisher believed that the historian, "could add most materially in 
their educational value--".34 Despite being one of Fisher's chief propagandists, Corbett 
had little impact on the planning process, and was unaware of the "secret" material and 
details of the various proposals. Brought into the Committee when the work was 
30 Ibid, Record of Business .... , January 3, 1907 entry, NMM. Fisher wanted Ballard to either 
replace Ottley as DNI or let his name stand as an alternate candidate in case the latter was not 
accepted as Secretary of the CID. Ballard refused the offer to become DNI to get his sea time as 
Captain. He did, however, agree to stand as an alternative for the CID post. 
3! Ballard, "Remarks .... ", ADM 1/8997. 
32 Ibid.,"Remarks ... ", pp. 1-2; "Some Notes on the Early Days of the Royal Naval War 
College", The Naval Review, Vol. XIX, 1931., pp. 237-47; Kemp, Fisher Papers v.2., "Part IV. War 
Games, November 1906-January 1907", pp.446-54. 
33 Kemp, Fisher Papers, Vo!'2,. pp. 316-7. 
34 Fisher to Corbett, March 9, 1907, Fisher MSS, FISR 115, #232, Churchill College 
Archive, Cambridge. 
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completed, Corbett elaborated on the "strategic tenets" underlying the plans. nothing 
more. His work contradicted the plans on several key points, providing contemporary 
critics such as Lord Charles Beresford and later historians with "evidence" that the 
Admiralty'S 1907 war plans were merely a sham to dupe Fisher's opponents. 35 
The Committee's other chief planner was Ballard's NID colleague. the future 
CID Secretary, Captain Maurice P.A. Hankey, RMA. As the War Division's coastal 
defence/amphibious analyst (1902-06), he had accompanied Ballard on the Owen 
Committee's imperial defence inspection prior to his appointment to Portsmouth.36 Kept 
abreast of developments, Ottley was not involved in the planning process. Ballard and 
Hankey carried out most of the technical work with the former travell i ng to London 
once or twice a week to confer with Fisher while Hankey kept "in touch" with Ottley.37 
Repeating their War Division performance, the Ballard-Hankey "team" were again the 
nucleus of the Admiralty's planning in 1906-07 as they had been throughout 1902-05.38 
Their designs continued the NID's 1902-04 North Sea studies and amplified many of 
the same strategic themes dating from the late 1890's. 
The "Admiralty War Plans Against Germany-1907" comprised three sections: 
Part I, Corbett's scholarly introduction, "Some Principles of Naval Warfare"; Part 2, 
Slade's "General Remarks on War with Germany: A Preamble for Reflection and 
Criticism"; Part 3, Plans A (AI) to D (DI) with Appendices.39 Corbett's contribution 
35 Schurman, Corbett, pp. 66-7; Haggie, pp. 120-5; Kemp, pp. 316-7; N. Lambert, Naval 
Revolution, pp. 180-1. 
36 Refer to Chapter Two above; Hankey, Supreme Command v. J., pp. 24-5, 30-9; Roskill, 
Hankey v.l., pp. 61-2, 66-7. 
37 Hankey, Supreme Commandv.i., p.39. 
38 This contradicts Professor Schurman's belief that the Navy's war planning "triumvirate" 
throughout 1905-07 was Ottley, Corbett, and Slade. Refer to: Corbett, pp. 41-5. Given the minor role 
played by these individuals and the War College in the drafting of the 1907 Plans, Schurman's 
contention is questionable. 
39The Admiralty's 1907 War Plans Against Germany and the 1908 "W" series plans 
comprise ADM 116/1043B, Parts 1 and 2 at the PRO. The Ballard Committ~~'s work, save Fisher's 
Commentary on the plans, are published in their entirety in Kemp (ed), The fISher Papers v.2 .. pp. 
318-464. 
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included axioms he and Slade had worked on in the War Course, published as "Strategic 
Terms and Definitions used in Lectures on Naval History'" and commonly knO\\TI as 
"The Green Pamphlet". 40 Aspects of the "Green Pamphlet" discussed in Part 1 deal t 
with general principles such as plans being dependent on the conflict. The 
Introduction's theme involved Corbett's "Command of the Sea" theory which was based 
on control of maritime communication lines, was never absolute, and was only 
exercised by "minor" types (cruisers and flotillas).41 Contrasting the Admiralty's 
existing offensive plans, Corbett deprecated the close blockade under modem 
conditions. He advocated a more open blockade with the British fleet in a secure 
position beyond an enemy's torpedo flotillas, similar to Philip Colomb's "masking-
observational" categories. Flotillas had, "destroyed close blockade, the pivot on which 
the old strategy mainly tumed."42 Excluded from the Committee's planning work, it is 
doubtful that Corbett realised that the war plans contained both his "open" blockade 
prescription and enhanced versions of the "old" strategy. 
Part 2, "General Remarks on War with Germany: A Preamble for Reflection and 
Criticism", was Slade's contribution to the Committee's work. It duplicated his 
September 1906 paper, "War With Germany", which outlined triggers for a future 
conflict and contingencies for each case.43 These included: a German invasion of the 
Low Countries, absorption of the Austro-HungarianiOttoman Empire, and the 
establishment of German colonies in South America.44 Slade merely reiterated case 
40 Schunnan, Corbett, pp. 50-5,67 and Education, pp. 164-5. 
41 Kemp. Fisher Papers v.2., pp. 318-28.; "The Green Pamphlet". War Course. "Strategical 
Tenns and Definitions used in Lectures on Naval History." prepared by Julian S. Corbett, Esq., LLM. 
(Lecturer in Naval History), Corbett MSS, MS 811143, Box 6: War College, Admiralty, and 
Committee of Imperial Defence., NMM. 
42 Kemp, Fisher Papers v.2., pp. 331-5. 
43 Captain of the War College, E. J. W. Slade, "War With Gennany.", September 1,1906, 
ADM 116/1036B, Case 0084. Reproduced (minus signature) in Case 0073, Section "War Plans, 
Opinions and Plans." 
44 Ibid; Kemp, p.347. 
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stu~ies examined in War College/War Course games throughout 1905-06. His 
appraisals were influenced by his interest in the effect of naval wars on European 
politics and Austro-German affairs. It was well known within the War Course that these 
aspects had influenced war game scenarios.45 It appears that the "Preamble~' was 
included primarily as an appreciation to the President and the College for their 
assistance in the drafting of the main contingencies. 
An amphibious advocate, like Corbett, Slade proposed seizing Borkum as an 
advanced base to control the Ems-Jade Canal should Britain intervene to prevent a 
German invasion of Holland or Belgium. The taking of a GermanlDutch island might 
entice the High Seas Fleet out where it could be defeated by the British Fleet(s). He. 
however, ruled out "Copenhagen" attacks on Kiel or other fortified ports as too costly.46 
Similar operations to draw out the Germans included: a close watch on the High Seas 
Fleet, taking Sylt as an advanced base, and an expedition to BrunsbUttal at the mouth 
of the Elbe to threaten the Kiel Canal, should Germany absorb Austria-Hungary. 
Supplementary damage done to the Canal might allow the Royal Navy to pass into the 
Baltic, operate along the coast, and threaten an expedition on Berlin.47 His scenarios 
repeated, almost verbatim, the NID's July 1904 plan and the Ottley/Wilson designs from 
1905. Those contingencies had mirrored 1900-05 German Admiralty Staff 
appreciations that a British foray into the Elbe or against Kiel had a likelihood of 
success.48 The August/September 1906 German Naval Manoeuvres again simulated 
combined British operations against Kiel and attacks up the Elbe, Weser, and Ems.49 In 
all likelihood, Slade and his staff consulted the NID Reports on the German 
45 "Royal Naval College.", Naval Review, Vol. XIX, pp.240-3. 
46 Kemp, Fisher Papers v.2., pp. 349-52. 
47 Ibid, pp. 357-8. 
48 Refer to Chapter Two, above. 
49 "Germany. Manoeuvres, Exercises, &c. Combined Naval and Military Manoeuvres. 
August 23,1906 and Autumn Manoeuvres. 1906. September 8-13.1906." NID Report. No. 834. 
September 1907, pp. 66-74 .. ADM 231/48, Nos. 819-854. 
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manoeuvres when compiling the War College games. The taking of Borkum as an 
advanced base was a recurring theme in the College's war games throughout 1905-06.50 
Only a few incidentals from the Preamble were included in the main plans. According 
to Ballard, Slade's input was limited to suggestions on the rough draft of each plan 
which resulted in "a few minor amendments only.,,51 The War College's contribution 
merely recapituled offensive designs that had already passed muster at the NID and 
Admiralty. Like Corbett, Slade was "out of sync" with the main work of the Committee 
due to his advisory status, a point contrary to other interpretations which have 
overemphasized the War College role in the framing of the 1907 plans. 52 
The "Introductory Remarks" outlined the premises, goals, and assumptions 
behind the Committee's four contingencies. Each plan dealt with the supposition of an 
Anglo-German war, with France either neutral or included as an active ally (Plans A 1-
D 1). They all examined the most effective means of bringing direct pressure to bear on 
Germany. Since Britain lacked the land power to affect a decision, the Navy's "full 
capacity" would instead be employed against Germany's mercantile marine and 
commercial ports. A third objective included a large German army if Germany invaded 
Denmark and seized Zealand and Fyen. This latter scenario was attributable to the 
Scandinavian neutrality dilemma as it was " the opinion of some authorities" that 
Germany would attempt to control of the Belts at the onset of a conflict. 53 While the 
High Seas Fleet was not the "ultimate objective", its destruction was a "desirable" first 
step. German overseas commerce would, "doubtlessly regret its loss, but no immediate 
suffering would thereby be entailed upon the material commerce and industries, such 
as would arise from a stoppage of trade. ,,54 The plans were therefore predicated on the 
50 "Royal Naval War College", Naval Review, Vol. XIX, p. 241. 
51 G.A. Ballard. "Remarks .... ", May 3, 1909, ADM 118997. 
52 Ihid, pp. 316-7: Schurman, Corbett, pp. 66-7; N.Lambert, Naval Revolution. pp. 179-80. 
53 Kemp, Fisher Papers v.2.,pp. 362-3. 
54 Ibid .. p. 363. 
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degrees of pressure exerted to destroy, stop, or impair German maritime trade: Plan 
AlAI, the primary stage to invoke the destruction or "enforced idleness" of German 
shipping; Plan BIBI, a "rigorous [North Sea] blockade"; Plan C/CI, attacks on Baltic 
ports; Plan DID I, combined operations to counter a German invasion of Denmark. The 
implementation of any of these options was left to the government, including exactly 
how far each plan would be modified to suit particular circumstances.55 
Near the end of the "Introductory Remarks", the planners revealed the real 
motivations for the plans in two sections entitled: "The Political Status of the Baltic 
Entrances" and "Proposals for Effectively Closing the Mouth of the Elbe. ,. The status 
of the Baltic straits was "a matter of supreme importance in connection with any plans 
for conducting hostilities against Germany." Given the"vague" position of the Belts, 
caused by the Norwegian neutrality issue, "considerable difficulties" negated any 
definite plan that might infringe Danish neutrality. The planners believed that the onus 
of drawing the Baltic entrances "into the actual sphere of operations" lay with a German 
violation of Denmark's neutrality, "if we can contrive it." Until the Great Belt's status 
was resolved, no reliable campaign could be forwarded. 56 
Evidence that themes from 1902-05, if not earlier, were continued was apparent 
as it was thought vital to eliminate the Kiel Canal's interior advantage by "the necessity 
of being able to definitely obstruct the mouth of the Elbe". Despite Ottley's 1905 mine 
blockade proposals, mines were unreliable and nonpermanent obstructions. Since, "Our 
entire plan of campaign may be very largely dependent upon our power to do this 
[blocking the Elbe]", the planners thought it may be imperative to sacrifice a hundred 
vessels to seal the Elbe.57 Like the July 1904-1905 plans, this design appreciated that 
this option was a necessary precursor to offensive operations in the Baltic. 
Plan AlAI was, however, a significant departure from the Admiralty's earlier 
55 Ibid. pp. 363-7. 
56 Ibid .• pp.370-1. 
57 Ibid. p. 371. Refer to Chapter Two above; Anatomy, pp. 479-80. 
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offensive designs. It was based on naval operations against Dutch trade in the 
seventeenth century which had forced the enemy fleets out to decisive defeat by the 
Royal Navy. Applied to modem conditions, German overseas trade could be crippled 
with minimal risk and difficulty through a distant North Sea blockade. 58 A cordon of 
42 cruisers and 4 torpedo gunboats would block the northern North Sea exit: from 
Pentland Firth to the Orkneys, on to the Shetlands, and then towards the Norwegian 
coast. If Norway remained neutral, the cordon would end near Vaagso Island. outside 
Norwegian territorial waters. Eight Scouts operating from Dover would seal the south-
eastern English Channel from the South Goodwin Light to the Outer Ruytingen Shoals 
off the French coast. The North Sea was divided into two separate command areas on 
either side of a line extending from Newcastle to Lemwig in Denmark. The northern 
line was supported by 8 armoured cruisers and 36 destroyers based on the Forth with 
the Channel cordon augmented by an armoured cruiser, 49 destroyers/torpedo-boats, 
and 11 "B" Class submarines. When available, armed merchant cruisers would replace 
cruisers on the northern cordon and the latter despatched to hunt down German shipping 
that slipped through the blockade. The British battle fleet (51 battleships and 13 
armoured cruisers) would be concentrated in the Humber to support either cordon and 
counter High Seas Fleet movements.59 The blockade and central position of the British 
fleet would force the Germans out to defend their trade where they would be engaged 
after their Baltic line of retreat had been cut off.60 AlAI corresponded to the NID's 
1902 North Sea studies which had recommended placing the Home Fleet in a centrally 
commanding position in the North Sea. The northern cordon repeated the northern 
"British" patrol line from the May 1902 NIDlWar College scenario.61 
Plan A 1 envisioned a French alliance and concentration of their main fleet in the 
58 Ballard. "Remarks .... ", May 3.1909, ADM )/8997, p.4. 
59 Kemp. Fisher Papers v.2., pp. 362-93. 
60 Ballard. "Remarks .... ", ADM 118997, p.4. 
61 Refer to Chapter Two, above. pp. 54-5, footnotes I t. 15-17. 
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Mediterranean against Austria and Italy should either country maintain their Triple 
Alliance obligations and enter the war. The British Mediterranean fleet could then 
reinforce the Humber battle fleet and the North Sea cordon. France would protect all ied 
Mediterranean interests, hunt down German shipping in that region, and establish the 
Channel cordon supported by a French submarine flotilla at Dover. A strong Cherbourg 
based fleet could support the British fleet in the North Sea.62 Assessing AJ AI's impact, 
the planners believed that the blockade would have a "very considerable" impact upon 
German interests. Neutral trade alone was"insufficient" for Germany's needs since its 
commercial interests would have to pay abnormally high rates to divert the remaining 
35% of the world's shipping tonnage (excluding 55% British and 100/0 Gennan) to 
fulfill their requirements. 63 
AlAI's economic lean was attributable to earlier evaluations of campaigns 
against an enemy's commercial interests. In 1905, Ottley had promoted both a mine and 
close blockade of Baltic and North Sea commercial ports as a means of curtailing 
Germany's overseas trade. 64 The DNI had outlined the Admiralty's economic guidel ines 
for war in a policy paper for the 1907 Hague Conference entitled: "The Value to Great 
Britain of the Right of Capture of Neutral Vessels".Ottley and The Hague Committee 
agreed that neutrals should be allowed to trade freely during a conflict, although limits 
wouLd be placed on the transport of enemy contraband. Britain's recourse included the 
blockade of an enemy's port and the capture/destruction of their shipping.65 The theme 
of the Admiralty's June 1906 Manoeuvres simulated an enemy's guerre de course 
62 Kemp, Fisher Papers v.2., pp. 393-4. 
63 Ihid., pp. 382-3. 
64 Refer to Chapter Two, above. 
65 Captain c.L. Ottley, "The Value to Great Britain of the Right of Capture .0fNeutral .. 
Vessels",9 May .. 1906, pp. 1-2., Fisher MSS, FISR 8/20, Churchill College, Cambndge; OtTer. firs' 
World War, pp. 274-5. 
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against British trade.66 Under AlAI, the dispersal of British fleets and loss of trade 
incurred during the manoeuvres could not occur as German movements outside the 
North Sea were restricted by the blockade cordons and the centrally concentrated 
Humber fleet. Not openly stated, the other influence on AlA 1 was the Baltic entrances 
dilemma. A distant blockade strategy aimed at "sealing" the North Sea averted the 
possibility that the Royal Navy might be excluded from the Baltic by any Scandinavian 
neutrality agreement. The Committee planners had created a feasible alternative should 
future diplomatic endeavours fail to maintain the Baltic status quo. 
Unlike AlAI, Plan BIB I was not intended for implementation in the event of 
war. It retained the objective against German trade but did so via a close commercial 
blockade. Remarks prefacing the plan deprecated its impact compared to AlAI 's distant 
blockade: "this plan would not add greatly to the punishment which Germany would 
suffer under Plans (A and A I), but it would much increase the risks we would incur 
ourselves." BIB I would only reduce German commerce "to a slightly greater extent than 
Plans (A and AI) .... ". Risks attending the plan, such as the dispersal of the British battle 
fleet and its exposure to enemy attack, were not "desirable" unless it coincided with a 
"vigorous" general offensive against the entire German coast or included French 
assistance. BIB I was expedient only if the government decided that the primary plans, 
A and C, could not bring Germany to terms. It represented: "a halfway step between 
these extremes, giving a minimum of result in proportion to the risks encountered." Its 
purpose was to "demonstrate" the difficulties of a close blockade in comparison to 
AlAI rather than "an approved plan of operations. '~7 BIB 1 was only meant to validate 
the other contingencies--a factor overlooked in other evaluations of the 1907 War Plans. 
BlBl amalgamated the NID's 1902-04 plans, Ottley's July 1905 proposals, 
Slade's "Preamble", and strategic themes from the 1890's. Germany's overseas trade 
66 "Detailed Programme and Rules of the Grand Manoeuvres, 1906.", May 9, 1906 and 
Vice-Admiral William H. May (Umpire) to Admiralty. July 5, 1906, ADM 11611001. Naval Trade 
Manoeuvres, 1905-1906, Case 444. Volumes 1-7; "Great Britain. Naval Manoeuvres. 1906", NIl) 
Report No. 817, May 1907, ADM 231/47, Nos. 809-818. 
67 Kemp, pp. 395, 408. 
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would be attacked through a close blockade against principal commercial ports: 
Hamburg and Bremen on the North Sea; Danzig, Lubeck, and Konigsberg in the Baltic. 
Two separate fleets would operate off the German North Sea estuaries and the Baltic 
approaches. To eliminate the Kiel Canal's interior advantage, the July 1904 Elbe plan 
was resurrected. Hulks were a more effective obstruction than mines which could be 
swept and necessitated a strong covering force to prevent their removal. As before. 
"sealing" the Elbe obviated the division of the main British fleet and effectively blocked 
Hamburg's entrance. With its western exit sealed, the German fleet could only exit 
through the Baltic where it could be advantageously engaged near the Skaw. Regarding 
the Scandinavian neutrality dispute, a clarification of Denmark's position was 
necessary: "in this matter of the status of the Great Belt it is most important to us to 
enunciate a definite line of national policy." Should Danish neutrality close the Belt. the 
British battle fleet would be relegated to the eastern Baltic during the day and forced to 
withdrawal to "a safe distance" at night to avoid German torpedo flotillas. The Baltic 
blockade would be maintained by an armoured cruiser squadron south of Fehmam 
Island, supported by flotillas comprising Rivers, 30-knot destroyers, and submarines. 
Detached Scout squadrons would blockade eastern Baltic ports such as Swinemlinde 
and Warnemlinde. The western blockade would be conducted by unarmoured cruisers, 
torpedo-gunboats, and destroyers off the North Sea river entrances. B 1 was contingent 
on the size of the French naval contribution given the political situation in the 
Mediterranean. If a considerable French naval force was available. they would blockade 
the eastern Baltic ports while the British conducted the Kiel and the North Sea 
blockades.68 
Along with the July 1904 plan and Ottley's 1905 proposals, BIB 1 repeated 
earlier schemes for the establishment of advanced bases off an enemy's coast. The 
seizure of Borkum and Heligoland to support the North Sea blockade were projected, 
with preference given to the former due to the heavy defences on the other island. This 
68 Kemp, pp. 396-404, 409-13, 432. 
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repeated Slade's prescription in the Preamble and was detailed in three Appendices. 
Borkum would be taken and defended by a force of 3000 Royal Marines, supported by 
older Royal Sovereign battleships in a bombardment role.69 The expedition's 
composition, defence arrangements, and the operation itself repeated Hankey's May 
1904 "Advanced Bases for the Fleet" paper.70 The planners, however, doubted BIB l's 
feasibility if the Elbe operation proved unsuccessful. If the Canal's exits remained open. 
the High Seas Fleet could strike against either of the blockading forces. Unless the plan 
was part of an "aggressive" campaign against the entire German North Sea littoral. 
and/or included French assistance, a close commercial blockade was, "'more to be 
deprecated than ever".71 While BIB 1 IS offensive orientation enhanced AlAI 's distant 
blockade, the last two plans in the series were equally aggressive and concerned with 
retaining access to the Baltic entrances. 
Plan C/Cl duplicated earlier contingencies and Fisher's "Copenhagen" 
pronouncements for a Baltic offensive. The plan escalated the pressure on German 
overseas commerce by advocating direct attacks on eastern Baltic ports. Although not 
stated, the main target was Germany's important Swedish iron-ore trade. Fisher. 
himself, was well aware of the vulnerability of this trade and the Baltic coasts. n The 
destruction of Germany's Baltic harbours was a more viable enterprise than similar 
operations against North Sea ports which were located up tidal estuaries, were strongly 
defended and, "could only be bombarded under great tactical and strategic difficulties." 
Protected by isolated defensive works, the Baltic anchorages were, however, susceptible 
to naval gunfire. Compared to the North Sea littoral, there were no impediments to 
navigation in the open, tide-less Baltic which allowed "spotting ships" to direct the 
bombardment. Once the port defences were obliterated, all shipping, locks, and facilities 
69 Ibid, pp. 405-06; 418-32. 
70 Refer to Chapter Two, above; footnote 39. 
71 Kemp, p. 408. 
n Refer to Chapter Two above, footnote 55. 
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could be destroyed. An attack on the Kiel Canal was ruled out due to the strength of the 
Cuxhaven-Kiel defences and extensive netlboom barriers that negated flotilla/submarine 
attacks on the Canal locks. In contrast to B, a bombardment of the Cuxhaven. Kiel. and 
Wilhelmshaven batteries was deemed "too formidable an undertaking", needlessly 
jeopardising modem British battleships.73 
C/C 1, however, retained the close blockade on the North Sea estuaries and the 
Elbe's closure as vital preliminaries to any Baltic campaign. To support these 
operations, the seizure of Borkum and Sylt was again proposed along with the Baltic 
islands ofRiigen and F ehmarn to support British flotillas offKiel. If the I Iigh Seas Fleet 
did not counter the landings in the Baltic, it might be attacked in Kiel Fiord by torpedo 
flotillas and submarines preceded by "boom-breakers". Once the Elbe and Borkum/Sylt 
expeditions had accomplished their objectives, the entire British fleet would proceed 
tluough the Great Belt. Dropping off the Kiel blockading squadron, the main fleet 
would then position itself east of the Fehmam Belt to support the Kiel force. The eastern 
ports of Swinemiinde, Neufaluwasser, and Pillau would be bombarded by the Royal 
Sovereigns and older "Special Service" battleships (i.e. Trafalgar Class). Once they 
were destroyed, flotilla attacks against the fleet at Kiel and the destruction of the 
Canal's locks were possible options. Another provision involved large scale raids by 
40,000 troops against the coastline from Kiel to Memel to tie down German forces. Like 
B 1, C 1 envisaged the French fleet's deployment in the eastern Baltic if Mediterranean 
conditions were favourable. 74 
Plan C/C 1 continued the axiom developed during the 1890's and adopted in 
1902-05--the offensive projection of naval power against an enemy's most strategically 
vulnerable points. The planners retained this dictum, but since the target was Germany's 
overseas commerce, they followed Ottley's 1905 recommendations for a Baltic 
commercial campaign. Attacks on Kiel, the German Fleet, the Canal, and amphibious 
73 Kemp, pp.432-4. 
74 Ibid., pp.434-6. 
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expeditions, were all secondary objectives once Germany's Baltic ports (and the 
Swedish iron-ore trade) were eliminated. Within the Scandinavian neutrality context, 
a campaign against commercial interests in the Baltic was an expedient method of 
bringing overwhelming pressure to bear on Gennany. 
The last plan, Plan DID 1, was, like AlAI, a direct response to the Norwegian 
neutrality dilemma and the potential closure of the Belts. Ultimately, the design was 
influenced by the instability in the region, the Kaiser's 1902-05 mare clausum 
scheming, and warnings from the Foreign Office and Dumas that Germany intended to 
seize Denmark en masse at the outset of war: "Plans (D) and (01) are based on the 
assumptions that those authorities are correct who believe that Germany contemplates 
an immediate occupation of Denmark on the outbreak of war, .... ". 75 Its primary 
objective entailed cutting the communications/supplies of German forces occupying 
Fyen and Zealand. Diplomatic uncertainties dictated two options. If the Danes supported 
German actions, all food imports into Zealand would be stopped. Should Denmark 
oppose an invasion, a British military expedition would be landed to force a German 
surrender. Landings could occur on Zealand's northwest comer, between Ise Fiord and 
Seiro Bay, which afforded ample accommodation, a secure line of advance, and clear 
fire support from the fleet. These operations were contingent on Plan C's 
implementation and an immediate close blockade of the Zealand coast. Combined 
operations to seize Sprongo and Omo Islands in the Great Belt and the Albue Peninsula 
were "necessary" to prevent German artillery from impeding the fleet's passage into the 
Baltic. As there was "no great difficulty" in occupying these areas, Royal Marines or a 
military force would be employed, supported by the Royal Sovereigns and older Special 
Service battleships. 01 repeated Plan C 1, with French naval forces attacking the eastern 
Baltic ports, allowing the British to blockade Kiel and conduct operations around 
Zealand.76 
75 Kemp, p. 436. 
76 Ibid, pp.436-8. 
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Aspects ofD were problematic, such as Denmark's diplomatic position and the 
Army's willing cooperation in amphibious operations. As preliminaries, D's 
amphibious proposals were identical to the Elbe proposal as a critical "'linchpin", 
allowing the primary offensive (C/C 1) to go forward. Like AlAI, the Danish operations 
were a flexible alternative, drafted specifically on the pretext that the Baltic might be 
closed to the Royal Navy. If the Belts were closed by force or a neutrality stipulation, 
D opened up the Baltic to C's assault on Germany's vulnerable eastern ports. Each plan 
was therefore highly dependant on the other for success and together consummated 
strategic axioms first developed in the 1890's. 
Despite a declaration in the Preamble's introduction that: "The opinions and 
plans herein .... are not in any way to be those definitively adopted except where that is 
expressedly stated, .... " 77, ship dispositions for Plans C-D indicated how serious the 
planners were about potential operations around Denmark and in the eastern Baltic. 
Some believe that the elaborate ship lists in the Appendices to Plans A-D are proof that 
the plans were concocted solely to thwart criticism that the Admiralty lacked an 
effective plan for war against Germany.78 Closer attention to the actual vessels 
comprising the flotillas assigned to Baltic operations reveals, however, that these were 
legitimate distributions for the plans' offensive parameters. The flotilla arrangements 
for C-D matched the earlier reorganisation of Home Fleet flotillas in April-June 1906.79 
Under Plans C-D's arrangements, powerful, long-range River Class destroyers were 
assigned to Baltic flotillas to counter German torpedo-craft attempting to disrupt British 
operations in the vicinity of the Belts and against Germany's eastern ports.80 The 
ongoing Norwegian neutrality dilemma, ChannellHome Fleet manoeuvres, and a change 
in the Navy's procurement policy also proved the viability of the Ballard Committee's 
77 ADM 116/10438, Part I, Volume 1, War Plans 1907-1908, Case #0073. 
78 Kemp, p.317. 
79 Refer to footnotes 23-4, above. 
80 "Plans (C) and (D}-Appendix I.", Kemp, pp.438-42. 
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plans had war with Germany become a likelihood before 1914. 
IV. 
Concurrent with the Committee's work (December 1906-May 1907), the 
Foreign Office and Admiralty worked to forestall any neutrality agreement which 
entailed the Baltic's closure. Eyre Crowe, Foreign Office Senior Clerk (1906-12), 
expressed trepidation over an extended neutrality including Denmark and Sweden. Such 
an agreement repeated the 1780 "Armed Neutrality" and a 1794 Swedish-Danish treaty, 
which were aimed at closing the Baltic to British warships. 8) In February 1907, Sir 
Charles Hardinge, Foreign Office Permanent Under-Secretary (1906-10), stated that a 
Scandinavian neutrality compact might not prevent a German invasion of Denmark and 
the closure of the Belts. Unless the European Powers guaranteed Danish neutrality, 
Britain's only recourse lay in recognising Scandinavian neutrality and a defensive 
alliance between Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Such an alliance was doubtful. 
however, since the Danes and Swedes expressed little support for neutralisation.82 Ottley 
expressed the Admiralty'S position at a 21 st February 1907 CID meeting. Norway's 
neutrality was a potential handicap in an Anglo-German war if Denmark's neutrality 
was not also assured. IfGennany occupied Denmark and closed the Belts, Britain would 
have to seize a Norwegian port, possibly Christiansand, to maintain a watch on the 
Skagerrak.83 Since the 1907 contingencies included Norway as the eastern "anchor" for 
AlAI's distant blockade and C's attacks on Baltic ports/trade, Ottley verified that free 
access into the Baltic was the cornerstone of the Navy's strategic policy against 
Germany. 
The connection between neutrality, naval planning, and the Baltic entrances was 
reiterated by Dumas. In early March 1907, the Naval Attache stressed the "immense 
importance" of Britain reaching "a full and clear understanding" with Denmark and 
8) Sweet, p. 462, footnote 44. 
82 Hardinge, "Memorandum on the Question of Danish Neutrality and the Free Navigation of 
the Straits giving access to the Baltic.", February 18, 1907, BD V//l. No. 91.. pp. 107-08. 
83 Minutes of the 95 th meeting of the CID, 21 February 1907, CAB 212: Salmon, p. 72. 
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Sweden over the passage of belligerent warships into the Baltic. Dumas echoed the 
Ballard Committee that the most effective means of bringing Germany "to book -, lay in 
the destruction of its overseas commerce, ports, fleet, and strategic assets such as Kiel 
and the Canal. Operations against these targets could only occur in the Baltic due to the 
strength of the defences at Cuxhaven and Brunsbiittal, the same realisation expressed 
in Plan C/C 1. Dumas repeated his February 1906 argument that the government 
consider supporting any Danish/Swedish proposals to deepen the Sound as an 
alternative route into the Baltic.84 The Foreign Office/Admiralty position was that the 
straits remain open to the passage of all ships. Any attempt to close them would be a 
violation of neutrality which might include Denmark or Sweden as Germany's ally in 
any future conflict. 85 Clearly, Dumas's interpretation and the Foreign Office appraisals, 
vis-a-vis the Belts and Sound, equated with Plan C's Baltic offensive. Ifa Scandinavian 
agreement or a German invasion of Denmark overturned the "status quo", Plans A and 
D gave the Admiralty flexible contingencies to pursue a campaign against Germany's 
overseas trade. 
Concerns over the Baltic channels included reducing Scandinavian suspicions 
regarding British policy. Sir Edward Grey's decision to "hush-up" on Denmark was 
motivated by advocates on the British side, such as Dwnas, who supported a secret 
Anglo-Danish arrangement to secure access into the Baltic.86 The Foreign Secretary's 
efforts were nearly undermined by Fisher's reaction to a potential German-Danish 
compact to close the Baltic. In a frank discussion with the Norwegian Minister, Nansen, 
Fisher warned that if Gennany occupied Denmark and closed the Belts, Britain would 
quickly occupy a Norwegian port (Christiansand) as a Skagerrak base.87 This repeated 
84 Sir F. LascelJes to Sir Edward Grey, March 7, 1907 with Enclosure: Captain Dumas to Sir 
F. Lascelles, March 6, 1907, BD VIII, No. 104., pp. 122-30. 
85 Minutes by Sir Charles Hardinge and Sir Edward Grey on Dumas to Lascelles, March 6, 
1907, BD VIII. No. 104, p. 129. 
86 Sweet, pp.462-3. 
87 Lindberg" pp 65-6; Sweet, p. 464, endnote 60; Salmon, pp.72-3. 
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Ottley's February disclosure to the CID and confirmed the crucial importance of the 
Belts and Norway in the Admiralty's Baltic strategy. Fisher's outburst was nullified by 
ajoint Admiralty-Foreign Office reaffirmation of their Norwegian policy at the CID in 
April. The Defence Committee openly endorsed the position that neutrality applied to 
Norway alone was "impracticable". 88 It was no coincidence that the Foreign 
Office/Admiralty initiatives regarding Norway and the Baltic entrances coincided with 
the final stages of the Ballard Committee's deliberations in January-May 1907. 
In June 1907, the Russian Foreign Minister, Alexander Isvolsky, forwarded a 
counter-draft eliminating the clause on a general Scandinavian reservation and offered 
instead a guarantee limited to Norway's independence, integrity, and neutrality. France, 
Germany, and, Norway, all supported the Russian formula; a development contrary to 
Britain's policy. The British government had to accept a neutrality agreement inimical 
to its strategic interests in the Baltic or become the only power opposed to the 
proposal. 89 Russia's desire to abrogate the Aland Islands servitude of 1856 and re-
fortify the islands, however, presented a way out. The linkage of Norwegian neutrality 
with the Aland issue gave Grey the pretext to veto the Russian treaty on the grounds that 
the islands' re-fortification would transform Sweden into a "Russian Grand Duchy". If 
Sweden submitted to Russian domination of the eastern Baltic or turned to Germany for 
protection, the Baltic could become a "Russo-German lake." The only means of 
resolving the entire Baltic problem lay in a meeting of the four Great Powers to revise 
the 1855-6 Treaties.90 Grey's stance forced Isvolsky to reject the idea of a conference 
since Russia wanted to prevent any further British interference in Baltic matters. The 
Foreign Office countered the Russian draft by advocating a separate Norwegian 
guarantee, but strictly in reference to the preservation of "integrity" not "neutrality". 
88 97 th Meeting of the CID, April 25, 1907, Minutes., CAB 212. 
89 Sir A Nichloson to Sir Edward Grey, June 19,1907. BD VIII, No. 94, pp. 112-5; Sweet, 
p.464. 
90 Sir Francis Bertie to Sir Edward Grey, July 9, 1907, BD VIII, No.1 06 .. pp. DO-I.; 
Salmon, pp. 72-3; Sweet, pp.465-6 .. 
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Despite a suspicion of British designs on Norwegian ports in wartime, Norway, Russia, 
and Gennany all agreed to Grey's stipulations for an integrity agreement--Gennany had 
to follow Russia to avoid becoming the sole opponent to the agreement. The Swedes 
were the only "hold-out" to the treaty, viewing the agreement as antithetic to their 
interests. Their suspicion of British motives delayed the treaty's finalisation until 2nd 
November, 1907.91 This was not, however, the end of the Scandinavian "status quo" 
question nor Foreign Office/Admiralty attempts to secure the Navy's free passage into 
the Baltic. Diplomatic debate over the Baltic situation, and Admiralty planning, 
persisted into 1908. 
v. 
Validation of the 1907 plans came in other guises. Upon completion, Fisher 
passed them to the former C-in-C Channel Fleet, Sir Arthur Wilson, for his observations 
and criticisms. The request and Wilson's May 1907 draft, "Remarks on the War Plans", 
corresponded with heightened furor over Norway and rumours of a possible Danish-
Gennan alliance to close the Belts. Judging from his intimation to Nansen in April, 
Fisher likely sought Wilson's input due to the growing uncertainty over the Baltic 
straits. The latter's survey of the Ballard Committee's work contained no serious 
criticism of the main plans and reiterated his and Ottley's June/July 1905 schemes. 
Dismissing Corbett's introduction as "general principles", Wilson outlined the same 
potential cases for war covered in Plans A-D: an Anglo-German war and France allied 
with Britain. Under the first condition, there were two options: "To endeavour to stop 
the enemy from coming out of his harbours at all", and to tempt the High Seas Fleet out 
to its destruction. Since a "close continuous watch off all the Gennans ports" was "very 
difficult and costly to maintain", Wilson believed these operations, outlined in Plans B 
and C, would not effect Gennan trade. Gennany would merely make up its deficits 
through neutral shipping or over land routes.92 
91 Salmon. pp. 73-5. 
92 Sir Arthur K. Wilson, "Remarks on the War Plans.", (May 1907). in Kemp. pp.454-6; 
ADM 11611 0438, Part I; FISR 5/13. No. 4231. Churchill College. Cambridge. 
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Supporting Borkum's seizure to watch the Ems, Wilson warned that close 
"watches" off the German North Sea estuaries were still liable to attack by superior 
force and were difficult to maintain at night. Replacing the close blockade, the Straits 
of Dover would be blocked by destroyers and submarines. Two fleets based either in 
Ireland or western Scotland and at Channel bases would conduct periodic "sweeps" of 
the North Sea; their objective to draw out the German fleet and cut it offfrom its bases. 
During the imminent war period, "Destroyers alone need be in the North Sea." 
Supported by Scouts and armoured cruisers, destroyer "watches", could be conducted 
off the North Sea littoral and near the Skaw to warn of German fleet sorties. Without 
allies, it was futile to launch major amphibious operations anywhere along Germany's 
coasts but transports should be provisioned for possible raids to tie down German 
forces.93 While stressing the destruction of the enemy fleet over trade, Wilson's 
proposals repeated A's basic tenets with the inclusion of a more offensive aspect (i.e.) 
North Sea "sweeps". 
In an Anglo-French war against Germany, Wilson repeated his June 1905 views 
against an economic campaign. Britain could only provide "serious assistance to 
France" through "a floating army" launching diversionary raids on the German coast. 
These raids would be "carried out with a certain recklessness oflife and yet not pushed 
so far as to risk being cut off entirely", to divert German resources from an attack on 
France. His principal operation was similar to the July 1904 plan, his June 1905 
proposals, and Plans B-C. A direct attack would be made up the Elbe by a run past the 
Cuxhaven defences to block the western end of the Kiel Canal and threaten Hamburg--
the same operation ruled out in C as far too dangerous and costly. Supported by a fleet 
of Majestic and Albion Class battleships, a "River Squadron", of Royal Sovereigns and 
other Special Service ships, equipped with "cow catchers" to keep off mines, would 
force its way up the Elbe. This squadron would blast its way past the Cuxhaven forts 
and endeavour to sink the German fleet in the Elbe with torpedoes and ram. Should the 
93 Kemp. pp.456-9. 
117 
Gennan fleet be absent, the squadron would attempt to destroy the Canal locks or secure 
the area.94 
In addition, Wilson advocated landings to support the Cuxhaven operations. A 
force of200,000 troops (mostly French) would conduct diversionary feints by appearing 
off the Skaw and threatening a landing at Biisum. Troops assigned to the Elbe operation 
would advance up the Weser and attempt a landing near Imsum to seize the railway and 
prevent Gennan reinforcements from reaching Cuxhaven. The main expedition, 
supported by the fleet, would land at Neufeld or Altenbriick to block Gennan 
reinforcements from the south. If the force maintained its position, the Cuxhaven forts 
could be destroyed/captured by a combined attack by the fleet and troops from the rear. 
Amphibious forays in the Baltic could only go ahead after the Elbe operation had 
completed its objective. If forces were available, troops could be moved into the Baltic 
to threaten Kiel and Stettin. Fehmam and Alsen would be seized as advanced bases to 
support the destroyers needed to guard against Gennan flotilla attack and conduct 
combined operations offKiel and Lubeck Bay.95 The second part of Wilson's survey 
maintained the axiom, stressed again in the war plans, that the closure of the Canal's 
western exit was a necessary precursor to any Baltic operations. Wilson provided two 
altemati ve strategies, roughly the same as the Ballard Commi ttee' s primary Plans A and 
C: one based on the possibility that the Baltic entrances might be closed to the Royal 
Navy; the other a vital preliminary to any naval offensive against Gennany' s vulnerable 
points in the Baltic. 
ChannellHome Fleets manoeuvres also verified that the 1907 plans were taken 
seriously. Channel Fleet and Fifth Cruiser Squadron tactical exercises in late June-early 
July 1907, examined a close watch on an enemy's main ports as outlined under Plans 
Band C. The first exercise would determine: "whether it is possible to maintain a force 
of Destroyers supported by cruisers off an enemy's coast which contains the enemy's 
94 "Secret, Wilson to Fisher", March 9, 1906, F1SR 115. No. 195., Fisher MSS, Churchill 
College; Kemp, pp. 460-1. 
95 Kemp, pp.461-3. 
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principal base, the Destroyer's base being over 150 miles from this principal base." The 
scenario simulated flotillas operating off Germany's North Sea estuaries or Kiel as 
detailed in B-C and Wilson's "Remarks". The task assigned to"X" (British) Fleet, 
commanded by Rear-Admiral George Callaghan, and comprising the Fifth Cruiser 
Squadron, Scouts, and destroyers, was to watch "C" fleet and report its movements to 
a fictional main fleet. "C" Fleet (Gennan), the Channel Fleet, commanded by its C-in-C, 
Admiral Lord Charles Beresford (1906-09), would attempt to leave its base at Portland 
unobserved and evade "X's" main fleet to carry out an unspecified "undertaking". "X" 
failed to monitor "C'" s progress, while Beresford missed an opportunity to destroy the 
principal "British" cruiser squadron.96 
Exercise II, 1 st _3 rd July, corresponded to C/C 1 's parameters for an observational 
force off the Skaw preventing a German sortie from Kiel before a British Baltic 
advance. The scenario's object involved watching an enemy's base, some 150 miles 
distant, with a battle fleet, attendant cruisers, Scouts, and destroyer flotillas. Beresford 
again commanded "C" Fleet (German), with "X" (British) commanded by the former 
DNI, Vice-Admiral Sir Reginald Custance, Second-in-Command Channel Fleet. "c" 
Fleet was nearly equal to the blockading force but weaker in cruisers and destroyers, 
which confonned to the High Seas Fleet's strength compared to the Royal Navy. The 
exercise would terminate once Beresford successfully crossed one of two meridians 
without being brought to action by "X". Beresford attained his goal when Custance 
over-extended his patrol line (and communications) too far to the northward. The 
exercise's tactical lessons included the proper destroyer dispositions for blockade lines, 
improved crew training for these operations, and the need for increased practice 
between destroyers and heavier units. This last recommendation was "all important" 
since British flotillas would bear the "brunt" of the action in the early phases of a war 
96 Tactical Exercises Channel Fleet, 5th Cruiser Squadron. Scouts and Destroyers, June-July 
1907, Exercise I, 24 June-27 June 1907, ADM 117926. From Admiral "0" Channel Fleet., 669-End, 
1908. 
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wi th Germany. 97 
The final exercise examined a blockaded fleet attempting a torpedo attack on its 
opponent before sortieing from its base. Retaining their roles, "X" (British) had to 
prevent "C's" (German) passage from Queensferry, (Wilhelmshaven, the Elbe) through 
the northern straits around Scotland, to its main base at Aberdeen. simulating an 
"enclosed" harbour with a North East entrance (Kiel). "X" was inferior in destroyers. 
but attempted to prevent "C's" flotillas at Aberdeen from attacking the fleet. The 
scenario equated with Plan C's proposed "watch" on the Elbe and Kiel and simulated 
a German fleet's attempt to move from the Elbe around Denmark to Kiel. The Canal 
was not included in the simulation. While "X's" dispositions prevented "C" from 
passing through the northern strait unmolested, Beresford's destroyers slipped out of 
Aberdeen undetected and found "X" Fleet. His observations repeated earlier 
assessments ofa close watch on enemy's port: "To maintain even this proportion, viz. 
half the number inside, off an enemy's base at a distance wi II require probably from two 
to three times the number of sea-going Destroyers able to keep the sea in the average 
weather that may be anticipated.,,98 The exercise had not, however, included the 
advanced base option to support "British" flotillas outlined in the war plans nor Fisher's 
suggested seizure of a Norwegian port to support operations in the SkagerraklKattegat. 
The exercises again revealed the necessity of keeping the longer range Rivers in separate 
flotillas from the 30-knot boats to enhance operations ofT an enemy's coast as outlined 
under Plan C's Baltic dispositions.99 
The strategic portion of the combined Fleet Manoeuvres (Channel, Home, 
Atlantic) in late October 1907 repeated the last exercise from July and directly 
corresponded to the Admiralty war plans. Its objective was a watch on an enemy fleet 
97 Tactical Exercises. Channel Fleet. Exercise II, 1 July-3 July, 1907, C-in-C's Observations 
on Exercise II; C-in-C Channel Fleet to Admiralty, August 1, 1907, Ibid. 
98 Tactical Exercises. Channel Fleet. Third Exercise, 8th to 10th July 1907, C-in-Cs 
Observations on the First Phase of the Third Exercise., ADM 117926. 
Q9 C-in-C Channel Fleet to Admiralty. Tactical Exercises. 24lh June-lOth July 1907. 
"Remarks on the perfonnance of Destroyers.", August 23, 1907, Ibid. 
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using two protected bases: one situated on the coast under observation, the other 
approachable through a narrow passage 145 miles from the entrance of a strait. A 
secondary objective evaluated the proper deployment for destroyers with their base 250 
miles from enemy territory. The scenario simulated Plan B-C's provisions for a British 
inshore "watch" off the Elbe and a distant observation ofKiel from near the Skaw. "X" 
Fleet's (German) bases at Stomoway and Cromarty represented Wilhelmshaven and 
Kiel respectively, the northern point of the Orkneys served as the Skaw, and Pentland 
Firth mimicked the Kiel Canal. The distance between "C" Fleet's (British) base at 
Queensferry and Cromarty approximated the distance between Dover and the German 
North Sea coast-an endurance simulation for British flotillas operating ofT the Elbe, 
Weser, and Ems. Unlike the June-July exercises, "C" fleet had liberty to use any base 
in X's territory for coaling and re-supply, including the establishment of "temporary" 
or advanced bases as outlined under Plans B-D. "X" Fleet's objective (Custance), was 
either to cross the meridian of 40 East, south of Parallel 600 North; threaten to land 
troops on "C"'s territory; or attack seagoing trade. Commanding the superior fleet, 
Beresford would prevent "X" from accomplishing its objectives which could only occur 
by the location and destruction of Custance' s forces. 100 
"c" Fleet's organisation also conformed to the war plans, for its pt and 3rd 
Destroyer Flotillas (mostly Rivers) were the same dispositions as outlined in the 
Appendix to Plans C-D with these British flotillas relegated to blockade operations off 
Kiel. 101 Time restrictions, however, meant that neither side accomplished their stated 
aims. 102 Although Beresford's observations on the Manoeuvre indicated the " 
100 October 1907 Manoeuvres. Commander-in-ChiefThe Nore., October 12, 1907; 
Beresford to Noel. HMS King Edward VII, Channel Fleet, 11 October, 1907; Flag Lieutenant Bernard 
Buxton, HMS Albemarle, Atlantic Fleet to Admiral Noel, October 22, 1907, NOElll B, Noel MSS, 
NMM. 
101 October 1907 Manoeuvres. "Composition of Opposing Fleets.", p. 6., Ibid; Kemp, 
Fisher Papers v.2., p. 438-41. 
102 Flag Lieutenant B. Buxton to Noel, October 22, 1907. NOEIIIB, NM!v1; G.A. Ballard, 
"Remarks .... ", April-May, 1909, p. 8-9., ADM 1/899. 
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impossibility" of having an inshore watching squadron. his tactical critique proved 
another platform to attack the Admiralty over a lack of cruisers and destroyers. 103 The 
strategic lessons of the October Manoeuvres were inconclusive, but the exercise again 
verified that parameters of the 1907 plans, particularly Plan C's BalticlNorth Sea 
operations, were viewed as serious considerations. 
Concern over East Coast coaling and torpedo bases also indicated that aspects 
of the Ballard Committee plans were deemed legitimate by the Admiralty. Frequent 
North Sea cruises gave the C-in-C Channel ample exposure to existing facilities at the 
principal East Coast ports and their suitability for wartime operations. In early August. 
Beresford outlined the benefits and shortcomings of eastern ports and made several 
recommendations. Based on the distance to the Ems (Borkum Light) and the main 
German exit north of the Elbe, he identified three suitable anchorages for North Sea 
operations: the Humber, the Forth (Rosyth), and Cromarty. Out of these, the Humber 
was the best positioned "strategically", but was geographically indefensible against 
enemy torpedo craft and thus useless as a fleet base. As Cromarty was too far north, 
Beresford suggested Rosyth as the main fleet coaling base. He recommended that the 
Board consider: improving the Forth's defences, Cromarty as an alternate, Grimsby's 
development, and the Humber's employment as a flotilla base. The DNI and Admiralty 
concurred with Beresford's analysis and recommendations, adding Scapa Flow as 
another potential main base in the North Sea. 104 
Following Beresford's suggestions, the Admiralty informed the War Office of 
their intention to establish protected East Coast coaling bases. As, "any naval conflict 
in which we may be engaged will probably be decided chiefly in the North Sea", the 
Board needed the Army Council to consider the erection and improvement of defences 
\03 C -in-C Channel Fleet to Admiralty, June I, 1908, "Second Plan of Action for British 
Fleet", ADM 11611037B. 
104 C-in-C Channel Fleet to Admiralty, 151 August, 1907; Admiralty to C-in-C. 11M Ships and 
Vessels, Channel Fleet, 23 September 1907, "Coal ing Bases and Torpedo Bases on East Coast of 
England." War Office, February 6, 1908, ADM 1/8030, Admiralty. War Office. 1908. November-
December. 
122 
at the Humber, Rosyth, Invergordon, and Scapa Flow. Their Lordships regretted that 
this overturned the Owen Committee's 1905 recommendations, "but as they consider 
that for the efficiency of their war plans a defended coaling anchorage in northern 
waters is essential", a revision of the defences at the ForthlRosyth was required. The 
Fleet would need to coal in safety, north of Sheerness, due to the "high degree of 
organisation" of the German torpedo flotillas--a veiled allusion that the Admiralty "war 
plans" conformed to AlAI's distant blockade, Wilson's North Sea "sweeps", and 
"watches" near the German littoral and the Skaw.lOs 
The connection between East Coast bases and the war plans was also confirnled 
by the C-in-C, Home Fleet, Vice-Admiral Sir Francis Bridgeman. In November, 
Bridgeman informed the Admiralty that he concurred in Commodore (T)' s, Lewis 
Bayly's, assessment that destroyer bases be established at Granton, Grimsby, and 
Harwich "in the event of war with a North Sea or Baltic Power". Supported by Scouts, 
flotillas operating from these bases would be in a position to "be off the mouth of the 
Elbe, the Weser, and the Ems as soon as we can (the Elbe also covering the Kiel Canal), 
and also to guard the Skagerak." Analogous to C/C I 's proposed watch on the German 
North Sea estuaries and the SkagerraklKattegat, the distances for destroyers operating 
from Harwich and Grimsby to the Weser Light Ship were some 250-270 miles. It was 
expedient to base Scouts and two flotillas at Granton to assist in the cruiser "guard" on 
the Skagerrak ( detailed in C/C 1). These flotillas could patrol the Skagerrak in the 
vicinity of Christiansand Fiord, some 380 miles from base. After seizing Borkum, 
Bridgeman and Bayly suggested despatching a depot ship to Vooren Tief, northeast of 
the island, to resupply and coal destroyers watching the German North Sea coast. The 
six Harwich and Grimsby based flotillas could then relieve each other in 48 hour shifts 
working from the Elbe to Borkum, with one third always being coaled and watered 
north of the island Leaving the Forth, the Granton flotillas could establish themselves 
at Lister Deep, north of Sylt Island, for operations in the Skagerrak. Noting that many 
lOS Admiralty to the Secretary of the War Office, 23rd September, 1907, Ibid. 
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of Bridgeman's suggestions were in place or under consideration, the new ONI, Slade 
(1907-09), regarded the flotilla distributions as "excellent'" but ultimately dependant 
upon Borkum's seizure; the very proposal outlined in his "Preamble"and Plans BIB 1-
C/Cl.106 
The provision for inshore support vessels required by the 1907 plans was 
considered before the Ballard Committee's deliberations. At an April 1906 Institute of 
Naval Architects meeting, Admiral C.C. P. Fitzgerald outlined non-secret details of the 
existing SeOUl class. His paper and the ensuing discussion addressed the merits and 
shortcomings of current Scouts compared to Fitzgerald's original 1901 design and 
"worked" out by the ONe, Sir Philip Watts (1902-1912).107 There was considerable 
debate on the current type's value regarding armament, speed, range, and endurance. 
Custance, an Associate Member of the Institute, thought the original design lacked 
sufficient armament and was too fast for fleet reconnaissance and inshore work against 
enemy destroyers. Others supported the Scout concept, but believed that armoured 
cruisers were also suitable for certain scouting tasks. All members unanimously agreed 
that the coal supply and range of the existing Scouts was inadequate. Future vessels 
would have to be larger and carry a greater coal supply for long range operations with 
or separate from the fleet. 108 
Shortly after this meeting and the March-April 1906 home flotilla redistribution, 
the Admiralty considered replacing its older unarmoured cruisers with the Scout class 
derivative discussed in Fitzgerald's paper. At a 26th May Board meeting on future 
shipbuilding requirements, the Controller (Third Sea Lord), Rear-Admiral Sir Henry B. 
Jackson, stressed the "importance" of providing vessels as "Parent Ships" for 
destroyers. These new "fourth type" cruisers would approximate the Scouts in 
\06 C-in-C Home Fleet to Admiralty, 21 51 November, 1907, including Chart and Cover 
Minutes by DNI, ADM 1/8030, Admiralty. War Office. 1908. November-December. 
\07 See Chapter One, footnotes 133-4. 
108 "The New Scouts.'" by Admiral c.c.P. Fitzgerald, presented at the 47th session of the 
Institution of Naval Architects. April 4. 1906, Transactions. Institute afNaval Architects, Vol. 
XLVIII, 1906., pp.l-18. 
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dimension and assume the inshore roles hitherto assigned to the old Torpedo Gunboats, 
now too slow and obsolescent for modem requirements. The Board concurred in 
Jackson's recommendation that the first vessel of this type be laid down at Pembroke 
in April 1907.109 
The push for new scouting cruisers as "parent ships" for destroyer flotillas 
continued into 1907. In a 7th January memorandum by Ottley, the argument for a fast 
light cruiser was laid out. Until a replacement for the older unarmoured cruisers was 
found, "We are, therefore, driven back on the alternative of employing armoured 
cruisers for scouting, reconnaissance work, and cruiser work in general in blue water, 
reserving the role of inshore cruiser work entirely for that essentially modem evolution 
of tactical necessities, the ocean-going destroyer and its derivatives, such as the British 
"Scouts" pending the evolution of a more satisfactory type." 110 Careful not to deride the 
administration's programme to scrap the Navy's older unarmoured cruisers, OUley 
argued that the current possession of a sizeable "mosquito fleet" of fast craft enabled 
Britain, "to press home its investigations off enemy's ports fronting upon the Narrow 
Seas and German Ocean, with a well grounded confidence that, if chased, it may show 
a clean pair of heels to an enemy in superior force." The projected cruiser (HMS 
Boadicea) to be laid down at Pembroke was the forerunner of the new class which 
would meet "the tactical necessities" for "future naval warfare.,,111 Indirectly, the ONJ 
had implied the duties and the locales where the new types, the Boadicea Class Scout 
Cruisers, would be deployed: observational and flotilla support operations along the 
109 "Memorandum ofa Meeting of the Sea Lords at the Admiralty on Saturday, 26th May, 
1906. To consider future shipbuilding Arrangements, &c.-held in accordance with the wishes of the 
First Lord, to consider and advise him as to possible reductions.", pp. 122-5, Thursfield MSS, 
THUI212, Letters and Printed Material sent by Fisher, NMM. 
110 "The Strategic Aspect of Our Building Program, 1907.", c.L. Ottley, January 7, 1907, p. 
25. Richmond MSS, RIC/4/2/aJ, NMM. 
III Ibid, pp. 34-5. 
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Gennan North Sea coast and in the Baltic.) 12 
Fisher, too, affinned the need for new cruisers for inshore operations. \\'riting 
to James R. Thursfield, The Times Naval Correspondent, he explained the primary 
function of the Boadicea as, "Parent Vessel to Destroyers for the work of the inshore 
Squadron." He reiterated that the new type would not be a "rehabilitation" of the old 
unprotected cruiser policy, the "bug-traps", but would fulfill the role of "backer-up" to 
flotillas engaged in inshore work on an enemy's coast. 113 While the Admiralty's 
commitment to improved scout cruisers began before the 1907 plans, this switch in 
procurement policy coincided with the Scandinavian "status quo" dilemma and the final 
stage of the Ballard Committee's deliberations. The sudden drive to equip flotillas with 
"parent" vessels for "inshore" operations, belied the fact that the main strategic axioms 
underpinning the 1907 War Plans were accepted Admiralty policy, even before their 
completion in April/May. British diplomacy during the Norwegian crisis, Wilson's 
"Remarks", ChannellHome Fleet manoeuvres, the East Coast base issue, and 
procurement all confinned the legitimacy of the Ballard Committee's designs as 
potential operations in a war with Gennany. The 1907 plans were the paradigm for 
further planning aimed at preserving the Royal Navy's prerogatives in the Baltic. Like 
the Ballard Committee's work, these new contingencies maintained the same themes 
developed in the 1880's-90's and were motivated by the same strategic concerns. 
112 R. Gray (ed), Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, /906-/921., (London, 1992), pp. 
50-I. 
1 n Fisher to James R. Thursfield, 'Confidential', (March?), 1907, Thursfield MSS, THU/2/6, 
Some Letters (Fisher) to the First Lord and remarks on Admiralty Policy, NMM. 
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The Admiralty'S first "official" operational planning was prompted by the 
realization that a future Anglo-German war was a likelihood due to the High Seas 
Fleet's growth and Germany's attempts to break the diplomatic alignment ofthe Entente 
in 1905-06. The Royal Navy's strategy focussed on offensive inshore, blockade. and 
amphibious operations in the North Sea and, particularly, the Baltic as the only viable 
avenues where naval power could exert direct pressure on Germany. The plans were 
also bypro ducts of the Norwegian/Scandinavian status quo dilemma, reflecting 
AdmiraltylForeign Office concerns that regional neutrality agreements or compacts 
could effectively close the Belts and Sound. This would hamper an offensive against 
Germany itself. Increased opposition to Fisher's policies in 1908-09, principally from 
the C-in-C Channel Fleet Lord Charles Beresford, created an environment antithetical 
to the establishment of a proper naval staff. As Fisher's paranoia over Beresford 
increased, he entrenched the Admiralty's strategic processes finnly under his 
prerogative and away from his Service opponents. 
The April 1908 Baltic and North Sea status quo agreements, the Casablanca 
Crisis (September to November 1908), and Austria's annexation of Bosnia-
Hercezgovina in late 1908-early 1909 also motivated the need for supplemental war 
plans. The co-existence of the Fisher-Beresford "row" and new plans for a possible 
Anglo-German conflict has created the impression that the Fisher regime's operational 
studies were unrealistic "showpieces" produced solely to confound the First Sea Lord's 
opponents. I Although there has been one serious examination of the "W" series plans 
and related studies of the 1907-08 Baltic status quo issue, none has convincingly linked 
the Admiralty'S 1908 war plans to the debate over the status of the Baltic entrances.2 
I Haggie, " War Planning", pp. 118-130; Kemp, Fisher Papers v.2, pp. 316-7; N. Lambert, 
Naval Revolution, pp. 180-1. 
:2 Summerton. "British Military Planning", Chapter Five, pp. 223-97. Also refer to: Mackay, 
Fisher. pp. 365-75,401-7; Williamson. Grand Strategy. pp. 104-7: Salmon, Scandinavia. pp. 71-
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The Foreign Office's Scandinavian diplomacy and the Admiralty's planning clarified 
that each influenced the other and verify that the "W" series continued the Ballard 
Committee's work and earlier NID proposals from 1902, if not earlier. 
The validity of the Admiralty'S operational planning was again evident through 
procurement, manoeuvres/exercises, and other studies. In form, substance, and style, the 
1908 plans continued the 1906-07 contingencies and repeated many of their internal 
foibles. This occurred because strategic questions were compartmentalised within the 
War College and separated from the true planning department, the NID. Despite this 
shift, the Admiralty'S strategy centred on Gennany's North Sea littoral and the Baltic 
as part of Fisher's offensive deterrent against Gennany and to secure free access into 
the Baltic in pursuit of that aim.3 
Even with the Ballard Committee war plans and the success of Fisher's materiel 
refonns, his administration came under increasing attack in the summer of 1907. By 
July-August, Beresford's opposition to the creation of the Home Fleet intensified 
despite Admiralty remonstrances of its authority. Inaction by the Cabinet and First Lord, 
Lord Tweedmouth (1906-08), allowed the growing "feud" to expand publically after the 
November "paintwork" dispute between Beresford and the commander of the Channel 
Fleet's First Cruiser Division, Rear-Admiral Sir Percy Scott.4 Fisher's problems 
intensified with the CID's Invasion Inquiry (November 1907-July 1908). Questions 
surrounding the Navy's ability to prevent a German "bolt from the blue" forwarded by 
82,85-93; Sweet, "The Baltic", pp. 45] -90; and Brian Bond, "British War Planning for Operations in 
the Baltic before the First and Second World Wars", in Rystad, Bohme, Carigren, In Quest of Trade 
and Security Vol.2., pp. 107-38. Neither Salmon, Sweet, nor Bond, however, examine the] 908 "W' 
series plans in any detail nor links to British diplomacy over the Ba]ticINorth Sea status quo 
agreements. 
3 Lambert, "Great Britain and the Baltic, ] 890-19] 4", pp. ] -22. 
4 "Correspondence Relating to War Orders and Position ofC-in-C Channel Fleet (Lord 
Charles Beresford), May 1907-March ]908.", ADMI16/1037, Case 1697; "Signal made by Rear-
Admiral Sir Percy Scott.... 'to paint ship"., ADM 1/7925, "From Admiral "D" Channel Fleet, Nos. 
635-End, 1907, no. 656; FDSF v.l., pp. 91-104; Mackay, Fisher, pp. 360-66, 370-74;"The Channel 
Fleet: Lord C. Beresford and Sir P. Scott reported at Variance.", The Times, November II, 1907, p. 
9f. 
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Lord Roberts, Colonel Repington, the Secretary of State for War. Richard Haldane 
(1905-1912), and "invasionists" in the CID placed the Admiralty's policies under further 
adverse scrutiny.5 Against this backdrop, the Scandinavian neutrality issue re-emerged 
to again define the direction of the Admiralty'S strategic planning. 
II. 
The inter-relationship between the Admiralty's strategic aims and Foreign Office 
diplomacy over the ongoing Baltic status quo question continued in early 1908. 
Although Norwegian independence and integrity were settled in November 1907, fallout 
from the neutrality debates engendered mistrust amongst the northern European powers. 
The foreign Office adhered to the preservation of the status quo in the Baltic 
established by Anglo-french-Russian Conventions in the Treaty of Paris negotiated at 
the end of the Crimean War in 1856.6 Tensions in the region had re-escalated in June 
1907 when Russia announced its intention to abrogate the 1856 Treaty to re-fortify the 
Aland Islands. This threatened Sweden's sovereignty and implied a closer German-
Swedish relationship. 7 
The August meeting of the Gennan and Russian emperors at Swinemiinde, 
coupled with rumours of a secret Russo-German agreement to exclude non-Baltic 
nations from the region during a conflict, heightened British anxieties over the position 
of the Baltic entrances. In mid-November, Sir Edward Grey reaffirmed that given the 
Swinemilnde developments, the key British policy issue was the effect a Russo-German 
5 The minutes ofthe sixteen meetings of the CID "Invasion" sub-committee are contained in 
CAB 16/3A. Appendices to inquiry are in CAB 16/3B. Also see: d' Ombrain, War Machinery, pp. 
74-92, 154-9, 164-71, 175, 179-80, 184-6, 190-2,206-14,218-225; Williamson, Grand Strategy, pp. 
89-109; R. Williams. Defending the Empire: The Conservative Party and British Defence Policy. 
1899-1915, (New Haven, 1991), pp.130-7, 143-51; Semmel, Liberalism, pp. 80,85-95, 101-06, 137-
42; FDSF v.l, pp. 345-51; Mackay, Fisher, pp. 378, 381-3, 384-6, 392-4, 396-7; Schurman, Corbett, 
pp.79-98. 
6 See Chapter 3 above; Sweet, "The Baltic", pp. 457-64; Bond. "British War Planning", pp. 
107-09. 
7 Chapter 3 above. footnotes 89-91 . 
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rapprochement might have on the Baltic naval situation.8 Throughout December 1907-
January 1908, the Russians and Gennans attempted to assuage British concerns by 
reaffirming their commitment to a Baltic status quo agreement. Germany proposed a 
similar compact for the North Sea which included Britain. Germany, Denmark and 
Holland as signatories. Grey expressed no opposition to either agreement provided that 
France was included in any North Sea arrangement.9 As Russo-Swedish negotiations 
over the Alands and a potential North Sea accord continued into January 1908. the 
Royal Navy's strategic aims were again the primary determinant of Britain's 
Scandinavian policy. 
With the possibility of two separate agreements, the inclusion ofthe Belts/Sound 
in either was considered vital. The Admiralty's viewpoint on the proposed accords 
originated with the former President of the War College, Captain Edmond Slade, who 
replaced Ottley as DNI in August 1907. He continned that combined North SealBaltic 
agreements might ensure that the straits were included. It was, however, essential that 
the English Channel be omitted entirely. If Germany refused to accept the Baltic 
approaches unless the Channel was also included, Slade believed two agreements was 
the desirable option. He stressed that the agreement be to "respect" rather than 
"maintain" the status quo. Britain could then take "quick and effective measures" to 
protect its interests without direct interference from other powers. 10 When the Germans 
clarified the inclusion of the Channel in a single arrangement if the British persisted 
with the Baltic entrances, Grey and the Admiralty opted for two separate accords. 11 
Providing the Foreign Office with the "script" for the BalticlNorth Sea negotiations, the 
8 Gooch and Temperley, BDVIlI: Arbitration, Neutrality, and Security, (London: HMSO, 
1932), Nos. 106-1 12. Grey's November 19th letter to Tweedmouth is 112. Sweet, "The Baltic", pp. 
465-8. 
9 Ibid., pp. 468-73; BDVIII, Nos. 113, 118, 120, 125, 129, 136. 
10 Slade to Lord Tweedmouth, January 16, 1908, Slade MSS, MRF/39/1, NMM, and Slade's 
Diary entry for January 16th, 1908, MRF/39/3. 
11 Sweet, "The Baltic", p. 474; Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Lascelles (British Ambassador at 
Berlin), January 24, 1908, BDVIlI, No. 140, p. 160. 
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Admiralty began to re-investigate the Baltic access question should diplomatic 
initiatives prove unsuccessful. 
Concurrent with a renewal of the Baltic issue, Fisher created another planning 
apparatus to succeed the Ballard Committee in early 1908. This new body, the Strategy 
Committee, emulated its predecessor as a "pseudo" staff through its ambiguous links 
to the War College and the NID. Comprising a select group under the First Sea Lord's 
presidency, its membership included: Slade; the War College President, Captain Robert 
S. Lowry; the War Division ADNI, Captain Osmond de Brock; Fisher's Naval 
Assistant, Commander Herbert Richmond; and any other officers asked by the Service 
chief on an ad hoc basis. Meeting several times a month, the Committee fonnulated and 
discussed operational plans. As an infonnal "think tank" under Fisher's controL 
however, it was impossible for the members to know the full range of the Board's 
policy on any given topic such as fleet dispositions. 12 Unlike the Ballard Committee, 
this group was not a NID/War College amalgamation. There was no balance between 
the two agencies as planning became the War College's preserve with the NID merely 
providing infonnation and advice when required.13 The inclusion of Slade and Lowry 
as the principal members of the Committee meant that planning was influenced by the 
College and not the NID-a complete reversal of the Ballard Committee's procedures. 14 
The Strategy Committee's nebulous structure meant that operational planning was 
influenced by Fisher's whims and the experience (or lack thereof) of the War College 
planners. The move to a proper staff system was thus suspended by Fisher's desire to 
12 "Appendices to Proceedings of a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence 
appointed to inquire into certain questions of Naval Policy raised by Lord Charles Beresford:', 
August 12, 1909, CAB 16/98, Appendix 36, "Letter from Rear-Admiral E.1.W. Slade to H.H. 
Asquith.", May 8,1909, pp. 194-5; Slade Diary, January 17,1908, Slade MSS, MRF/39/3, NMM; 
Mackay, Fisher, p. 396. 
13 Slade to Corbett, January 3,1908, Corbett MSS, MS 811143, Box 6, NMM. 
14 Slade Diary, January 4, 1908, Slade MSS, MRF/39/3, NMM. 
13 I 
keep strategic policy isolated from Beresford and his other Service opponents. 15 
In December 1907-January 1908, Fisher approached the Foreign Office about 
a formal offer to assist Sweden in deepening the Sound's Flint Channel. Slade had 
recommended a similar proposal in November 1907 which stressed the potential gains 
of a Baltic offensive. 16 The advantages were: free access into the Baltic, easy passage 
for British dreadnoughts and older battleships through the Sound, and preventing 
Sweden from becoming a German satellite. The Foreign Office, however. deemed the 
proposal inopportune due to Swedish susceptibilities over the Aland Islands issue. 17 
Even as the Strategy Committee reconsidered Baltic schemes in February-March, the 
CID Invasion Inquiry debates revived amphibious proposals for Danish operations and 
inter-service cooperation. 
The link between Invasion and combined operations was influenced by Julian 
Corbett's re-employment at the Admiralty. Brought in by Fisher to work with Slade, 
Corbett prepared historical precedents to shore up the Navy's case against the 
"invasionists" in the CID. Coinciding with this work, Corbett was completing his 
England and the Seven Years War, the main theme being a study of successful 
amphibious operations (i.e. Wolfe at Quebec in 1759). His and Slade's work on the 
Invasion Inquiry reanimated Fisher's interest in the potential of amphibious descents, 
though he still opposed an independent role for the Army in national strategy. IS At a 1 st 
February Strategy Committee meeting, Fisher: "agreed that the best form of defence 
would be to send an army to sea [as] it would paralyse all Gennan initiative and would 
15 Slade Diary, January 6-8, 18, April 11, May 6, 20, July 11, 13, 1908, Ibid; Fisher to Sir 
Edward Grey and Fisher to Lord Tweedmouth, January 23,1908, FGDN v.2, pp. 155-9; Schurman, 
Corbett, pp. 73-8; d' Ombrain, War Machinery, pp. 157-60. 
16 Chapter 3 above; "British Policy in the Event of War with Gennany", November 25, 1907, 
HD3/133, Pennanent Under-Secretary's Department: Correspondence and Papers (Intelligence 
Service); Salmon, pp. 89-90. 
17 Slade Diary, January 1, 1908, MRF/39/3, NMM; Sweet, pp.477-8. 
18 Schurman, Corhett, pp. 60-3, 73-5, 82-98; J. S. Corbett, England in the Seven Years War: 
A Study in Combined Strategy, 2 Volumes, (London, 1907): Slade to Corbett, November 18, 27, 
December 6-7,1907 and January 3, 1908, Corbett MSS, MS 811143, Box 6, NMM. 
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tie a large portion of their forces to the sea coast." Through military contacts during the 
CID invasion debates, Slade collaborated with the DMO, Major-General John Spencer 
Ewart~ on the possibility of a joint Danish expedition. 19 The invasion sub-committee 
gave the Admiralty a forum to convince the Anny of the necessity for a sea-borne 
military force. During the CID's 20th February meeting, Slade asserted that the "threat" 
posed by an amphibious force of 60,000 troops would be enough to discourage a 
German invasion of England. Maintaining that the Anny was the Navy's "projectile". 
Fisher quarrelled with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), General (later 
Field-Marshal) Sir William Nicholson over the implementation of an independent 
military policy. The meeting, however, ended on an amicable note, with Slade 
convinced that the Army had come around to the Admiralty's viewpoint. 20 The Strategy 
Committee soon consulted the War Office over an expedition to Denmark and got the 
proposal "crystallised out". The soldiers agreed to prepare schemes for attacking and 
holding Zealand and the Nyborg-Sprongo-Korsor line in the Great Belt-- amphibious 
designs considered since 1904, outlined in the 1907 War Plans, and inspired by Fisher's 
conviction that the Baltic was the critical theatre in an Anglo-German conflict.21 In late 
February, uncertainty generated by the proposed status quo agreements and hints that 
Germany wanted the ChanneVStraits of Dover in the North Sea arrangement prompted 
the Strategy Committee to re-approve the 1904-07 proposals to block the Elbe.22 
Should the Foreign Office's diplomacy prove unsuccessful, the Admiralty resurrected 
its chief offensive options to secure the Baltic entrances for operations against Germany. 
By late February-early March, progress in the North SealBaltic status quo 
negotiations had brought the agreements closer to culmination. Germany assured Grey 
that the Baltic entrances would be included in one of the two agreements. In early 
19 Slade Diary, February 18, 1908, MRF/39/3, NMM; Sweet, pp.477-8. 
20 Slade Diary, February 20. 1908, MRF/39/3; Mackay, Fisher, pp.396-7. 
21 Slade Diary, March 4, 1908, MRF/39/3. 
22 Ibid., February 22, 1908; Sweet, pp.474-5. 
133 
March, Grey brought Sweden into the Aland Islands arrangement and persuaded the 
Russians to drop their position and preserve the existing status quo. With the Aland 
issue resolved both agreements were signed on 23 rd April 1908.23 These positive 
developments, however, had little effect on Fisher's attitude and official Admiralty 
policy. After the Aland settlement, he wrote to Edward VII that a more decisive 
guarantee was needed to secure the Navy's strategic access into the Baltic. 
I told Hardinge [Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ] .... that 
we were making a hideous mistake in our half-measures, which please no one 
and perpetuate the fable of 'perfidious Albion', and that we ought to have 
thrown in our lot with Russia completely and let her fortify the Aland Islands as 
against Sweden and Germany. For a naval war (as against Germany) we want 
Russia with us, and we want the Aland Islands fortified. Germany has got 
Sweden in her pocket now, and they will divide Denmark between them in case 
of war as against Russia and England, (and unless our offensive is quick) close 
the Baltic as effectually as the Sultan locks up the Black Sea with the possession 
of the Dardanelles. 24 
Fisher noted that this epistle "followed on" a previous talk where he had reiterated his 
1904-05 contention that the Navy should "Copenhagen a 'fa Nelson the German Fleet 
at Kiel.,,25 His correspondence revealed the direction of the Strategy Committee's new 
operational studies and the motivations behind them. He did not believe that the status 
quo agreements ensured the Navy's passage into the Baltic in a conflict with Germany. 
Slade, too, bombarded Tweedmouth with appreciations on the Baltic entrances 
and arguments that more decisive steps were warranted in an Anglo-German war. In 
March, he remarked that although the Germans would mine the Great Belt and maintain 
batteries to prevent the passage being swept, British naval/amphibious operations could 
go ahead, " .... and probably it would be found that with proper preparation by the Navy 
these Channels would in the end be quite as suitable for landing operations as the N. and 
23 BDVlll, Nos. 141-9,152-3. The text of the Baltic and North Sea Agreements are Nos. 
152-3: Sweet, pp.475-7. 
24 Fisher to King Edward VII, March 24,1908. FGDN v.2. p. 169. 
25 Fisher, Memories. pp. 3-5. 
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N.E. sides ofZealand.,,2(, In November 1907, Slade had argued for an offensive Baltic 
push "as soon as possible", at the outset of any war with Gennany. Securing the Belts, 
such an attack would quickly bring Gennany to tenns and would halt German sea-borne 
commerce. A naval presence in the Baltic would eliminate its use as a "safe refuge" for 
Germany's fleet and a staging area for expeditions against Britain. The DNI promoted 
Fisher's proposal to deepen the Sound even if it meant playing the Swedes off against 
the Danes who were less inclined to accept such an undertaking. The Admiralty 
conclusions were: 
1. That we ought not to abandon the Baltic. Whatever we may fmd it necessary 
to do in war as a temporary measure, it must never be admitted by actual word 
or inference, that we do not intend to defend our interest in those waters. 
2. That both Denmark and Sweden should understand that we do not intend to 
allow the entrances to that sea to be shut in our faces. 
3. That in order to ensure that we shall not be excluded from the Baltic, we must 
be prepared at any time after war has broken out to undertake a large combined 
expedition against Denmark. 
4. That the passage through the Sound is the best passage into the Baltic if it is 
deepened, and it will be to our advantage to push the work on if possible. 
5. That we should endeavour to convince both Russia and Sweden that it will 
so be greatly to their advantage if this passage is made .... 27 
A belief that Foreign Office diplomacy in the BalticlNorth Sea negotiations had 
not guaranteed the Navy's access to the Baltic led Fisher and Slade to pursue an 
independent policy. By late March, the Strategy Committee was constructing 
contingencies for the seizure of the Danish Islands.28 In April, Fisher circumvented 
diplomatic channels and approached Count Wrangel, the Swedish Minister in London, 
over the deepening of the Flint Channel. It was analogous to his April 1907 
conversation with the Norwegian Minister, Fridtjof Nansen, over a possible British 
26 "D.N.I. 's remarks on the Considerations affecting the Operations of a British Force in 
Zealand.", March 1908, Slade MSS, MRF/39/3. 
27 "Memorandum by DNI to Lord Tweedmouth on Baltic Operations", November 25, 1907, 
lhid 
28 Slade Diary, March 28, 29,30, and April 25, 1908, MRF/3913. 
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violation of Norway's neutrality. Grey repudiated Fisher's overture as the Foreign 
Office remained convinced that the status quo agreements had fmally settled the Baltic 
issue.29 For Fisher, the Admiralty would have to re-examine and re-draft its strategic 
options surrounding the Baltic entrances to secure what diplomacy had failed to 
accomplish. 
ill. 
The 1908 "W" series war plans originated in strategic concerns over the Baltic 
entrances following the BalticlNorth Sea agreements. Stimulated by studies begun 
during the status quo negotiations in January-March 1908, they were only marginally 
distinct from the Ballard Committee's work. This was primarily due to the Strategy 
Committee's status and composition. Linked excl usively to the War College and Fisher. 
it was bereft of the experience that former NID planners such as Ballard and Hankey 
had brought to the planning process. As such, the contingencies it produced largely 
imitated the inshore and amphibious operations again contemplated. 
The six "W" series plans, W.1.-W.6., all examined a potential Anglo-German 
conflict but varied in their assessments over the involvement of other powers. War 
Plans W.l. and W.2. dealt with an Anglo-German war, while W.3. assumed Britain 
would support France. The remaining plans explored the unrealistic scenario that Britain 
would face a German-American compact.30 The directive to begin the plans came from 
Fisher in late May with the first drafts to be completed in June. Proposals were passed 
from Fisher to Slade and the ADNI's, who then disseminated them to Lowry and the 
War College where the actual work was carried OUt.31 Corbett unofficially contributed 
through his work on the Invasion Inquiry, but to a lesser extent than he had on the 
29 See: Chapter 3 above; Salmon, pp. 72-3; Sweet, pp. 477-8; "Minute by Sir Edward Grey 
commenting on memorandum by Mr. G. H. Villiers on the 'Passages into the Baltic Sea', May 7, 
1908, BDVIII, No. 155., p. 182. Grey refers to Fisher's approach to Wrangel as coming "from a 
certain quarter here." 
30 "War Plans Gennany, W.1.-W.6.", ADM 116110348, Part. l. 
31 Slade Diary, May 26,30, and June 1, 1908, MRF/39/3, NMM. 
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Ballard Committee.32 
"War Plan Gennany, W.l." (June 1908), explored a Gennan offensive strategy 
anticipated to reduce British naval forces by enticing them to attack the German North 
Sea coast ---an operational plan studied and adopted by the Gennan Admiralty Staff. The 
1906 Gennan Manoeuvres simulated a British offensive against their North Sea 
coastline and amphibious/naval attacks on Kiel and the Canal; a fact known to the NID 
and Admiralty.33 The difference between W.l. and earlier plans was that it entailed a 
defensive strategy over thrusts against the North Sea and Baltic coasts. At the outbreak 
of war, British fleets would avoid the Gennan coast and hostile torpedo-craft. W.l. 
cautioned that British units should avoid entering the Baltic if Gennan naval forces 
controlled the Belts. The "North Sea Battle Fleet" would retire at night, "beyond the 
utmost limits which hostile destroyers could reach from their own ports.", (i.e. 170 
miles from the Gennan coast). The object was, "that a force in the Heligoland Bight will 
be able to cut off any small force which may leave the Elbe or the Jade, or give notice 
of any movement of the main Gennan Fleet." The plan postulated an "observational" 
blockade employing a division of six destroyers and a Scout off each estuary, with the 
cruiser returning to within 30 miles to support the destroyers at daybreak. Beyond the 
small cruisers on station. and out of Gennan flotilla range, an armoured cruiser 
squadron would patrol as a covering force.34 
W.l. comprised the new War Orders to the C-in-C Channel, which reminded 
Beresford that war planning, fleet dispositions, and strategic policy were exclusively 
under the Admiralty's control. These orders followed Beresford's 5th June letter to the 
new First Lord, Reginald McKenna (1908-1911), which outlined his chief objections 
32 Ibid., June 15, 1908. 
33 Lambi. pp. 333-8; "Foreign Naval Progress and Estimates, September 1907. Gennany 
Manoeuvres, Exercises, &c., 1906.", pp. 49-82, NID Report No. 834, ADM 231/48. 
34 "War Plan Gennany W.l.'" June 1908. pp. 350-402.403-43, ADM 116/10348, Part 1. 
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to Admiralty policy.35 The July War Orders summarised aspects of W.l. and the 
restrictions placed on Beresford's command by the Admiralty. 
1. The principal object is to bring the main German fleet to decisive action and 
all other operations are subsidiary to this end. 
2. The Commander-in-Chief will direct the movements of the 1 st Cruiser 
Squadron and Destroyer Flotillas off the German coast. 
3. He is to establish a cordon of cruisers from the Skaw to Norway. 
4. He is to stop the German trade in the North Sea. 
S. He is not to enter the Baltic without orders. 
6. He is not to pass the Straits of Dover except to follow the main German Fleet. 
7. He is to prevent any raiding expeditions leaving the German portS.36 
Plan W.l. incorporated Plan B-D's close North Sea blockade scenario, even though it 
advocated a more distant "observational" operation. Provisoes to seize one of the 
Frisian Islands as an advanced base were included in the Admiralty'S communications 
to Beresford. The Board: "attach [ ed] great value to the establishment of an advanced 
base for the torpedo craft; but the utmost secrecy being necessary for the successful 
carrying out of the project, its details are reserved for a special communication as stated 
in the print herewith."-- an allusion to Plans B-C and proposals considered since the 
1 890'S.37 
Conversely, W .1. 's prescriptions to keep the fleet away from German torpedo-
craft was akin to Wilson's "Remarks" and Corbett's "Introduction" to the 1907 War 
Plans, which deprecated a close blockade strategy due to the losses that German flotillas 
would inflict on even a portion of the British Fleet. W.l., in fact, imitated Wilson's 
proposals that a close watch on the German rivers and the SkagerraklKattegat be 
35 "Appendices to Proceedings of a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence to 
Inquire into Certain Questions of Naval Policy Raised by Lord Charles Beresford. 1909", 2 Whitehall 
Gardens, August 12, 1909, CAB 19/9B; Mackay, Fisher, pp. 400-01. Beresford's charges included: 
fleet allocations in home waters, the Home Fleet's constitution, no campaign plan, a shortage of small 
cruisers and destroyers, and lack of a properly defended East Coast base. 
36 "War Orders to C-in-C Channel", July I, 1908, ADM 11611034B, Part I; Admiralty, c.1. 
Thomas [Civil Lord] to C-in-C Channel Fleet, "War Orders", July l, 1908, ADM 116/1 037, Case 
1697. 
37 "Secret. Extracts from Official Correspondence, &c between the Admiralty and Lord C. 
Beresford, April 1907 to January 1908, War Orders, June 1908.", ADM 116/3108, Case 0086. 
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maintained to watch for High Seas Fleet sorties. 38 War Plan W .1. attempted to provide 
a viable alternative to the dangers associated with a close blockade like 1907's Plan 
Ai A 1 (distant blockade ).It did not, however, exclude inshore operations as it contained 
the "close watch" on the North Sea rivers and the establishment of an advanced base to 
support these operations. A German fleet sortie against light forces watching the North 
Sea coastline could have drawn the British fleet into the very waters that W .1. 's central 
premise intended to avoid. The inexperienced War College planners attempted to find 
an intermediate ground between the conflicting realities of a close watch on the German 
seaboard and the dangers revealed by Wilson's sober 1907 "Remarks". 
Plan W.2. (June 1908) was synchronised with the "observational" blockade and 
resurrected advanced flotilla base schemes near the German coast. The proposal for a 
coup de main on Borkum was ruled out due to increased fortification on the island but 
retained as a possible option. Other islands would instead be seized by an expedition of 
Royal Marines. Wangeroog and Sylt were potential forward bases, especially Sylt as it 
was already a German torpedo-boat station, possessed the proper facilities, and doubled 
as a coaling base for squadrons off the German North Sea coast and those watching the 
SkagerraklKattegat. The drawback was that the islands were defended, Sylt heavily. 
Another proposal included creating an "extempore" breakwater from hulks on the 
Horn's Reef where destroyers could coal and be serviced by a depot ship. The Home 
Fleet would be based at Rosyth with the Channel Fleet operating from Portland, 
midway up the English Channel. 39 
Apart from the Horn's Reef"breakwater" scheme, W.2.lacked originality. The 
advanced North Sea base concept originated in the NID's July 1904 plan, if not earlier 
in Ballard's 1897 RUSI essay, the 1905 Ottley-Wilson recommendations, and the 
38 1907 Admiralty War Plans for War With Germany, Part I, "Some Principles of Naval 
Warfare." (Corbett], and "Remarks on the War Plans.", [Wilson], May 1907, ADM 116110348, Part 
I; Kemp, Fisher Papers v.2, pp.330-1, 334-6, 454-9. 
39 "War Plan. Gennany W.2.", June 1908, pp.444-508, ADM 116/10438, Part l. 
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Ballard Committee studies.40 W.2.'s amphibious proposals duplicated Slade's 
"Preamble" and, specifically, Plans BIB l-C/Cl which contained Hankey's original 1904 
"Advanced Bases for the Fleet". The use ofBorkum, Syl!, and Wangeroog as advanced 
bases was projected in Plans B-D and Wilson's "Remarks".41 W.2. mirrored W.l.'s 
premise that British heavy vessels should stay out of the North Sea. Its proposal to use 
Rosyth and Portland as bases repeated Wilson's recommendations that two strong fleets 
should be based on northern and southern English ports. North Sea "sweeps" by either 
fleet would, it was hoped, cut the High Seas Fleet off from its ports. Wilson thought that 
destroyers alone needed to be in the North Sea.42 Lord Esher intimated that this was the 
prevailing Admiralty conviction in August 1908. 
I saw Francis [Knollys, Edward VII's Private Secretary] .... and a good deal of 
Jackie [Fisher]. We had one very long talk about Naval strategy and all his 
worries. J. told me of Arthur Wilson's determination, in the event of war with 
Germany, not to locate his battle-fleet in the North Sea. The rendezvous would 
be in the Orkneys, and there the fleet would lie, ready for battle. Only Cruisers 
and Destroyers in the North Sea.43 
Fisher's support for the more cautious North Sea operations advocated by Wilson and 
the Strategy Committee was implied. It supports recent contentions that Fisher was, at 
the time, initiating a protective North Sea strategy to safeguard Britain's East Coast. 
Throughout 1905-1909, Fisher apparently adopted a "flotilla defence" strategy 
that would keep heavier units out of the North Sea while coastal destroyers, torpedo-
boats, and submarines defended Britain against German invasion. This purported 
strategy was an economical response to rising British naval expenditure. It conforms to 
the equally controversial belief that fiscal restraint and an inclination for speed and 
40 Refer to Chapters 2 and 3 above; Anatomy, pp. 502-07; Captain G.A. Ballard, 
"Remarks .... ", May 3. 1909 , ADM 118997. 
41 See Chapter 3 above; 1907 Admiralty War Plans and Remarks on the War Plans by Sir 
A.K. Wilson, May 1907, ADM 1 16/1043B, Part I; Kemp (ed), Fisher Papers v.2, pp 395-454. 
42 Ibid .• pp.458-9. 
43 Brett and Esher Oliver, Esher. Volume 2, Journal entry. August 21, 1908. 
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heavy armament drove Fisher to favour a battle crUIser fleet over dreadnought 
battleships. "Flotilla defence" complemented the battle cruiser concept by avoiding a 
major North Sea fleet action and allowed the Admiralty to employ battle cruisers in 
defence of imperial trade routes. This supposition and analysis of Admiralty war 
planning is, however, cursory at best. It regurgitates earlier arguments that war plans 
were merely a foil to Fisher's critics without evaluating: the contents of the 1907-08 
plans, their relation to the Ba~tic balance of power/straits issue, nor if Fisher desired a 
"flotilla defence" why was the emphasis of 1904-08 planning orientated towards 
offensive operations?44 
The third plan, W.3., followed the BalticlNorth Sea agreements, but was 
influenced by the beginning of the Casablanca Crisis in late September 1908. With this 
crisis following Austria's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Grey warned the 
Admiralty that preparations were needed in case Britain had to support France in 
response to a German ultimatum.45 W.3. assumed that Britain would back France and 
preserve the European balance of power. While Part 1 of W.3. (September) was an 
immediate response to the Casablanca crisis, Part 2 (August) originated in the Strategy 
Committee's work during the BalticlNorth Sea negotiations, W.l.'s BalticlNorth Sea 
operations, the 1907 War Plans, and earlier planning from 1904-05. 46 W.3. Part 1. 
envisioned the transport of a British expeditionary army (BEF) of 70,000 across to 
Dunkirk to aid the French in battles along the Franco-German frontier. The antithesis 
44 N. Lambert's contentious, Fisher's Naval Revolution encapsulates the author's 1992 
Oxford DPhil dissertation, "The Influence of the Submarine Upon Naval History, 1898-1918." and 
related articles. See: "Admiral Sir John Fisher and the Concept of Flotilla Defence, 1904-1909.", The 
Journal of Military History, 59 (October 1995), pp. 639-60. Sumida's, In Defence, outlines his belief 
that the battle cruiser, mated with a superior fire control system, was the intended pinnacle of Fisher's 
reform policy-an argument widely accepted by most historians of the Edwardian Navy. 
45 The Casablanca Crisis began on September 25, 1908, when the Gennan consul in 
Morocco attempted to conceal three deserters from the French Foreign Legion. It led to naval 
consultations with the French, suspended since 1905-06. See: Williamson, Grand Strategy, pp.132-3, 
243-6; FDSFv.J, pp. 140-50; Grey to McKenna, November 5,1908, No. 132, BDVlI, and Nos. 
119-44; Fisher to Viscount Knollys, December 22, 1908 in FGDN v.2, pp. 204-05. 
46 "War Plan W.3. England and France v. Germany.", Part I, p. 28, September 1908, and 
Part2, p. 19, August 1908, ADM 11611 0438, Part 1. 
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of Fisher's opposition to the "continental" strategy and his refusal to safeguard ·'the 
Ferry" in 1906, this aspect was likely due to Slade's contacts with the War Office.47 
After the acceleration of the Bosnian Crisis in mid-November, the War Co llege planners 
re-examined operations along the German North Sea littoral, in Denmark, and the 
blocking of the Elbe.48 
War Plan W.3., Part 1. maintained that the North Sea remained the Navy's 
principal theatre with the High Seas Fleet's destruction the main goal. It repeated Plan 
AlAI, Wilson's recommendations, and W.l., in denying Germany's North Sea access 
while goading the German fleet into a decisive action. Like the 1907 plans, Part 1. 
forecast active naval cooperation with France. With the Royal Navy concentrated in the 
North Sea, the French would hold the English Channel from Ushant to Land's End. 
French squadrons would institute an upper Channel cordon, supported by torpedo-boats 
at Dunkirk, Calais, and Dover. French Mediterranean forces would guard against 
Austrian and Italian intervention and facilitate the release of the British Mediterranean 
Fleet to home waters.49 Given Fisher's attitude to French involvement, however, these 
provisions only became a reality after 1912 due to pressures created by the Anglo-
German naval rivalry. 50 
Despite views from Wilson, Corbett, and others that close blockade was 
obsolete, W.3., Part 1. retained this scheme. Whereas Plan W.l. had supplanted the 
close blockade with an "observation" of the German littoral, Partl. was a melange 
comprising Plan A's distant blockade, W.l. 's "watch" on the German coast, and post-
47 "War Plan W.3 .... Partl.". pp. 481-554, ADM 116/10438, Part 1; Williamson, pp.77-9; 
Mackay, Fisher, pp. 350-6, 405-6. 
48 Slade Diary, October 8, November 10, 19, 1908, MRF/39/3. 
49 "War Plan W.3 .... Part I, pp. 481-554, ADM 116/1043B. 
50 The Anglo-French Naval Agreements in 1912 and 1914 were influenced by: the Agadir 
Crisis, July 1911; Anglo-German naval conversations and the Haldane Mission to Berlin, February 
1912; Parliamentary debates over the 1912- t 3 Naval Estimates; Churchill's proposal to abandon the 
Mediterranean and the Grey-Cambon letters of November 1912. The best interpretation remains: 
Williamson, Grand Strategy, pp. 284-99, 318-27. 
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1904 North Sea amphibious/inshore operations. Proposed scenanos included: 
observational squadrons of cruisers, destroyers, and submarines off the German rivers: 
the Channel Fleet !First Cruiser Squadron's observation of the Skagerrak; a Royal 
Marine expedition to Borkum supported by the Home Fleet; a Heligoland bombardment 
by the battle fleets and Fifth Cruiser Squadron with the Borkum operation; a cruiser 
cordon between the Terschelling and Hom's Reef Light Vessels; a patrol line from the 
Shetlands to Norway; destroyer patrols off the North Frisian Islands; and the old plans 
to block the Elbe and Weser. To prevent German attacks against the BEF's transport to 
France, British cruisers and destroyers would effectively "block-in" the Heligoland 
Bight through an observational blockade of Germany's North Sea portS.51 
W.3., Part 1., attempted to balance competing options which were all equally 
complex, contradictory, and hazardous. A close blockade of the German coast coupled 
with observational lines off the Heligoland Bight and German rivers dissipated strength, 
exposing the British cordons to an attack in force. If fleet units converged to support 
lighter forces, they would invariably be drawn into waters occupied by German torpedo-
craft and submarines-- the scenario Plan W.1., Plan AlAI, and Wilson had all sought 
to avoid. 
By February 1905, the German Admiralty Staffhad already considered that the 
British might advance on the Elbe and seize Borkum, Heligoland, and Sylt as advanced 
bases. In 1906, Germany strengthened its defences in the Frisian Islands, Cuxhaven, and 
Heligoland to prevent a surprise attack on the Elbe and the Canal's western entrance. 
The German Admiralty Staff's decision to strengthen their North Sea littoral defences 
was influenced by the outcomes of their 1904 and 1906 manoeuvres. In both exercises, 
Yellow Fleet, (British), had varying success in attacks around Heligoland and thrusts 
against the Elbe, Weser, and Ems. The manoeuvres simulated a British push past 
Cuxhaven to destroy the Gennan fleet and block the western end of the Canal. These 
facts were not explored in W.3., Part 1. despite detailed NID reports on the manoeuvres 
51 "War Plan W.3 .... Part 1.", ADM 116110438, pp.481-554. 
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and upgraded Gennan North Sea defences.52 With planning reorientated to the War 
College, the degree to which Lowry's staff consulted the NlD reports is questionable. 
Internal contradictions from earlier plans were repeated in the "W" series. A 
close blockade on Gennany's North Sea littoral, with observational squadrons or 
cordons outside the Bight, ignored the complexities attending such operations. Beyond 
Borkum's value as a forward base, no provisions were made for the 
logistical/communications difficulties inherent in maintaining simultaneous blockade 
lines at considerable distance from East Coast bases. Borkum was 240 miles from 
Harwich, the nearest British port. 53 Although the cordon system "leaves much to be 
desired in many respects", the Strategy Committee instead focussed on preventing the 
passage of neutral trade from North Sea portS.54 Unlike the Borkum, Heligoland, and 
the Elbe proposals, they were aware of the dangers facing a North Sea close blockade 
but less certain of its success. 
Promoting the close blockade in Part 1., the Committee doubted its 
effectiveness: "The remarks on this project must, however, be prefaced by stating 
frankly that it is fraught with greater possibilities of danger to the blockading squadrons 
than the system cordons across the Straits of Dover and across the northern entrance to 
the North Sea.,,55 Either Plan AlAI's distant blockade or W.1.'s "observational" 
blockade were preferred to a close blockade. These internal contradictions and 
omissions reflected the Strategy Committee's ad hoc status, the NID's separation from 
the planning process, and the planners' inexperience--symptoms of Fisher's agenda to 
52 "Foreign Naval Manoeuvres, 1904. Gennany", NID Report No. 758, March 1905, pp.5-
19. ADM 231/43; "Gennany. Coast Defences, Resources, &c., including Coast Defence, Ordnance. 
Mines &c., 1906.", NID Report No. 812, January 1907, 257 pp, ADM 231147; "Gennany. 
Manoeuvres, Exercises, &c., 1906.", NID Report No. 834, September 1907, pp. 66-74, ADM 
231148; Lambi, pp. 255-6, 277-8,332-8; P. Kennedy, "Gennan Naval Plans Against England, 1896-
1914." in The War Plans a/the Great Powers, pp. 181-4; Hayes, pp. 102-3, 115-16. 
53 Ibid., p.lIO. 
54 "War Plan W.3 .... Part 2 .... p.503, ADM 116/10438. Part l. 
55 Ibid. 
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preserve his strategic policy from internal attack. 
War Plan W.3. Part 2. (August 1908) was predicated on 1904-07 Baltic proposals 
re-examined during the BalticlNorth Sea status quo arbitrations. Postulating that France 
would face a German invasion alone, Part 2. recommended three cases where British 
troops could be employed in the North SealBaltic to relieve pressure on the French 
frontier armies. Case 1 suggested a Heligoland Bight blockade and patrol of the northern 
North Sea exit should Denmark side with Germany. The North Frisian islands ofSylt, 
Rom, Fohr, Amrum, Langness, and Oland would be seized by British troops on the 
outbreak of war. Case 1 also advocated a Baltic landing on the Eiderstedt Peninsula to 
threaten the Kiel Canal--the source of Fisher's ongoing fascination with Schleswig-
Holstein. Other aspects of W.3. reflected his Baltic/"Copenhagen" themes and the 
Army's employment as the Navy's "projectile". 
Cases 2 and 3 prescribed responses to a German invasion of Denmark. The Navy 
would force the Great Belt and block the Little Belt's northern entrance. Amphibious 
landings could then seize Fehmam, Sylt, and Rom Islands to establish bases against Kiel 
and secure the Lister Deep anchorage. Simultaneous landings would be made on the 
Eiderstedt and the peninsula between the Bay ofEckernforde and the Scheifiord. British 
fleets would check German naval forces to protect the landings and also conduct a 
blockade on Danzig, Swinemiinde, Travemiinde, and Memel. The last three ports and 
the Elbe would be blocked with sunken hulks as a final measure. 56 In form, content, and 
objectives, W.3. Case 2 copied contingencies first outlined in 1904-05, "fleshed out" 
by War Plans B_D,57 and the Strategy Committee's January-March efforts to guarantee 
access through the Belts. 
Discrepancies from the Ballard Committee plans were repeated in W.3 .. 
including ignoring: the strong defences at Kiel and other Baltic ports; an extensive 
German rail network which facilitated rapid military deployment; the logistical 
56 "War Plan W.3 .... Part 2 .• pp.559-67, ADM 116/10438, Part 1. 
57 For the similarities between W.3.'s proposals and 1907 Plans 8-0, refer to Chapter 3 
above and Kemp, Fisher Papers v.2., pp.395-445. 
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difficulties attending any Baltic operations: and the presence of Gennan mines. 
torpedo-craft, and submarines in these confmed waters. 58 Another oversight assunled 
the Army's cooperation in the Baltic designs. Whereas W.3. Part 1. tacitly accepted the 
"'continental" strategy vis-a-vis the BEF's transport to France, Part 2. espoused that the 
Anny act as the Navy's "projectile". The Strategy Committee and Slade incorrectlv 
expected the military's support for these adventures despite Fisher's opposition to the 
"continental" strategy, the DMO/General Staffs rejection of earlier amphibious 
proposals, and inter-service conflict during the Invasion Inquiry. 59 
Proof that the "w" series emulated earlier contingencies existed in attached 
studies. Pertaining to W.l.-W.3. were the following: "Detailed Plan for the Seizure of 
the Island of Sylt.", "Detailed Scheme for Blocking the Weser River.", and "Detailed 
Scheme for Blocking the Mouth of the Elbe.". While more refined, these schemes 
regurgitated 1904-07 proposals such the seizure ofSylt and the blocking of the Weser 
and Elbe with sunken hulks.60 Other studies complemented W.3. 's scenario of a possi ble 
Gennan invasion of Denmark. Entitled, "Military Expedition to Zealand in Support of 
the Danes Against German Invasion.", these provisoes detailed a combined expedition 
to prevent German control over the Belts and the Sound.61 As such. they elaborated on 
scenarios outlined in: Plan D, Slade's liaison with the DMO during the Invasion Inquiry, 
the Strategy Committee's December 1907-March 1908 studies, and Fisher's ongoing 
concern over the Baltic entrances. 
"Forcing the Defences at Cuxhaven." was also appended to the "W" series. It re-
examined Wilson's 1906-07 proposals to force the Elbe with old Royal Sovereign Class 
58 Hayes, pp. 102, 108; Haggie, p. 123; FDSFv.I, pp.426-7. 
59 Summerton's, "British Military Planning", especially Chapter 5 remains the most 
comprehensive study of the General Staft7DMO evaluations of the Admiralty's 1905-08 amphibious 
projects. 
60 ADM 11611 043B. Part \., pp. 698-726. 
61 "Very Secret. Military Expedition to Zealand in Support of the Danes Against German 
Invasion.", June 6, 1908, Ibid, pp. 741-60,761-89. 
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battle ships and minesweepers.62 Proceeding up the Elbe, this "River Squadron" would 
bombard Cuxhaven' s forts to expedite four options: an attack on the German Fleet if 
in the Elbe, the Kiel Canal's destruction, troop landings to destroy the Cuxhaven 
fortifications, and to cover an expedition occupying the peninsula between the Elbe and 
Weser Rivers. Introductory comments, however, demeaned a successful run past the 
Cuxhaven defences. 
The fact cannot, however, be disguised that the project is one which can only be 
regarded as justifiable in the direst extremities. It is full of dangers from the 
outset, and, as far as can be seen, dangers which would be productive of loss 
altogether incommensurate with the advantages likely to accrue.63 
These realistic appraisals were a volte face to Wilson's "Remarks" where he accepted 
the operation as necessary despite the heavy loss in ships and men.64 The planners, 
however, retained it as an option despite their apprehensions over the operation's 
objectives. An attack on the German Fleet in the Elbe was, "a gratuitous waste of effort, 
wrong from any point of view", while blocking the estuary was thought more effective 
than a direct attack on the Kiel Canal: "This being so, it is quite unnecessary to sacrifice 
ships and men in attempting to force our way past Cuxhaven." Assaulting Cuxhaven 
was an "eccentric" attack, dependent on large bodies of troops which would not 
influence the naval situation. Favouring the less costly Elbe option, the Committee were 
apparently unaware that in July 1904 and May 1908, the Hydrographic Department had 
ruled out successful river obstructions due to the strong tides and currents in the Ems, 
Weser, and Elbe estuaries. Endeavours to "seal up" the western North Sea outlets were 
further complicated by interference from the German defences.65 
While the Cuxhaven paper was a comprehensive analysis of Wilson 's pet project 
62 Kemp (ed), Fisher Papers v.2, pp.459-61. 
63 "Forcing the Defences at Cuxhaven.", October 5,1908, ADM 1 16/1043B, Part I., pp. 
729-40. 
64 Kemp, Fisher Papers v.2, p.459. 
65 "Blocking a Channel in a tideway", Memorandum by F. Mostyn Field, Hydrographer. 
May 22, 1908, ADM I 16/866B, 1889-1912 Naval Staff Memoranda, Case 4173. 
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and related schemes, it was not an outright condemnation. It subtly intimated that 
certain operations were, in fact, viable contingencies. The planners advocated 
obstructing the Elbe as a "less suicidal way" of removing the Canal as an interior line 
for the German Fleet. Sending an expeditionary force to capture the Cuxhaven 
Peninsula was legitimate if Britain was allied with France as it threatened the German 
right flank, the Canal, Schleswig-Holstein, and would tie up considerable German 
forces-another reiteration of earlier NIDI Admiralty plans. 66 The retention ofthis option 
revealed the importance attached to these operations as vital preliminaries to any Baltic 
campaign by Fisher and the Admiralty. 
The last plans, "War Plans W.4.-W.6., England v. Germany and the United 
States", illustrated Fisher's often unrealistic approach to war planning. A product of his 
increased strategic preoccupation with the United States during the second half of 1908, 
the plans dealt with the unlikely scenario of Britain facing a German-American 
alliance.67 Fleet deployments based on a war against the U.S. and Germany were 
considered in July, a distribution decried by Slade as, " .... the most hopelessly puerile 
thing that he could possibly bring out.'~8 The inclusion of the United States as a naval 
threat was strange, since Fisher was becoming increasingly pro-American and did not 
envision their hostility in an Anglo-German conflict.69 W.4.-W.6. assumed that all other 
powers were neutral with the American fleet crossing the Atlantic to join with the High 
Seas Fleet. What would precipitate such an occurrence was not clarified. According to 
Slade: "Sir J.F. said that in case of war between us & Germany combined with America 
we should base a fleet in Lough Swilly [northern Ireland] ready to meet the Americans 
66 "Forcing the Defences at Cuxhaven.", October 5, 1908, ADM 116/10438, Part 1, pp. 
729-31. 
67 "War Plan W.4., England v. Gennany and the United States.", December 8, 1908, ADM 
116/10438, Partl., pp. 596-625; "War Plans W.S., W.6., England v. Germany and the United 
States.", ADM 116/10438, Part 2, (Volume 2), pp.482-718. 
68 Slade Diary, June 22, 1908, MRF/39/3. Mackay. Fisher. p.403. 
69 Offer, The First World War, pp.253-5. 
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first if it comes over. What was going to bring it over he did not specify.··71) Under this 
circumstance, Britain's only recourse was to keep its fleets concentrated at home to 
engage the Americans as they came over. Canada would not be reinforced and the 
Mediterranean Fleet and all overseas cruiser squadrons recalled home.71 In a 16th 
November meeting between Fisher, McKenna and Slade to discuss the Two Power 
Standard, as applied to Gennany and the U.S., the W.4.-W.6. provisions were 
scrutinised. The "prevailing idea" was that nothing could be done until the Navy was 
strong enough to "go off the coasts of both and defeat them." Apparently opposed to this 
view, the ONI complained: "The idea of defensive war is quite unknown to them 
[Fisher, McKenna], and the possibility of dealing defensively with one & offensively 
with the other never occurred to them.,,72 Slade's objection under! ined a viable strategic 
option in the quixotic W.4.-W.6. proposals. They gave the Admiralty the flexibility to 
calculate how much force was needed to mask the High Seas Fleet in the North Sea, 
leaving the remainder to meet the American fleet or break into the Baltic under the 
provisions outlined in Plans C-O, W.2., and W.3. 
W.4.-W.6. resurrected the 1904-07 schemes repeated in War Plans W.l.-W.3. 
and emphasised a cruiser/destroyer "watch" on the German rivers, an observational 
blockade of the North Sea coast, and amphibious projects to capture Heligoland and 
Borkum as "flying" bases for flotilla patrols.73 Like the 1907 War Plans, the "W' series 
contained addenda outlining the actual ships slated to participate in the projected 
operations.W.5. included attached orders to all Fleet and Squadron C-in-C's on the 
outbreak of war. These detailed the individual ship allocations, dispositions, and duties 
under the operations assigned to them in the Admiralty war plans. W.5. and W.6. 
contained nominal ship lists, assigned to specific operations as well as their distribution, 
70 Slade Diary, November 16, 1908, MRF/39/3. 
71 "War Plan WA.", December 8, 1908, ADM 116/10438, Partl.. pp. 865-8; "War Plan 
W.5.", Introduction, ADM 116110438, Part 2 .. pp.486-8. 
n Slade Diary. November 16. 1908, MRF 39/3, Slade MSS, NMM. 
73 "War Plan WA.". pp. 870-2; "War Plan W.5.", pp.489-93. 589-649. 
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points of assembly, objectives, and deployment areas. The orders pertained to each fleet. 
squadron, flotilla, and the various operations they were to fulfil under the strictures of 
Plans W.1.-W.5 .. 74 
When considered with the Admiralty's anxieties during the BalticlNorth Sea 
status quo negotiations, the Casablanca Crisis, and Austria's annexation of Bosnia-
Herzcegovina, the inclusion of detailed ship/fleet deployments suggests that aspects of 
the 1908 plans were, like their antecedents, viewed as viable contingencies in an Anglo-
German war. This was reinforced by the elaborate reappraisals of earlier projects to 
seize Borkum, Sylt, and Heligoland; the 1904-05 Elbe blocking plan to neutralise the 
Canal's western exit; and descents in Denmark to secure the Belts. The axioms 
underpinning the 1908 plans were the same as their predecessors: to contain/destroy the 
High Seas Fleet in the Baltic or Elbe, eliminate Kiel, and carry the war directly to 
Germany through landings in either Schleswig-Holstein or Pomerania. The repetition 
and latent inconsistencies in the "W" series reflected Fisher's reorganisation of the 
Admiralty's planning environment, but also his view that the Baltic and North Sea 
littoral were the principal operational theatres for a war with Germany. The 1908 plans 
revived the same theme behind Admiralty planning from the 1890's onwards-an 
offensive against the enemy's vital strategic assets as a deterrent or, failing that, to 
quickly terminate a conflict. 
Even as the "W" series neared completion, Fisher reiterated his view that the 
Annybe employed as the Navy's "projectile". Writing to the Conservative MP, Edward 
Goulding, he voiced his opposition to Lord Robert's post-Invasion Inquiry agitations 
for a home defence army, adding: 
We want an Army to attack, not one to defend! 'A DEFEN CE' Army means the 
end of England! For then it's not 'invasion'--it's 'STARVATION'! There is only 
ONE defence and only one for our Empire! 'The command o/the sea' Don't 
imperil that by filching money that ought to be used for the Navy in bolstering 
up an Army that is sworn not to go away from their homes L .. We want a sea-
74 "War Plan W.5.". ADM 116/1043B, Part 2, pp. 676-80, 690-701, 715-18. For similar 
ship lists and their roles under the 1907 Admiralty War Plans, see: Kemp, Fisher Papers v.2, pp. 
384-93, 409- 18. 438-45. 
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going Anny that we can launch forth anywhere AT AN HOUR'S NOTICE!75 
Along with this remonstrance, Fisher remained preoccupied with access into the Baltic. 
On 21 st December 1908, he informed McKenna that he would have to miss a meeting 
with the President of the Board of Trade, Winston Churchill, because, "I am engaged 
all the afternoon with Ottley on a strategic discussion about the Baltic and the Belts 
which I cannot defer;". 76 This meeting occurred immediately after the second meeting 
of the CID's sub-committee on the "Military Needs of the Empire", a forum where the 
Admiralty hesitantly revealed its plans to seize Zealand and the Belts before increased 
opposition from the DMO and the General StatI.77 Although never openly endorsing his 
preference for Baltic contingencies and other provisions in the "W" series plans, Fisher 
had tacitly supported the work produced by the Strategy Committee and the Ballard 
Committee. 
IV. 
Fisher's "Commentary on the War Plans" (December 1908), was the only 
substantial document illustrating his views on the 1907-08 war planning. 78 His 
observations did not clarify or critique the deficiencies in both series but reinforced the 
notion that they were accepted doctrine. Fisher placed particular emphasis on Wilson's 
May 1907 "Remarks". He repeated the latter's concerns that at the outbreak of war, 
British capital ships should be kept out of the North Sea: "It would be suicidal to expose 
the armoured units of our Fleet to a surprise Torpedo attack by stationing them before 
75 Fisher to Edward A. Goulding, mid-November 1908, FGDN v.2, p. 201. 
76 Fisher to Reginald McKenna, December 21, 1908, Ibid, pp. 203-04. 
77 Minutes and records from the CID's Military Needs of the Empire sub-committee, 
December 1908 and March 1909, are contained in: CAB 16/5, "Report and Proceedings ofa Sub-
Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence Appointed by the Prime Minister to Consider the 
Military Needs of the Empire.", July 24, 1909. See also: Mackay, Fisher, pp. 404-08; d'Ombrain, 
War Machinery, pp. 92-7, 158-60; Fisher to Esher, January 17 and March 15, 1909, FGDN v.2, pp. 
220,232-3, where Fisher reveals his intentions and motives for not divulging the Admiralty's 
amphibious plans to the CID sub-committee. 
78 "War Plans and the Distribution of the Fleet.", December 1908, 10 pp., ADM 
116/10438, Part 1. 
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War within striking distance of the enemy .... At such a time the North Sea should swarm 
with our Destroyers and Submarines backed with their supporting Cruisers:' 79 While 
this statement supports the "flotilla defence" contention,80 at no time did he define 
whether he preferred a defensive strategy over offensive proposals in the war plans. 
Fisher did not condemn the close blockade concept outlined in Plans B-D and W.3., 
although he believed it unwise to place the British fleets in harm's way of German 
flotillas before the outbreak of war. Approving an "observational" blockade on the 
German littoral, the seizure of Borkum and Sylt, and operations to neutralise the Elbe 
exit, Fisher sanctioned Plans W.l. and W.2., which repeated Wilson's 1907 arguments 
for an "observational" blockade.81 
Antithetical to this endorsement and another example of his erratic strategic 
thought, was Fisher's views on the submarine's effectiveness. In a November 1908 
paper entitled, "The Submarine Question.", he stressed the submarine's ability to remain 
"autonomous" from refuelling for extended periods and that: "No practicable means at 
present exist or appear to be feasible for effecting the destruction of the latest type of 
submarine, or of being even warned of her approach." Given these factors, British naval 
forces would be precluded from steaming in the North Sea and Baltic with impunity. 
It is inevitable that when the Germans fully realise the capability of this type of 
submarine-.... -the North Sea and all its parts will be rendered uninhabitable by 
our big ships-until we have cleaned out the submarines. '" The arguments in this 
brief record in no way attempt to lessen the influence and necessity of big 
armoured ships .... They do however point to a complete approaching revolution 
79 Ibid., p. 4; Mackay, Fisher, p.369. 
80 See footnote 44, above. 
81 Fisher's "Commentary" on the War Plans indicates that while he did not reject a close 
blockade, he was perhaps more inclined towards an observational blockade with advanced bases as 
outlined by Wilson and elaborated in Plans W.1.-W.2 .. See: FDSF v.l, pp. 369-70; Mackay, Fisher, 
p. 370. N. Lambert indicts Marder and Mackay for accepting this view because they fail to account 
for Fisher's predictions on the impact of the submarine, Naval Revolution, pp. 166-7. He, however. 
ignores the "Commentary", the contents of the Admiralty'S war plans, and Fi~her'~ corresp~ndence. 
which support Marder and Mackay. Lambert's selective approach to sources unpJtes that FIsher could 
not be of two minds over these types of operations and the submarine/destroyer threat-a contrast 
which Mackay recognised. See: Fi.'iher, pp. 367,417-19. 
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in the type of our war with any power, particularly with any European power on 
account of the narrow waters of the North Sea and Baltic, English Channel and 
Mediterranean being denied to large ships of war until the submarine is cleared 
out. 82 
This realistic assessment contradicted the axioms behind W.l.-W.2's "observational" 
blockade and the other war plans endorsed in his "Commentary". Forecasting the 
submarine's future role, Fisher was of two minds over its capabilities and his support 
for "watching" squadrons, the seizure of advanced bases, and riverine operations along 
Germany's North Sea littoral, not to mention a Baltic campaign.83 That he did not 
modify his views or reject the Admiralty War Plans in his December "Commentary" 
after his conclusions in the November "Submarine" paper indicates that their proposals 
were still considered viable. 
Annotations in the "Commentary", however, confuse the issue over which 
specific plan, if any, Fisher preferred. There was a veiled reference to the economic 
advantages of a distant blockade, outlined in Plan AlAI and suggested in W.1 .: 
.... we are prepared to deal effectively with the 942 German mercantile vessels 
that cover the ocean ..... The geographical position of Germany immensely 
favours us in a maritime war. The British Isles form a huge breakwater 600 
miles long barring the ingress and egress of German vessels from the ocean-
Dover rendered impassable by the Destroyers and Submarines, and the Northern 
passage from the North Sea to the Atlantic can be as completely barred. 84 
The reference to Britain as a "breakwater", repeated Ottley's July 1905 views that an 
economic blockade of the entire German seaboard could be effectively maintained.85 
Months before the Ballard Committee's creation, Fisher again alluded to the 
"breakwater" analogy allowing the Navy to "mop up" 800 German steamers at a 
82 "The Submarine Question.", November 1908, Fisher MSS, FISRl5/13. # 4238, Churchill 
College Archives, Cambridge. 
83 Mackay, Fisher, pp.367-8. 
84 "War Plans and the Distribution of the Fleet.", ADM 116/1043B, Part 1, pp. 9-10. 
85 Ottley to Julian Corbett, July I, 1905, RJC/9, Richmond MSS, Papers Belonging to 
Julian Corbett, NMM. 
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conflict's outset. 86 The "Commentary's" suggestions to close the Straits of Doyer and 
the northern Orkney-Shetland-Norway gap, was a direct reference to Plan AI AI's distant 
blockade.87 This does not, however, confirm that Fisher preferred that strategy over 
other proposals in the "W" series or earlier war plans. Slade's "Preamble" and the 
"Introductory Remarks" to Plans A-C clearly outlined that the Navy's chief objective 
was to pressure Germany's commercial interests through attacks on its overseas 
commerce and ports; no similar guidelines exist in the "W" plans.88 The discrepancy 
between the two series lies in Fisher's reorganisation of the Admiralty's thinking 
establishments. With planning stripped from the NID, Ballard on active sea command. 
and Ottley's and Hankey's move to the CID, Slade was the only remaining Admiralty 
"economist" from the original 1907 planners. 89 After the Strategy Committee's creation, 
the DNI's influence over planning was diminished to that of a messenger between 
Fisher and the War College. Thus, the offensive premises behind the "W" series 
reflected Fisher's concern over the Baltic entrances and was an expedient response to 
any flare-up in European tensions. While an economic war against Gennany had been 
investigated by Captain Henry H. Campbell in the NID's Trade Division since 1906, 
that work was merely an offshoot of the offensive/observational strategy developed 
from the 1890's onwards.90 
Fisher's inference in the "Commentary" to an economically motivated distant 
86 Fisher to S. Fortesque (Royal equerry), April 14, 1906, FGDN v.2, p.72. 
87 Refer to Chapter 3, above; Kemp, Fisher Papers v.2, pp.372-94. 
88 Ibid, pp. 346-62, 362-7, 372, 382-3, 393-4, 395-6,408,432-3,436. For the introductions 
to the "W" series plans, refer to: "War Plans. Gennany. W.l.-W.3.", ADM 116/1043B, Volume 1, 
pp. 350-560; "War Plan W.4. England v. Germany and the United States of America.", December 8, 
1908, pp. 596-625. 
89 Offer. First World War, pp.232-9, 273-81. 
90 This contradicts Offer. who believes that Fisher's strategic mindset was governed solely by 
an "economist" outlook. The Admiralty apparently confirmed its preference for an economically 
based blockade strategy over offensive operations in the Baltic during the CID's "Military Needs" 
sub-committee. See: Ibid .• pp. 242-3 and 229-43,249-57,261-3,270-84. This will be examined in 
the next chapter. 
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blockade was likely part of his ploy to hide the Admiralty's BalticlNorth Sea planning 
from the Army and politicians during the CID "Military Needs" sub-committee. Instead 
of forwarding the Zealand expedition proposal critiqued by the DMO, Slade presented 
an economic plan for a blockade of Germany before the Defence Committee on 17th 
December, 1908. The timing of this meeting, the drafting of War Plan W.4 .. and 
similarities between Fisher's "Commentary" and Slade's paper all coincided.91 While 
it has been argued: "it is therefore quite possible that a strand of the First Sea Lord's real 
thinking is represented by the cautious but realistic plans preferred by the Ballard 
committee." ,92 there is no evidence that he preferred AI AI's distant blockade over the 
other war plans. The "Commentary" and "Submarine" paper suggest that, by late 1908. 
Fisher was more apt to implement the cautious estimates 0 f Wilson and W.1. -W .2. at 
the outbreak of a conflict than an offensive push into the Baltic or against the Gennan 
North Sea littoral. 
v. 
Critiques of the "W" series focussed on inconsistencies in Plans, W.1. --W .2 .. 
Beresford's June 1908 campaign plan for the Channel Fleet included observations that 
inshore squadrons off the Elbe, Weser, and Ems were not possible at the outbreak of 
war. The October 1907 Manoeuvres had, "proved the impossibility of having an Inner 
Squadron owing to the shortage of small ships and limited radius of action of the Thirty-
Knot Destroyers.,,93 The C-in-C believed that the manoeuvres indicated that main fleet 
operations near the German coast would be costly if Gennan torpedo-craft ventured out 
undetected at night. While the British Fleet should be positioned to support its cruisers 
and engage the High Sea Fleet it sortied, "it should not as a rule, be less than 200 miles 
from the German ports between sunset and sunrise. Cruisers attached to the main fleet 
91 "Economic Effect of a War on Gennan Trade.", December 12, 1908, (17 pp.), Appendix 
V., CAB 16/5, "Report and Proceedings ofa Sub-Committee .... on the Military Needs of the Empire.", 
July 24, 1909; Offer, The First World War, pp. 242-3; footnotes 69 and 71, above. 
92 Mackay, Fisher, p.370. 
91 C-in-C Channel Fleet, Admiral Lord Charles Beresford. to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 
"Second Plan of Action for British Fleet.". June 1, 1908, ADM 116/1037. 
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will watch the Skaggerak and search all waters north of a line drawn from Spurn Point 
to the German-Danish border. '~4 These recommendations dovetailed with W. 1 . ' s central 
premise to keep the British fleet at least 170 miles off the German coast at night. 
October 1908 correspondence between Beresford and the Admiralty queried 
W.l.-W.2. 's provision to place British fleet units near the Heligoland Bight to cut off 
German forces issuing from the Elbe or Jade. Beresford was wary of any operations in 
or near the Bight. 
There is a proposal to place a weak Flotilla in the Heligoland Bight at the 
commencement of hostilities. It may be possible to do this after the enemy has 
been worsted and driven into port, but it would be impossible to maintain 
Destroyers and Mining Ships on the German Coast at the very beginning of the 
War, especially in view of the recent German increase in the numbers of Light 
Cruisers and Destroyers; the more powerful armament carried by the latter; and 
the development of Heligoland as an armed advance post. All these facts point 
to the intention of the Germans to resist any close blockade of their coast, and 
to obtain command of their inner waters--the Heligoland Bight.95 
His appraisal was cognisant of W .1. 's contention that a close blockade was dangerous 
due to German torpedo-craft. Beresford went beyond the War College assessments, 
however, and recognised the advantages for German defences with Heligoland as a 
forward base. Commenting on the logistical/communications difficulties for the 
"observational" line near Heligoland, Beresford declared: "The British Force must be 
divided into reliefs, and operates about 200 miles from the British Coast, whilst the 
German Force in addition to their greater numbers, are working close to their bases." 
This problem was compounded by the fact that the "observational" blockade was a 
dissipation of strength which subjected British squadrons to concentrated Gennan 
attacks.96 Beresford recognised that W.l. 's alternative in placing the fleet out of harm's 
94Ibid., and C-in-C Channel Fleet to Admiralty, December 9, 1907. 
Q'i C-in-C Channel Fleet to First Sea Lord, October 8, 1908, No. 2206/015, ADM 11611 037. 
These are Beresford's remarks on the Admiralty Letter (M Branch) of July I, 1908, "Secret and 
Personal enclosing War Plan Against Germany", part of the Admiralty's communication of War 
Orders to the Channel Fleet. 
96 Ihid 
156 
way exposed the observational squadrons to a potential defeat in detail. It was a 
weakness identified by other officers in the Fleet. 
Junior officers familiar with the War College's work were privately aware of 
foibles in the "W" series plans. In October 1908 the War Division ADNJ. Captain 
Osmond de Brock, condemned the military expedition to Zealand as "a mass of 
verbiage.,,97 One of the more promising officers in the "Fishpond", Commander (later 
Admiral Sir) Herbert Richmond was involved with the "W" series while serving as 
Fisher's Naval Assistant. His advocacy for a naval staff. in collusion with Corbett and 
Slade, collided with the ad hoc nature of planning under Fisher's control. In April 1907 
Richmond denounced the Admiralty's handling of strategic planning as: "beneath 
contempt.,,98 
Appointed Flag Captain to the Home Fleet C-in-C. Admiral Sir William May, 
in early 1909, Richmond's views became more extreme. He harshly condemned the 
"observational" blockade premise of W.l.-W.3 .. 
The Admiralty's plans are to my mind the vaguest amateur stuff I have ever 
seen. I cannot conceive how they were discussed or what ideas governed the 
framers of them. Weak dissipation of strength all along the line is the most 
marked characteristic .... Destroyers are used sometimes as scouts, or torpedo 
boats, sometimes as destroyers for attacking enemy torpedo craft. No clear idea 
of how they are to be used or what they are doing is laid down. Cruisers are 
scattered in long vague patrols .... As it is, it is simply a jumble without form. 
Destroyers in small numbers are used to patrol the Skaggerak. No seaman can 
have arranged this, certainly no one with a knowledge of destroyers.99 
With limited available destroyers, Richmond suggested an alteration in W .1.' s pickets 
off the German coast. The inshore patrol should be maintained by fast light cruisers and 
replaced by destroyers at night. With their higher speed and wireless telegraphy, light 
cruisers were more effective at watching the German rivers and communicating enemy 
97 Quoted in Mackay, Fisher, p.405. 
98 Richmond Journal, April 4, 1907, Richmond MSS, RICIlI7, NMM; B. D. Hunt, Sailor-
Scholar: Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, 1871-1946, (Waterloo, 1982), pp. 19-20. 
99 Journal, May 2, 1909, Richmond MSS, RIC1l/8, NMM. 
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movements. Concentrated armoured cruiser squadrons positioned behind the inshore 
squadrons could quickly converge on enemy squadrons emitting to disrupt the British 
patrols. Another concern, using the "watch" on the Skagerrak as an example, was the 
large force needed to guard against any variety of enemy concentrations seeking to 
break through the British cordons. 100 
Clarifying ambiguities in the "W" series, Richmond recognised the dangers 
associated with observational squadrons off the German rivers. the watch on the 
Skagerrak, and the long blockade line between Terschelling and Hom's Reef. Sharing 
Beresford's criticisms, he thought "watching" squadrons could only be maintained by 
the proper deployment of armoured and light cruisers. The antidote was the fast, 
scouting-type cruiser. 
The light fast unarrnoured cruiser is the proper vessel for look-out work. 
supported by a squadron of armoured cruisers so placed that they can move to 
any point and cut off an enemy whose approach is signalled by the unarmoured 
line .... scouts are the proper vessels for this outlook work: speed is essential: sea 
keeping powers and a considerable radius of action are wanted; an armanlent 
sufficient to deal with destroyers: and a power of cruising economically with 
power to increase rapidly to at least 15 knots: an efficient wireless telegraphy 
installation is of course absolutely essential, & protection if any should be below 
the water to resist Torpedo attack rather than above water against gunnery 
attack, against which speed is her defensive armour .101 
Richmond's emphasis on speed, wireless, underwater defence against torpedo attack, 
and an effective armament to deal with destroyers, indicated that such cruisers were 
required for the "observational" lines outlined in War Plans W.I.- W.3 .. 
Beresford too, had demanded more light cruisers in his condemnations of 
Admiralty policy. In June 1908 correspondence with McKenna on shipbuilding policy, 
Beresford argued that more light cruisers were required for the "preliminary struggle" 
with Germany involving a fight for the "command of the inshore area" and combined 
100 "Remarks on War Plans. 1909-1910.", Richmond MSS, RICII3/4, NMM. 
IOJ Ibid 
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. . h . 102 
operatIons In t e BaltIc. Both officers had thus realised the necessity for this type of 
vessel in operations off the German rivers and North Sea coast. The Admiralty had, 
however, already projected a remedy, ironically, along the same lines as Richmond's 
and Beresford's recommendations. 
The Admiralty had considered replacing its old unarmoured cruisers in 1906 
before the Ballard Committee's planning work. In November 1907, the Navy Estimates 
Committee discussed the inclusion of new scout cruisers under the 1908-09 Naval 
Estimates. There was, "a strong consensus of opinion" among the Committee members, 
"that a type of unarmoured vessel was also urgently necessary to act as parent-vessels 
to the large and increasingly numerous flotillas of our Destroyers when operating on an 
enemy's coast, as well as to meet vessels of the same type now being built by foreign 
nations." These cruisers were described by the then DNO, Rear-Admiral Sir John 
Jellicoe, as forming an "inshore watching squadron" with destroyers off enemy ports. 
Accordingly, the Committee decided to include five improved Boadecias in the 
Estimates. \03 New construction under the 1908-09 Estimates incorporated six cruisers 
(including Boadecia).104 The sudden switch in building policy to provide the new 
cruisers was not a reversal of reforms initiated by the Fisher administration in 1904, but 
a subtle transformation. Despite the removal of redundant vessels, the stricture that 
procurement act as the "acid test" of strategy was not shelved. In the guidelines to his 
reform package, Fisher had realised that altered strategic exigencies would dictate the 
102 Beresford to Vice-Admiral A.B. Milne, April 22, 1909, containing enclosure sent by 
Beresford to First Lord, June 5, 1908, "The Shipbuilding Policy as it Affects the Fighting Efficiency 
ofthe Fleet.", pp. 13, 16, Milne MSS, MLN/227, NMM. Also refer to: Slade Diary, January 7, 1908, 
MRF/39/3, regarding the DNI's discussions with Beresford about war plans. Beresford: " .... was very 
insistent on the lack of cruisers to carry out what he wanted to do." 
103 Quote and infonnation from the November 1907 Navy Estimates Committee, pp. 12-19 
taken from Mackay, Fisher, pp. 386-7. The original print is in the Fisher MSS, No. 4724 at Churchill 
College, Cambridge. 
104 "Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty Explanatory of the Navy Estimate, 1908-
09.", and "Details of New Construction: Dockyard Built Ships-cont.", in Navy EstimatesJor the Year 
/908-1909, with Explanation oj Differences Ordered by the House oj Commons to be printed 30 
January /908. , (London, 1908), pp. 4, 200-1, 224-5. 
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vessel types required by the Fleet. In the first volume of Naval Necessities (1904) he had 
trumpeted: 
Strategy should govern the types of ships to be designed 
Ship design, as dictated by strategy, should govern tactics 
Tactics should govern details of armaments. !Os 
The Admiralty's 1908-09 building program provided the vessels to meet operational 
requirements along the German North Sea coast as stipulated by the 1907 contingencies 
and the "observational" blockade proposal in the W.1.-W.3. plans. 
There are other indications that the "W" series were considered viable in the 
event of war with Germany. During the July 1908 Manoeuvres, Blue Fleet (German) 
commanded by Beresford, was to engage a numerically superior, but divided, Red Fleet 
(British) under the Home Fleet C-in-C, Vice-Admiral Sir Francis Bridgeman. Red 
would watch Blue and proscribe Beresford's movement until Bridgeman's fleet was 
reinforced. To unite with the main force, Red reinforcements had to pass through straits 
"XX" or "YY" without being detected or engaged. The scenario conformed to W.l.-
W.2., where the British fleet was forced to watch the Elbe and Skagerrak for High Seas 
Fleet sorties. Beresford placed his battle fleet to cover Strait "XX" and a detached 
squadron of cruisers (armoured and unarmoured) and 27 -knot destroyers to watch" YY". 
The manoeuvres, however, produced no major engagement and failed to resolve the 
special question on the impact of submarines and mines as neither admiral attempted 
to discover the others whereabouts--a dereliction for which both were censured. 106 The 
exercise did produce a pertinent appraisal of W .1. -W .6.' s proposals to employ British 
destroyers off the German coast/rivers. In his evaluation, Slade reviewed Beresford's 
"watch" on Strait "YY" and surmised that: 
lOS P.K. Kemp (ed), The Papers of Admiral Sir John Fisher, Volume I., (London, 1960), p. 
40. 
106 Lord Charles Beresford, July Manoeuvres 1908, "Report of Proceedings of Blue Fleet. ", 
and "Remarks by Commander-in-Chief on Manoeuvre Report and Lesson to be Learnt.", August 23, 
1908, (8 pp.); From Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief, Channel Fleet, "Memorandum on Fleet 
Exercises in the North Sea, July 1908.", November 16, 1908, Noel MSS, NOEll) B, Manoeuvres 
\908, NMM. 
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A point which comes out very clearly in these manoeuvres is that the 27 knot 
boats will be of very little use at any distance from our own coasts. We cannot 
depend upon them for use on the Gennan coast unless we can find some secure 
base for them. If this cannot be done we may write them off for offensive 
purposes, although they still will have a very useful field of action in the local 
defence of the coasts. 107 
Slade"s remedy for the 27 knotters' liabilities repeated the forward base concept as a 
concession to the limitations of early British destroyers in blockade operations as 
examined in Ballard's 1897 RUSI essay, Hankey's May 1904 advanced fleet base 
scheme, and the NID's July 1904 plans to seize Ushant as an advanced base for a 
Brest/Cherbourg blockade and Heligoland in a war against Germany. 109 The taking of 
Borkum or Sylt, as prescribed under Plan BIC and W.2., would have rectified this 
problem. The DNI's observations indicated a link between the manoeuvre's lessons and 
North Sea scenarios in the "W" series. 
Further evolutions addressed destroyer deployments in the Heligoland Bight. An 
October 1908 Home Fleet flotilla exercise examined the practicality of W.l.-W.3.·s 
"observational" patrols off the German estuaries. Two River Class destroyer squadrons, 
accompanied by unarmoured cruisers, were involved in the exercise: "8" Squadron 
simulating a British blockading flotilla; "A" Squadron representing the Germans. The 
exercise, "was intended to simulate an attempt ofGennan Destroyers during a war with 
England, trying to get from the mouths of the Jade and Weser Rivers to the 'Elbe' ."109 
107 "Memorandum by DNI on Manoeuvres.", July 1908, p. 7. Slade MSS, MRF/39/3, 
NMM. 
108 Refer to Chapters I and 2, above; Ballard, "The Protection of Commerce During War.", 
pp. 402-04; Hankey, "Advanced Bases for the Fleet" ,May 2, 1904, Hankey MSS, HNKY/6/3, 
Churchill College, Cambridge; Battenberg, "The Organisation for War of Torpedo Craft in Home 
Waters.", July 4, 1904, Naval Necessities v.2, pp.508-19, ADM 116/3093, Case 0026. Also refer to: 
Manning, While, for further discussion of the advanced base concept resulting from the limitations of 
27 and 30 knot destroyers in any projected blockade of Brest and Cherbourg. 
109 From Vice-Admiral Sir Francis Bridgeman to the Secretary of the Admiralty, October 31, 
1908, "Destroyers Watching Mouths of Rivers-Exercise Carried out by Eastern Group." Three 
enclosures: Commodore (T) Lewis Bayly to C-m-C Home Fleet. October 9; C-in-C Home Fleet to 
Commodore (T), October 17; Commodore (T) to C-in-C Home Fleet, October 23, 1908, ADM 
116/1037. 
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While both sides were equal in strength and the weather favourable to the blockaders, 
~~A" effectively "broke out" twice. The British flotilla commander, Commodore (T) 
Lewis Bayly, concluded that the blockaders dispositions needed to be considerably 
larger for such operations to be effective: "The exercise was carried out as laid down 
in order to give the greatest amount of instruction to the greatest number; but for 
effective blockading, I consider the blockaders should be to the blockaded as 3 to 1, .... ". 
Bridgeman endorsed Bayly's recommendations in his report to the Admiralty.IIO 
Bayly's suggestion repeated earlier critiques of a modem "close" blockade in the 1889 
"Three Admirals" report and the September 1902 "Argostoli" exercise in the 
Mediterranean. 1l1 Confirming the logistical weaknesses in the War College's 
"observational" investment of the German estuaries, the exercise proved that the "W" 
series were investigated by the fleet to identify deficiencies and familiarise the flotilla 
crews with these types of operations. 
The inshore/observational capabilities of British flotillas were again addressed 
by Home Fleet commanders in June 1909. Bayly's successor as Commodore (T), E. 
Charlton, submitted a table to the new Home Fleet C-in-C, Admiral Sir William May, 
detailing coal and oil-fuel consumption rates for River ("E") and Tribal ("F") Class 
destroyers operating outbound and inbound from East Coast bases to the German North 
Sea river estuaries. As calculated by a junior flotilla officer, Commander Paton, the 
distances from Grimsby and Harwich to the Ems, Elbe, and Weser were correlated with 
the endurance and fuel expenditures of both destroyer types. According to the 
calculations, Charlton reported that both destroyer types had enough fuel to conduct 
offensive operations off, and even in, the German rivers for several days. 
2. It will be noted from colwnn 8 that these vessels should have enough coal 
remaining to spend three days on a enemy's coast for offensive purposes. I do 
not think the German rivers are difficult to navigate beyond the fact that our 
destroyers would be working in almost unknown ground. Their work would be 
I to Commodore(T) to C-in-C Home Fleet, October 23 and Bridgeman's minutes on cover 
sheet, October 31, 1908, Ibid. 
III Refer to Chapter 1, above. 
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rendered much more difficult if buoys and marks were removed or shifted. but 
this should quickly become known to us as the German system of marking 
channels is very elaborate. I 12 
Aside from minor hydrographic inconveniences, Charlton was optimistic about 
successful destroyer deployments under W.1.-W.3.'s parameters. He was equally 
confident that the Tribals could be refuelled at sea by oil-carrying lighters which would 
extend the duration that they could be employed off the German littoral. a factor that 
also won the approval the new DNI, Rear-Admiral A.E. Bethell (1909-12).113 While 
these exercises revealed logistical inconsistencies in the War College proposals, they 
were significant. The examination of these issues at a fleet level indicated that the 
Admiralty viewed an "observational" blockade as a viable contingency to cover other 
North Sea/Baltic operations outlined in the "W" series. 
Coinciding with the Home Fleet flotilla reports, a series of secret hydrographic 
tests were conducted off Hom's Reef on Jutland's western coast in June and September 
1909. Directed by the Hydrographic Department and the Admiral Commanding 
Coastguard and Reserves, R. Henderson, the torpedo gunboat HMS Halcyon, on 
assignment as a Fisheries Protection Vessel, conducted three days of sounding tests at 
various locations off the Danish port of Ebsjerg in mid-June 1909.114 The purpose was 
to discover a suitable offshore anchorage near Ebsjerg and Hom's Reef. Halcyon's 
Commander, M. Fitzmaurice, reported that a Slugrarrd Coast anchorage fulfilled the 
necessary requirements, as it was outside Danish territorial waters, had easy access, 
112 From the C-in-C Home Fleet, Admiral Sir William May to the Secretary Admiralty, June 
22, 1909. Enclosures: "Report by Commander Paton, HMS Cherwell on River Class and Tribal 
Destroyers." included in, From Commodore (T) (E. Charlton), HMS Topaze, to the C-in-C Home 
Fleet, June 5, 1909, ADM 1/8040, From Admirals "X" Home Fleet, Nos. 1-1356.1909. For Tribal 
and River Class destroyers, March's British Destroyers should be consulted, though it is not always 
reliable. 
I \3 From Commodore (T), HMS Topaze, to the C-in-C Home Fleet, June 5, 1909; "Report by 
Commander Paton .... on River Class and Tribal Destroyers.", ADM 1/8040. 
114 HMS Halcyon remained a Fisheries Protection Vessel until 1914 when she was converted 
into a mine-sweeper. See: Conw~ 's, 1906-1922, p.20. 
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possessed good depth of water, and had ample accommodation. He concluded: "It is 
to be considered that this anchorage would be strategically suitable.,,115 The report was 
passed on to the NID and the Hydrographer, who both decided that further information 
was required on the degree of shelter afforded by the anchorage during westerly and 
northerly gales. 116 Accordingly, Halcyon conducted a second series of tests in September 
which proved inconclusive. Danish trawlers passing through the channel under 
examination and the proximity of the Blaavand Point Lighthouse compromised the 
secret intent attached to the examinations. 117 
Halcyon's covert activities and the importance attached to a second series of 
anchorage tests by the NID and the Hydrographer suggest that Fitzmaurice was sent to 
verify aspects of the "w" series plans. The anchorage tests conformed to W .2. 's 
proposal to create an "extempore" breakwater on the Hom's Reef where flotillas could 
be refuelled/coaled and serviced by depot ships. The location of the anchorage off 
Ebsjerg was well situated for the seizure ofSylt as a destroyer "flying" base supporting 
British squadrons watching the Skagerrak, and a base for cruisers and flotillas engaged 
in "observational" duties near the Heligoland Bight--scenarios detailed in W.l.-W.3 .. 
Like the Home Fleet flotilla exercises, Halcyon's anchorage tests confinned that the 
Admiralty considered the possible implementation of the 1908 "W" series proposals in 
a war with Gennany, especially W.1.-W.2.'s "observational" blockade off Gennany's 
North Sea littoral and in the Skagerrak. 
115 From Commanding Officer, H.M.S. Halcyon, Commander M. Fitzmaurice to Admiralty 
Hydrography Department, Chief Hydrographer F. Mostyn Field. "Confidential. Anchorage in Vicinity 
ofEbsjerg." (NID Report No. 734), June 24, 1909; Fitzmaurice to Admiral Commanding 
Coastguard & Reserves, July 26, 1909, ADM 116/866B, Case 4173. Detailed tracings from Admiralty 
Chart #] 887, "Eiger River to Blaavand Point.", show the position of the anchorages in question. The 
chart is located in the PRO Map Room, reference: MFQ 955 (1). Also see: ADM 53/21565, 
«Logbook ofHMS Halcyon, 1909, April] to ]910, March 23.", entries for June 18-22 and 
September 2-8, 1909. 
116 Fitzmaurice to Hydrography Department, June 24, 1909; Fitzmaurice to Admiral 
Commanding Coastguard & Reserves, July 26, 1909, ADM 116/866B. 
117 Secret. From Commander Fitzmaurice. H.M.S. /lalcyon, "Anchorages in the Vic inity of 
Hom's Reef." to Admiral Commanding Coast Guard, Reserves, September 8. ]909, ADM 116/8668. 
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The "W" series war plans reflected Fisher's continued anxiety over the Baltic 
status quo and his belief that the Foreign Office had not guaranteed the Navy's access 
through the Belts and Sound in the BalticlNorth Sea agreements. That this concern 
governed renewed planning in 1908 was evident in Foreign Office diplomacy 
throughout the status quo negotiations and the January-March 1908 work by Slade and 
the War College planners. Fisher's direct approaches to aid the Swedes in deepening the 
Sound reveals the importance of the Baltic entrances in the Admiralty's strategy and the 
motivations behind the "W" plans themselves. Although the later plans in the series, 
such as W.3., were also reactions to other crises in the European balance of power, they 
reflected Fisher's strategic views and preliminary planning during the BalticlNorth Sea 
negotiations. 
Despite their inconsistencies, the "W" series realistically attempted to overcome 
the dangers associated with a close blockade of the Gennan seaboard as outlined in 
1907's Plans B-O, while retaining an offensive edge. Proof that they, and their 
predecessors, were not "foils" to buttress Fisher's policies against Beresford and "the 
Syndicate of Discontent" is evidenced by several factors. By late 1907, the Admiralty 
was committed to building the proper ships for projected inshorelblockade offensive 
operations through the construction offast, light cruisers to support new, longer ranged, 
more seaworthy, and powerfully armed British destroyers (i.e. Rivers) working off 
Germany's North Sea estuaries as outlined in War Plans W.l.-W.3.IlS Ironically, the 
need for these vessels was also realised in Beresford's and Richmond's critiques of 
these projected operations. Home Fleet manoeuvres, destroyer exercises, and associated 
flotilla reports from 1908-09 validated that the "W" proposals were serious 
considerations since they simulated operations off the German North Sea coast/rivers. 
118 March, British Destroyers; Conway's, /906-/921, pp. 2, 72-7. The Admiralty's Ships 
Covers, ADM 138, at the Brass Foundry, Woolwich provide the technical specifications and 
developmental background of the new destroyer types. For the particular classes refer to: ADM 
1381184a and 1 84a-e. River Class; ADM 1 38/242-b, Beagle Class; ADM 1381246-c, Acorn Class. 
The Covers for the new generation of light cruisers include: ADM 138/231-b, Boadicea Class; ADM 
138/252, Blonde Class; ADM 138/240-c, Bristol Class; ADM 138/253&a, Weymouth Class; ADM 
1381263&a, Active Class. 
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The June/September 1909 sounding tests to locate an anchorage off the western Danish 
coast also confirmed how serious the Admiralty were about the W.1.-W.3. plans. The 
continued emphasis on Baltic and North Sea operations reflected, as they had in 1904-
07, that the Royal Navy's offensive power could only directly influence Germany in 
these two vital strategic regions, (i.e.) its exits to the North Sea. While Fisher may have 
been anxious about Beresford's opposition, he was equally concerned about losing 
access to the Baltic. The 1908 war plans continued the broad outlines of the offensive 
axiom initiated in the 1890's- the projection of the Navy's strength against an enemy's 
vitals. 
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Chapter Five: Probes into Admiralty War Planning, 1908-1909. 
I. 
The inter-relationship between naval planning, diplomacy, fleet exercises, a new 
light cruiser procurement policy, even HMS Halcyon's covert activities off western 
Jutland, had all revealed the validity of the Admiralty's 1907-08 war plans. By late 
1908, however, the Navy's strategy garnered unwanted attention from several quarters, 
especially Fisher's Service opponents and "continental" advocates. His reactions to 
these perceived intrusions from the Cabinet and Army would later affect the Navy's 
strategic development into the First World War. Weaknesses in the Admiralty's 
strategic policy were supposedly revealed at the 23rd August 1911 CID meeting during 
the second Moroccan Crisis. Before Agadir, however, the "Military Needs of the 
Empire" subcommittee (December 1908, March 1909) and the Beresford Inquiry (May-
July, 1909), had placed the Admiralty on the defensive over its strategic preparations 
for war with Germany. Any evaluation of planning in the 1909-1914 period must 
examine the impact of these subcommittees on the direction of the Admiralty's 
planning, the question of a naval staff, and the attitudes of the First Sea Lord. 
At the "Military Needs" inquiry, Fisher deliberately misrepresented the intent 
behind the 1907-08 war plans. Beresford's campaign against the Admiralty'S policies 
was another matter. The CID provided the former C-in-C Channel with a high level 
forum to attack alleged discrepancies in the war plans. During this investigation, the 
Ballard and Strategy Committee studies were officially revealed for the first time. 
Despite Beresford's and Admiral Sir Reginald Custance's efforts to discredit the plans, 
they retained their relevance. The malcontents even supported an observational 
blockade on Germany's North Sea littoral and the entrances to the SkagerraklKattegat 
as outlined in the "w" series plans. 
While Admiralty war planning was validated during the "Beresford Inquiry", its 
overall strategic policy did not escape scrutiny. The related question of a naval staff and 
Fisher's reaction proved the most debilitating to the future development of war plans. 
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The Navy War Council's creation In October 1909 satisfied the CID~s 
recommendations, but reinforced the First Sea Lord's hegemony over all planning 
matters. This body finally dethroned the NID as the Navy's traditional "staff" and 
principal war planning department, a position it had held since 1887. An experienced 
and reasoned system of operational planning, in existence for over two decades, was 
effectively eliminated. With Sir A.K. Wilson's inauguration as Fisher's successor, the 
Navy's strategic planning took a confused and tortuous path reflecting the latter's 
reactions to the CID probes into Admiralty policy. Although the premises behind the 
Navy's offensive designs were sound, Fisher's absence, Wilson's autocracy, and a 
misinterpretation of the original intent behind the 1907-08 plans, retarded the progress 
of the Admiralty's war planning into the First World War. 
II. 
As the 1908 "W" plans neared completion, the CID attempted to coordinate 
British naval and military policy in the event of an European war. Set against the 
Casablanca incident and Austria's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in October 1908, 
Rear-Admiral Ottley, now CID Secretary, persuaded Asquith to convene a special 
committee to consider Britain's defence requirements as influenced by Europe. The 
ClD's "Military Needs of the Empire" subcommitteemeton 3rd, 17th December and 23rd 
March 1909, and placed the Navy's strategy up for scrutiny. Chaired by the Prime 
Minister it included representatives from the CID, Admiralty, Army, and Foreign 
Office.· Before its first meeting, ajoint General StaffIDMO critique of the Naval War 
College's June 1908 proposal for a military expedition to Zealand, placed Fisher on the 
defensive. The War Office's 27th November memorandum repeated the DMO's 1905-
06 arguments against amphibious Baltic operations in favour of the "continental" plan 
• "Report and proceedings of a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence 
Appointed by the Prime Minister to Consider the Military Needs of the Empire.", March 1909, ~AB 
16/5. The Final Report of the Sub-Committee is dated July 24,1909. Members of the sub-committee 
were: Asquith as chairman; the First Marquess of Crewe; Sir Charles Hardinge; McKenna; Fisher; 
Slade; Captain A. E. Bethell (replaced Slade as DNI in March 1909); Richard B. Haldane. Minister 
for War; General Sir John French; General Sir William Nicholson, CIGS; Major-General J.S. Ewert. 
DMO; Lord Esher; and Ottley. 
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to support the French frontier armies. 2 This exacerbated an increasingly intransigent 
Fisher. His refusal to disclose the Navy's Baltic designs to the "Military Needs" 
subcommittee was evident as Slade remarked on 28th November: "Sir J. wanted to see 
me about the meeting on Thursday on the subject of the Military Needs of the Empire. 
His view is that we had better not say anything at all about it.,,3 This self-enforced 
"close-down" followed a favourable War College re-evaluation of the old plan to block 
the Elbe--revealing the Admiralty'S commitment to a potential Baltic campaign against 
Gennany.4 
Fisher's attitude throughout the "Military Needs" inquiry alternated between 
deliberate subterfuge and outright obduracy. When the General Staff presented their 27th 
November memorandum before the sub-committee on 3rd December, Fisher apparently 
initiated some form of outburst at the Army. Neither the subcommittee minutes nor 
Slade's diary reveal that he perpetrated a scene with other sources differing on the 
severity, context, and date of this alleged diatribe. Fisher categorised the Army's 
"continental" strategy as "suicidal idiocy" and allegedly advocated an amphibious 
landing in Pomerania. Given his intention not to discuss the Admiralty's Baltic plans 
at the CID, this exposition was unlikely.s Vehemently opposed to the BEF's despatch 
to the continent, Fisher nonetheless gave the Prime Minister the Admiralty's 
"guarantee" that the Army would be safely transported to France in the event of war. 
Fisher declined Asquith's offer that troops could be provided for offensive naval 
operations due to the considerable time required to mobilise military fonnations. The 
2 Ibid, "Memorandum by the General Staff', November 27, 1908, Appendix IV. Refer to 
Chapter Four above, foot note 59; Mackay, Fisher, p. 405; FDSF V.I., pp. 385-7. 
3 Slade Diary entry, November 28, 1908, MRF 39/3, Slade Papers, NMM. 
4 Slade Diary entry, November 19, 1908, MRF 39/3, Slade Papers, NMM. 
5 Admiral Sir R. Bacon, The Life of Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, Volume 2. (London, 1929), 
pp. 182-3. Williamson's Grand Strategy, p. 109, follows Bacon's interpreta.tion of Fisher's tirade at 
the Army but gives a more accurate portrayal of events based on the CID minutes. Also see: Mackay, 
Fisher, pp. 404-07. 
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Admiralty had to immediately implement measures at the outbreak of war.6 Fisher 
declined the offer for troops and reversed his January 1906 views over safeguarding '"the 
Ferry" to France to deflect attention away from the Navy's offensive planning. His 
reluctance to reveal the Admiralty's plans to the CID, Army, and Cabinet. was 
motivated by the need to safeguard strategic policy from criticism by these departments 
and, by extension, the internal Service opposition led by Beresford.7 Fisher's decision 
not to communicate details of the Admiralty'S 1908 contingencies to the C-in-C 
Channel was evident in early January 1908. Attempting to improve relations between 
the two protagonists via strategic issues, Slade eventually acquiesced to Fisher's view 
that the entire planning spectrum be deliberately kept from Beresford. 8 As the "Military 
Needs" sub-committee progressed, so would the distortion of the Admiralty's true 
strategic agenda. 
Fisher skirted the issue of the Navy's offensive plans before the CID sub-
committee for fear that they may be "leaked" to the "Syndicate of Discontent". At the 
17th December meeting, the Admiralty presented Slade's blockade memorandum, "The 
Economic Effect of War on German Trade".Maritime economic pressure directed at 
Germany would be enough to bring her to terms, considering her large seaborne trade 
and dependence on overseas raw materials and foodstuffs. Slade advocated Britain's 
traditional policy of denying Dutch and Belgian ports to hegemonic European powers.9 
The CIGS, Nicholson, unable to challenge Slade's statistics on the effect of an naval 
war on German commerce, commented that Germany would overrun France before 
6 Minutes of the first meeting of the "Military Needs" sub-committee, December 3, \908, 
CAB 16/5, PRO. 
7 Mackay, Fisher, pp.404-06. 
8 Refer to Chapter Four above; Slade Diary, January 6-8, \908, Slade MSS, MRF/39/3, 
NMM; Schurman, Corbett, pp. 73-8. 
9 "The Economic Effect of War on German Trade", December 12, 1908, CAB 1615, 
Appendix V., pp. 20-7. 
170 
economic pressure became effective. 10 Although the paper was accepted by the Defence 
Committee it was not, as some have suggested, adefmitive representation of the Navy's 
actual strategy. I I At best, it was a "smokescreen", representing only the broad outlines 
of the Admiralty's strategy, deliberately introduced to draw the sub-conmlittee away 
from the North SeafBaltic plans recently castigated by the War Office. Slade's discourse 
did not distinguish which strategy was more effective between the two options on the 
Admiralty's books: the distant blockade outlined in Plan AlAI and Plans W.l.-W.2 .. 
or a close investment against Germany's North Sea coast as stipulated in the specimen 
Plan BIB 1 and W.3., Part 1. The DNI avoided reference to Germany's important Baltic 
commerce, especially the Swedish iron-ore trade, which was the underlying motive 
behind the Admiralty'S offensive Baltic designs, (i.e.) Plan C/C 1 and Plan W.3. Part 2.12 
The sub-committee also considered a memorandum from Lord Esher. Fisher's 
friend and supporter. A staunch navalist, he strongly opposed sending an expeditionary 
force to France because British troops would be placed under French command. 13 
Attempting to "scuttle" the "continental" strategy, Esher advocated that the government 
support the Navy's proposed war on German trade, a close North Sea blockade, and an 
amphibious army for sudden descents on the enemy's territory. Placating the soldiers, 
Esher proposed that a token force of six mounted brigades (12,000 men) be sent to aid 
the French. Nicholson and General French rejected Esher's recommendations on 
technical grounds and the fact that "command of the sea" would not affect the 
10 Minutes of the third meeting of the "Military Needs" sub-committee, Thursday March 23, 
1909, CAB 16/5. 
II "Report of the Sub-Committee .... to Consider the Military Needs of the Empire", July 24, 
1909, CAB 16/5, p. viii.; OtTer, The First World War, pp.242-3. 
12 "lbe Economic Effect of War on German Trade", CAB 16/5, Appendix V., pp. 20-7. For 
Plans C/C 1 (1907) and W.3., Part 2., (1908) refer to Chapters Three and Four above. 
13 Brett and Esher Oliver (eds), Esher v. 2, Entry for November 9, 1908, pp.357-8. 
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"immediate issue" of land battles along the Franco-German frontier. 14 French's 
opposition was damaging since he was Esher's friend, an anti-continentalist", and 
supporter of amphibious operations,I5 Esher's unequivocal defence of the Admiralty 
"' 
revealed his role as Fisher's ally in the debate over Britain's national strategy. Fisher 
obviously kept him apprised of the Navy's broader strategy. though not the details of 
actual contingencies. 
Fisher's refusal to disclose war plans was compounded by further challenges to 
his administration. During the infamous 1909 Naval Scare (January-February), the 
Admiralty faced accusations that their incompetence had caused the loss of Britain's 
lead in dreadnought construction to Germany.16 At the beginning of the crisis, Fisher 
informed Esher of his intention not to divulge the Navy's plans to anyone, especially the 
CID and Beresford. 
I rather want to keep clear of Defence Committee till Morocco [Casablanca 
Crisis] is settled, as I don't want to disclose my plan of campaign to anyone. not 
even C.B. [Beresford] himself. I haven't even told Ottley and don't mean to. 
The only man who knows is Wilson, and he's as close as wax! The whole 
success will depend on suddenness and unexpectedness, and the moment I tell 
anyone there's an end to both!!! So just please keep me clear of any conferences, 
and I personally would sooner Defence Committee kept still. I'm seeing about 
the transports. I started it about 7 weeks ago and got 3 of my best satellites on 
it (unknown to Ottley), so you'll think me a villain of the deepest dye!17 
His allusion to Wilson, "transports", and "satellites", was to a paper on Baltic 
14 "Assistance to be given by Great Britain to France if she is Attacked by Germany, Note by 
Lord Esher", December 14, 1908; Minutes of the second meeting of the "Military Needs" sub-
committee, December 17, 1908; Report of the Sub-Committee ... .to consider the "Military Needs of 
the Empire", July 24, 1909, p. ix., CAB 16/5. d' Ombrain, War Machinery, pp. 94-5; Williamson, 
Grand Strategy, pp. 109-10. 
15 d' Om brain, pp. 145-6; Brett & Esher (eds), Esher v.2., pp. 185, 187,226,268,326,333, 
355,379,404,435; Major-General Gerald French, The Life of Field-Marshal Sir John French, 
(London, 193 1 ). 
16 FDSF r. J., pp. 151-85; Mackay, Fisher, pp. 408-10. 
17 Fisher to Esher, January 17, 1909, FGDNv.2., p. 220. 
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operations being prepared for the last CID "Needs"sub-committee meeting. 18 Indicating 
the reasons for his reluctance to divulge Admiralty planning to the CID (i.e. security and 
Beresford), Fisher's correspondence and other evidence validated that the 1907-08 plans 
remained serious considerations. 
In late February 1909, Fisher directed the Fourth Sea Lord, Vice-Admiral A.L. 
Winsloe, and the Admiralty's Transportation Department that alterations were required 
for coal and oil provisions to the home fleets in the event of war. Under a new system, 
fuel would be sent immediately to the fleets to fill bunkers during the imminent period 
before hostilities. Additional coal in colliers would be stationed at coastal ports. "as 
close as possible to the scene of operations" to resupply the fleets or join them at sea as 
required. These arrangements included "offensive flotillas" to be coaled at two 
"advanced positions": a Northern position or base comprised of the 2nd Flotilla and 6th 
Division (1 parent ship, 1 cruiser, 4 Scouts, 46 Torpedo-Boat Destroyers); a Southern 
base consisting of the 1 st Flotilla and 5th Division (1 parent ship, 2 cruisers, 3 Scouts, 31 
Destroyers). Large colliers would resupply destroyers lying alongside in rough weather. 
If necessary, battleships and cruisers would be "strictly required" to limit oil fuel 
expenditure except in emergency to allow destroyers to carry out their operations. 
Reference was made to the oil supply for the Flotilla Leader HMS Swift and the 
Scouting Cruiser HMS Boadicea, vessels specifically designed to support flotillas 
engaged in inshore operations. 19 Fisher did not indicate the locations of the advanced 
"bases" but the arrangement alluded to observational "watches" near the Skaw and 
along the German North Sea littoral as outlined in Plans B-C, Wilson's "Remarks", and 
the "W" series plans W.l.- W.2. The fleet coal/oil supply reorganisation conformed to 
18 Report and Proceedings ofa Sub-Committee ... on the Military Needs of the Empire, 
"Appendix X. Naval Considerations regarding Military Action in Denmark.", February 4, 1909, pp. 
45-8., CAB 16/5. 
19 First Sea Lord to Fourth Sea Lord. "Re: Arrangements for the supply of Coal and Oil Fuel, 
in war to ships in Home waters.", February 20. 1909, MT 23/229. Admiralty. Transport Department: 
Corre~pondence & Papers, PRO .. pp. 1-2,6-8,17.1 am indebted to ~arwick Brown for provid,ing me 
with this reference. For specifications and development of HMS Swift, see: Gray (ed), Conwcry !i 
J906-/922, p. 73; Brown, Warrior, p. 195. 
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October 1908 and June 1909 Home Fleet flotilla exercises and HMS Halcyon's 
J une/September 1 909 sounding tests on the Hom's Reef. This confrrmed that "watches" 
on the North Sea estuaries and the Skaw were projected as preliminary operations in a 
war with Gennany.20 Despite the CID probe, work continued on the Admiralty'S 
offensive designs. 
By March 1909, the Admiralty was under considerable pressure from Fisher's 
"feud" with Beresford, the Naval Scare, and the introduction of the revised 1909-10 
Naval Estimates. These strains only heightened Fisher's resolve to keep the Navy's war 
plans under a tighter rein. On 15th March he expressed voiced his motives to Esher. 
implying that the Navy's strategy entailed inshore/amphibious operations in the North 
Sea and Baltic. 
The General Staff criticism is, on the other hand, the thin end of the insidious 
wedge of our taking part in continental war as apart absolutely from coastal 
military expeditions in pure concert with the Navy-expeditions involving hell 
to the enemy because backed by an invincible Navy (the citadel of the military 
force). I don't desire to mention these expeditions and never will, as our military 
organisation is so damnably leaky! [potentially to Beresford] but it so happens 
for two solid hours this morning I have been studying one of them of 
inestimable value only involving 5, 000 men and some guns, and horses about 
500-a mere fleabite! but a collection of these fleabites would make Wilhelm 
scratch himself with fury! ... Are we or are we not going to send a British Army 
to fight on the Continent as quite distinct and apart from coastal raids and 
seizures of islands, etcetera, which the Navy dominate ?21 
Another consideration affected Fisher's pugnacity over the disclosure of war plans. 
Coinciding with the final ''Needs'' sub-committee meeting was Beresford's impeding 
th 22 furth . .. f I resignation as C-in-C Channel Fleet on 24 March. Any er cnnClsm 0 nava 
planning might have given Beresford additional ammunition for his attacks on 
Admiralty policy in the public sphere. 
20 Refer to Chapters Three and Four, above. 
21 Fisher to Esher. March 15,1909, FGDN v.2., pp.232-3. 
22 FDSF v.I .. pp. 103-4, 188; Fisher to Viscount Knollys, December 22, 1908, FGDN v.l., 
pp. 204-5; Mackay, Fisher, pp. 402-3; Bennet, Charlie B. pp.298-9. 
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During the 23rd March "Military Needs" sub-committee, the Admiralty 
presented a 4th February memorandum outlining possible naval/amphibious operations 
in Denmark, "Naval Considerations regarding Military Action in Denmark." This was 
the paper referred to by Fisher in his January correspondence with Esher. It was a 
deliberate attempt to gauge the General Staff's reaction and divert attention away from 
the Navy's offensive plans by denigrating operations already condemned by the DMO. 
The paper purposely suggested the employment of French, not British, troops in the 
Baltic. In the case of a war between Britain and Germany alone, it ruled out any 
attempts to force the Belts or an expedition to Denmark. The paper deliberately 
emphasised the dangers posed by mines and German torpedo-craft in or near the Baltic 
entrances. The memorandum continued: 
It is difficult to imagine a better way of playing into the hands of Germany than 
by sending a fleet into the Baltic; and if a military expedition is sent also so 
much the better for the Germans. The German ships know every part of the 
Belts and Baltic intimately, they are close to Kiel for support and 
supplies .... whereas we do not know the Baltic, and would have to depend for 
supplies on a very long and difficult line of communications open to attack at 
many points. 
A Baltic blockade (Plans C-D) was also downplayed due to the length of the German 
coastline and the "relatively insignificant local German trade" that would be effected.23 
These same considerations were not applied to scenarios involving the employment of 
French forces in the Baltic. 
Emulating Plans C-D and W.3., Part 2., the second prescription entailed a push 
into the Baltic and the landing of a French military expedition in Fyen and Zealand to 
gain control of the Belts. This recommendation envisioned a strong French fleet forcing 
open the Kattegat and the Belts, while the British held the North Sea and Dover 
StraitS.24 Predictably, the Army representatives deemed it as unfeasible as the other 
23 "Naval Considerations regarding Military Action in Denmark", Admiralty. February 4, 
1909, CAB 16/5, Appendix X., pp. 46-7. 
24 Naval Considerations .... Denmark, "The Case of War with Germany when Great Britain is 
Assisted by France or by France and Russia", February 4, 1909, Ibid., pp. 47-8. 
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combined operations advocated by the Admiralty throughout 1905-09. Surprisingly, 
Fisher did not object to the General Staff's assessments of the Denmark paper. He, in 
fact, accepted the view that Germany may occupy Fyen and Zealand and close the Belts. 
As an alternative, he again suggested, a 'la 1906-08, that an accommodation be reached 
with Sweden to deepen the Sound for a neutral passage into the Baltic.25 Fisher's guile 
in reintroducing a plan (June 1908 War College Zealand design) previously condemned 
by the DMO in November 1908 and the Swedish offer worked. The Anny and non-
naval sub-committee members rejected the Danish proposal. The final report of the 
"Needs" sub-committee cited Denmark's inevitable defeat in a German invasion as 
implying the immediate closure of the Baltic "to ships of the largest type',.26 Like the 
"economist" paper presented at the 17th December 1908 meeti ng, the Denmark 
presentation was another "smokescreen" to divert the CID and Army from the 
Admiralty's actual strategy against Gennany. 
Although the sub-committee' s final report vindicated the economic pressure that 
could be brought against Germany by "means of naval force alone", the Army had 
influenced the CID's conclusions. An economic blockade would not prevent Germany 
from overrunning France. While the Committee concluded: "In the event of an attack 
on France by Germany, the expediency of sending a military force abroad, or of relying 
on naval means only, is a matter of policy which can only be determined, when the 
occasion arises, by the Government of the day.", the report tacitly accepted the 
"continental" strategy. The second clause gave the General Staff a green light to 
continue work on the details of its plan; a design deemed "valuable" by the sub-
committee.27 Fisher could feel justified that his stonewalling had paid ofT for no 
definitive decision was made on Britain's national strategy, with the war plans safely 
25 Minutes of the third meeting of the Military Needs sub-committee, March 23, 1909, "HI. 
Military Action in Denmark", pp. 8-9, Ibid. 
26 Report ofa Sub-Committee .... on Military Needs of the Empire. 1909, July 24, 1909, "Ill. 
Military Action in Denmark", p. xi., CAB 16/5. 
27 Report ofa Sub-Committee .... on the Military Needs of the Lmpire. 1909 .. July 24,1909, 
Ibid., pp. viii-x.; Williamson, pp. 110-12; Mackay, pp.407-8. 
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within the Admiralty's preserve. But the rift between the two Services was widened bv 
the "Needs" sub-committee. Fisher's allusive 3rd December 1908 "guarantee" to 
transport the BEF to France, preserved the Navy's offensive strategies but later placed 
the Admiralty at a disadvantage when the CID again explored Britain's strategic options 
in 1911. 
III. 
Relinquishing command of the Channel Fleet, Beresford began the final stage 
of his campaign against the Fisher regime. Free from official censure, he accused the 
Admiralty of incompetence in the following areas: home fleet allocations, the Home 
Fleet's constitution, no campaign plan between the Admiralty and the C-in-C afloat, a 
shortage of small cruisers and destroyers, and the lack of a properly defended port on 
the East Coast. 28 On 19th April, Asquith appointed a CID sub-committee to investigate 
Beresford's accusations and the dissension rife in the Service for the past three years. 
In fifteen meetings from 27th April to 13 th July, evidence from Beresford and his former 
second-in-command, Reginald Custance, was countered by the First Lord before 
Asquith, Lord Morley, Sir Edward Grey, Lord Crewe, and Richard Haldane. Fisher, 
while present, took no active role in the proceedings.29 The inquiry's proceedings, its 
chief issues, and conclusions have been summarised elsewhere. The Cabinet's use of 
the CID to investigate an internal naval matter was both highly irregular and 
inappropriate, allowing Beresford to openly challenge the Board's supreme authority.30 
The Admiralty easily rebutted Beresford's accusations that no war plans existed by 
presenting a narrative outlining all communiques with the C-in-C on the War 
28 Appendices to Proceedings of a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence to 
lnquire into Certain Questions of Naval Policy Raised by Lord Charles Beresford. 1909.2. August 12, 
1909, CAB 16/9B,. PRO; Mackay, pp. 400-1. 
29 Report and Proceedings of a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence to 
Inquire into Certain Questions of Naval Policy Raised by Lord Charles Beresford. 1909. CAB 16/9A., 
328 pp. 
30 FDSFv.l .. pp. 189-204; Mackay, pp. 412-17; d' Ombrain, War Machinery, pp. 219.231-
5. 
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Plans/Orders matter.3] Beresford contradicted himself under cross- examination when 
he admitted that he "did get things which called themselves plans, but which did not 
regard as worthy of name. ,,32 A recent assertion that the July 1908 War Orders (Plans 
W.l.-W.2.) were "fake" and merely meant to placate Beresford is incorrect. given the 
July 1908 Channel Fleet Manoeuvres, the October 1908 Home Fleet flotilla exercises. 
and the February 1909 coal/oil supply reorganisation for the Home Fleets. These 
exercises and arrangements were all based around a North Sea-SkagerraklKattegat 
observational blockade as outlined in the War Orders.33 
The Admiralty introduced the Ballard Committee and "w" series plans to further 
refute Beresford's charges. Maurice Hankey, then Assistant Naval Secretary to the CIO, 
viewed Beresford's allegation about a lack of war plans as an "extraordinary lapse on 
his part." No doubt reluctantly, Fisher produced the 1907-08 plans to demolish 
Beresford's accusations and gave the CID the first official knowledge of their 
existence.34 The Inquiry's final report on the war plans issue concluded: "Lord Charles 
Beresford's original statement in his letter to the Prime Minister that 'upon assuming 
command of the Channel Fleet I was unable to obtain any strategical scheme or plan for 
disposal in war of the forces under my command,' was modified under cross-
examination, and the Committee are satisfied that he had no substantial grounds for 
complaint in this matter.,,35 
Beresford's critiques of the Admiralty's plans were a confused and contradictory 
evaluation of the Ballard Committee designs and the 1908 "w" series. He derided the 
3] Fisher to McKenna, May 26, 1908, FGDN v.2., pp. 177-9. This letter/summary is included 
in the Appendices to the Beresford Inquiry proceedings, CAB 16/9B. 
32Third meeting of the "Beresford" sub-committee, 29th April, 1909, Testimony of Lord 
Charles Beresford, Question 636, p. 60., CAB 16/9A. 
33 Lambert, Naval Revolution, p. 190, also Chapter 4 & fn. 19, above. 
34 Hankey, Supreme Command, v.I., pp. 71-2; Roskill, Hankey. p. 97. 
35 Appendices to Report and Proceedings .... , Part Ill.-War Plans and General Conclusion.", 
August 12, 1909, CAB 16/98. 
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1907 series as "the pedagogue's plan", full of platitudes and "not a plan that you can act 
upon; it is theoretical and not practical'~ --a mistaken assumption which included 
Corbett's "Introduction" with the actual plans and ascribed their authorship solely to the 
historian.36 Plan AlA 1 's distant North Sea blockade was "radically unsound" and 
"impractical" because it was too far from the German bases and employed too many 
vessels in the blockading cordons. The lack of "watching" cruisers and an adequate East 
Coast base were also concems--two of his principal charges against the Admiralty. 
These discrepancies and Plan A's design allowed the Gennan fleet to move undetected 
through the Kie1 Canal and around the Skaw to the west where it could attack the British 
fleet in the rear. Agreeing that the object was lure the Gennan fleet into the North Sea, 
Beresford decried Plan A's "defensive" orientation and the war on German trade: "War 
by compartments is foolish; it prolongs it, and has never been the custom of the British 
Race.,,37 His remedy was, "we have got to have an attacking policy ... we have got to 
watch the enemy's coast with watching cruisers; they have only two egresses, [Elbe, 
Skaw] and when they come out the Admiral should know they have come out. ,,38 
Disagreeing with Plan A's distant "watching" strategy, Beresford's solution repeated 
the July 1908 War Orders comprising Plan W.l-W.2.'s "observational" blockade and 
Plans B-C. 
Beresford's other critiques revealed his scant analysis of the 1907 plans. 
Believing that Plan BIB 1 was a serious contingency, he agreed with the planners that 
a simultaneous close blockade in the Baltic and North Sea littoral operations were 
unnecessary and dispersed the British Fleet. While blocking the Elbe was "sound", if 
36 First meeting of the "Beresford" sub-committee, 27th April, 1907, Questions: 98-99, 108-9, 
p. 9.; Third meeting, 29th April, Questions: 658-664, pp. 61-2., CAB 16/9A. 
37 Appendices to Report and Proceedings .... August 12, 1909, "Appendix 1 I . Criticisms by . 
Lord Charles Beresford of Admiralty War Plans, Part I., (forwarded by Lord Charles Beresford, Apnl 
29, 1909), War Plans. Parts 11, Ill, ~d IV., pp. 92-3, CAB.16/9B. ~irst m~ting .0f"Beresford'~ su~ 
committee, 27th April, 1909, QuestIons: 109-114, p. 9; ThIrd meetmg, 29 Apnl. 1909, QuestIons. 
663-672, pp. 61-2, Ibid. 
38 Report and Proceedings ..... First meeting, 27th April. 1909. Question 112, p. 10; Third 
meeting, 29th April. 1909, Questions 582-4. pp. 51-3, CAB 16/9A. 
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it failed the Gennans could defeat either British fleet in detail. Even if the Elbe 
obstruction held and the whole British fleet were despatched to the Baltic. Britain was 
left open to invasion. Additional concerns included the logistical problems of moving 
past Kiel and resupply difficulties for a British fleet blockading Gennan Baltic ports. 
Deeming Plan A "impossible", Beresford glossed over Plans C and D as possessing the 
same disadvantages as B, (i.e.) logistics. Plans B-D, however, "might possibly be 
effected" if the French were allied with Britain and assumed the defence of the Dover 
Straits.39 These ineffective appraisals of the 1907-08 war plans betrayed Beresford' s use 
of the planning issue to support his other charges against the Admiralty. 
Rear-Admiral Custance's testimony too, did not diminish the validity of the 
Fisher regime's war plans. He thought the plans "curious" as they under-rated the 
German fleet, over-exaggerated British strength, and "made no real attempt" to deal 
with the principal objective of bringing the Germans to action. Plan A was "particularly 
faulty" in placing the northern cordon too far from the enemy and concentrating the 
main British fleet at the Humber where it was exposed to an attack from German 
destroyers. He himself had recommended a similar Home Fleet concentration at the 
Nore to counter sorties by a combined Russo-German fleet issuing into the North Sea 
in 1902.40 His chief objection involved the cruiser cordons being under the Admiralty's 
control while their supporting armoured cruisers were commanded by the C-in-C 
Channel: "a division of authority little calculated to success." Believing, "plans prepared 
by a Committee are not only useless, but dangerous.", Custance shared Fisher's and 
Wi lson' s attitude that, "The plan must be in the head of the officer who will conduct the 
war, and he must be a member of the Board." His other complaints ridiculed Plan B's 
Borkum proposal and the July 1908 War Orders (Plan W.l-W.2) as "really so confused 
to be unintelligible, and indicate the dangers we have been running from want ofproper 
direction [Fisher/Admiralty]." Custance did not elaborate on these "dangers" nor 
39 Appendices to Proceedings .... ,August 12, 1909, Appendix II. Criticisms by Lord Charles 
Beresford of Admiralty War Plans. Part l.. pp. 92-3, CAB 16/98. 
40 Refer to Chapter Two, above. 
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criticise other designs such as Plans C. D, or W.3., indicating that he may have 
supported these proposals. 
Custance's late 1907 campaign plan for the ChannellHome Fleets comprised 
Beresford's" Second Plan of Action" sent to the Admiralty in June 1908. His proposals, 
ironically, equated with the "unintelligible" provisions of Plan W.2. and Wilson's 1907 
recommendations to keep heavy units out of the North Sea at the outset of war. Since. 
" it will not be possible at the opening of the war to keep a squadron inshore off the 
Elbe, Weser, and Ems, or to enter the Baltic", Custance thought the first option the 
"ultimate aim" with the second "advisable" only if the war was proving favourable to 
Britain. His plan mirrored Wilson's 1907 "Remarks" and W .2. 's proposal to base two 
British fleets on northern and southern English ports to cut off and engage the High Seas 
Fleet. The main fleet would be based at Queensferry while a cruiser-destroyer force was 
based at the Humber. Harwich, and the Medway. Patrolling a line from Spurn Point to 
the GennanIDanish frontier, fleet cruisers would watch for Gennan movements and 
guard the Skagerrak. Operating south of the Spurn Point line, the cruiser/destroyer force 
would cover the southern portion of the North Sea. The main fleet would be "in such 
a position" that it could support British cruisers and engage the Gennan fleet if it sortied 
but remain 200 miles from Gennan ports during nightfall. Custance' s objective was that 
the two forces act in mutual support: the southern force preventing German destroyers 
from moving north to attack the main fleet, the latter moving south to engage the High 
Seas Fleet should it sortie against the southern destroyers/cruisers.41 
Although his plan parallelled aspects of Plans W.l.IW.2., and Wilson's North 
Sea "sweeps", Custance thought the war plans "difficult to criticize, because it is hard 
to understand what is aimed at.. .. ". His critique of the July 1908 War Orders included 
the outgoing destroyer/cruiser dispositions near the Heligoland Bight and the small 
.t I Report and Proceedings of a Sub-Committee .... , Eleventh meeting, June 8, 1909. Evidence 
of Admiral Sir Reginald Custance, Questions: 2353-55, p. 275, CAB 16/9A; C-in-C Channel Fleet to 
Admiralty, June 1, 1908. "Second Plan of Action for the British Fleet.", ADM 116/1037. 
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number of vessels allotted to Beresford for operations near these waters.42 Custance's 
inconsistent and contradictory appraisals reinforced Beresford's charges against the 
Admiralty but were not a serious analysis of the 1907-08 war plans. 
During the Beresford Inquiry, the Admiralty received support from two sources 
intimately familiar with the Navy's plans: George Ballard and Sir A.K. Wilson. As the 
chief architect of the 1907 War Plans, Ballard sent Fisher a May 1909 paper detailing 
the history and development of the contingencies then under attack in the CID inquiry. 
His offer to defend the plans before the Committee was significant since as Captain of 
HMS Hampshire in the 1st Cruiser Squadron (1907-09) he had been under Beresford's 
overall command for the past three years.43 Regarding the former's condemnations of 
Plan A, Ballard concluded: 
It is evident that he entirely fails to grasp the main idea. These cruisers are not 
watching cruisers in any sense of the word as regards watching for the exit of 
the enemy's fleet, but placed solely to intercept trade. It would be quite 
unnecessary to set a close watch on either the Skaw or the Elbe, as it would not 
matter in the least which way the enemy came out. Our object is to force them 
to proceed to a distance of more than 300 miles from their own sheltered bases 
to defend their trade and then fall upon them when outside, or cut off their 
retreat. For the latter purpose the main battle fleet is placed in a commanding 
and safe central position. 
Only if this plan failed, or if the government decided that a "more advanced and 
vigorous offensive" was necessary, would Plans BIC be implemented. Beresford's 
assumption that blocking the Elbe "was a bad policy for us to shut an enemy in" was 
also mistaken, for it ensured that the Germans would be forced to use one exit only to 
the North Sea.44 
42 Report and Proceedings of a Sub-Committee ... , Twelfth meeting, June 15, 1909, Evidence 
of Admiral Sir Reginald Custance, Question 2390, p. 285, CAB 16/9A. 
43 G.A. Ballard, "Record of business, letters &c.", personal entries for August 20,1907 and 
December 16, 1909. Ballard Papers, MS 80/200, Box 1., NMM. Also refer to the Navy Lists, August 
1907 to January 1909, under HMS Hampshire. 
44G.A. Ballard to Fisher, May 3, 1909, "Remarks on the Framing of Certain Plans for 
War .... ", pp. 4-7, ADM 118997. 
182 
Ballard demolished Beresford's critiques by tracing the 1907 designs back to the 
NID's North Sea studies initiated by Custance in 1902. Since the plans were predicated 
on "the known opinion of several officers of high standing (NID's War Division) and 
embodied the "result of much special attention", the final form of the 1907 plans were 
decided with the "concurrence of more than one practical expert" (i.e. Ballard, Hankey. 
Ottley, Slade). Critics such as Beresford and Custance, "differ quite as much among 
themselves, and can produce no alternative plan which is entitled to carry weight as 
representing the views of a majority of naval officers. "--a reference to their inconsistent 
representations before the sub-committee. Ballard viewed Beresford's campaign plans 
as suspect, especially after the October 1907 Manoeuvres where the C-in-C had "placed 
his fleet in a position of perpetual danger for no adequate reason" and was nearly 
annihilated by Custance's destroyers.45 Ballard's paper illustrated the inadequacies in 
the malcontent's criticisms and further validated the Admiralty's strategic designs, such 
as Plan A, as credible contingencies. 
Wilson's June 24th testimony confirmed that he also endorsed the Fisher 
administration's strategic policy. A contributor to the Admiralty's planning throughout 
1904-07, it was unlikely that Wilson would have supported Beresford's criticisms since 
his"Remarks on the War Plans" duplicated two of the Ballard Committee's scenarios.46 
Wilson agreed with Custance that it was neither "practicable" nor "desirable" for a 
committee to construct plans for the outbreak of war as secrecy was a serious problem. 
While, "He was perfectly certain that any plan drawn up in peace would not be carried 
out in war.", Wilson viewed the Admiralty plans as "extremely useful" if they were 
applied to appropriate conditions. Plans could also be tested in naval manoeuvres 
(which they had since 1888) and evaluated under conditions "much nearer the real thing 
than was possible in land work.'~7 Cross-examined by Beresford, Wilson denied that 
45 Ibid., pp. 1-4, 7-10. 
46 Refer to Chapter Three above. 
47 Report and Proceedings of a Sub-Committee .... thirteenth meeting. 24 June. 1909, 
Testimony of Admiral Sir Arthur K. Wilson. pp. 305-16, CAB 16/9A; Appendices to Proceedings of 
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Admiralty policy had resulted in a dearth of destroyers and small cruisers. His retort 
recapitulated his aversion to a close blockade strategy as outlined in his 1907 
"Remarks": "my point is that, as I do not want to work over on the German coast, I do 
not want so many [cruisers/destroyers].,,48 Although Wilson would in two years 
advocate a close North Sea blockade, he regarded Beresford's insistence on more 
vessels, each to fulfill specific duties under a war plan, as virtually "impossible".49 
Other questions associated with the Fisher administration's strategic preparations did 
not, however, avoid serious circumspection by the "Beresford" sub-committee. The staff 
question attached to the war planning issue was the weakest link in Fisher's armour. 
Allegations that the Admiralty lacked a proper staff apparatus had prompted 
Fisher to remove ambiguities in the existing planning organisation before the Inquiry. 
To shore up his position, Fisher consulted Corbett over a re-structuring of the 
Admiralty'S "thinking" department. 50 During the Inquiry itself, Haldane supported 
Beresford's call for the establishment of a naval staff.51 This aspect of the controversy 
between Beresford and the Admiralty gained prominence when the Prime Minister 
queried Slade about alleged deficiencies within the Navy's planning/intelligence 
environs. Recently appointed as C-in-C East Indies (February-March), Slade's rejoinder 
to Asquith's questions criticised Fisher's use of ad hoc planning committees and the 
DNI's advisory position in strategic matters. His paper hinted that a formal staff system 
a Sub-committee .... Appendix 11, Admiral of the Fleet Sir A.K. Wilson's Remarks on War Plans., 
pp. 94-6, August 12, 1909, CAB 16/9B; Evidence of Sir Arthur Wilson on the scope of Naval Plans, 
ADM 118047, Admiralty. May 1908; FDSFv.l., pp. 197-8. 
48 Report and Proceedings of a Sub-Committee .... thirteenth meeting, 24 June, 1909, Question 
2598, p. 314, CAB 16/9A. Refer also to: Questions 2529, 2539, 2540, 2554, 2601, and 2602., pp. 
305-16. 
49 Appendices .... Swnmary of Proceedings-Part III. War Plans and Intelligence, Appendix 48, 
August 12, 1909, CAB 16/98. 
50 Fisher to Corbett, April 13, 1909, FGDN v.2., pp. 243-4. 
51 Report and Proceedings of a Sub-Committee .... Proceedings of the 10th meeting of the Sub-
Committee, July 13, 1909, CAB I6/9A; d' Ombrain, War Machinery, pp. 233-4. 
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with executive powers was needed, ideally through a conversion of the NID.52 
Before and during the Inquiry, the CID's Naval Assistant Secretary took the 
initiative to install a proper staff system at the Admiralty. In late November 1908, 
Hankey sent a staff outline to the War College President, Captain R.S. Lowry, believing 
that Lowry's position on the Strategy Committee might induce Fisher to accept the 
proposal. Although Fisher stated he would "give full consideration to if', Hankey heard 
nothing further. 53 In late May he broached the topic with McKenna in another paper. 
"The organisation of a General Staff ", arguing that the CID's final report would be 
favourable if a "scheme" for a naval "General Staff" were forwarded. With McKenna· s 
blessing Hankey informed Fisher that the basis of a staff already existed in the planning 
committees (Ballard and Strategy), the NID, and the War College. Hankey later stated 
"gradually I persuaded him" on the need for a staff, but what Fisher accepted was a 
greatly "emasculated" version of the original proposal. 54 
Slade's successor as DNI, Rear-Admiral A.E. Bethell (1909-1912), had also 
drafted a staff proposal in mid-May. He shared Hankey's appreciation that an executive 
body was needed to coordinate war planning and that the Admiralty already possessed 
a "staff' in the First Sea Lord, the NID, and War College. Bethell's recommendation 
for a ''Navy War Council" included: the First Sea Lord as President, the DNI as Vice-
President, an "Assistant Director for War", the War College President (Rear-Admiral) 
and Captain, and the First Sea Lord's Naval Assistant. The head of the NID's War 
Division and the Commander of the War College would act as Joint Secretaries. The 
DNI should be given "executive powers" to streamline work and allow the NID to 
52 Appendices to the Proceedings .... , Appendix 36: 1. Telegram Sent to Rear-Admiral E.J.W. 
Slade, April 29, 1909.2. Letter from Rear-Admiral E.J.W. Slade to Mr. Asquith in Reply to #1., May 
8, 1909, CAB 16/9B. 
53 "Papers and Correspondence about a Naval War Staff", Lowry to Hankey, November 24, 
27, 1908, HNKY 712, Hankey MSS, Churchill College, Cambridge. 
54 Hankey to McKenna, May 27, 1909, Fisher to Hankey, (n.d.), "Papers and 
Correspondence about a Naval War Staff", I-INKY 712; Hankey, The Supreme Command v. i.,pp. 72-
4; Roskill, Hankey, p. 99. 
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circumvent "M" Branch (Secretariat) and present its submissions directly to the Board. 
Strategic questions would be discussed by the Council with problems worked out at the 
War College and the War Division retaining its role as a planning department. Once 
completed, the Council would review and approve all war plans. 55 Bethell's 
recommendations, however, were not implemented. Fisher accepted his and Hankey's 
suggestions in-so-far as they aided the Admiralty's case before the CID, not because he 
truly desired a staff system with executive powers. McKenna presented Hankey's 
revised May draft, "in a somewhat diluted form" to the "Beresford" sub-committee. 56 
The Beresford Inquiry's final report, 12th August 1909, recognised McKenna's 
watered-down version of Hankey's (and Bethell's) staff proposal as part of the 
Admiralty'S ongoing development of its strategical side.57 Defects in the planning 
organisation had not escaped notice. Beresford's accusations and Slade's testimony 
influenced the sub-committee to urge the creation of a naval staff as soon as possible. 
Although some progress has been made, the measures which have been taken 
hitherto are open to a good deal of criticism, and the Committee may probably 
consider it vitally important that steps should be taken without delay to complete 
the organisation of a great naval War Staff.58 
Fisher remained as defiant as ever. Reproaching the CID's findings in a 28 th August 
letter to Esher, he defended his accomplishments and admonished the "cowards" on the 
Defence Committee for: 
II. The suggestio falsi that the Admiralty had been wanting in strategical 
thought-whereas we had effected the immense advantage of establishing the 
55 "Proposals by Director of Navallntelligence for carrying out the duties of a General Staff 
and re-organisation of the Navallntelligence Department", Admiralty. Naval War Staff., May 15, 
1909, ADM 118047, Admiralty, May 1908. 
56 Hankey, Supreme Commandv. /.,pp. 74-5 
57 Report and Proceedings of a Sub-Committee .... Tenth meeting, May IS, 1909, Testimony 
of First Lord, Reginald McKenna, Questions: 2192-7, 2200-0 I, CAB 16/9 A; Appendices to 
Proceedings .... Appendix 48, Summary of Proceedings. Part III. War Plans and Intelligence. 
CAB16/9B. 
58 Ibid, Appendix 48., p. 245. 
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Naval War College and gave the evidence of practical strategy in effecting the 
concentration of our Fleets instead of the previous state of dispersion. No 
redistribution of strategical force since the days ofNoah!59 
While the war plans proved that the Admiralty's strategic policy was not deficient, the 
War College and fleet re-concentration could not compensate for the lack of a staff 
although one had always existed within the NID. The CID's fmal report, and indeed the 
entire Inquiry, had undermined Fisher's position in not recognising the Admiralty's 
ultimate authority over a truculent subordinate. Lacking Cabinet support, Fisher had 
little choice but to acquiesce in the CID's judgement that a "great naval Staff" be 
erected at the Admiralty. 
Since the CID's final report did not recommended the new staff's structure nor 
its relationship to the Admiralty, the outgoing Fisher had considerable leeway in its 
constitution. As he intimated to McKenna, there would be no executive powers 
accorded the staff: " The point to guard against is a Board within a Board, and no 
diminishing of the direct personal responsibility to the First Lord or First Sea Lord." 60 
Borrowing the title coined by Bethell, the new "Navy War Council" was announced on 
11 th October 1909. It retained the system established with the Ballard Committee in 
1906: a planning branch bereft of executive authority and solely responsible to the 
Service chief and not the Board as advocated by Slade, Hankey, and Bethell. The 
Council's duties were vaguely defined as "the study of strategy and the consideration 
and working out of war plans." Its structure was similar to Bethell's outline, inel uding: 
the First Sea Lord as President, the Admiralty's Assistant Secretary as Council 
Secretary, the DNI, and the Director of the new Naval Mobilisation Department (OMO). 
Not a "regular" member, the War College President attended when business required 
his presence. Should the First Sea Lord be absent, the Presidency was assumed by the 
Second Sea Lord or any Sea Lord fulfilling the former's duties. All "executive powers" 
59 Fisher to Esher, August 28, 1909, FGDN v.2., pp. 260-1. Also refer to: Fisher to Ottley, 
August 291h, p.263. 
60 Fisher to Esher, October 9, 1909, FGDN v.2., p.270. 
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remained in the hands of the Service chief.61 With its initiative centred in the First Sea 
Lord, the Council was a stop-gap solution to placate the CID's call for a naval staff. "a 
sop to the critics and the politicians rather than a genuine attempt to solve the 
problem.,,62 Like its predecessors, the Ballard and Strategy Committees, the Council was 
merely another advisory body serving the dictates of the Service head. 
Fisher's Navy War Council toppled the Intelligence Department from its 
position as the Navy's principal planning centre when war plans and mobilisation were 
transferred to the new DMD. This body was fonned after the Beresford Inquiry to ease 
the strain on the overworked NID. The real reason for this upheaval occurred because 
the heads of the NID's War and Trade Divisions, Captains Henry Campbell and A.R. 
Hulbert, had supplied Beresford with information to aid his case against the Admiralty. 
Following the Inquiry, Campbell and Hulbert were sacked, the Trade Division 
abolished, and the War Division hacked away from the NID and merged with the 
Mobilisation Department.63 The effect of this "reorganisation" was alluded to in the 
Naval Staffs historical monograph: 
The new organisation left the Intelligence Department reduced in prestige and 
shorn of half its strength. It reverted more or less to the position it had held 
previous to 1887 when it was confined to the collection and collation of 
intelligence. This was a change of profound significance, for it meant that there 
was no longer a single head to collate the work of the divisions for the 
consideration of the First Sea Lord. The Director of Naval Intelligence was no 
longer in a position to discuss and consider plans of war .... so that in the year 
1 909 brought with it a great change in the status of the Intelligence Department 
and it is not possible to regard it after that year as the equivalent of a Naval 
Staff.64 
Under the First Sea Lord's continued overlordship, the War Council was bereft of the 
61 "A Navy War Staff, Part I.", February 18, 1910 and "Navy War Council", October 12, 
1909, The Times. FDSF v.I.. pp. 247-8. 
62 Haggie, "War Planning", p. 128. 
63 FDSF v.I., pp. 201-2. 
64 Naval Staff. Chapter X, pp. 48-9. NLMD. 
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established and experienced system of strategic planning developed \vithin NID from 
1887 to 1909--a network responsible for the Admiralty's operational contingencies 
during the entire period. Even Fisher's ad hoc 1906-08 planning committees had. at 
their epicentre, competent and talented officers from the War Division such as Ballard 
and Hankey. While Esher stated that the system was "all right while you have a Fisher 
there.",65 this was not the case after 1909. 
That the Navy War Council was never intended to serve as a planning staffwas 
apparent shortly after its establishment. As evidenced from its official minutes, the 
Council only met 14 times in its 29 months of existence, October 1909-March 1912. 
During Fisher's last three months it met only four times, while his successor, Wilson, 
convened the organisation a mere seven times during his two year tenn of office. 
Moreover, there is no evidence that discussion, and or work, on war planning ever took 
place.66 The Times Naval Correspondent, J.R. Thursfield viewed the body as "a very 
important step towards the evolution of a fully organised Naval War Staff; buL .. it is 
no redemption in full of the pledges given in that regard by the Admiralty to the 
Beresford Committee.,,67 Divorced from Fisher's policies, his fonner Naval Assistant, 
Herbert Richmond, condemned the War Council as "an absurd anomaly" and "the most 
absurd bit of humbug that has been produced for a long time.", which: 
pretends to be the basis of a General Staff, but its constitution shews that 
whoever devised it has no idea of what a staff is wanted for, or the particular 
functions of such a body .... The study of war forms no part of its work. The 1st 
Sea Lord remains supreme & imposes his crude strategical ideas on the nation.68 
The Navy War Council's creation and the NID's demise as a planning department were 
the final acts in Fisher's retrenchment of the Service chief s hegemony over strategic 
65 Esher to M.V. Brett, March 12, 1909, Esher v.2 .. p. 374. 
66 Navy War Council Minutes, 13 October, 1909 to 5 March, 1912, ADM 116/3090, Case 
0023. 
67 "A Naval War Staff. Part I.", The Times, February 18,1910. 
<>8 Richmond Diary, October 27, 1909, RIc/liS, Richmond Papers, NMM. 
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policy; a move that had reached its apogee during the "Military Needs" sub-committee. 
It proved a harbinger for the decline of coherent naval planning into the First World 
War. 
IV. 
The Navy War Council was one aspect of Fisher's agenda to secure a policy 
legacy. His last goal was to install a successor who would continue his materiel and 
personnel reforms and the strategic policy developed over the previous five years. 
Throughout late October-early November 1909, Fisher and McKenna worked to assure 
Wilson's ascension as the next First Sea Lord. Wilson was one of the few officers with 
the requisite seniority and respect to have avoided the partisanship which had spilt the 
upper Service ranks. McKenna promoted the Admiral as an acceptable compromise 
candidate who could heal the rift caused by the Fisher-Beresford feud.69 In all 
likelihood, he was meant as an interim replacement until a more suitable nominee, such 
as Prince Louis Battenberg, emerged.70 The promotion of"Ard Art" also circumvented 
any political changes which might halt Fisher's legacy. In late November 1909, Asquith 
dissolved Parliament in preparation for a General Election in the new year. If the 
Conservatives won, a member of the Beresford clique might have become First Sea 
Lord. Five of the eligible admirals on the active list were "Syndicate of 
Discontent"members. Even if the Liberals retained power, there was no guarantee 
Asquith would not oust McKenna and appoint a new First Lord inclined towards the 
Beresfordians.71 It was essential for Fisher that Wilson be confrrmed post-haste.72 
69 Bradford, Wilson, pp. 223-4; FDSF v. I., pp. 204-5, 211-2; Williams, Defending the 
Empire, pp. 127-37. 
70 Lambert, Naval Revolution, p 202-3, based on Fisher to Pamela McKenna, December 10, 
1909 and Fisher to Reginald McKenna, February 23, 1911 in FGDN v.2., pp. 344, 356. 
71 Fisher to McKenna, December 17, 1909, FGDN v.2., p. 284. N. Lambert, "Admiral Sir 
Arthur Knyvett Wilson, V.c. (1910-1911)" in Malcolm Murfett (ed), The First Sea Lord .. : From 
Fisher to Mountbatten (Westport, 1994), pp. 35-7. The five Syndicate admirals were: Beresford, 
Custance, Lewis Beaumont, Sir Arthur Moore, and Ashton Curzon-Howe. Two of the five, Beaumont 
(1894-99) and Custance (1899-1902), had been DNI. 
72 Fisher to Frederick Ponsonby [Viscount Knollys], November 3, 1909, FGDN v.2 .. p. 276. 
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Reluctant to leave the Admiralty, he wanted Wilson as First Sea Lord for at least two 
years to preserve his reforms and as a "stonewall" to his opponents. 73 
Wilson was selected because he was the best guarantor of Fisher's reform 
policies. He has been linked to the so-called "materiel schoof' and supported Fisher's 
controversial capital ship program.74 In mid November 1909, Wilson reassured 
McKenna that he would maintain the Admiralty'S policy of dreadnought construction.75 
By-and-Iarge, he adhered to the existing strategic policy. Wilson may have been at 
"variance" with details of the Admiralty war plans, but this does not prove that his 
strategic views were fundamentally different from Fisher's.76 Wilson was an active 
participant in offensive planning throughout 1905-08 and had endorsed the principal 
Admiralty contingencies against Germany during the "Beresford Inquiry". He shared 
Fisher's attitude on the First Sea Lord being the sole director of all strategic planning. 
A month before his retirement, Fisher intimated that only he and Wilson knew what the 
Navy's actual war plans were and that the policy would continue: 
We [FisherlWilson] have talked a lot about our War Plan for the Navy. You 
know he told the Defence Committee that only he and I knew of the War Plan, 
which is quite true, and it was the same when his Fleet was joined up with mine 
when South African War [was] in progress. He would sooner die than disclose 
it. I suggest you to withhold your judgement.n 
By December, Wilson was in charge at the Admiralty and was irritating the other 
Sea Lords and McKenna with his obstinacy ~ secretiveness, and uncompromising 
73 Fisher to McKenna, November 8, 1909, Ibid., p. 217. 
74 Lambert, "Sir Arthur Kvyvett Wilson", in Murfett (ed), The First Sea Lords, p. 36; FGDN 
v. I., pp. 68, 213, 401; FGDN v.2., pp 264-6. 
75 Fisher to Arnold White, November 13, 1909, FGDN v.2., p. 277. 
76 Lambert Naval Revolution, p. 203. The questionable assertion that Wilson's strategic 
inclinations did not "'mirror" Fisher's will be examined in the next chapter. 
77 Fisher to Esher, December 25, 1909, FGDN v.2., p. 286. 
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attitude.78 The reins had passed to the one officer who consistently shared Fisher's belief 
that secrecy and prerogative should dictate the Service chief s approach to strategy and 
planning--a view entrenched by the challenges presented to the Admiralty's strategic 
policy throughout 1909. As Fisher stated in Memories, "Only Sir Arthur Wilson and 
myself, when I was First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, knew the Naval plan of war:,79 
ACCQIdingly, when FisheI'sretirement and Wilson's succession became official on 25 th 
January 1910, the Service chief s ultimate authority over the Navy's strategic policy was 
re-established.80 This reaffirmation, Wilson's personality, and the demise ofNID-based 
war planning, ensured that the Admiralty's strategic policy appeared directionless and 
disorganized going into the First World War. 
78 Sir Francis Bridgeman to Fisher, November 21. 1909, Ibid., pp 282-3; FDSF v. I.. p. 213; 
Lord Esher to M.V. Brett. January 4,1910, Esher v. 2., p.433. 
79 Fjsber,Memories. p. 102. 
80 FGDN v.I., p. 205; The Times, December 2, 1909, p. 12a. 
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Chapter 6: The Solidification of Dual Strategies, 1911-1914. 
I. 
Admiral of the Fleet Sir A.K. Wilson's tenure as First Sea Lord (January 1910-
December 1911) contributed little to the Admiralty's strategic policy compared to 
earlier administrations. The Navy's chaotic planning after 1910. however. was also 
attributable to Fisher's final actions as First Sea Lord. A proven planning system centred 
on the NID, was terminated by his policies after the "Beresford" Inquiry. The Navy War 
Council firmly re-trenched the Service chief's prerogatives over all Admiralty planning. 
Yet, neither Fisher nor McKenna could have foreseen the new Service head' s autocratic 
approach in policy matters when they assured his ascension in 1910. Under Wilson, the 
Admiralty's strategy reflected his preferences from 1905-09, including designs earlier 
condemned by the Ballard Committee and Wilson himself for North Sea close blockade 
and inshore operations. While Fisher and Wilson's strategic views were similar, the 
latter's adoption of these questionable proposals disrupted the consistency of naval war 
planning leading into the First World War. 
Lacking Fisher's political aptitude, Wilson could not combat further probes into 
naval policy by the Cabinet, Army, and CID. As a result, defects in the Navy's war 
plans were revealed at the 23rd August 1911 CID meeting over the Agadir Crisis. 
Wilson's poor performance before this caucus led to: the Army's "continental" plan 
gaining wider acceptance, Churchill's replacing McKenna as First Lord, the institution 
ofa so-called Naval War Staff, and Wilson's removal. This fallout, however, was more 
a rejection of Wilson's strategic policy than a censure of all planning developed since 
the 1890's. 
After Agadir, contentious aspects of the Wilson regime's plans were openly 
challenged. Home Fleet C-in-C's, Admirals Sir Francis Bridgeman and Sir George 
Callaghan, condemned proposals for a close North Sea blockade. Responding to the C-
in-C's concerns, the War Staff advocated an equally unworkable "Intermediate" mid-
North Sea blockade. There is evidence that as a remedy to this system the Admiralty 
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accepted the distant (economic) blockade strategy, codified in Plan AlAI (1907), as 
early as November-December 1912.1 Others have overlooked this development, 
especially the roles played by George Ballard and Lieutenant K.G.B. Dewar in 
resurrecting and legitimising this plan.2 Yet even as this strategy was reconfirmed at the 
eleventh hour in 1914, questionable contingencies from the Fisher period were 
reanimated by Churchill. Those familiar with these inshore/amphibious proposals 
rejected their revival due to strengthened German North Sea defences and a 
misinterpretation of the original plans by Churchill and his obscure planning group 
established in 1913. When the war began, the Royal Navy's strategic policy was split 
between two divergent options: offensive inshore operations discredited by the 1906-08 
Admiralty planners and the 1907 distant blockade, resuscitated in 1912-1914. 
Historians have condemned the Admiralty's 1910-14 planning as hopelessly 
outdated in light of German submarine and flotilla capabilities in the North Sea. Others 
have claimed that Fisher and Wilson did not share the same strategic views on North 
Sea operations--a questionable point given Fisher's correspondence and his well-known 
penchant for a Baltic campaign.3 It is important to realise that the Wilson-Churchill 
schemes were never to be implemented under the original blueprints for the 1907-08 
war plans. In fact, the close blockade and amphibious scenarios were those most 
deprecated by the Ballard and Strategy Committee planners.4 The principal options from 
those series were either a distant blockade as adopted in 1912 or a Baltic push aimed at 
German trade. Independently, the North Sea operations promoted by the First Lord and 
First Sea Lord were valueless as former planners such as the DOD (Director Operations 
I Admiralty to C-in-C Home Fleets, "War Plans and War Orders", November 25, December 
16,1912 and February 18, 1913. ADM 116/3412.War Plans and War Orders Home Fleet and 
Detached Squadrons. November 1912-December 1913. 
2 See: FDSF v. J.; Mackay, Fisher; Lambert, Naval Revolution; Haggie, "War Planning in the 
Fisher Era" ; Hayes, "Admiralty's Plans". 
3 Hayes, "Admiralty'S Plans", pp. 95-116; Lambert, Naval Revolution. pp. 203-5. 
4 Refer to Chapters Three and Four. 
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Division, Naval War Staff), Ballard, realised in 1913-14. The Admiralty's tortuous 
strategic policy before August 1914 was the result of a fractured planning system. 
Wilson's autocracy, and opposition to his and Churchill's strategic designs. 
II. 
Verdicts on Wilson's capabilities as First Sea Lord are not flatteri ng. Inarticulate 
and secretive, he lacked Fisher's Machiavellian flair when defending the Admiralty's 
case before the politicians. This was evident at the CID where his opposition to the 
Anny's "continental" strategy tarnished the Admiralty's competence be fore the Cabinet. 
Throughout 1911, McKenna desperately appealed to Fisher to return to England and 
take over Wilson's brief when the Admiralty's case went before the CID.5 Maintaining 
Fisher's materiel policies, Wilson exercised a harsher despotism in administrative and 
strategic matters. Senior officers, including the other Sea Lords, found it impossible to 
work with and under the First Sea Lord because of his rigid formality, obstinance, and 
authoritarianism.6 The Second Sea Lord (soon Home Fleet C-in-C), Vice-Admiral Sir 
Francis Bridgeman, who had served under Wilson in the Channel Fleet, warned Fisher 
in November 1909: "I know from experience with him that there is no joy to be found 
in serving either with him or under him! Deadly dull and uncompromising as you know! 
He will never consult with anyone and is impatient in argument, even to being 
impossible.,,7 After Wilson's appointment, Bridgeman was proven correct for he was 
treated "as ifhe were a second lieutenant on board a ship.", in matters of Board policy 
and personnel administration. 8 
The First Lord, too, was disenchanted with Wilson's overall attitude. McKenna 
5 N. Lambert, "Admiral Sir Arthur Knyvetl-Wilson, V.C. (1910-1911), in Murfett, First Sea 
Lords, p. 38; Fisher to Mrs. Cecil Fisher, December 2, t 91 0, Fisher to Esher. October II, 1911, 
FGDNv.2 .. pp. 417, 390; d' Ombrain, War Machinery, pp. 239,242,250-1; Mackay, p.424. 
6 Lambert, "Wilson" in First Sea Lords. p. 39. 
7 Bridgeman to Fisher, November 21, 1909, FGDN v.2., p.282. 
8 Esher to Brett. January 4, 1910, Esher v.2 .. p. 433; FDSF v I.. pp. 213-4. 
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hoped for Wilson's retirement and frequently discussed his supersession with Fisher.Q 
Wilson's intractability dictated his conduct of the strategic realm. His approach to war 
planning was revealed before the Beresford Inquiry where he had complained that the 
secrecy of war plans was compromised once they were communicated to the C-in-C's 
afloat. IO Consequently, Wilson distrusted planning bodies and a staff system, preferring 
to keep strategic contingencies safely, "locked in the brain of the First Sea Lord" and 
no where else. 11 Evidenced by the Navy War Council minutes, no in depth study of 
planning/strategic issues occurred under Wilson's presidency. 12 Because Wilson relied 
exclusively on his own council, the Admiralty's strategic course became increasingly 
convoluted during this period. 
Before August 1911, it is difficult to chart the Admiralty's strategic planning. 
Along with Wilson's secretiveness, plans had to conform to the Declaration of 
London's provisions for the blockade of an enemy's ports. When the House of Lords 
rejected the agreement in December 1911, major changes were apparently made to the 
war plans. Since the documents outlining these changes and Wilson's plans are missing 
from the Admiralty records, it is difficult to define the true nature of the Navy's 
contingencies from January 1910 to August 1911.13 When Wilson departed in December 
9 Fisher to Ottley, February 25, 1910, Fisher MSS, FISR 119, #474, Churchill College, 
Cambridge; Fisher to McKenna, February 23, 1910, Fisher to Jellicoe, May 9, 1911, Fisher to 
McKenna, July 12, 1911, Fisher to Reginald Henderson, September 29, 1911, Fisher to Arnold White, 
October 1, 1911, FGDN v.2., pp. 356, 369, 377, 386, 387. 
10 Report and Proceedings of a Sub-committee .... by Lord Charles Beresford, Thirteenth 
meeting, 24 June 1909, Testimony of Admiral Sir A.K. Wilson, pp. 305-16, CAB 16/9A; Appendices 
to Proceeding ofa Sub-committee .... , Appendix 11, Admiral Sir A.K. Wilson's Remarks on War 
Plans, pp.94-6, 12 August, 1909, CAB 16/98. 
11 Fisher to Esher, December 25, 1909, FGDN v.2., p. 286. ; FDSF v.I., p. 247. 
12 Navy War Council minutes, 13 October, 1909 to 5 March, 1911, ADM 116/3090, Case 
0023 .• PRO. 
13 The only Admiralty docwnents pertaining to the Declaration of London are 
ADM 1/8400/397 and ADM 11611233-35 which cover the 1914-1916 period. Cabinet papers on the 
Declaration under CAB 17/87. CAB 41/33/19, CAB 371105- 107 give no indication of what changes 
were to be made to the Admiralty's war plans. There are likewise no hints of how the Declaration 
affected Admiralty planning in the Navy War Council minutes for 1910-1911. 
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1911, the Admiralty still had not sent the C-in-C Home Fleet, Admiral Bridgeman, 
copies of its new war plan against Gennany,14 Wilson's sudden support for a close 
North Sea blockade in 1911, contradicting his earlier views, is also open to conjecture 
due to the disappearance of his personal papers and diary. 15 Given these discrepancies, 
allegations that Wilson's strategic views were "fundamentally different" from Fisher's 
are not that straight forward. His adoption of a close blockade may have contrasted 
Fisher's alleged "flotilla defence" strategy, but there is insufficient evidence to 
conclusively state that the two men were at opposite ends of the strategic spectrum. 16 
Fisher stated that he and Wilson were at "variance" over details of the Admiralty's 
plans,17 yet Wilson's contribution to planning throughout 1905-07, the similarities 
between his 1907 "Remarks" and War Plans A and C, Fisher's correspondence linking 
Wilson with his strategic program, and Wilson's support for the 1907-08 war plans 
during the Beresford Inquiry, indicate that they agreed on the Admiralty'S strategy 
against Gennany.18 Moreover, Fisher never condemned a close observational blockade 
of the Heligoland Bight as later adopted by Wilson in either his October 1908 
"Submarine" paper or his December 1908 war plans "Commentary. If anything, the 
"Commentary" validated Plans W .1. and W.2 which mirrored Wilson' s 1907 proposals 
for a cruiser/flotilla North Sea observational blockade. 19 
Evidence confirms that a close or observational North Sea blockade was 
projected by the Wilson Admiralty in March 1910. Correspondence from the outgoing 
Home Fleet C-in-C, Admiral Sir William May to his successor, Bridgeman (his second 
14 Docket, "Addenda to Preliminary War Orders", Minutes by Flint (Head "M" Branch) and 
Minute by DNM, Duff, December 11, 1911, ADM 118132, Admiralty 1910,29 November-December; 
Lambert, "Wilson" in Murfett, p. 44-5. 
15 Bradford, Wilson, p. viii.; Lambert, Naval Revolution, p. 207. 
16 Ibid, pp. 204-7. 
17 Fisher to Grey and Fisher to Tweedmouth, January 23, 1908, FGDN v.2., pp. 155-7. 
18 Refer to Chapters Two and Three above. 
19 Refer to Chapter Four above. 
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stint as C-in-C), in March 1911 contained war orders and related communications 
between the Admiralty and Home Fleet from February 1909 to December 1910. The 
actual orders/plans are missing, but an index of the packet's contents indicates that the 
Admiralty'S strategy closely matched the outlines of War Plans W .2. -W.3., Part 1, from 
1908. On 14th March, 1910, Commodore (T), E. Charlton, sent the Admiralty a paper 
on the "German coast blockade". This was followed by a late August memorandum 
from May on the "Impracticability of Advanced bases". Given the subject of the Home 
Fleet-Admiralty correspondence, the contents of the C-in-C's war orders entailed an 
observational blockade ofthe German North Sea littoral and seizure of advanced flotilla 
bases as detailed in War Plans B-C (1907) and W.2. (1908). Responding to May's 
critiques, the Admiralty abolished the advanced base orders in October 1910. Sometime 
between October and early December, fresh War Orders for a Heligoland Bight 
"watch"were passed to the Home Fleet C-in-C who, along with Charlton, responded on 
10th December.20 The contents of the orders conformed to Plan W.3., Part 1. 's 
parameters for an observational blockade of the Bight by cruiser cordons on a line from 
the Terschelling to the Hom's Reef Light Vessel. 21 Between March and December 191 0, 
the Admiralty'S strategy was modified from a close watch on the German coast to a 
more distant observational blockade of the Bight as detailed in the 1908 War Plans. 
Based on Plans B-C and Wilson's 1907 "Remarks", the "watch" on the Bight remained 
the Admiralty's strategy for the remainder of Wilson's term. 
Combined Home-Atlantic Fleet exercises in April-May 1910 to test East Coast 
defensive patrols ("flotilla defence"), indirectly simulated observational patrols off an 
enemy's coast.22 One scenario simulated Red (Home) destroyer flotillas (River Class), 
20 "Secret, Received from Admiral Sir William May by Admiral Sir F.C.B. Bridgeman, 
March 25,1911, Sections III and IV, Contents," May MSS, MAYIIO, Tactical Reports, 1908-1913, 
NMM. 
21 Refer to Chapter Four above. 
22 C-in-C Home Fleet to Admiralty, "Report of the work carried out during the combined 
cruise with the Atlantic Fleet, April-May 1910.", 13th May, 1910, ADM 1181 19, From Admirals "X" 
Home Fleet. 1910. 
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supported by cruisers and Scouts, on Coast Patrol off the Firth of Forth. A coordinated 
attack on Red's patrol lines by Blue (Atlantic) flotillas (Rivers and Tribals). light 
cruisers, and Scouts resulted in the entire Red force being: "ruled out of action." The 
C-in-C Home Fleet concluded: "The scattered patrol [line] appears to me the weakest 
form of defence. It is attacked in detail and cannot get the help of its reserves." Hardly 
a shining example of "flotilla defence" at work, the exercise could have equally 
simulated British flotillas and "parent vessels" on close observational duties off the 
German North Sea estuaries given the composition of the forces involved: (i.e.) 
Boadicea Class light cruisers, Scouts, and RiverlTribal Class destroyers?3 The 
dispositions in the May 1910 exercise were identical to those from the 1907-08 
manoeuvres, and earlier, conducted to test aspects of the Admiralty's offensive 
designs.24 
III. 
Wilson's strategy was revealed during the 1 14th CID meeting at the height of the 
Agadir Crisis. Details of the 23 rd August 1911 meeting, the DMO/General Staff 
exposition of their "continental" strategy to support France, and the belief that Wilson 
"botched" the Navy's case have been recounted elsewhere.25 The Navy was under 
adverse scrutiny before the meeting due to the Admiralty's lax preparations in the early 
stages of the crisis.26 The War Secretary, Richard Haldane, took advantage of 
favourable circumstances such as Fisher's resignation and Wilson's political liabilities 
23 Report by C-in-C Home Fleet, William H. May, 13th May 1910, Ibid. 
24 Refer to Chapters Three and Four above. 
25Williamson, pp. 187-94; Hankey, Supreme Command v. 1., pp. 78-84; N. d'Ombrain, "The 
Imperial General Staff and the Military Policy of a 'Continental Strategy' ~uring ~~ 1911 
International Crisis", Military Affairs, October 1970, pp. 88-93; J. P. Macmtosh, 1 he Role of the 
Committee oflmperial Defence before 1914". The English Historical Review, Volwne LXXVII, 
1962, pp. 189-91; Steiner, pp. 71-8, 200-02; Summerton, " British Military Planning", Chapter 8. 
pp.431-81. 
26 Williamson, pp. 182-3; FDSF v. 1., pp. 241-4; Churchill, World Crisis v. J.. pp. 45-9. 
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to get the meeting on his own terms.27 Haldane deliberately instigated the meeting to 
undermine the Admiralty'S position within the CID. His motives involved a 
strengthening of the military entente with France and the creation of a defence ministry 
headed by the War Office. Aside from Wilson, McKenna, Hankey, and Bethell (ONI). 
the assembly constituted a strong gathering of the entente faction. Lord Esher and other 
regular Committee members who may have been inclined towards the Admiralty's 
strategy were purposely excluded from the debate.28 Along with Wilson's political 
ineptitude, this explains why the Navy was preordained to give a poor perfonnance in 
the last major prewar discussion on Britain's national strategy--a view still generally 
held by most historians. A reconsideration of the meeting's minutes and the motives 
behind Wilson's strategy indicates, however, that the Admiralty'S case has been 
misrepresented. 
Wilson repeated Fisher's stance during the "Military Needs" and "Beresford" 
inquiries when responding to the OMO, Brig.- General Henry Wilson's, proposal to 
despatch an expeditionary force to France. Pressed by Haldane whether the Admiralty 
would cover the BEF's transport across the Channel, Wilson stated that the Navy could 
perfonn the service ''without serious difficulty." Yet before his presentation he reversed 
his position, critiquing the Army's plan for leaving Britain open to small raids and 
removing troops for amphibious operations. The Admiralty's strategic policy entailed 
an observational blockade on the Gennan North Sea coast, especially the Ems, Weser, 
and Elbe estuaries. Owing to the Kiel Canal, it was necessary to watch the Baltic 
entrances--the outlines of these operations conforming to Plans BIC and W .1-W.3 .. Part 
1 . Although, "We had no wish to prevent the German Fleet from coming out", it was 
the egress of German destroyers and submarines into the North Sea that Wilson saw as 
27 J. w. Coogan, The End o/Neutrality: the United States, Britain, and Maritime R;~hts, 
1887-19/5. (London, 1981), pp. 140-3. 
28 d'Ombrain. War Machinery, pp. 100-02. 
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"essential to prevent." 29 This scenario apparently influenced his sudden support for a 
"close" blockade 30 __ a strategy condemned in his 1907 "Remarks". While it has been 
claimed that Wilson advocated this "close" blockade due to destroyer shortages for 
either a "flotilla" strategy or an observational blockade3l • he alluded to the latter 
scenario: "If possible we should maintain our watch upon the Gennan coastline with 
destroyers." This repeated the observational blockade detailed in Plans C and W .1. -W.3. 
Part 1, with British destroyer flotillas supported by Scouts and light cruisers. Operations 
to seize Wangeroog at the mouth of the Jade and Shillinghom were also projected. If 
necessary, both islands could serve as advanced bases for British flotillas, though 
Wilson later viewed the Shillinghom operation as unessentia1.32 Amphibious landings 
at the Weser's entrance and BilsUm to threaten the Kiel Canal were other options. 
Covered by the Fleet, these landings could detain at least ten Gennan divisions while 
only employing one British division and Royal Marines. These operations would draw 
Gennan fonnations from the main battles in France and might lead to the eventual 
destruction/expulsion of the High Seas Fleet ifit were at Wilhelmshaven.33 
Recapitulating themes from 1905-09,Wilson advocated the seizure of 
Heligoland, an operation earlier decried by the Ballard Committee. Royal Marines 
would capture Heligoland "as soon as possible" after the outbreak of war --a scenario 
detailed in Hankey's 1904 "Advanced Bases for the Fleet" and Plan B from 1907. 
While not anticipating "any difficulty", regular troops should be spared to alleviate the 
"very arduous" blockade caused by Gennan torpedo craft utilising the North Sea 
coastline. Cross-examined by the Home Secretary, Winston Churchill, and the CIGS, 
29 Committee oflmperial Defence. Minutes of the 1141h meeting, August 23,1911, CAB 2/2, 
pp. 10-11. 
30 Lambert, Naval Revolution, pp. 205-9. 
31 Ibid .. p. 204. 
32 Minutes of the 114th Meeting, CAB 2/2, p. II, 14. 
33 /hid, pp.II-12. 
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Field-Marshal Nicholson, Wilson elaborated on points already covered. Despite 
Churchill's doubts and Nicholson's view that amphibious landings "were doomed to 
failure", Wilson pressed on. Provided that the North Sea operations led to a successful 
fleet engagement, the Baltic could be entered and the Prussian coast blockaded. 
Advanced bases such as Fehmarn Island would have to be established to support the 
Fleet. Attacks on Swinemiinde and Danzig were possibilities but, as realised throughout 
1905-08, ultimately contingent on Denmark's attitude. 34 
After Churchill's queries about the necessity of a blockade and Nicholson's 
observation that the Heligoland enterprise was "madness", Wilson again gave the reason 
for this strategy. An observational blockade would prevent German destroyer attacks 
on the Fleet. Any other policy was unacceptable as: "The safety of our Fleet depended 
upon preventing the German destroyers from getting out", and involved an increased 
British destroyer complement. 35 His beliefthat submarines could be contained in coastal 
waters by light forces originated in 1904 exercises between the Channel Fleet and 
submarines.36 Wilson's reference to the German destroyer/submarine threat during the 
Agadir caucus was the primary motivation for the adoption of the "close" North Sea 
blockade in 1910-11.37 It was not, however, a fundamental split with Fisher's views for 
Wilson's plans retained the same themes promulgated throughout 1904-09: 
observational, inshore, and amphibious operations off the German North Sea estuaries 
as precursors to a fleet action and a Baltic campaign aimed at Germany's vitals. His 
refusal to cooperate with the "continental" strategy and the demand for troops for 
amphibious projects indicated that he still adhered to the Fisher regime's strategic 
policy.38 
34 Minutes of the 1141h meeting of the CID, August 23, 1911, CAB 2/2, pp.12-13. 
35 Ibid. p. 14. 
36 Lambert, "Wilson" in First Sea Lords, pp. 42-4. 
37 Lambert. Naval Revolution. pp. 205-11. 
38 Minutes of the 114th Meeting .... , CAB 2/2, pp.14-15. 
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The Service chiefs shortcomings during the 23 rd August meeting fostered the 
belief that the Admiralty lacked credible war plans. Even the vacillating Prime Minister 
admitted that the Navy's strategy was "puerile" and "'wholly impracticable".39 
Admiralty supporters such as Hankey were dismayed by Wilson's presentation. The 
CID Naval Secretary believed the Admiral's discourse, "savoured rather of having been 
'cooked up' in the dinner hour.,,40 Historians have focussed, perhaps unnecessarily, on 
Wilson's CID performance as proof that the Admiralty'S plans were amateurish 
compared to the Army's equally controversial "continental" strategy.41 While the First 
Sea Lord was out of his depth before the Committee, insinuations that the Admiralty's 
strategic policy was inept are unwarranted. At best, his proposals conformed to Plans 
W.1.-W. 3, Part 1., for an observational North Sea blockade with flotillas and their 
supports lying off the German estuaries during the day. These plans were, in fact. meant 
to keep the enemy's coast under observation but removed British capital ships from the 
threat posed by German torpedo craft.42 Moreover, the meeting's minutes reveal that 
critiques ofthe DMO's plan by Churchill, Wilson, and McKenna, were no less scathing 
or damaging than those directed at the Admiralty. At several junctures, the Home 
Secretary bested General Wilson on questions pertaining to British military action in 
the event of a retreat from the Meuse and the BEF being placed under French 
command.43 
Wilson, however, diverged from Fisher's script during the "Military Needs" and 
"Beresford" sub-committees to "hush up" on strategic matters and revealed the 
Admiralty'S offensive planning to the CID. The point was not lost on Hankey who 
39 Williamson, p. 193. 
40 Hankey, Supreme Command v.I.. p. 81. 
41 Williamson, pp. 191-3; d' Ombrain, War Machinery. pp. 101-02; Summerton, 443-71: 
Lambert, Naval Revolution, pp.204-07. 
42 See above, footnotes 29-32 and Chapter Four. 
43 Minutes of the 114th Meeting .... , CAB 212, pp.6-1O. 
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confided to Fisher, " He [Wilson] allowed himself to be drawn too much about his naval 
intentions, a subject on which you always declined to be drawn.'"w Fisher was 
"astounded" and "really upset" with Wilson when he discovered the extent of the 
revelations before the Committee.45 Yet he still agreed with Wilson's plans, despite 
their disclosure before the CID. In a November letter to the naval journalist Arnold 
White, Fisher was incensed by, " .... a d-d pernicious report being spread that A.K. 
Wilson had no war plan and that the English Fleet was not ready." Intimating pre-
knowledge of the Admiralty's plans, he continued: " .... his [Wilson's] dispositions of the 
Fleet were all studied and perfect. As I believe I am the only one he ever trusted with 
his plans, I can speak.,,46 If Wilson differed from Fisher in strategic policy, it was in his 
honesty before the Defence Committee. The appearance of incompetence. however, 
was enough to indict the Admiralty before the politicians. By September, requests from 
the War Office for information on the BEF's transport to France were being ignored by 
the Admiralty's Transport Department.47 With this development and Wilson's wretched 
performance during the Agadir crisis, Haldane and Churchill pushed Asquith for an 
Admiralty re-organisation and the creation of a naval staff. Churchill became the new 
First Lord on 25th October after exchanging the Home Office with McKenna.48 
Ironically, within two years, he was promoting many ofthe same operations detailed by 
Wilson before the CID. 
Confirmation that Wilson's plans entailed a ''watch'' on the Bight and North Sea 
estuaries was apparent even before Agadir. Preliminary orders from the Home Fleet C-
44 Hankey to Fisher, August 24, 1911, quoted in FDSF v.I., pp. 392-3. 
45 Fisher to Hankey, August 29, 1911, Hankey MSS, HNKY 5/2A, Churchill College, 
Cambridge. 
46Fisher to White, November 10, 1910, FGDNv.2., pp. 414-15. 
47 Lambert, "Wilson", in First Sea Lords, p.48. 
48 FDSF v. /., pp. 246-51; Williamson, pp.192-6; R. S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill. 
Volume 2: Young Statesman, /901-14. (London, 1967), pp. 534-41; op cit., Winston S. Churchill 
:Companion Volume 2., Part IJ, 1907-19/ /, (Boston, 1969), pp. 1294-8; P. Gretton, Former Naval 
Person: Winston Churchill and the Royal Nm:v. (London, 1968). pp. 38-44. 
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in-C in January 1911, indicated that this was the strategy although it was not "officially" 
communicated to the Fleet until late August. The War Orders included an inshore watch 
on the Elbe and Weser by the Home Fleet's 1 st and 2nd Destroyer Flotillas with the 3rd 
Flotilla as reinforcement, supported by armoured cruisers of the 1 st and 3rd Cruiser 
Squadrons. The objectives were to report and, if possible, prevent a High Seas Fleet 
sortie and the passage of German destroyers, cruisers, and merchant transports into the 
North Sea. Attendant vessels (light cruisers/Scouts) would form a daytime cordon 
between the Borkum and Hom's Reef Light Vessels, supporting the destroyer flotillas 
at night but retiring before sunrise. Annoured cruiser squadrons, would close on the 
attendant vessels during the day but would remain north of the cordon at night. These 
were provisional contingencies, for if a Dover Straits defence and fleet mobilisation 
were in place: "such a close watch of the Heligoland Bight will not be essential." The 
inshore watch would be periodically withdrawn to entice out the Gennan Fleet.49 The 
plan's outlines conformed to Plan W.3., Part 1., for an observational blockade of the 
Bight from Terschelling to Hom's Reef.50 Following the 23rd August meeting, however, 
dissatisfaction with Wilson's strategy increased amongst senior fleet commanders. 
May's successor as Home Fleet C-in-C, Vice-Admiral Bridgeman, (February 
1911) and his Second-in-Command, Vice-Admiral Sir George Callaghan, thought the 
Admiralty's proposed watch on the Bight unworkable. Both were concerned over 
maintaining flotillas in the Bight due to a dearth in destroyers, Y annouth' s inadequacy 
as a base for the 1 st Flotilla, and organisational changes to the armoured cruiser 
49 Heligoland Bight Blockade Squadron. Preliminary War Orders for Commodore T. in 
Command. Issued by C-in-C Home Fleet, Admiral Sir William May, January 23, 1911, ADM 
116/3096. War Plans Home Waters, 1911-1914, Case 0030; Admiralty to Callaghan, Home Fleet, 
"Blockade of North Sea Coast of Gennany August 1911 ", pp. 7-40, August 23, 1911; Bridgeman to 
Admiralty, August 31. 1911, ADM 137/1936 (HSA 138) Secrets Packs of the ~-in-C Grand Fleet. 
t914-1918, Vol. LVI. Pack 0022. Operations. Section K.-Strategical and Tactical Matters. Nos. I-tO. 
50 Refer to Chapter Four. 
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squadrons slated to support the blockade. 51 Bridgeman and Callaghan were also alarmed 
by Wilson's proposal to capture Heligoland as an advanced base.52 The practicality of 
an inshore destroyer watch off the German rivers itself was questionable after a July 
1911 exercise between a submarine flotilla and the 1 st Flotilla produced unfavourable 
results.53 This reinforced Bridgeman's doubts and he refused to endorse draft orders 
from Commodore (T), R. Arbuthnot, for inshore flotillas assigned to watch the Gennan 
North Sea rivers. 54ln further secret orders to the Home Fleet, Wilson persisted with the 
imposition of a watch on the Bight, Heligoland' s seizure, and the bombardment of 
Gennan coastal fortifications. When Bridgeman succeeded Wilson as First Sea Lord 
and Callaghan assumed command of the Home Fleet in November 1911, the new C-in-
C again challenged the feasibility of a watch on the Bight. In his recommendations to 
the Admiralty, Callaghan wanted a review of the North Sea blockade scenario due to 
destroyer shortages and expressed his "grave objection" to risking even a "portion of 
the main fleet" in land bombardments. Bridgeman concurred with the views of his 
recent 'second" and Wilson's strategy passed into abeyance.55 Its replacement was 
equally flawed and, ultimately, even more untenable. 
IV. 
Dissatisfaction with Wilson accompanied Churchill's 25th October 1911 
appointment as First Lord. As the latter's 'unofficial' advisor, Fisher was aware of an 
Admiralty re-organisation and recommended a reconstituted Board and key 
51 "War Plans. Remarks on Certain Points In", pp. 1-24., Callaghan to Admiralty, January 9, 
1912, Section VII., War Stations. Watch on Gennan Rivers, p. 10; Commodore (T), R.K. Arbuthnot 
to C-in-C Home Fleet, December 18, 1911, ADM 116/3096. 
52 "Blockade of North Sea Coast of Gennan Empire"., Memorandum by Bridgeman and 
Callaghan to Admiralty, August 31, 1911, ADM 118132. Admiralty. 1910., 29 November-December. 
53 Lambert. Naval Revolution, p. 209; Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes, Naval 
Memoirs: The Narrow Seas to the Dardanelles, 1910-1915, (London, 1934). p.42. 
54 Callaghan to Admiralty, January 9, 1912, Section VII.. War Stations. Watch on German 
Rivers, p. 10 .. ADM I 16/3096. 
55 Ibid, Section X. "Notes on Operations in the North Sea" 
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departments. Admitting the First Sea Lord's administrative liabilities: "Wilson is no 
good ashore", Fisher proposed Vice-Admiral Prince Louis Battenberg as a replacement. 
He emphasised Captain George Ballard's recall from the fleet to replace Bethell "at 
once" as DNI.56 Ballard was then commanding the battleship HMS Britannia in the 
Home Fleet's 2nd Division and had also been considered by McKenna as the obvious 
choice for DNI. 57 Although the Board's re-arrangement bore little resemblance to 
Fisher's suggestions, Ballard was not excluded. 58 After drafting a memorandum on statT 
organisation, Ballard was subsequently appointed Director Operations Division (DOD-
Planning) on the new Admiralty War Staff--a position analogous to his stint as ADNI 
War Division in 1904-06.59 His appointment and work as the Service's pre-eminent 
~~strategist" during 1902-07, would again influence the the Admiralty's war planning 
throughout 1912-14. 
It was Wilson's opposition to Churchill's naval staff, and not strategic planning, 
that led to his removal. On 28th October, the First Lord issued a Naval War Staff 
memorandum outlining its organisation, role, and staff officer training. 60 Wilson 
countered Churchill's paper with the reasons for his resistance to a staff system. The 
appointment of a new Chief of the War Staff (COS) would muddle the authority and 
communication between the Service chief, the DNI, DNM, and DNO. Wilson 
reaffirmed his (and Fisher'S) dictum that, "The preparation of War plans is a matter that 
must be dealt with by the First Sea Lord himself', aided by his Naval Assistant, the 
56 Fisher to J.A. Spender, October 25, 1911, FGDN v.2 .. pp. 397-9; Fisher to Churchill, 
October 26 and November 4, 1911, R. Churchill, Young Statesman, pp. 1300, 1321. 
57 G.A. Ballard, Record of Business, letters, &c., December 9, 1910, Ballard MSS, 
MSSO/200, NMM; Lambert, Naval Revolution, p.265, endnote 262. 
58 FGDN v.2., pp. 399-400, Footnote 1. 
59 G.A. Ballard, "Record of Business, Letters, &c.", 1 December, 1911 and Sth January, 
1912. Ballard MSS, MS SO/200., NMM; Memorandum by Captain George A. Ballard to Rear-
Admiral Sir C. Ottley, Secretary CID and later passed on to the First Lord, Winston Churchill. 
October 1911, CAB 17/S, Naval War Staff. 1911. 
60 R. Churchill, Churchill: Companion \'.2 .. Parl 2, pp. 1303-12: Gretton, pp. 79-S1. 
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DNI, and the Mobilisation Department. Peacetime "paper schemes and theories" were 
untrustworthy in war due to the changing conditions of naval warfare. As strategic 
policy was determined by "experiment" and manoeuvres, Wilson debunked the idea that 
staff officers be trained "to think" and not be able to perform their duties when afloat.61 
The CID Secretary, Rear-Admiral Ottley, turned Wilson's strategy against him as proof 
that a staff system was urgently required at the Admiralty. Condemning a blockade on 
Gennany's North Sea estuaries and Heligoland' s seizure, Ottley advocated a staff in 
view of Wilson's failure to consult the Ballard Committee's appraisal that any 
Heligoland project was "utterly impracticable". According to Ottley, the Committee's 
work (i.e. Plan AlAI IS distant blockade) "was utterly thrown away" by Wilson's 
insistence on the discredited Heligoland proposal, amphibious landings against a 
determined enemy, and the employment of ships against forts. 62 Ballard's comments on 
Wilson's memorandum noted Wilson's own admission that some form of a staff was 
needed to assist the First Sea Lord and stressed the necessity of properly trained staff 
officers.63 
Wilson ultimately fell victim to his own irascible nature and an autocratic 
rigidity instilled by the Victorian Navy. Like other senior officers of his generation, 
Wilson, and even Fisher, could not understand that the complexity of strategy, tactics, 
technology, communications, finance, and administration at the turn of the century 
required flexibility, specially trained officers, and an effective bureaucracy to attain 
wartime fighting efficiency. 64 With Wilson's attitude impeding promised changes, 
61 Wilson's October 30th memorandum to Churchill in Bradford, Wilson, pp. 229-35 and R. 
Churchill, Churchill. Companion v.2 .• Part, 2, pp. 1312-16. 
62 "Notes on Sir Arthur Wilson's Memorandum by Sir Charles Ottley.", 10pp., November I, 
1911; Ottley to Churchill, November 2, 1911, CAB 17/8, Naval War Staff 1911. 
63 "Notes on Sir Arthur Wilson's Memorandum.", Captain G.A. Ballard, November 1, 1911, 
Ibid 
64 J.T. Sumida, "Naval Administration and Policy in the Age of Fisher", The Journal of 
Militarv !-listory. Vol. 54, No.1., January 1990, pp. 1-26. For an in-depth examination some of these 
trends in the Victorian and Edwardian Navy, see Gordon. Rules of the Game. 
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Churchill received Asquith's assent to replace Wilson and made a clean sweep of the 
Admiralty Board on 28th November 1911. Wilson relinquished his office to the former 
C-in-C Home Fleet, Bridgeman, in December.65 
The Admiralty War Staff was instituted on 8th January 1912, based on a staff 
outline from the former ONI and Second Sea Lord, Vice-Admiral Prince Louis 
Battenberg.66 Ballard and Fisher's former Naval Assistant, Captain Herbert Richmond, 
provided further input on the Staff's organisational duties.67 The organisation, however, 
possessed serious structural flaws and was essentially a modified Navy War Council. 
Unlike earlier planning groups, a "Chief of the War Staff' (COS) reported directly to 
the First Sea Lord and was responsible for the work of three divisions: Operations, 
Intelligence, and Mobilisation. In effect, the Staff re-established the old NID structure. 
Each division was headed by a separate director, akin to the ADNIs, who had equal 
access to the COS and the Service chief. The Staff's principal task involved the 
operational study of war as opposed to its technical and material components. The 
Operations Division under Ballard handled the actual war planning. Like the NID, the 
Navy War Council, and Fisher's pseudo planning groups, the War Staff was an advisory 
body with no executive powers.68 
Its main defect lay in the COS's position. As the First Sea Lord's principal 
advisor, the COS had no direct authority as he was not a Board member. Consequently, 
65 FDSF v.I., pp. 256-8; Gretton, pp. 82-4; W. S. Churchill, The World Crisis v.i.,(London, 
1923), pp.81-6. 
66 Report by Battenberg to Churchill, November 22, 1911, reproduced in Kerr, Battenberg, 
pp.235-8. 
67 For Ballard's contribution refer to footnote 59 above. Richmond suggested a separate 
"Operations Division" to handle war planning. Richmond to Rear-Admiral Troubridge, Private 
Secretary to First Lord, "Considerations affecting a Staff.", (n.d.) 1911, Richmond MSS, RICI12/4, 
NMM. 
68 Churchill to Greene, November 19, 1911, ADM 1/8377, The Naval War Staff, 1911-1914; 
"Memorandum by the First Lord on a Naval Staff', The Times, January 8th, 1911, pp. 9f, lOa; "Naval 
War Staff". I.-Memorandum by the First Lord on a Naval War Staff.", January 1,1911, Sir William 
Graham Greene MSS, G EE/2. Printed Papers reo Administration (1869-1921), NMM; Naval Staff, 
Chapter XI.. pp.52-4. 
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strategic and command responsibilities were confused, the point made by Wilson in his 
late October memorandum.69 Ideally, the First Sea Lord should have been the COS, as 
suggested by Wilson and alluded to by Slade and Bethell during, and immediately after, 
the "Beresford" Inquiry.70 This flaw endured when the next Service head, Battenberg, 
refused to incorporate the COS's duties with his office. It was a reversal of his opinion 
in 1902 that the First Sea Lord should head any future naval staff. Once in power, 
Battenberg refused to lower his status by becoming COS to the First Lord.71 
The War Staff's structure retained the over-centralised policy from the Fisher-
Wilson regimes. As ADOD (February 1913-May 1915), Richmond characterised the 
War Staff as: " a body which never was nor ever could be a war staff as it was deficient 
in all characteristics that are needed for staff work." The main weakness involved 
everything passing through the COS: "There is no decentralisation, and his mind has to 
grapple with every problem that arises even in its details .... The result of this fear to 
decentralise is that the First Sea Lord and Chief of Staff are so overworked that they 
cannot consider suggestions brought to them". Another problem was that the "mass" of 
staff officers were "wholly unfit for their duties.'m Fisher, too, was aware of the staff's 
deficiencies. In a war, the First Sea Lord would retain supreme control over strategic 
policy, as the War Staff, "is an exceedingly useful body to be kicked and to deal with 
d----d rot!and make out schemes for the German Emperor to have next morning at 
breakfast!,,73 Churchill's Admiralty War Staffwas merely a revamped version of the 
previous "staff" organisations: a body bereft of the authority needed to properly deal 
with planning matters and confounded by an unclear demarcation of administrative 
69 Ibid., pp. 53-4; Bradford, Wilson, p. 229-31. 
70 Refer to Chapter Five, pp. 182-4. 
71 Battenberg to Fisher, February 25, 1902 in Kerr, Battenberg, pp. 144-9; FDSF v.I., pp. 
265-6; Hunt, Sailor-Scholar, pp. 22-3. 
n Gretton, p. 162. 
73 Fisher to Esher, January 3, 1912, FGDN v.2., p.425. 
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tasks. 
Other obstacles impaired the War Staff's effectiveness. A Staff Training 
Division was advocated in early 1914, but it passed into abeyance with the outbreak of 
the war.74 Excepting Ballard and a few others, there was a paucity of experienced 
personnel to educate and train officers for the new organisation. A Royal Navy Staff 
Course was established as part of the War College in January 1912, but junior officer 
education was incommensurate with regular staff duties. Course instruction emphasised 
technical subjects over strategy and tactics because many senior officers opposed the 
training of specialised staff officers and distrusted the staff concept. This attitude 
affected staff candidate quality, as those nominated to attend the Staff Course were 
below average ability. 75 According to Vice-Admiral K.G.B. Dewar, a lecturer at the War 
College from 1909 to 1913: "We had the opportunity but not the capital to float a 
staff.,,76 Along with its structural defects, this lack of talent hamstrung the War Staff's 
strategic endeavours into the war. 
Another liability was the First Lord's continual interference. Churchill acted as 
"war lord", relying heavily on policy advice from Fisher and the Second Sea Lord, 
Battenberg. His authoritarianism was evident in his treatment of Wilson's successor, Sir 
Francis Bridgeman. Churchill excluded Bridgeman from strategic affairs and dealt 
instead with the first COS, Rear-Admiral Ernest Troubridge, the First Lord's appointee 
and an officer not widely noted for his intellectual acuity.77 Bridgeman was given no 
choice in Troubridge's appointment nor any say in the reconstitution of the NID and 
NMD into the War Staff.78 Not as ineffectual a Service chief as some sources have 
74 Naval Staff, pp. 56-8. 
75 FDSF v. J., pp. 265-6; Hunt, Sailor-Scholar, p. 23; Vice-Admiral K.G.B. Dewar, The Navy 
From Within, (London, 1939), pp. 152-4. 
76 Ibid, p. 154. 
n FDSFv.2., pp.21-2. 
78 Lambert. "Admiral Sir Francis Bridgeman (1911-1912)" in First Sea Lords, pp. 56-7. 
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claimed,79 he found it difficult to work with the impetuous Churchill and being treated 
as a mere figurehead. Bridgeman's attempts to exert his office further strained his 
relationship with Churchill and led to his replacement on the grounds of ill health by 
Battenberg (December 1912-0ctober 1914) after a year as First Sea Lord.so Churchill's 
interference in Admiralty strategy became evermore pervasive and disruptive leading 
into the First World War. 
v. 
Following the War Staffs creation, the Admiralty re-evaluated its operational 
contingencies against Germany. In early April 1912, the C-in-C Home Fleet received 
official confirmation that the close observational blockade of the German North Sea 
littoral was "considered as cancelled.,,81 As a replacement, Troubridge and the War Staff 
devised the so-called "Intermediate blockade". Wrongly labelled, ''the fITst attempt by 
the Admiralty to set down on paper the Royal Navy's real plan of campaign in the event 
ofwar.",82 it proved more flawed than the strategy it was meant to supersede. It entailed 
a cruiser/flotilla blockade cordon across the North Sea from the Norwegian coast to a 
location near the latitude of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne (55 0 N). From there the line ran 
south to Texel Island and the Dutch Coast. The British fleet would cruise off the 
Scottish coast, westward of the patrol line in support of the cordons. Once contact with 
the German fleet was established, the main fleet would proceed to intercept and 
engage.83 Pressed by Churchill to prepare an alternative to Wilson's "close" blockade 
79 Ibid, pp. 54-73; FDSF v.I., pp. 258-9. 
80 Lambert, "Bridgeman" in Murfett, pp. 54-73; FDSF, v.I., 252-64; Gretton, pp. 92-5; R. 
Churchill, Churchill v. 2., pp. 630-41; op cit., Companion Volume II, Part 3, pp. 1653-4, 1657, 1611, 
1681, 1684-95. 
81 Admiralty to Callaghan, April 9, 1912, ADM 116/3096. 
82 Lambert, Naval Revolution, pp. 262-3. 
83 "Memorandum Approved for Issue to Staff Officers.", April 15, 1912 [not issued], M-
001112, ADM 116/3096. 
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and devoid of planning experience,84 Troubridge, likely culled the details of his 
proposal from the 1908 "W" series plans. Whereas Wilson had followed W.3 .. Part 1 's 
guidelines for a watch on the Bight by a line of cruisers between Terschelling and 
Horn's Reef, the War Staff's design placed the same line further out into the North Sea. 
minus inshore flotillas and "parent vessels" off the German estuaries. 
The weakness of Troubridge's plan was confirmed in late July-early August 
1912 Home Fleet manoeuvres. Blue Fleet's (British) goal involved establishing secure 
lines of communication to obstruct Red Fleet's (German) movement to achieve 
"unchallenged supremacy" in the North Sea. This included a cordon from Flarnborough 
Head to Stavanger in Norway--an observational line nearly identical to the War Staff's 
April outline. A second line between the Orkneys and the Shetlands to Lat.: 61 ON would 
prevent Red cruisers from entering the Atlantic. Blue Fleet' s main units were 
concentrated off Scotland's east coast. Red would weaken and destroy the enemy's 
surveillance by concentrated attacks on Blue's cruiser cordons. Secondary goals 
included landing an expeditionary force on Blue territory and attacks on trade. The 
Manoeuvre Umpire-in-Chief, Admiral Sir William May, observed that the "F.S." 
(Flamborough-Stavanger) line failed to prevent Red Fleet from appearing off Blue's 
coast on two occasions and was highly vulnerable to concentrated attacks by Red 
squadrons and flotillas. He surmised: 
That it is hard to arrange satisfactorily for the patrol of such a long line, where 
the furthest position from a base is 340 miles must be freely admitted, but the 
system of stringing out cruisers and destroyers has been shewn to have 
drawbacks; further by this system scouting is carried out practically along one 
line which fails to give sufficient warning of the approach of an enemy. It also 
allows for the enemy to cruise about outside the range of visibility with 
impunity.85 
Churchill's decision not to adopt Troubridge' s system until it was tested in manoeuvres 
84 Lambert. Naval Revolution, p. 262. 
85 "Naval Manoeuvres 1912, Remarks by Umpire-in-Chief.", August 5, 1912, May MSS, 
MayllO, Tactical Reports 1908-1913, Essays on tactics and reports on Manoeuvres 1912-1913. 
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proved wise given its abysmal performance in the summer exercise.86 Added to the 
logistical and communications nightmare created by the long cordon, the Navy lacked 
the cruisers and destroyers to maintain a 300 mile plus observation line across the North 
Sea. 
Deeming Troubridge's plan an "experiment" which had "failed completely", 
Churchill ensured that the design was abandoned as an official contingency. 87 The 
cordon plan was "generally condemned by naval opinion outside the Admiralty". 88 This 
has been interpreted as the C-in-C Home Fleet's, Callaghan, influence on Admiralty's 
planning. The argument that Callaghan's condemnations of the "intennediate" blockade 
and Wilson's "close" blockade led to the adoption of the distant blockade strategy is, 
however, not at all conclusive.89 The "intermediate" blockade's failure resulted in 
Troubridge's removal as COS. He was succeeded by the Naval War College President, 
Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, in January 1913.90 Before that transition, the North 
Sea strategic dilemma had been examined and solved by the Service's most qualified 
planner. 
The DOD's assessment of the "intermediate" blockade was not as scathing as 
those by Churchill and May. In a report on the August manoeuvres, Ballard thought that 
flotillas could maintain their stations on a long observation line. A "close and perpetual 
watch" on the enemy's main exits was, however, ''virtually impossible" as British 
flotillas had to operate at the maximum distance from their bases. Close observation on 
a large scale was impossible until suitable numbers of ocean-going submarines were 
86Telegram from Churchill to Admiralty, 24th May, 1912, ADM 116/1169, Manoeuvres 
1912., Case 1625. 
87 "Notes on the Manoeuvres: Prepared for the Prime Minister by the First Lord.", October 
17, 1912, ADM 116/3381, First Lord of the Admiralty, Miscellaneous Papers, 1911-1914, Case 5793. 
88 W. Churchill, World Crisis, v. J., pp. 153-4; Churchill to Clementine Churchill, March 24-
25, 1912, R. Churchill (ed), Churchill Companion Vo!.2., pp. 1529-30. 
89 Lambert, Naval Revolution, pp. 261-4; op cit., "Bridgeman" in First Sea Lords. p. 63. 
90 Churchill to Asquith, August 15, 1912, in R. Churchill, Young Statesman, p. 1633; Naval 
Staff, Appendix B. pp. 121-2. 
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available. To detect the enemy's passage into the North Sea, a mean distance near 3rd 
Meridian East Longitude was the best position for an observational line in a war with 
Germany. Instead of constructing additional cruisers and submarines for a watch on the 
Bight, an extensive mining policy might impede the enemy's passage into the North 
Sea. Similar to Ottley's 1905 close mine blockade proposal, Ballard advocated that a 
160 mile long minefield be laid off Germany's western littoral. Such a barrier could 
prove beneficial to any commercial blockade for: "if a steamer or two on the way from 
Rotterdam to Hamburg were blown up off the Texel, the traffic to German ports would 
almost certainly cease at once." Until the Admiralty approved a mining policy, "it is not 
considered that the existing War Plans should be materially changed." The 
"Intermediate" blockade remained the only feasible alternative, "a middle course''. 
between the "undesirable extremes of a close blockade" or abandoning all observation 
in the North Sea.91 
Mining was not Ballard's only solution to the vagrancies posed by the close and 
"Intermediate" blockades. In late November-December 1912, War Plans/Orders were 
issued to Callaghan embodying the distant blockade scenario originally detai led in 
1907's War Plan AlAI. Ballard and the Operations Division redrafted this plan with the 
same basic assumptions behind the original 1907 design informing the 1912 version.92 
The idea was to utilise Britain's geographical advantage to cut offall German shipping 
from oceanic trade, secure England's coasts from invasions and raids, and cover the 
BEF's transport to France. This strategy, "resemble [ d] those which led to the successful 
battles in the Anglo-Dutch wars.", the same seventeenth century paradigm that was the 
basis for Plan AlAI in 1907. A prolonged distant blockade would cause "serious 
economic consequences to Germany", forcing the High Seas Fleet to break the blockade 
91 "Observation Force in North Sea. Remarks on War Orders for, in connection with lessons 
of the 1912 Manoeuvres.", Captain G.A. Ballard, DOD, September 16, 1912, ADM 116/866B. 
92 Naval Staff, p. 55, footnote I.; War Plans and War Orders, No.1., Home Fleets. No. 
0020 (copy), 16 December, 1912 and No. 0025, 18 February, 1913 with corrections by the DOD, 
ADM 137/818, (H.S. 818), Home Fleet & Detached Squadrons. October 1913 to July 1914. 
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and instigating a fleet action closer to British bases than their own.93 
The 1912 November-December War Plan/Orders repeated virtuaUyevery detail 
of the Ballard Committee's Plan AlAI. A "Northern Blockade" of armoured cruisers 
would patrol between the Orkneys and Shetlands, on to the Norwegian coast, to prevent 
the passage of German shipping. Destroyer/submarine flotillas would patrol the Dover 
Straits to block the English Channel. The main British fleet, based on the Scottish coast, 
would support the northern cordon while the Channel Fleet reinforced the southern line. 
Grand Fleet cruiser squadrons would conduct North Sea"sweeps" to detect German 
sorties, akin to Wilson's suggestions in his1907 "Remarks". New provisions included 
a line of cruisers in the Western Approaches and a submarine watch in the Bight to 
attack German ships issuing from the North Sea exits; the last aspect corresponding 
with Ballard's report on the August 1912 Manoeuvres. The C-in-C Home Fleet would 
frustrate German attempts to break the blockade, land an invasion force, and bring the 
enemy fleet to action on a "good occasion". Should the Gennans attempt a northern 
break- out, the C-in-C was directed to cut off the enemy fleet, supported by the Channel 
Fleet. While Callaghan may command both fleets at sea, it was "imperative" that the 
Admiralty, and not the C-in-C, control the overall strategic situation.94 
The late 1912 H orne Fleet War Orders have been examined in seminal and more 
recent studies but, surprisingly, the chronological significance of the plan has been 
overlooked.95 The evidence reveals that as a compromise to the close and "Intermediate" 
blockades, the distant blockade was adopted much earlier than July 1914, as is generally 
93 G.A. Ballard, "Remarks on the Framing of Certain Plans .... ", May 3,1909, ADM 1/8997; 
Chapter 3 above; "War Plans, General Instructions.", December 16,1912, ADM 116/3412, War 
Plans and War Orders Home Fleets and Detached Squadrons. November 1912-December 1913; 
94 Admiralty to C-in-C Home Fleets. "War Plans and War Orders", November 25, December 
16, 1912, and February 18, 1913, ADM 116/3412, War Plans and War Orders Home Fleets ~d 
Detached Squadrons. November 1912-December 1913. The February War Plan/Orders contamed 
only minor changes to flotilla dispositions. 
95 FDSF v. l.. pp. 369-71; Lambert., Naval Revolution. pp. 264-8. 
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believed to be the case.% Secondly, the plan was clearly attributable to the DOD and 
was not a by-product of the C-in-C Home Fleet's 1911-12 critiques as claimed by recent 
interpretations.97 lt was a continuation not only of Ballard's 1897 RUSI essay, but the 
NID's North Sea strategical studies inaugurated in 1902 and developed throughout the 
Fisher period as a response to German naval policy and the period's diplomatic 
uncertainties. 
The North Sea strategical problem was also analysed by a junior officer 
affiliated with the War College. Commander K.G .B. Dewar was aware of the projected 
blockade designs through his work at the College as a lecturer. In early 1912, he 
investigated the feasibility of both the close and "intennediate" blockades. According 
to Dewar, British blockade theories "might have been produced by a Rip VanWinkle 
who had never seen a steamship, much less a submarine, torpedo or mine." He viewed 
the close blockade on the Bight as "a suicidal policy which would open a red road of 
ruin to our fleet", while the intermediate blockade was exposed to constant attack from 
concentrated enemy squadrons. The mid-North Sea blockade was "impracticable" for 
it was difficult to watch and effectively support a 300 mile long cordon. It required the 
support of the main fleet which could be drawn into waters teeming with enemy torpedo 
craft. Like May, and a lesser extent Ballard, Dewar believed that the "intermediate" plan 
employed an excessive number of cruisers and flotillas which stripped the main fleet of 
its support.98 These deficiencies compelled Dewar to find an alternative. 
As the topic of a RUSI paper, Dewar outlined the same strategy recently re-
adopted by the Admiralty. His April 1913 JRUSI Gold Medal Prize Essay prescribed 
the distant blockade as the antidote to defects in the other blockade designs. The essay 
mirrored the 1907 plan developed by Ballard and Hankey, resurrected, and 
communicated to the Home Fleet in November-December 1912 and early 1913. The 
96 FDSFv.l.. pp. 371-3, 382-3; Williamson, p. 318; Mackay, Fisher, p.443. 
97 Lambert, Naval Revolution. pp. 261-70; op cit, "Bridgeman" in First Sea Lords. p. 63. 
98 Dewar, Navv From Within, pp. 145-6, 149-50. 
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northern Orkneys-Shetland-Norway exit would be blocked by a British cruisers 
supported by the main fleet based on Scotland while the Dover Strait was closed by 
destroyer, torpedo-boat, and submarine flotillas. To effectively seal the ChanneL the 
southern line would be supported by a pre-dreadnought squadron, the same Channel 
Fleet stipulated in the late 1912 War Orders to Callaghan. Even the stated objective of 
Dewar's strategy, the strangulation of German overseas trade, emulated the Ballard 
Committee's rejuvenated war plan.99 
Similarities between the DOD's contingency and Dewar's essay were not mere 
coincidence. 100 Although details of Dewar's contact with Ballard are unknown, some 
consultation involving the former's RUSI paper occurred. Like Ballard, Dewar was a 
burgeoning naval academic and a friend of the ADOD, Herbert Richmond. Dewar and 
Richmond were also founding members of The Naval Review and the Naval Society as 
a forum for intellectual debate within the Service. IOI Interestingly, the publication of 
Dewar's essay corresponded with Ballard's tenure as a Councillor on the RUSI 
Board.102 Dewar's paper was significant for the last chapter, "Application and 
Conclusions", containing the details of his plan, was suppressed by the essay 
competition judge, Rear-Admiral Sir Frederick C. D. Sturdee, for security reasons-
another indication that the distant blockade strategy was official policy by late 1912-
early 1913.103 Sturdee succeeded Jackson as COS in July 1914, which corresponded 
99 Ibid, Appendix 1; Commander Kenneth G. B. Dewar, "What is the Influence of 
Commerce on the Operations of War? How did it Affect Our Naval Policy in the Past and How Does 
It in the Present Day?", JRUSJ, April 1913, Volume LVII, No. 422., pp.449-500. 
100 Naval Staff, p. 55, footnote 1. 
101 For Dewar's career at the War College, his association with Richmond, and the formation 
of the Naval Society and Naval Review, refer to: Navy From Within; Dewar MSS, DEW/39/1-4, 
DEWII, Pre-First World War: Papers relating to Dewar's career before 1914, DEW/33 Private 
Correspondence: Personal Letters from Dewar to Richmond, 1915-1918; Hunt, Sailor-Scholar. pp. 
27-39; J. Goldrick and J.B. Hattendorf (eds), Mahan is Not Enough: Proceedings ola Conference on 
the Works o/Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, (Newport, 1993), pp. 83-102. 
\02 JRUSI, April 1913, Volume LVII., No. 422., Title page. 
103 Dewar, Navy From Within. pp. 146-9. 
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with the publication of Dewar's final chapter in The Naval Review's second volume and 
the final Admiralty confirmation of the distant blockade strategy .104 Whatever his 
motives or influences, Dewar's essay gave the distant blockade plan intellectual 
accreditation as a credible wartime strategy against Germany. Churchill's increased 
meddling in strategic matters, however, meant that considerable misconceptions still 
remained over the Admiralty's plans for a war with Germany. 
VI. 
The desire for an alternative to the distant blockade and the First Lord's 
interference in strategy originated with officers desiring a more aggressive strategy 
against Germany such as Churchill's outgoing Naval Secretary, Rear-Admiral David 
Beatty. Before assuming command of the Battle Cruiser Squadron, he protested the 
ambiguity of Admiralty instructions to Callaghan regarding potential German actions. 
Beatty complained to Churchill that no suggestions were made about the "propriety" of 
securing a Norwegian base to cover the Skaw or other offensive operations of that 
nature. lOS The fear that, "our general views on strategy will become dominated by purely 
defensive strategy", was held by others including the COS's Assistant, Captain Arthur 
V. Vyvyan. 106 With a renewed invasion debate in the CID, Churchill reconsidered the 
distant blockade as the Navy's primary strategy. 107 His new stance was encapsulated in 
a February 1913 letter to Battenberg .. Agreeing that the distant blockade was the 
"guiding policy" in a long war, it could only be maintained on a "basis of moral 
superiority." That "moral superiority" was only possible through an offensive at the 
outset of a war and intermittently during its course. Only by conducting "ourselves [so] 
104 Naval Staff, Appendix 8., p. 122; [Dewar], "The Influence of Commerce in War.", The 
Naval Review, Volume 11.. (London, 1914), pp. 159-64; "War Orders No.1. -War Plans (War With 
Germany), July 1, 1914, ADM 116/3096; FDSFv.l., pp. 372-3, 382-3. 
lOS War Plans-note by First Lord to First Sea Lord, containing a memorandum written by 
Rear-Admiral Beatty, January 21, 1913, ADM 116/3412. 
106 "Remarks on the 1913 Manoeuvres." Captain Arthur V. Vyvyan, Assistant to COS. nld. 
1913, ADM 116/1169. 
107 FDSFv.l.. pp. 354-7. 
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that the sea is full of nameless terrors for him-instead of for us", would Germany fear 
the Royal Navy's "teeth" and make blockade practicable. Churchill advocated blocking 
the Elbe to cover the BEF's transport to France in conjunction with a close blockade of 
the Heligoland Bight as a "rigorous interlude or prelude". Britain could easily establish 
an "overwhelming" flotilla superiority in the Bight for at least a week. Supported by the 
Grand Fleet, a "general converging drive" into the Bight by all flotillas and cruiser 
squadrons would "catch up in front" any German sorties and "sweep the whole back in 
a jumble" into the Elbe and towards the Skaw. Both North Sea debouches could then 
be picketed by the "full strength" of British flotillas supported by cruisers and battle 
cruisers to prevent German attempts to disrupt the expedition to France.IOS 
The COS agreed with Churchill's estimation that the Admiralty's plans lacked 
"initiative" but was sceptical over the alternatives. Jackson hinted that a push into the 
Bight was problematic given the shortage of sea-going destroyers required for such an 
operation. It was "unwise" to despatch a weak British force to blockade the Bight given 
the numbers and effectiveness of German torpedo flotillas.109 Ballard, too, voiced 
similar concerns over Churchill's projected North Sea forays. The plan to establish an 
~'overwhelming" flotilla superiority was unrealistic. Against 200 German torpedo craft, 
Britain could only muster 140 destroyers from all its flotillas. Ballard cautioned that 46 
were antecedents to the River Class and of "indifferent capacity for oversea work." The 
remaining 94 (Rivers, Tribals, Beagles) were good sea boats but lacked the fuel capacity 
to remain on station near the Bight for no more than two days. Churchill's "sweep" 
could only be effective by employing battle cruisers, cruisers, and light cruisers, in "a 
big ship movement". Cruiser squadrons and flotillas would have to arrive 
simultaneously at points along an arc off the North Sea estuaries, staying clear of 
Heligoland. At sunset, the cruisers would have to retire due to the dangers posed by 
German torpedo-craft and submarines. British flotillas could maintain a night watch, but 
108 Churchill to Battenberg, February 17, 1913, ADM 116/3412. 
109 "Remarks on War Plans and on the First Lord's Notes on the Subject", Vice-Admiral Sir 
Henry Jackson, March 11,1913, ADM 116/3412. 
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they too would have to retire at sunrise because of the German cruiser threat. Ballard 
viewed this as a compromise option, but the tone of his recommendations did not 
support operations in or near the Bight. I 10 
The ADOD, Richmond, concurred with his superiors' assessments of 
Churchill's plan. Deeming the renewed call to block the Elbe as "absolutely 
impracticable" and inshore operations as "the most disastrous thing-viz., exposing 
themselves to defeat in detail", Richmond condemned an offensive in the Bight: 
The grand drive he [Churchill] suggests is the apothesis of weakness: a long line 
of destroyers & cruisers, weak everywhere, strong nowhere can do nothing. A 
well handled concentrated force can cut into it anywhere & capsize all your 
plans .... The pt Lord supposes that after this drive we could 'picker the Elbe 
with the full strength of our destroyers. We could not. We would not have 50% 
of them after this drive. Consider the fuel problem alone & you see that it must 
be so .... Sweeps, hustling the enemy, getting him into a jumble-all these are 
words only. They mean nothing: they will not affect well considered plans of a 
thinking enemy any more than beating drums and waving flags would do. III 
The First Lord had, however, already begun another examination of an offensive North 
Sea thrust and operations rejected during the Fisher-Wilson regimes. 
The Operation Division's frustration with Churchill was partly due to the fact 
that, like Fisher, he had established his own pseudo planning body seperate from the 
War Staff. In January 1913, Churchill created an ambiguous planning group, headed 
by Rear-Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly , (commanding 3rd Battle Squadron, I lome Fleet, 
1913-14) to re-examine the close blockade/ advanced bases theme developed in the 
1890's. Bayly's team was "to investigate the feasibility of seizing a base on the Dutch, 
German, Danish, or Scandinavian coasts for flotilla operations on the outbreak of war 
I \0 "Remarks by DOD, Captain Ballard, on First Lord's paper", [March] 1913, 
ADM. 1 16/3412. 
III "ADOD. Captain Herbert Richmond's remarks on the First Lord's paper and letter of 
February 17,1913", [March] 1913, Ibid. 
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with Germany. ,,112 Three objectives underscored these proposals: enticing out the High 
Seas Fleet, establishing bases for a close blockade on Germany's North Sea ports, and 
eliminating German raids against Britain. 1 13 Bayly's June 1913 plan involved seizing 
Borkum and/or Sylt as advanced flotilla bases. Each expedition included 12,000 troops 
supported by older Royal Sovereign Class battleships and armoured cruisers carrying 
the flat boats for disembarkation. Vigorous mine-sweeping and smokescreens would 
precede the actual landings. An operation to take Esbjerg and Faro Island on Jutland's 
western coast was also projected. Since, "There does not appear to be any reasonable 
difficulty in taking this place, .... " the initial landing of a brigade, followed by a division. 
would suffice to hold the port despite Esbjerg's being only 20 miles from the Gennan 
frontier by rail. Repeating 1904-08 themes, Bayly recommended a destroyer raid up the 
Elbe to destroy the Kiel Canal's locks. Unlike Wilson's earlier recommendation, 
however, Heligoland' s seizure was ruled out due to the island's strong fortifications and 
dangers posed by German submarines/torpedo craft. 1 14 
Bayly's reanimation of the close blockade/advanced base concept did not sit 
well with the Admiralty staff. Writing to Battenberg, Jackson dismissed Bayly's plan 
as: "an operation which it was not essential to carry out as the first step in a war". 
despite its so-called "moral effect." Taking a flotilla base was too costly: "it seems as 
if the losses we should incur in such an undertaking would probably be greater than the 
112 Admiralty to Bayly, January 31, 1913, ADM 137/452. (HS 452). Seizure of an Advanced 
Base. September 1914 to April 1915. Mackay, pp. 455-6; M. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Volume 
3: The Challenge a/War, 1914-1916, (London, 1971), pp. 19-21. The other officers assembled to 
work under Bayly included: Rear-Admiral Arthur C. Leveson, who succeeded Ballard as DOD in May 
1914 and Brigadier-General Sir George Aston, RM who was attached to the War Staff for "special 
services" throughout 1913- t 4. 
113 .. Jackson to First Sea Lord., Invasion Question. Seizure of Advanced Bases. Remarks by 
Rear-Admiral Bayly.", March 17, 1913, ADM 137/452. 
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losses which occur in an attempt to carry out a close blockade without the base.'·115 
Callaghan too, failed to see the logic behind reverting to a recently abandoned strategy. 
The close blockade: "appears to be still more impractical now, it is useless to reconsider 
it.,,1l6 The most telling criticism of Bayly's projects came from the DOD. Confirming 
the War Staff's views on the costs of taking either Borkum or Sylt, Bayly's group had 
an "imperfect knowledge" of the German defences which made their projects, "a 
gamble at best." Ballard continued: 
Gambles in war are justifiable if an adequate advantage may be forthcoming, but 
here that does not appear to be the case. The sole object of the proposed 
expeditions is to obtain an advance flotilla base .... Destroyers and colliers lying 
inside Sylt would be within range of German siege artillery on the mainland. 
Inside Borkum they would be constantly harassed by small torpedo craft arriving 
by canal from Emden. In neither anchorage would they enjoy any rest. Moreover 
they would be undefended against attack from the sea .... We do not consider an 
undefended harbour a proper flotilla base on our own coast. Still less, therefore, 
would these practically undefended anchorages on the coast of the Continent 
within 3 hours steaming of the main German bases answer requirements. 
The DOD categorised proposed landing sites on Sylt as "too unstable a factor", 
compared to Staff studies which had ruled out these locales and the employment of 
smokescreens to cover the actual landings. The Operations Division never bothered to 
formulate a plan to take Esbjerg as it was "outside the region of practical war 
considerations which it takes the staff all their time to attend to."117 
Ballard's objections to Bayly's schemes were significant given his expertise with 
the close blockade/advanced base concept detailed in his 1897 RUSI paper and work 
as an Admiralty planner throughout 1902-07. Closely affiliated with this theme, why did 
Ballard reject the Bayly-Churchill recommendations in 1913? Like Jackson, Callaghan, 
and other enlightened officers in the Service, Ballard viewed such operations as an 
115 COS to First Sea Lord. re: submission of Bayly's Interim remarks, March 17, 1913, Ibid. 
116 C-in-C Home Fleet to Admiralty, "Employment of Destroyers in War", (6pp.), October 3, 
1913, Naval Papers. DS/MSI20, No. 240., Battenberg MSS, lWM. Cited in Lambert, Naval 
Revolution, p.270, endnote 296 as MBm6/240. 
117 Ballard to Jackson, July 10, 1913, ADM 1371452. 
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anathema under modem conditions when more sensible alternatives were in place such 
as the distant blockade adopted in November-December 1912. As codified in Plan 
AlAI, the distant blockade was the most effective method of throttling Germany's 
overseas trade and drawing the High Seas Fleet out without endangering Britain's 
maritime supremacy. A close investment of the Bight or German coast was a costly step 
backwards. More than anyone then at the Admiralty, Ballard knew that Bayly's 
proposals were not meant as separate operations but as preliminaries to a Baltic 
campaign aimed at Germany's strategic and economic vitals as detailed in Plan C/C 1.118 
Independently, inshore operations off Germany's North Sea estuaries were a waste in 
lives, resources, and energy. This was alluded to in his remarks on Bayly's plans: 
"Gambles in war are justifiable if an adequate advantage may be forthcoming ... ", which 
was the case in a sustained strike against German strategic/economic interests in the 
Baltic, but not the "moral effect" of Churchill's Heligoland Bight foray. 
Besides his critiques, Ballard provided another alternative to the close blockade. 
In a February 1913 supplement to his September 1912 proposal, Ballard outlined an 
offensive North Sea mine blockade. While the distant blockade would eliminate 
Gennan overseas trade, British naval pressure on Germany would be "greatly 
minimised" by neutral trade. A close investment of enemy ports would remove this 
trade, but expose British fleets "to a degree of risk which would jeopardise our whole 
naval superiority." Because the close blockade "has become very difficult, if not 
impossible", an offensive mine campaign to preclude neutral action was a credible 
consideration. 119 Ballard countered political and moral objections to this policy by 
outlining the legal use of mines in war. The 1907 Hague Peace Conference's 
Convention VII did not restrict the employment of offensive mines off an enemy's port 
nor in international waters. By notifying mariners of potential danger areas, Britain's 
legal and humanitarian responsibilities were effectively met. The "moral effect" of even 
118 Refer to Chapter 3. 
119 "Secret. Proposal for the use of mines in an Anglo-German War in Support of an 
Offensive Strategic Plan.", DOD, Captain G.A. Ballard, February 6, 1913, ADM 116/3412, pp. 1-3. 
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a limited mine field could prove "very extensive." Two minefield could be laid within 
two days of a declaration of war against Gennany. The first (M 1) would be laid across 
the Dover Straits from the South East Goodwin buoy to the Outer Ruytingen Shoal. It 
would stop all trade bound for German, Dutch, Belgian and Danish ports via the 
Channel and provide a "fonnidable barrier" to Gennan fleets or cruisers attempting to 
get past Dover. The Ml design was actually adopted during the war as part of the Dover 
Barrage but was largely unsuccessful in preventing the passage of Gennan submarines 
through the English Channel. 120 A second barrier (M2), at right angles eastward of the 
Terschelling Light Vessel would block vessels moving along the Dutch coast. Some 
2,400 mines would be required for both operations. A third option, mining the Kattegat, 
was only possible if Russia were allied with Britain and gave its assent. 121 
The DOD's plan gained the War Staff's and Board's provisional approval in 
April 1913. Orders delivered to Callaghan and the Senior Officer commanding the 
Navy's minelaying squadron, Captain Bonham, in DecemberI913-early January 1914, 
indicated that the Admiralty viewed Ballard's proposal as a supplement to the distant 
blockade. 122 It was, however, a limited gesture by the Admiralty and not as, one source 
claims, recognition that a large scale mine blockade of the Bight would be implemented 
on the outbreak of war. 123 The potentials of mine warfare were accepted by the 
Admiralty but a wholesale commitment to offensive mine laying remained a relatively 
low priority. Increased attention did not translate into correlative funding, for the fiscal 
outlay on mines and related material remained consistent throughout 1911-1914. 124 
120 Paul Halpern, A Naval History a/World War 1, (London, 1994), pp. 346, 349-50. 
121 Ballard, "Proposals for the use of mines in an Anglo-German War ... ", ADM 116/3412, 
pp.3-9. 
122 Admiralty to Callaghan, April 23, 1913, Letter M00331l3, ADM 116/3412; Jackson to 
Battenberg, April 5, 1913, DSIMISCI20/199, Battenberg MSS, IWM; Halvorsen," Mines and Mine 
Warfare", p.88. 
123 Lambert. Naval Revolution, pp. 270-2. 
124 Halvorsen, "Mines and Mine Warfare", pp. 87-9; Admiralty. "Future Plans for the 
British Fleet", January 21,1914, DSIMISC/20/277, Battenbcrg MSS; Mackay, p.378. 
225 
Variations on the DOD's mining plans did, however, resurface during the war. 125 
That Ballard's mining paper was accepted was a credit to his reputation in the 
Service given Churchill's dislike for the DOD. Ballard did not ingratiate himself with 
Churchill through his experienced critiques of the latter's offensive designs. The First 
Lord detested Ballard's forthrightness and was, by all appearances, resentful of his 
intellectual capabilities. In late 1913, Churchill unsuccessfully attempted to block the 
DOD's promotion to Rear-Admiral. 126 Ballard's mining plan proved, in fact, his "swan 
song" as an Admiralty planner. On 1 st May 1914, he was appointed Admiral of Patrols 
in charge of safe-guarding the East Coast from raids and invasion, an anomaly 
considering that he had not yet become Rear-Admiral. He was replaced as DOD by 
Rear-Admiral Sir Arthur Leveson, Bayly's colleague on Churchill's pseudo planning 
staff.127 Ballard remained Admiral of Patrols, with his command steadily reduced in 
size, until November 1915, when he was temporarily appointed Rear Admiral 
Commanding East Coast which terminated in May 1916. Re-employed as Admiral 
Superintendent at Malta in September 1916, he remained in that command until 
September 1919.128 That Fisher did not recall Ballard to the War Staff when he again 
became Service chief in October 1914 is strange, given that Ballard's expertise could 
have aided the former's push for a Baltic campaign throughout late 1914-early 1915. 
Churchill's antipathy towards Ballard was the likely reason he was kept off the wartime 
staff. Even as one of the Admiralty'S most influential pre-war planners departed the 
scene, (and maybe because of it) Churchill continued to push strategic designs 
125 One such proposal was Operation "ZZ", forwarded by the Second-in-Command Grand 
Fleet, Admiral Sir Charles Madden, in August 1917. "Blockade of Germany. Proposals of Admiral 
Second in Command (Grand Fleet) for Operation 'ZZ'.", August 7,19]7, ADM 137/1936. Madden's 
proposition will be examined in the next chapter. 
126 Lambert, Naval Revolution. p. 266. 
127 G.A. Ballard, "Record of business, letters, etc.", Entry for May 1, 1914, MS801200, 
Ballard Mss; Naval Staff, Appendix B., p. ]22. 
128 Ihid., Entries for: October 12, 1914; January 1915; October 29, 1915; November 6, 1915; 
May I, 1916; July 7, 1916; September 27, 1916; Ballard, Black Battlefleet, p. 9; Halpern. A Naval 
History, pp. 24, 35. 
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developed, but later dismissed by Ballard and others, right up until August 1914. 
Despite the War Staffs condemnations, the First Lord remained transfixed by 
the lure of the eastern North Sea littoral. On the eve of the war, he resuscitated Bayly's 
designs despite adverse opinion both within and outside the Admiralty. The first step 
involved an attempt to revive the stillborn 1905 CID combined operational sub-
committee. 129 The project was again shelved, however, with the outbreak of the war and 
the CID being placed into "a state of suspended animation" by the government. 130 
Admiralty correspondence with the Home Fleet also denoted a return to offensive North 
Sea proposals. Drafts of new War Plans/Orders communicated to Callaghan on 15th 
June recapitulated aspects of Churchill-Bayly's recommendations: an offensive drive 
into the Bight (designated Plan M), a close flotilla blockade of the Bight (Plan L.a.), the 
same with an advanced base at Borkum or Sylt (Plan L.b.), and the establishment of a 
base near Stavanger to control the Skaw (Plan T).13l The C-in-C's remarks on these 
proposals were, as to be expected, neither complimentary nor supportive.132 Inquires 
from the new DOD, Leveson, to the War Staffs Director Intelligence Division (DID), 
Rear-Admiral Henry Oliver, attempted to clarify existing navigational questions 
associated with inshore operations off the Gennan North Sea estuaries, Heligoland, and 
Sylt. 133 This activity culminated in Churchill's 31 st July letter to the Prime Minister 
enclosing Bayly's June 1913 advanced base reports. To facilitate military and naval 
cooperation, the First Lord advocated separate studies of each report from the War 
129 COS (Acting) Vice-Admiral F.C.D. Sturdee to First Lord and First Sea Lord, "Plans for 
Combined Offensive Action on the Outbreak of War.", July 21,1914, ADM 1/8386/213, Plans for 
Combined Offensive Action on the Outbreak of War. Proposed Reconstitution of the Sub-Committee 
of the CID. 
130 Roskill, Hankey, p. 140. 
131 Jackson to C-in-C Home Fleet, Re: draft of new War Plans and War Orders, June 15, 
1913, ADM 116/3096, Case 0030. 
132 Remarks ofC-in-C Home Fleet on draft of proposed new War Plans/Orders, June 23, 
1914, Ibid 
133 DOD to DID and COS War Staff, June 29, 1914, Ibid 
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Office and Admiralty. The reports dealt with the establishment of bases at: Ameland 
Island or Born Deep, (Dutch coast between Texel and Borkum), Ekersund 
(southwestern Norway), Laeso Channel (Kattegat), Kungsbacka Fiord (southwestern 
Sweden), Esbjerg, Sylt, Borkum, and Heligoland. l34 
Predictably, the War Staff again condemned these projects. Jackson deprecated 
Ameland's seizure as guaranteeing Holland's declaration of war against Britain. The 
protection of Born Deep would entail the British fleet being exposed to attacks from 
both the Dutch and Germans within the Borkum-Texel radius. Dutch coastal defence 
vessels, combined with German forces, would make Ameland's occupation, "a source 
of great anxiety, not commensurate with the slight gain in distance for our Floti lias if 
working off Heligoland.,,135 The COS rejected the advanced base concept as exposing 
British covering forces to attack from seaward while defences were being erected to 
secure the base. Until a decisive fleet action settled the issue for Britain. these 
enterprises were "not worth the cost of the ships and men which must certainly take 
place in the operation.,,136 
The General Staff officer assigned to examme Bayly's schemes, Major 
Hereward Wake shared Jackson's doubts. Although an overseas base had aided Japan 
in 1904-05, those conditions could not be emulated on the islands selected by Bayly. 
Ameland was vulnerable to long-range artillery from the mainland. Seizing 
Scandinavian bases would necessitate a large force to deal with Norwegian, Swedish, 
and Danish armies intent on protecting their neutrality. Laeso Island could only serve 
as a temporary anchorage, while there were insufficient troops to deal with the 
fortifications at Esbjerg, Sylt, Borkum, and Heligoland. The objectives selected by 
Churchill did not fulfill the criteria of "whether the advantages to be gained are 
134 Churchill to Asquith, July 31, 1914, ADM 137/452. 
\35 Report by COS, Admiral Sir Henry Jackson on: Borns Deep (Ameland Gat) as a 
temporary advanced base for a Flotilla.", August I, 1914, ADM 137/452. 
136 FDSF v.2 .. pp. 180-1. 
commensurate with the risks incurred." 137 
Following his appointment as Second-in-Command Grand Fleet and before his 
reluctant replacement of Callaghan on 3rd August 1914,138 Vice-Admiral Sir John 
Jellicoe joined the opposition to the First Lord's projected North Sea adventures. In a 
27th July communique to the new COS, Vice-Admiral Sturdee, Jellicoe discounted a 
close blockade of the Bight as a legitimate method of protecting the BEF's transport to 
France: "we shall gain our end with much less loss to ourselves, if we keep our forces 
nearer home instead of sending them off the German coast." Regarding Bayly's 
Borkum, Sylt, and Heligoland schemes, he echoed Wake and Jackson's assessments: 
I am not of the opinion that the advantages to be derived from the use of such 
a base are worth the cost in men and ships of capture. It is doubtful whether the 
Army could spare such men for such an attempt even if it were considered 
desirable, and I am distinctly of the opinion that the enterprise is not worth the 
sacrifices involved. 139 
Aware of, and perhaps influenced, by Callaghan'S stance against Churchill's offensive 
plans, Jellicoe was possibly comforted by the fact that the distant blockade was 
reconfinned as the Grand (Home) Fleet's primary strategy in early July!40 Yet, that 
strategy was by no means assured on August 4, 1914. The war merely whet the First 
Lord's appetite for more aggressive action against Germany. It is ironic, however, that 
the distant blockade's lineage stemmed from the same offensive propositions forwarded 
by Wilson, Churchill, and his acolyte, Bayly: (i.e.) the NID's pre-1909 operational 
studies. This strange dichotomy undermining the Navy's strategic cohesiveness during 
1911-1914 did not abate during the war. Influenced by wartime operational realities in 
137 Major Sir H. Wake, "Report on the Proposal to Occupy Certain Places as Temporary 
Naval Bases for Offensive Action Against Germany.", August 11, 1914, ADM 137/452. 
138 See: Gordon, Rules of the Game, pp.386-8, for an evaluation of Jellicoe's mind set on 
succeeding Callaghan. 
139 Jellicoe to COS Admiralty, July 27, 1914, in A. T. Patterson (ed), The Jel/icoe Papers 
Volume I., 1893-1916: Selections from the private and official correspondence of Admiral of the 
Fleet Earl Je//icoe ofScapa, (London, 1966), pp.40-1. 
140 "War Orders. No. l. (War With Germany)", July I, 1914, ADM 116/3096. 
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the North Se~ offensive themes developed in the 1890's and the Fisher regime remained 
serious considerations throughout 1914-18. 
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Chapter 7: Offensive Planning and Operational Realities, 1914-1918. 
1. 
Britain's declaration of war against Germany on 4th August 1914 did not 
appreciably alter the Royal Navy's strategic policy as it had evolved after 1911. Since 
there was no clear delineation between the distant blockade, as instituted in 1912, and 
offensi ve prewar plans, the Admiralty's unfolding wartime strategy appeared erratic and 
uncoordinated. Some have suggested that the Navy had no definitive plan at the war's 
outset and suffered a ~~continuing failure" to produce coordinated operational schemes 
afterwards. This was attributable to the lack of a proper staff system prior to the war, the 
half measures implicit in the War Staff's creation in 191 L and the espousal of 
individual causes by senior officers comprising the War Staff Group. The immediate 
prewar period established the Admiralty's wartime failings since there was "misplaced 
emphasis" on the distant blockade to defeat the High Seas Fleet rather than a concerted 
effort to disrupt Germany's economy. I This view is contentious given the above 
evidence and other sources which confirm that an economic strategy underpinned all 
prewar naval planning against Germany.2 The widely accepted view is that, despite 
operational failings and the ensuing North Sea stalemate, the Navy's strategic policy 
was consistent and logical. Geographically and numerically, the distant blockade was 
the safest and surest method available to win the war in the North Sea. Offensively, 
through the enforced idleness of the High Seas Fleet, and defensively, by the 
strangulation of German trade, the Ballard-Dewar plan achieved the Admiralty's 
principal strategical aims.3 The underlying strategic question after August 1914 was, 
I J. Goldrick, The King's Ships Were at Sea: The War in the North Sea, August /914-
Februarv 1915, (Annapolis, 1984), pp.311-2. 
2 Refer to Chapters 2, 4, and 6, above; Offer, First World War. 
3 P. Kennedy, "Britain in the First World War" in A. R. Millet and W. Murray (eds), 
Military Effectiveness, Volume One: 71,e First World War. (London. 1988), p. 39; op cit., British 
Nal'Q/ Mastery, Chapter 9; FDSF. v.2., pp. 3-4. 
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could the Navy maintain its stranglehold on the North Sea and still employ the strategy 
identified in Corbett's study of the Seven Years War (i.e. peripheral assaults on the 
Continent), to expedite Germany's defeat?4 
Two factors explain the Admiralty's approach to the challenges of war. 
Operational planning was dictated by the dominance of the mine and submarine in the 
North Sea. As predicted by Callaghan, Jellicoe, Fisher, and even Wilson, the Grand 
Fleet's predominance ended slightly north of the Heligoland Bight and west of the 
Skagerrak. And still, the Admiralty's strategic policy retained the offensive concept 
determined by history, tradition, and planning developed during the late Victorian 
period. Although the blockade's "historical panacea" remained constant throughout 
1914-185, ittoo was ultimately part of the same process begun nearly thirty years earlier. 
When Fisher and Churchill re-inaugurated 1902-09 contingencies against Germany in 
1914-15, they were maintaining the axiom endemic throughout the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries: the decisive projection of naval strength against an enemy's most 
strategically (and economically) vulnerable points. While the Admiralty's strategic 
course appeared disjointed, in actuality, both the distant blockade and offensive Baltic-
North Sea proposals were byproducts of plans developed in the late 1880's-1890's. 111-
defined and vague, the Royal Navy, nonetheless, had a strategic doctrine in place at the 
war's outset. 
The wartime offensive designs continued planning established by Custance, 
Ballard, Hankey, Ottley, and Fisher at the tum of the twentieth century, and were the 
last installments in the trend first created by the NID to meet a perceived Dual Alliance 
naval threat. Churchill's push for an advanced base along the eastern North Sea littoral, 
Wilson's Heligoland obsession, and Fisher's Baltic campaign, continued themes 
constructed, tested, and consistently reconsidered after 1887. Fisher's second term as 
First Sea Lord and his controversial "Baltic Project", warrants a re-examination since 
4 Corbett, Seven Years War, 2 Volumes. (1907). 
5 Goldrick. King's Ships, p. 312. 
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it was a paradigm of the strategic trend established in the late nineteenth century. A 
wartime procurement policy similar to those begun in the 1890's and 1906-08 to meet 
specific requirements under the 1907-08 Admiralty War Plans, link the pre and post 
1914 plans and legitimise Fisher's propositions. 
Even the post-Dardanelles environment could not quash revived prewar 
offensive plans. The German U-boat threat in 1917-18, became the catalyst for 
contingencies akin to close mine blockade and blocking plans developed by the NID 
and its alumni throughout 1904-1913. Excepting Arthur Marder, others have either 
overlooked or excluded operational contingencies, such as Operation "ZZ" (J uly 1917), 
designed to seal the North Sea and Baltic exits to the passage of German submarines. 
Consequently, their significance in the Admiralty's prewar and wartime strategic 
development has been ignored.6 In many respects, the April 1918 Zeebrugge-Ostend 
Raids were the culmination of the trend begun in the NID three decades earlier. Foibles 
aside, the prewar offensive projects resurrected during the war still retained a strategic 
flexibility designed to best utilise the Navy's traditional strengths decisively against 
Germany. 
II. 
The conflict was scarcely a week old when it became evident that Churchill's 
desire for an offensive continued to dominate the Admiralty'S strategic agenda. He 
remained transfixed by the advanced base/close blockade proposals fust formulated by 
Rear-Admiral Bayly's planning group in early 1913. By 9th August, Churchill was 
bombarding the new COS, Vice-Admiral F.C.D. Sturdee (July-November 1914), and 
Battenberg with his favourite project to seize Ameland and Born Deep as an advanced 
flotilla base for: "a close observation and control of the Southern approaches to the 
Elbe." Supported by the Channel Fleet, 3000 Marines, 9 cruisers, 4 destroyer flotillas, 
3 river monitors, and 18 submarines (6 liE" Class, 12 "C" Class) would take the island. 
Reminiscent of themes from the 1890's later detailed in the 1904-08 war plans, seizing 
6 FDSF \'.4.: 1917: Year of Cris is , Chapter 9; Halpern, Naval History; Bond, "British War 
Planning", pp. 107-38. 
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AmelandiBorn Deep might tempt out the High Seas Fleet, allow British aerial 
observation of the Bight, establish a submarine base in the Bight, or facilitate an attack 
on the Kiel Canal. These remained, however, secondary considerations to the need to 
"maintain in full vigour the spirit of enterprise and attack. ... " which the operation 
entailed by taking the action to the Gennans.7 Critical of Churchill's "harum scarum" 
North Sea projects,S the ADOD, Captain Richmond, repeated the fonner COS's, 
Jackso~ earlier appraisals of the Ameland plan. Besides its "strategical & tactical 
futility", the island's seizure might alienate Holland and the Cape Dutch and lead to 
Japanese moves against the Dutch East Indies which would not sit well with Australia. 
Ameland's harbour could not even accommodate a force capable of doing appreciable 
damage. Holding it would be a source of "constant anxiety", incommensurate with the 
lives and ships lost in the process.9 
Churchill's fixation with Germany's North Sea littoral was not the only 
offensive option to emerge in the first month of the war. He forwarded the outline of a 
Baltic campaign to the Russians in mid-August. With Asquith's approval, he had 
approached the C-in-C of the Russian Anny, Grand Duke Nicholas, on 19th August, 
stating that British command of the Baltic was not insunnountable but contingent on 
two factors: (l) the High Seas Fleet's defeat; (2) a successful attack on the Kiel Canal. 
The first could occur at any time, while the second could be accomplished by a 
destroyer/air attack on the Brunsbiittallocks; a provision outlined in the NID's July 
1904 Elbe study, by Wilson in 1905 and 1907 , War Plan C/C 1, and Bayly in June 1913. 
Success in either endeavour could allow a British fleet to enter the Baltic. Establishing 
naval superiority, the fleet "could carry, convoy, and land" Russian troops for three 
operations: outflanking Gennan armies holding the Danzig-Thorn line, attacking Berlin 
from the north, or an assault on Kiel and the Canal to drive out the Gennan fleet if in 
7 "Minute of First Lord on proposed advanced Flotilla Base at Mouth of Elbe". August 9, 
1914, ADM 137/452. 
8 Richmond Diary, August t 4, 1914, Portrait. p. 99. 
9 Diary, August 9, 1914, Ibid., p. 96. 
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the Baltic--options mIrronng Fisher and Wilson's 1904-05 Schleswig-
Holstein/Pomeranian plans. Agreeing in principle with the proposed operations as 
"quite feasible and fully expedient", the Russians only promised cooperation if the 
general military situation "lend itself to its application."lo The Masurian Lakes and 
Tannenberg disasters (August 27-30th) ensured, however, that Russian military 
participation in any future Baltic campaign was dubious even after Fisher's return to the 
Admiralty in late 1914.11 
Another prewar offensive proposal was tabled after the Ameland plan. As an 
"unofficial" advisor attached to the new War Staff Group established in August, 
Admiral Sir A.K. Wilson reanimated his 1911 Heligoland project. Viewed as 
impracticable, the island's capture had been denounced by the Ballard Committee. 
Home FleetC-in-C's, and even Bayly throughout 1907-1913. Jellicoetoo found the plan 
abhorrent. 12 True to character, Wilson continued to believe that the island could be 
taken and presented Churchill with a detailed operational plan in mid-September. 
Recognising the "sound general principle" that ships should not be risked against 
fortifications, recent improvements in range-finding and fire control made an attack on 
Heligoland feasible. Sixteen pre-dreadnoughts in five separate groups would neutralise 
the island's gun emplacements--each group preceded by minesweepers during their 
bombardment runs. Once the fortifications and German naval craft were destroyed, a 
battalion-strength landing party would establish a garrison. While the Grand Fleet 
covered the expedition forty miles north-west of Heligoland, British 
destroyer/submarine pickets off the North Sea estuaries would guard against submarines 
and/or the High Seas Fleet. In British hands, the island would facilitate command of the 
Bight and provide an effective watch on all German naval movements via the Jade, 
Elbe, and Canal. Heligoland's defence would be accomplished by a mine blockade and 
10 Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis Volume 2., (London, 1923). pp.23-4. 
II Halpern. p. 106. 
12 FDSF\'.2., pp. 182-3. 
235 
submarine "watch" on the German estuaries. and a small garrison equipped with 
machine guns and a few 4 or 6-inch gunS.13 Wilson' s proposal repeated. the central 
premise behind his 1910-11 close blockade strategy--preventing the egress of German 
submarines into the North Sea. 14 A growing realisation of that threat by senior fleet 
officers would negate Wilson and Churchill's hopes for an early naval offensive against 
Germany. 
At a 17th September strategic conference at Loch Ewe. Wilson's plan and 
Churchill's Baltic proposal were reviewed as part of the Grand Fleet's general North 
Sea policy. IS Unanimously, the assembled flag officers opposed the Heligoland project. 
The 2nd Battle Squadron commander, Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender, ruled out 
naval gunfire against the forts. Land defences had the range "too easily" while naval 
spotting was difficult on the flat, featureless island. Rear-Admiral Sir Charles Madden, 
Grand Fleet COS, concurred with Warrender's assessment, emphasising that the 
difficulties of eliminating the island's deep gun emplacements, combined with the 
"great danger" posed by German submarines, rendered the plan unworkable. Even Vice-
Admiral Bayly (commanding 1 st Battle Squadron), agreed that the margins were "too 
narrow" to risk the Grand Fleet near Heligoland and doubted the mine blockade's 
effectiveness on the German estuaries. Jellicoe's summation that: "the reduction of 
Heligoland would involve far more serious losses in capital ships than would 
compensate for any advantage gained, .... ", settled the matter for all present, incl uding 
I3 Wilson to Churchill. "The Capture of Heligoland", September 10. 1914. (8 pps.). ADM 
11611350,1914-1918 War Operations and Policy. Naval and Military. Case 5863. Volume 3. 
14 Refer to Chapter 6 above; Lambert, Naval Revolution, pp. 205-11. 
15 Attending the conference were: Churchill; the COS, Vice-Adm. F.C.D. Sturdee; the DID, 
Rear-Adm. H .F. Oliver; Admiralty Secretary, Sir W. G. Greene; C-in-C Grand Fleet, Adm. Sir J. 
Jellicoe; COS Grand Fleet, Rear-Adm. Sir C. Madden; Vice-Adm. Sir L. Bayly, 1- Battle Squadron; 
Vice-Adm. Sir C. Warrender, 2nd Battle Squadron; Vice-Adm. Sir E. Bradford. 3n! Battle Squadron; 
Vice-Adm. Sir D. Gamble, 4111 Battle Squadron; Commodore (S), R. Keyes; Commodore (T), R. 
Tyrwhitt. FDSF v.2 .. pp. 8-15; Patterson (ed), Jellicoe Papers \' 1., p.69. 
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the First Lord and War Staff representatives. 16 
Churchill's Baltic proposition was also rejected by the Grand Fleet hierarchy. 
As the only dissenter, Bayly supported the plan since it included operational designs that 
he had drafted in June 1913. He again promoted a destroyer attack against the 
Brunsbiittallocks to seal the Canal's western exit and a cruiser-flotilla attack on Kiel 
harbour as preliminaries to a move through the Belts. Commodore (T) Reginald 
Tyrwhitt, commanding Harwich Force, refuted Bayly's exposition. Besides the 
navigational difficulties in the Elbe, the Canal locks comprised two gates: the outer gate 
would have to be smashed first to get at the inner--a daunting task under heavy 
defensive fire. Tyrwhitt viewed an attack on Kiel harbour as equally prohibitive given 
the threat posed by German mines, submarines, and destroyers. It was not advisable to 
risk a reduction in naval force by "eccentric movements" such as a direct assault on 
Kiel. Accordingly, the assembly concluded that a Baltic campaign was infeasible until 
two fleets, each strong enough to deal with the High Seas Fleet, were available to 
operate off the German North Sea coast and pass through the Belts. 17 A proposal 
similar to Bayly's was aired by Captain W.W. Fisher (commanding HMS St. Vincent, 
1 st Battle Squadron) in February 1915, for a "Copenhagen" style attack on the High Seas 
Fleet in Schillig Roads. Not surprisingly, it was rejected by Jellicoe for the same reasons 
presented above. 18 The Churchill-Bayly prescriptions, however, still retained the valid 
premise established in previous operational studies on the Baltic, from the NID's July 
1904 war plan to Admiralty War Plans C-D and W.3., that Gennany's North Sea 
egresses had to be eliminated before an offensive against German strategic/economic 
assets in the Baltic. 
The Loch Ewe decisions were not surprising considering the unfolding realities 
16 Memorandum by JeJlicoe on General Policy discussed at Loch Ewe, September 17, 1914, 
ADM 116/1350; Jellicoe to Admiralty Secretary, September 24, 1914, in Jellicoe Papers v.I.. pp. 68-
9. 
17 Jellicoe Memorandum, Sept. 17, 1914, ADM 116/1350; Je/licoe Papers, v. 1., p. 69 
18 Jellicoe to the Secretary of the Admiralty, February 23, 1915, Jellicoe Papers v.I., p. 146; 
FIJSF v.2 .. pp.414-5. 
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of naval war in the North Sea. The potential of the Illlne and submarine were 
demonstrated by the loss of the light cruisers HMS Amphion and Pathfinder on 4th 
August and 5th September. Jellicoe's intense caution, his fears over the safety ofScapa 
Flow and other East Coast bases, his 1 st September decision to move the fleet to western 
Scotland, and the edict that the Grand Fleet's "sweeps" remain north of Latitude 57°N 
were soon vindicated. 19 Five days after the Loch Ewe conference, U-9 rapidly sank the 
armoured cruisers Aboukir, Cressy, and Hogue off the Dutch coast with the loss of over 
1,400 officers and ratings. The postmortem has been succinctly stated: "The submarine 
had now eclipsed the High Sea Fleet as the greatest threat to the Royal Navy's control 
of the seas.,,20 The sinking of the cruiser HMS Hawke on 15th October, prompted 
Jellicoe to move the Grand Fleet westwards to the northern Irish coast. Additional 
losses, such as the new dreadnought HMS Audacious sunk by a mine off Loch Swilly 
on the 27th October, and the seaplane carrier HMS Hermes torpedoed on the 31 S\ led to 
an alteration in the Grand Fleet's tactics (large cruiser/destroyer screens) with Jellicoe 
accorded complete autonomy to use all bases outside the North Sea. By the end of the 
year, German Kleinkrieg tactics to reduce British superiority via the mine and torpedo 
had demolished prewar conceptions of what a North Sea surface war actuallyentailed.21 
But still, the push for inshore and amphibious operations along the German littoral 
continued. 
III. 
On 28th October 1914, Admiral Prince Louis of Batten berg formally resigned as 
First Sea Lord. Despite unfair denunciations of his German birth in the press, 
19 Halpern" pp. 24, 29-30; Goldrick" pp 69-73; FDSFv.2., pp. 64-7; Jellicoe Papers v.I., 
pp. 45-6, 50-I, 67-8, 71-2. 
20 Halpern, p. 33; Goldrick, pp. 120-2, 123-35; FDSF v.2 .. pp. 55-9; J. Corbett, History of 
the Great War: Naval Operations Volume I .. (London, 1920-31), pp. 163, 165, 172-7. 
2\ Churchill to Jellicoe, October 8, 1914 and Jellicoe to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 
October 30, 1914, Patterson (ed), Jellicoe Papers v. I., pp. 73-7; Corbett-Newbolt, Naval Operations 
v. J. pp. 239-46; Halpern. pp.33-4, 37-8; Admiral of the Fleet Earl Jellicoe ofScapa, The Grand 
Fleet. 1914-16: Its Creation. Development. and Work. (London, 1919), pp. 149-52; FDSFv.2 .. pp. 
67-70,74-7; Goldrick, pP·138-42. 
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Battenberg's lethargic approach to operational matters had placed him in a untenable 
position. Under Cabinet criticism for his own erratic handling of the war, the First Lord 
had a convenient scapegoat in Battenberg and suggested the latter's resignation. 22 
Churchill's decision to re-install the seventy-three year old Fisher was equally 
controversial. King George V and senior officers such as the DID, Oliver (replaced 
Sturdee as COS in November), had serious misgivings about the appointment. Fisher 
gave little indication that his energy, drive, and detennination had lapsed since 1910. 
Days after his reappointment, he implemented a massive building program associated 
with potential offensive projects in the North Sea.23 Buoyed by Fisher's presence, 
Churchill advocated Borkum' s seizure as a successor to the defunct Ameland proposal--
a design ultimately aimed at securing naval control in the Baltic. 
Churchill's Borkum-Baltic theme was tabled after the Loch Ewe conference. 
Writing to Jellicoe, he stressed that Germany's "wise policy" ofdeclining battle ensured 
their control of the Baltic and gave them the "immense advantage" of threatening the 
Russian flank, protecting their coast, and drawing supplies (i.e. iron-ore) from Sweden 
and Norway. Consequently, "It is to secure the eventual command of the Baltic that 
British naval operations must tend." This could be accomplished through: the High Seas 
Fleet's defeat, breaking the Canal, or an effective blockade of the Bight.Churchill hoped 
the C-in-C would study the best method to pass into the Baltic "when the time 
arrived.,,24 The newly formed War Council likewise supported a western North Sea 
offensive. In early December, Arthur Balfour, Conservative representative on the 
Council, forwarded a memorandum to Maurice Hankey, now War Council Secretary, 
advocating an advanced base for submarines and flotillas as "the most effective way of 
crippling the movements of the enemy's fleet, and parrying any attempt at invasion. 'The 
22 Lambert, "Battenberg" in First Sea Lords, pp. 84-6; FDSF v.2., pp 82-9; 
23 Ibid, pp. 89-91, 93-4; Mackay, pp. 459-68; Halpern, p. 36 
24 Churchill to Jellicoe. October 8, 1914, Jellicoe MSS, Volume 2, 48990, 1908-19 J 5. 
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paper gave Churchill added impetus to put his case to the Prime Minister.25 
Late December memoranda sent to Asquith and Fisher incorporated the outline 
of Churchill's Borkum-Baltic proposal. British command of the Baltic could be secured 
by May 1915 and would create two new fronts: Berlin and the Kiel Canal. Borkum's 
capture and an intensive mine blockade of the German North Sea estuaries were the 
opening preliminaries. The High Seas Fleet's exclusion from the Bight would facilitate 
an invasion of Schleswig-Holstein and advance on the Kie1 Canal, further paralysing the 
movements of the German fleet. With British forces established in Schleswig-Holstein, 
Denmark could be encouraged to join the Allies with the incentive of a postwar 
restoration of her lost provinces. With this support, Britain could occupy Fyen and 
secure the Great Belt. A strong fleet might then be passed into the Baltic to cut Germany 
off "from all northern supplies." The final stage involved Russian troops landing in 
Pomerania within striking distance of Berlin, immobilizing large German 
concentrations. As the overture, Borkum' s capture was an "indispensable measure" for 
securing British flotilla superiority in the Bight and enticing a general fleet action. 26 
By early 1915, Churchill touted the Borkum scenario as the Admiralty's most 
viable strategic option, Writing to Fisher on 4th January that "Borkum is the key to all 
Northern possibilities", the operation would prevent raids, block the North Sea exits, 
and facilitate an invasion of either Oldenburg or Schleswig-Holstein. He urged that 
preparations be made to attack "at the earliest moment.,,27 The First Lord attempted to 
convince Jellicoe that, combined with an active mining policy against the German 
ri vers, Borkum could become "the most dreaded lair of submarines in the world". Thi rty 
"B" and "C" Class submarines supported by two destroyer flotillas and a squadron of 
25 Memorandum by Arthur 1. Balfour to Hankey, December 3, 1914, ADM 11611350; FDSF 
v.I.. pp.184-5. 
26 Churchill to Asquith, December 29, 1914 in The World Crisis v.2., pp. 44-5:.Churchill to 
Asquith, December 31, 1914 in Gilbert, Churchill Companion Volume 3, pp. 348-9; Churchill to 
Fisher, December 21.22,1914. FGDNv.3 .. pp. lOS, 107; FDSFv.2 .. pp. 185-6. 
27 Churchill to Fisher, January 4, 1914, FGDNv.3., p. 121. 
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pre-dreadnoughts would secure British predominance in the Bight. Repeating his prewar 
"moral superiority" argument, Borkum's seizure was "the only aggressive policy which 
gives the Navy its chance to apply its energy and daring and in six weeks of fierce 
flotilla warfare we could beat the enemy out of the North Sea altogether.,,28 In principle, 
Fisher supported the plan as it corresponded with his own proposals for a future Baltic 
campaign. Together, he and Churchill persuaded Asquith on the plan's merits and 
gained the War Council's approval on rt' 1 anuary to begin operational planning for an 
April-May attack. Their presentation even convinced the Secretary of State for War, 
Lord Kitchener, to set aside a division for the assault.29 
Fisher's confidence in the First Lord's projects was, however, circumspect when 
they contradicted his strategic views--a reality later confirmed during the Dardanelles 
debacle. Responding to Churchill's 4th January memorandum, he agreed that Borkum 
offered great possibilities but added: "it's a purely military question whether it can be 
held." The Admiralty's first priority remained: "to conserve our naval superiority over 
the Germans and in no wise jeopardize it by minor operations whose cumulative effect 
is to wear out our vessels and incur losses in ships and men." 30 Two weeks later he 
informed Churchill: "1 have no wish whatever to cold-douche any projects for our being 
troublesome to the enemy .... But I desire to emphasise the necessity of sticking to the 
enemy's vitals!,,31 By this stage the "vitals" were the Baltic and the High Seas Fleet. 
Privately, Fisher told Richmond that he "didn't intend to have the Borkum business 
done. ,,32 His correspondence with lellicoe during the same period also suggest a distaste 
28 ChurchiU to JeIJicoe, January 4, II, 1914, Jellicoe MSS, Volume 2, 48990, 1908-1915, 
British Library; Churchill to Jellicoe, January 18, 1915, in Patterson, Jellicoe Papers, v.I., pp. 124-5. 
29 Meeting of the War Council: extract from Secretary's notes, January 7, 1915 in Gilbert, 
Churchill Companion Volume 3, pp. 389-90; Churchill, World Crisis v.2., pp. 26-7; Halpern, p. 103. 
30 Fisher to Churchill, January 4, 1915, FGDNv.3., pp. 121-2. 
31 FishertoChurchill,January 18, 1915,lbid, p.132.AlsorefertoMackay, pp.456-7. for 
Fisher'S growing disenchantment with the Borkum proposal. 
32 R. Prior, Churchill's World Crisis as History, (London. 1983), p. 53; Hayes, "Admiralty'S 
Plans", pp. 113-4. 
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for Churchill's offensive policies.33 The C-in-C had already rejected Borkum's seizure 
in his July 1914 critique of Bayly's Plan L.(b)., as an "enterprise .... not worth the 
sacrifices involved." 34 Alluding to the growing confluence of Churchill's Borkum and 
Fisher's Baltic schemes, a frustrated Jellicoe complained: "I fear we are suffering badly 
from (1) No policy. (2) Too many cooks. (3) Amateur strategists. But one must do his 
best.,,35 
Concurrent with Borkum, Churchill promoted taking Sylt as an advanced base. 
Like Borkum, this operation had been detailed in Slade's "Preamble" to the 1907 War 
Plans, Plans W.2.-W.3. from 1908, and Bayly's June 1913-July 1914 investigations. 
Based on the latter, Churchill forwarded his proposal in early December 1914. An 
attack would be launched from Sylt's northern end by a bombarding force (A) 
consisting of 4 older pre-dreadnoughts, 3 Monitors, and 20 destroyers, covered by the 
Grand Fleet, "within supporting distance". Once the enemy guns were silenced, a 
landing force (B) comprising 5000 troops would take the island, supported by the naval 
elements moving into Lister Deep to dominate the mainland approaches to Sylt and 
Rom Island to the north. A defence force (C) of 10 "C" Class submarines, 40 destroyers, 
seaplane carriers, and 6 gunboats/sloops based on Lister Deep could make the base 
"self-contained & self-supporting" against attempted recapture. The creation of a 
naval/air base would allow regular observation and effective control over the Heligoland 
Bight's debouches.36 Churchill's Naval Secretary, Commodore Charles de Bartolome, 
doubted the venture given the island's strong defences. Even if naval bombardment 
neutralised German batteries, a British landing would encounter heavy opposition from 
33 Fisher to Jellicoe, January 11th and 19th, 1915, FGDN v.3., p. 127, 133. 
34 Jellicoe to COS, Admiralty, July 27, 1914; Jellicoe Papers, v. I., pp. 40-1. 
35 Jellicoe to C-in-C Home Fleet, Vice-Admiral Sir Alexander Bethell, January 22, 1915, 
ihid. p. 128. 
36 "Memorandum by First Lord for an Attack on Sylt", December 2,1914, ADM 137.t52. 
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well prepared defensive positions and an annoured train.37 Bartolome's apprehensions 
were not without foundation for the Gennan Admiralty Staff. aware of British designs 
on Borkum, Sylt, and the Elbe, had strengthened their North Sea defences between 
1905 and 1914.38 
By now an established pattern, Churchill ignored Bartolome's concerns and 
earlier War Staff condemnations of the Borkum-Sylt proposals. He sent another minute 
on Sylt to the War Staff Group on 3rd January 1915. Stressing that the Staff draft '"the 
best plan possible", preparations should be made to implement the operation on either 
pt March or 5th April. Addenda to the December 1914 outline included ordering 
"necessary appliances"such as monitors, annour-plated landing boats, and smoke-laying 
devices. Utilising aerial and cross spotting. the bombardment squadron could subdue 
fire from the Gennan batteries sufficiently to allow transports to approach under 
darkness and smoke to disembark between 8,000-12,000 troops and support the infantry 
attack. Gennan counter-attacks would be eliminated by "bottling-up" the High Seas 
Fleet behind Heligoland with 40 British submarines ("B"-"E" classes) during the day 
and 60 destroyers from the pt Fleet Flotillas at night. The Grand Fleet would lie in 
support near the 56th Parallel. Minefields, indicator nets, and destroyers with towed 
charges would protect the landinglbombardment forces from submarine attack. The 
entire operation could succeed within three days through, "A resolve to have the island 
at all costs, coupled with exact and careful preparations. ,,39 
Churchill's Borkum-Sylt schemes dissipated for several reasons. I1MS 
Formidable's loss on 1 st January and Bayly's subsequent removal as Channel Fleet C-
in-C, eliminated his support for the proposals at a critical juncture. Bayly had been 
purposely transferred from the Grand Fleet in December to command the Borkum 
attack. Second, the onset of the Dardanelles operation removed a vital material 
37 Undated paper by Commodore Bartolome, Ibid; FDSF v.2., p. 187. 
38 Hayes, "Admiralty's Plans", pp.114-16; Chapter 4 above, footnotes 33,52,58. 
)q Minute by First Lord on the Capture of Sylt to Admiralty Secretary, First Sea Lord, Sir 
Arthur Wilson. COS., January 3,1915, ADM 137/452. 
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component from the plans when Channel Fleet pre-dreadnoughts were redeployed to the 
Mediterranean in February-March 1915.40 Ultimately, Churchill's failure to win over 
senior flag and staff officers to his concepts ensured their demise. The unyielding 
attempts to impose his "hasty & crude ideas" on the Admiralty staff were self-defeating, 
frustrating, and highlighted his amateurism in naval strategy.41 Reiterating prewar 
assessments, the COS, Oliver, and the ADOD, Richmond, demolished the Borkum-Sylt 
proposals. Oliver observed that apart from its heavy defences, Borkum' s sandy 
composition meant that only direct hits on the German batteries would be effective. 
Bombardment of its defences was hampered by off-lying shoals and the island's mined 
approaches. luist, to the northeast, would also have to be taken as artillery mounted 
there could easily range on Borkum.42 Given one of Churchill's drafts to plan the 
operation, Richmond's unofficial reaction revealed the War Staff's frustration. An 
attack on Borkum: 
is quite mad. The reasons for capturing it are NIL, the possibilities about the 
same. I have never read such an idiotic, amateur piece of work as this outline in 
my life. Ironically enough it falls to me to prepare the plans for this stupendous 
piece offolly ... .It remains with the Army, who I hope will refuse to throwaway 
12,000 troops in this manner for the self-glorification of an ignorant & 
impulsive man.43 
Richmond's official memorandum gave a more detailed appraisal of the scheme's 
implausibility. Persistent haze and indiscernible natural features on the island impeded 
effective spotting and range fmding. Unproven aerial spotting, hidden German batteries, 
mines, and navigational impediments caused by sandbanks/shoals all negated an 
effective bombardment ofBorkum' s defences. Under existing hydrographic conditions, 
smokescreens were impractical and would only impede the bombardment and 
40 FDSF v.2., p. 188 and 98-100; Dewar, Navy From Within, pp. 166-9; Churchill, World 
Crisis v.2., p. 29; Goldrick, pp.229-37. 
41 Richmond Diary, September 10, 1914, Portrait, p. 107. 
42 Memorandum by COS on Capture of Borkum, December 15,1914, ADM 137/452. 
43 Richmond Diary. January 4, 1915, Portrait, pp. 134-5. 
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disembarkation of troops. 44 
Churchill's Borkum fixation continued despite the War Staffs opposition and 
the impending Dardanelles operation. On March 9th, he informed Jellicoe that 
preparations were proceeding for an attack on the island on or about May 15 th , as new 
monitors ordered by Fisher were nearing completion. As an adjunct, he suggested that 
a "fast division" (Queen Elizabeth Class dreadnoughts, Lion Class battle cruisers, 
Arethusa Class cruisers, and "M" Class destroyers) be "passed into" the Baltic to 
contain the High Sea Fleet and cut Germany's Scandinavian supplies. Richmond 
dismissed the plan, as the force was too small to be an effective diversion and wholly 
unsuited for an attack on German trade. It was an "uneconomical use" of the Queen 
Elizabeths' fighting power.45 The provision likely served as the archetype for 
Churchill's "Operation Catherine" in 1939-40, an operation viewed as unfeasible then 
as it was twenty-five years earlier.46 
Jellicoe still viewed the Borkum-Sylt proposals as anathema to maintaining 
British North Sea supremacy. Both islands were untenable as advanced bases due to 
their closeness to the German mainland. Holding them would risk the Grand Fleet in 
mine and submarine infested waters. The C-in-C never understood, "how an attack on 
Borkum could possibly assist fleet operations in the Baltic or lead to the German Fleet 
being driven altogether from the North Sea." As a prelude to a mine blockade or an 
invasion of Schleswig-Holstein, the plan was "ludicrous".47 The former COS, Jackson, 
was equally blunt. Responding to a late March inquiry from Fisher on potential 
offensive proposals, Jackson believed the Borkum project justifiable only if it resulted 
44 H.W. Richmond, "Attack on Danzig (Borkum)", January 19, 1915,Portrait, pp. 138-9. 
45 Churchill to Jellicoe, March 9,1915, Jellicoe MSS., Volume 11.,48990,1908-1915; H.W. 
Richmond, ADOD, "Considerations Affecting the Dispatch of 'Queen Elisabeth' Class to the Baltic", 
March 6, 1915, Portrait, pp.145-7; Richmond to Corbett, March 6, 1915 and Corbett to Richmond, 
March 7, 1915, Corbett MSS., MS82/006-MS811143, Box 7, NMM. 
46 C. Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely: The Royal Navy in the Second World War. 
(London, 2000), pp. 93-6; Bond, "British War Planning", pp. 129-34. 
47 FDSF\' 2., p. 190. 
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in the Gennan Fleet's destruction. If meant as a diversion or prelude to other operations 
"further to the East", Borkum "had better be left alone". 4~ 
Throughout, Fisher's questionable support was crucial for the implementation 
of the Borkum plan. Churchill certainly thought so, as he complained in The I J orld 
Crisis: 
But although the First Sea Lord's strategic conceptions were centred in the entry 
of the Baltic, and although he was in principle favourable to the seizure of 
Borkum as a preliminary, I did not find in him that practical, constructive and 
devising energy which in other periods of his career and at this period on other 
subjects he had so abundantly shown .... He spoke a great deal about 
Borkum, .... but he did not give that strong professional impulsion to the staffs 
necessary to secure the exploration of the plan.49 
Fisher never gave the Borkum scheme the "strong professional impUlsion" it needed, 
because he had known since 1907 that the project was unfeasible, unnecessary, and 
detracted from what he viewed as the decisive theatre--the Baltic. Surprisingly, Fisher's 
familiarity with the Admiralty's 1907 War Plans has not been examined as a factor in 
his rejection of the Borkum scheme.50 Churchill's lament discounts the fact that Fisher 
knew that Plan BIB 1 's Borkum scenario was merely an "example" to enhance the 
feasibility of the two primary plans in the series: Plan A, a distant blockade, and Plans 
C-D, a Baltic campaign. He had confirmed this in his 1908 War Plan "Commentary".51 
Denunciations of the Borkum scheme by fleet and staff officers throughout 1913-15 
validated that the Ballard Committee's assessments and Fisher's avoidance of the 
project were correct. 
48 Fisher to Jackson, March 30, and Minute by Jackson to Fisher, March 31, 1915, ADM 
137/452. 
49 Churchill, World Crisis v.2., p. 27. 
50 For example see: FDSF v.2., pp. 184-91: Mackay, pp. 455-68, 471-5, 478-82; Halpern, 
pp. \02-5. 
51 Refer to Chapters 3 and 4, above. 
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IV. 
Evaluating Fisher's "Baltic Project" is problematic given his May 1915 
resignation over the Dardanelles, and the historiographical conundrum caused by those 
trying to interpret the "true" intent of his strategic design. Fisher apparently utilised the 
Baltic as a "talking point" to deflect the First Lord's North Sea proposals. Fisher (and 
Churchill) doctored evidence to justify his contention before the Dardanelles 
Commission in 1916 that the Baltic plan was the main reason for his break with 
Churchill.52 Standard interpretations assign no such ulterior motives to Fisher's Baltic 
campaign but contend it was the predominate factor behind his opposition to the 
Dardanelles operation. 53 N either argument, however. places Fisher's wartime proposals 
within the wider context of his prewar strategic musings, nor the offensive planning 
trend begun in the late 1890's. His prewar strategic views on deterrence and a strike at 
the enemy's vitals were encapsulated in the "Baltic Project". Like Wilson, Fisher and 
Churchill maintained that the North Sea stalemate could only be broken through a 
decisive projection of strength against Gennany's vulnerable points--the axiom 
originating with the historical conceptions of Laughton and Colomb and codified in the 
NID's planning beginning in the late 1890's. Although Fisher and Churchill agreed over 
the "ends" of an offensive strategy (with the distant blockade), differences over the 
"means" of implementation created an irreparable rift in their relationship. 
The origins of Fisher's wartime Baltic scheme are complicated since no detailed 
contingencies were completed nor can his and Churchill's memoirs be trusted as reliable 
interpretations. 54 It is certain that Fisher approached Julian Corbett in mid-December 
1914 to prepare a memorandum on the topic. The completed draft, On the possibility 
of using our Command of the Sea to influence more drastically the Military Situation 
of the Continent. later entitled The Baltic Project, was returned on 19th December 
52 Mackay, pp. 456-7, 459-65, 467-75. 
53 FDSFv.2 .. pp. 191-7. 
54 Mackay, p. 459-60, 462. 
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1914.55 Comparing the current conflict to the Seven Y ears War, it amalgamated Fisher' s 
favourite prewar amphibious themes and Corbett's credo on combined operations 
outlined in his 1907 study of the eighteenth century conflict. 56 Corbett's influence on 
Fisher, and the continuation of the Laughton-Colomb conceptions from the 1890's, was 
apparent in his collaboration on the First Sea Lord's "Baltic Project"'. Like 1907-08, and 
the concurrence of the historian's work on the CID's "Invasion" issue with the release 
of his England in the Seven Years War, the theme of utilising an offensive incentive to 
bring out an inferior enemy fleet was evident in Fisher's Baltic proposal. Corbett had 
reinforced this maxim in his theoretical treatise Some Principles of Maritime Strategy 
(1911), which examined historical examples oflimited combined operations. advanced 
bases, offensive strikes, and "open" blockade as methods to achieve theatre dominance 
and maritime command over an enemy's sea and land forces (eg. the Russo-Japanese, 
Spanish-American, Crimean, RevolutionarylNapoleonic, Seven Years, and Anglo-
Dutch Wars).57 
Since the "passive pressure" of the distant blockade may prevail, Fisher saw no 
need to change "the present scheme of naval operations." If, however, the blockade 
failed to work within a reasonable time frame the "possibility of bringing our Command 
of the Sea to bear more actively" would have to be considered. The alternative repeated 
the "fatal stroke of 1761" and the occupation of the Baltic: "in such strength as to 
enable an adequate Russian army to land in the spring on the coast of Pomerania 
within striking distance of Berlin or so as to threaten the German communications 
eastwards!" An operation on this magnitude required the entire battle fleet, leaving the 
North Sea open and British Baltic forces exposed to a German counter-stroke. Fisher's 
remedy was to sow the North Sea/Bight with mines on such a scale that "naval 
55 Corbett to Fisher, December 19,1914, Corbett MSS. MS 82/006. Letters from Lord 
Fisher, 1903-1919, NMM; Schurman, Corbett, pp. 159-60. 
56 Corbett, Seven Years War, 2 Volumes ( 1907). 
57 1.S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, (London, 1911), pp. 31-2, 35-6, 52-6, 
57-67,73-83,94-104,137-9,158-60,162-4,166-8, 185-210,292-310. 
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operations in it would become impossible" even if it offended the neutrals. A chief 
concern was the danger to British communications once the fleet was in the Baltic. Any 
difficulties in securing an advanced Scandinavian base could be overcome by restricting 
British mining to a certain latitude. 
The analogy of British Baltic operations during the Crimean War suggested that 
the "menace" of the plan might divert resources from other fronts and disturb the 
"German equilibrium". It might force Germany into "desperate expedients" such as a 
fleet action in which the High Seas Fleet would be annihilated. Although the risks were 
serious, "risks must be taken to use our Command of the Sea with greater energy .... " 
only if the distant blockade's "passive pressure" was deemed not to be working.58 
Corbett had misgivings with the mining provision: "ifit is possible for us to make the 
North Sea untenable with mines, is it not even more possible for the Germans to play 
the same game in the Baltic?,,59 Fisher, however, failed to revise the paper and remained 
evasive over mining the Bight as a precursor to a Baltic offensive--a factor some see 
as a "significant" indication that he was only semi-serious about the plan.60 
While agreeing on the desirability of a Baltic campaign, Churchill was vexed by 
Fisher's insistence on a mining policy and his rebuff of the Borkum operation. In 
October 1914, he had vehemently opposed "ambush" and blockade mining because of 
insufficient mine stocks and the problems of maintaining fields in submarine dominated 
waters.61 In late December, he attempted to steer Fisher towards his reasoning over 
Borkum and the Baltic: 
I am wholly with you about the Baltic, .... But you must close up this side [North 
58 "The Baltic Project or On the possibility of using our Command of the Sea to influence 
more drastically the Military Situation on the Continent.", ADM 116/3454, Admiral of the Fleet 
Lord Fisher-Miscellaneous Personal Papers Associated with his Resignation as First Sea Lord in 
1915, Case 11522. The text ofthe memorandum is in Fisher's Records, pp.217-22. 
59 Corbett to Fisher, December 19, 1914, Corbett MSS, MS 82/006. 
60 Mackay, p.473. 
61 "Appendix D. Mining. Notes by the First Lord.", October 18,1914, Churchill, World 
Crisis v. I .. pp. 566-9; FDSF v. 2., pp. 79-81. 
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Sea] first. You must take an island and block them in. a 'fa Wilson; or you must 
break the Canal or the locks, or you must cripple his Fleet in a general action. 
No scattering of mines will be any substitute for these alternatives.62 
After Fisher's death, Churchill denigrated the lack of "a definite or coherent plan of 
action" and Fisher's caution over unnecessarily risking ships, expressing the conviction 
that: "he never seriously intended to dare the prolonged and awful hazards of the Baltic 
operation, but that he talked vaguely and impressively upon this project, which was in 
any case remote, with a view to staving off demands which he knew I should make upon 
him." Some view this as further proof that Fisher used the Baltic to stifle Churchilrs 
ambitious proposals.63 There is merit in this supposition for in late January 1915, 
Hankey told Corbett about Churchill's anger with the Baltic project as it was interfering 
with the Dardanelles scheme.64 Other factors, however, support the contention that 
Fisher wanted a Baltic offensive as long as it conformed to the Admiralty's earlier war 
plans against Germany. 
With the operational losses incurred since September 1914, Fisher was reticent 
about risking heavy units in the North Sea. By January 1915, his correspondence with 
Jellicoe parallelled the C-in-C's concerns over Grand Fleet sorties in submarine/mine 
infested waters.65 This tempered Fisher's approach to offensive projects such as 
Borkum, but how far that applied to the Baltic remains unknown. Before the war, he 
was of two minds over the submarine's capabilities in "narrow waters" and the pursuit 
of inshore-amphibious operations.66 In connection with the Baltic project, Fisher 
thought a mine blockade of the Bight was the safest option to close Germany's western 
62 Churchill to Fisher, December 22, 1914, FGDN v. 3., p. 107. 
63 W. Churchill, "Lord Fisher and his Biographer", Great Contemporaries, (London, 1941), 
pp. 300-2; Mackay, pp.463-4. 
64 sctmnnan, Corbett, p. 160. 
65 Fisher to Jellicoe. December 23,26,27,28,1914, Jellicoe Papers v.I., pp. 114-7; Fisher 
toJellicoe, January 4, 1915,FGDNv.3., p. 120. 
66 Refer to: Mackay, pp. 367-8. 
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North Sea exits.61 His mine blockade variation was not a new concept. In 1905 the ON!. 
Ottley, had outlined a close mine blockade of the Gennan North Sea estuaries while 
Ballard had advocated a similar proposal twice in September 1912 and February 1913.68 
Aware of Plan B/Bl 's intent, which had deprecated taking Borkum as a precondition to 
a Baltic descent, it is not unlikely that Fisher's mine blockade scenario was based on 
Ottley's and Ballard's earlier work. He was well aware of their planning abilities from 
their NID work and the Ballard Committee throughout 1905-07. 
Churchill's postwar conviction that Fisher lacked a "definite or coherent plan 
of action" is circumspect considering the latter's knowledge of the NID's July 1904 
plan, the Ballard Committee's Plans C-D, and War Plan W.3. from 1908, which all 
detailed Baltic operations. Moreover, Fisher had clearly outlined his proposal to mine 
the Bight as an attachment along with the Baltic paper in his response to Churchill's 4th 
January memorandum touting Borkum as "the key to all Northern possibilities." 
Warning that the Admiralty should conserve British naval superiority and avoid costly 
"minor operations", Fisher stated: There is no option but to adopt an offensive mine 
laying policy. " Recognising the present deficiencies in mine stocks, he was confident 
that increased mine production and the introduction of faster minelayers meant that the 
policy could begin once the minefields were carefully selected.69 The waning of Fisher' s 
Baltic plan may have had as much to do with the dearth of mining materiel before 1917 
10 as did his conflict with Churchill over strategic priorities. 
A final point regarding the disparity between Fisher's and Churchill's strategic 
perceptions should be made. Fisher was clearly aware of the disadvantages of a Baltic 
campaign and, akin to his 1904-09 deterrence philosophy, advocated it only if the 
distant blockade proved ineffective. Despite Fisher's violent rhetoric, it was a provision 
61 Fisher, Records, pp. 228-30, 236-7. 
68 Refer to Chapter 2 and 6. 
69 Churchill to Fisher and Fisher to Churchill, January 4, 1915, enclosure "MINE-LA YlNG", 
FGDNv.3., pp. 121-3; Fisher, Records. pp. 237-9. 
10 FDSF v.I .. pp. 77-8; Halpern, pp. 34, 344-5. 
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to be implemented after careful policy review and was not a Schlieffen-type alternative. 
That was clear within the The Baltic Project's text. 71 Compare this reasoning to 
Churchill's promotion ofthe Borkum-Sylt -Heligoland Bight schemes throughout 1913-
15 against all professional advice and balanced prewar studies. Although both men 
embraced a decisive strike against the enemy's vulnerable points, it is obvious which 
fully understood its relevance and limitations under actual war conditions. 
Other factors curbed implementation of the Baltic plan. It assumed that 
successful combined operations could be launched against an industrially and militarily 
powerful nation such as Germany. According to Captain Alfred Dewar, who with his 
brother Kenneth were the dominant figures in the Admiralty'S post-war Naval Historical 
Branch, this was entirely different from expeditions against an adversary's distant 
colonial possessions as envisioned in the pre-Entente war plans.72 Another flaw included 
the 10gisticaVtacticai difficulties of passing vessels through the "narrow and easily 
mined channels of the Belts". The COS, Oliver, believed that such an attempt "would 
have been madness." Fisher's inattention to these details escaped him: "How the fleet 
would pass the Great Belt in single line ahead with the German battle fleet deployed and 
crossing the T did not interest him, or how the fleet could be supplied in the Baltic. ,,73 
Deficient fleet collier numbers and related logistical problems may have also impeded 
any move into the Baltic--far removed from the Grand Fleet's shore based facilities. 74 
A third problem was that the possibility of a large Anglo-Russian Baltic expedition was 
remote considering the vast organisational difficulties involved and the dubious 
71 Refer to Chapters 2 and 3, above for the meshing of Fisher's Baltic-deterrent theme with 
operational planning in the 1905-07 period. 
72 FDSFv.2., p. 194; "Naval and Military Policy in the Event of War with France", July 
1905, ADM 116/311 I; Anatomy, Appendix II., pp. 550-68. 
73 Admiral Sir W. James, A Great Seaman: The Life of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry F. 
Oliver, (London, 1956), pp.137-8. 
74 J. Sumida, "British Naval Operational Logistics, 1914-1918". The Journal of Military 
History. 57 (July 1993), pp. 466-8. 
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availability of Russian troops.75 
The only senior officer supportive of the Baltic plan was the C-in-C Dover 
Patrol (1915-17), Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon. He believed the concept might have 
provoked a general fleet action, with the Germans forced to meet the British in the 
Baltic, "in the face of a large fleet of submarines and of extensive and unknown 
minefields." Marder concurs in this assessment which, at the very least, might have 
seriously weakened the High Seas Fleet. 76 Corbett too envisioned it as a potential 
"dramatic stroke" should the distant blockade prove insufficient to defeat Gennany. 77 
The most convincing, but not incontrovertible, evidence that Fisher was serious 
about the Baltic project was the building programme implemented in late 1914. As 
related in his memoirs, the inception of this "Armada" of612 ships, "intended/or great 
projects in the Baltic and North Sea", occurred at the Admiralty on 3rd November 
1914.78 Like other aspects of the Baltic project, however, this inference is not that 
straightforward. The 3rd November meeting was concerned solely with the construction 
of 20 new submarines and not a Baltic fleet. Fisher altered the conference minutes to 
make it appear that the new vessels were destined for the Baltic to support his stance 
during the Dardanelles Commission in 1916. The Admiralty's 1914-15 construction 
policy was orientated towards providing vessels for the Grand Fleet as much as it was 
Baltic operations.79 This was the case regarding the first monitors ordered by Churchill 
in November which were intended primarily for Army support operations along the 
Belgian coast or a "Copenhagen" type attack on the High Seas Fleet. 80 The expanded 
75 Naval Staff, p. 68, NLMD; Bond, "British War Planning", p. 120. 
76 Admiral Sir R. Bacon, The Life of Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, Volume 2., (London, 1929), 
pp. 190-1; FDSF v.2., p. 195. 
77 Schunnan, Corbett, p. 159. 
78 Fisher, Memories, pp. 86-90. 
79 Mackay, pp. 460-2. 
80 Churchill, World Crisis v.l.. pp. 497-9. 
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monitor programme in December 1914 was likely only then being linked with a Baltic 
campaign.81 The same sequence is apparent in the construction of shallow draught 
battle cruisers. Fisher's enthusiasm to convert two of the projected Revenge Class 
dreadnoughts to battle cruisers (Renown and Repulse) was attributable to the type's 
success at the Falklands in early December and to bolster the Grand Fleet following the 
High Seas Fleet's "tip and run"raids on Yannouth and Scarborough.82 By the end of the 
month the battle cruiser and Baltic concepts had fused. Writing to the Third Sea Lord 
(Controller), Rear-Admiral Frederick Tudor, Fisher alluded to Baltic operations as a 
determinant in the design of the two ships: " it is VIT ALL Y IMPERATIVE for 
STRATEGIC REASONS to keep the deep draught UNDER 26 FEET!,,83 
The merging of the Baltic project and procurement was solidified in late January 
1915 when Churchill approved "the old man's children", the light battle cruisers, 
Courageous and Glorious (and later Furious). 84 Although their role was never defined, 
they were likely intended to provide fire support for landings or as bait to lure away 
German surface forces. Their shallow draught and speed indicated that they were 
designed to enter and operate in the Baltic, "through the international highway of the 
Sound." 85 Writing to lellicoe in February 1916, Fisher lamented that he had hoped to 
employ the type that spring even "before the ice was clear in the Baltic, where I 
proposed to use them, owing to their very light draught of water. in the big plan I've 
mentioned to you. ,,86 Another link between the construction programme and the Baltic 
were the orders placed for specialised landing craft--the "X" Lighters. Designed to carry 
81 Mackay. p. 467-8. 
82 Ibid, pp. 473-4; Conway's, 1906-1921, pp.38-9. 
83 Fisher to Tudor, December 27, 1914, FGDN v.3., pp.l13-4. 
84 Churchill, World Crisis v.I., pp. 500-1. 
85 Fisher to Churchill, January 25. and Fisher to Jellicoe, January 29, 1915, FGDN \'.3., pp. 
145,150; Conway's, 1906-1921, pp.39-40. 
86 Fisher to Jellicoe, February 12, 1916, FGDN v.3., pp. 306-7. 
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500 troops, Fisher wanted enough of these self-propelled barges to land 50,000 men on 
a beach at one time. While these vessels could have also been destined for combined 
operations along the Belgian coast, the initial order for 200 craft in February 1915 
corresponded with the sanctioning of the Courageous Class, indicating that they too 
were intended for the Baltic. The "X" Lighters' rapid production also tended towards 
Fisher's original intention to execute the Baltic plan in the summer of 1915.87 
Defmitive proof that the Admiralty'S 1914-1915 building programme was orientated 
towards a Baltic descent is circumspect due to a lack of substantiative evidence and 
Fisher's reluctance to have the War Staff thrash out the details of the plan. Some have 
suggested this as the reason why it was never implemented.88 An argument can also be 
made that Fisher's wartime procurement policy did in fact reflect his preparation for a 
Baltic campaign. The creation of vessel types for specific strategical/operational roles 
was not a new concept to him, (i.e.) destroyer development in the early 1890's for a 
close "observational" blockade on the northern French bases. 89 In many ways, the 1914-
15 construction policy also imitated steps taken in 1906-09 to provide light cruisers as 
"parent vessels" for destroyer flotillas engaged in inshore operations outlined in the 
Admiralty's 1907-1908 War Plans. Like the cruisers, Scouts, and larger destroyers 
developed during his first administration, the products of Fisher's wartime construction 
policy were also designed with a potential North SealBaltic offensive in mind.90 The 
"Baltic Project" was much more than a "talking point" for the First Sea Lord to counter 
the impulsive Churchill. 
Fisher communicated The Baltic Project to the Prime Minister as an appendix 
in a 25th January paper: "Memorandum by the First Sea Lord on the Position of the 
87 FDSF v.2., pp. 193-4, 196; Conway's, 1906-1921, pp. 101; Undated paper by Fisher 
(1916?), ADM 116/3454. 
88 R. Hough, First Sea Lord: An Authorised Biography of Admiral Lord Fisher, (London, 
1969), p. 333; FDSFv.2., p. 196. 
89 Refer to Chapter I, above. 
90 Refer to Chapters 3 and 4 above. 
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British Fleet and its Policy of Steady Pressure." By this stage. Asquith was a finn 
adherent to the Dardanelles proposition. Attributing Fisher's opposition to the Near 
Eastern plan solely to the Baltic, he refused to circulate the latter's memorandum to the 
War Counci1.91 The reasons for this are unclear, but it may have been influenced by 
Fisher's offensive mining policy which could have unnecessarily offended the 
neutrals.92 It was Fisher's failure to express the reasons behind his opposition to the 
Dardanelles venture at the 28th January War Council meeting that ensured the Baltic 
project's supersession.93 Although he championed a Baltic campaign up to his break 
with Churchill in May 1915, the plan was consumed by the ever deepening commitment 
against the Turks. 
The details of the Dardanelles operations, Fisher's break with Churchill, and the 
fallout which toppled them from the Admiralty has been detailed elsewhere.94 The 
Navy's failure to force the Straits on 18th March 1915 parallelled, however, some of the 
difficulties a British fleet might have encountered in passing into the Baltic. Apart from 
minefields and shore batteries, any fleet endeavouring to force its way through the 
Belts/Sound would have had to contend with swarms of German torpedo-craft. The 
mine-sweeping difficulties at the Dardanelles could have proved a harbinger for an even 
greater failure in the Baltic. That point was, ironically, realised by Corbett in December 
1914 long before either plan was even officially tabled.95 The lack of a proper planning 
division (established September 1917) to thrash out a northern operational plan and 
91 The memo is reproduced in Churchill, World Crisis v.2., pp 151-5; Mackay, pp. 482-6; 
FDSF v. 2., pp. 195-6. 
92 Ibid, p. 196. 
93 The most comprehensive analysis of the January 28th, 1915 War Council meeting and 
Fisher's actions is in Mackay, pp. 485-90. 
94 FDSFv.2., Chapters 9,10,11; Corbett & Newbolt, Naval Operations Volume 2: Gilbert, 
Churchill, v.3., Chapters 6, 8-10; Mackay, pp. 488-505. 
Q:'i The March 18, 1915 attempt to force the Dardanelles, the minesweeping and related 
difficulties, and operational "post-mortems" can be found in: Marder, FDSF v.2., pp. 245-50, 259-65; 
FDSF ".4., pp. 191-6; op cit., From the Dardanelles to Oran, (London, 1974), pp. 11-32; Churchill, 
World Crisis v.2., Chapters 11, 13; Keyes, Naval Memoirs, Volume I, Chapter 13. 
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coordinate everything from bombardment to logistics may have repeated the 
Dardanelles failure on a larger scale in the Baltic.96 By October 1914, Fisher"s 
inclination to keep strategic conceptions "locked in the head of the First Sea Lord and 
nowhere else" was well entrenched. The removal of Churchill and Fisher did not, 
however, diminish the re-exploration of prewar offensive contingencies. 
V. 
The post-Dardanelles fallout had little effect on the Admiralty's investigation 
of potential offensive operations against Gennany. British merchant shipping losses in 
Gennany's first unrestricted submarine campaign, February-September 1915, and 
continued operational losses to U-boats and mines prompted a re-examination of Baltic 
and Heligoland Bight offensives.97 Churchill's successor as First Lord, Arthur Balfour 
(May 1915-December 1916), sought Jellicoe's advice on a more vigorous naval 
strategy. Throughout January-February, he queried the C-in-C about utilising old 
battleships in the Baltic with the Russians against the Gennan fleet and Kiel.98 Having, 
"long arrived at the conclusion that it would be suicidal to divide our main fleet with 
a view to sending ships into the Baltic", Jellicoe decried a Baltic campaign due to 
German naval strength and the dangers from mines and submarines near the Belts. At 
best, he supported feints against Borkum and Sylt using pre-dreadnoughts and monitors 
as "bait" to draw the High Seas Fleet over British submarines in the Baltic and North 
Sea.99 On 17th February, the War Committee (replaced the War Council in November 
1915), re-evaluated Fisher's Baltic project and related prewar North Sea plans. 
Reiterating Jellicoe's conclusions, the Committee ruled out Baltic operations. North 
SeaIBaltic advanced bases were also rejected due to troop unavailability and strong 
German land defences. Proposals reminiscent of Ballard's 1897 RUSI essay and the 
96 Naval Staff, pp. 70-1, NLMD. 
97 Halpern, pp. 291-300, 309-10; FDSFv.2., pp. 367-8. 
98 Balfour to Jellicoe, January 6 and February 2, 1916, Jellicoe MSS. 48992, Vol. 4. 
99 Jellicoe to Balfour. January 25 and February 3, 1916, Ibid 
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NID's 1904-05 plans to block Gennan ports with sunken hulks and/or mines were also 
dismissed due to a lack of merchant ships to serve as obstructions and the Gennan 
fleet's presence which negated the maintenance ofminefields. lOo Despite this censure, 
the advanced island and blocking schemes remained considerations well into 1917. 
Balfour re-considered Wilson's Heligoland proposals to establish British control 
in the Bight. On 19th September, 1916, he circulated a paper to the Sea Lords and senior 
Fleet officers questioning the island's value to Germany and what its possession meant 
for Britain. Jellicoe repeated conclusions arrived at Loch Ewe two years earlier. Despite 
its advantages as a forward base Heligoland, "would be to us a great incubus and drag 
on the fleet, exposing the fleet to great risks with no commensurate advantage". Unless 
it was entirely self-supporting, the island: "would be a millstone round the neck of the 
Navy, and an attempt to hold it would lead to heavy losses from mine and submarine." 
The new First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Henry Jackson (May 1915-November 1916), the 
other Sea Lords, and Commodores (S), Sydney S. Hall, and (T), Tyrwhitt, concurred 
with the C-in-C's assessment. Although British control of the island, "would be a thorn 
in the side of the enemy", it would be difficult to supply and maintain and thus "a very 
great anxiety to us". The naval war's altered circumstances had even forced Wilson to 
conclude that, "the balance of advantages and disadvantages is very much against taking 
possession of it [Heligoland]."101 
Unlike Churchill, Balfour's desire for action was tempered by the 
recommendations of his naval advisors. In October, Balfour repudiated a Baltic 
offensive because of the heavy losses e~pected from a push through the heavily mined 
southern exits of the Belts. It, "would be more costly than the naval attempt on the 
Dardanelles-and there is no military prize comparable to Constantinople to reward our 
tOO Minutes of the February 17th, 1916 meeting of the War Committee, CAB 2217; Corbett 
and Newbolt, Naval Operations v.3., p.314. 
101 Balfour. "Questions on Heligoland", September 16, 1916; Replies to First Lord's 
"Questions on Heligoland", October 1916, ADM 116/1350., 15 pp. 
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efforts if we succeeded."102 The Admiralty's strategic priorities remained. however. as 
convoluted as in the immediate prewar period. Dictated by the submarine threat, it was 
difficult to delineate between defensive or offensive remedies. Despite rejecting the 
Heligoland proposal, Jackson soon advocated "Copenhagen" style attacks on Gennan 
bases to eliminate the depredations of "Submarine Raiders" in early November 1916. 
Only by the "double edged stroke" of combined operations against German U-boat 
bases in Belgium, for example, could the threat be overcome. \03 Dissatisfaction at the 
Admiralty'S handling of the anti-submarine campaign, however, forced Balfour to 
remove Jackson and appoint Jellicoe as First Sea Lord in late November 1916. 104 The 
growing crisis in the naval war would even force even the latter to re-consider proposals 
he had deprecated since the eve of the war. 
Germany's renewed unrestricted submarine campaign in February 1917, proved 
the catalyst for a re-examination of discounted prewar plans. By late spring-early 
summer, remedies to the submarine scourge were trickling into the Admiralty from the 
Grand Fleet. On 30th May 1917, Captain W. W. Fisher of HMS St. Vincent, (made 
Director of the Naval Staff's new Anti-Submarine Division in June 1917) forwarded 
a proposal to Jellicoe detailing the blocking of the Elbe, Weser, Ems, and Jade rivers 
to halt the egress of German submarines. A modernised version of the NID's July 1904 
plan, Fisher advocated blocking deep water channels in the rivers with sunken hulks, 
moored and sensitive ground mines, and net obstructions. A small armada of light 
cruisers, destroyers, monitors, submarines, and trawlers, with air cooperation, would be 
employed in the operation. The barriers would be established under smokescreens to 
minimise German defensive fire. Other contingencies included the closing of the Baltic 
102 Balfour's memorandum, " Report on Recent Naval Affairs", October 1916, summarised 
in FDSF v.4 .. p. 241. 
103 Jackson to Balfour, November 6, 1916, Jackson MSS. X97/014., Box I., NMM. 
104 Balfour to Jackson, November 21, 1916, Ibid.; FDSF v.3., pp. 330-7; # 14, "Documents 
relating to Jellicoe's transfer to the Admiralty as First Sea Lord", Patterson, Jel/icoe Papers v.2.; op. 
cit., Jellicoe: A Biography, (London, 1969), pp. 149-53. 
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exits by the American fleet and Heligoland's capture via poisonous gas. lOS The 
suggestion to employ "asphyxiating gases" apparently originated within the Board of 
Invention and Research and Lord Fisher in December 1916.106 The DOD, Rear-Admiral 
George P. Hope, deemed the entire plan "defective" as there "was no real force behind 
it." Unless covered by "the full Naval force of the Allies", which risked destroyers 
needed in the anti-submarine campaign, Hope surmised that the blocking operations 
would fail. He did, however, believe that Captain Fisher's scheme deserved "very 
careful study" as the Admiralty may be obliged to implement blocking operations 
against the German rivers and the Belgian ports at Zeebrugge and Ostend to halt reduce 
U-boat depredations. 107 
Appointed Minister of Munitions in the coalition Lloyd-George Cabinet, 
Churchill forwarded renewed North Sea proposals to the Admiralty in late luly as a 
counter to the U-Boats. He again suggested seizing Borkum, Sylt, Heligoland, and 
creating an anchorage off Horn's Reef to: lure the High Seas Fleet out, block Germany's 
North Sea estuaries, and seal the Baltic exits.108 Earlier arguments against these 
operations were repeated by lellicoe; the head of the Planning Section, Captain A.D.P. 
Pound; the DOD, Hope; and Oliver who had become Deputy COS in May. Borkum and 
Sylt's seizure were complicated by their closeness to the mainland which exposed them 
to constant bombardment and air attack. Unless the German fleet was eliminated, the 
same scenario applied to Heligoland which was vulnerable to continual naval 
interdiction. An aspect of 1908's Plan W.2., lellicoe ruled out the Horn's Reef 
105 MemorandwnlLetter by Captain W.W. Fisher to the First Sea Lord. Sir John Jellicoe, 
May 30,1917, ADM 137/2712, Plans Division War Records. Blocking eMB's and Heligoland 
Bight. Holland Index. 
\06 "Attack on Heligoland", (December 1916?) 2 pp., Fisher MSS. FISR 5/22, # 4316, 
Churchill College. 
107 Remarks on Captain Fisher'S scheme by Rear-Admiral George P. W. Hope, DOD, Naval 
Staff. June 4,1917, ADM 137/2712. 
108 Mr. Churchill's Scheme and remarks by Captain A. D. P. Pound. Planning Section. 
August 1917,22 pp .. ADM 13712712. 
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anchorage as having "small value" because of its distance from the Gennan estuaries. 
Blocking Germany's North Sea bases would only reduce the submarine menace and not 
abolish it as they would simply use Kiel. Alternately, the Baltic exits could only be 
closed after the High Seas Fleet's destruction and/or the establishment of a Kattegat 
base. Neutral susceptibilities complicated the latter provision while the entire plan was 
"an operation of great magnitude" requiring the bulk of the Allied naval resources. This 
was compounded by the Franco-American refusal to commit their battleships to inshore 
operations but, more importantly, the inability to strip escort craft away from the convoy 
system. Jellicoe surmised: "if we failed in blocking his ports we should be very much 
worse off than before." His remarks were not meant to "veto" Churchill's proposals but 
indicated the need to seriously examine blocking operations, "dealing with the menace 
at its root", should present anti-submarine methods fail. 109 While riddled with 
deficiencies, Churchill's reanimated designs spurred the Admiralty to another 
consideration of the blocking option. 
In late July, Jellicoe ordered the Operations Division's Planning Section to 
investigate closing the North Sea and Baltic exits. With an Allied Naval Conference 
looming, he thought it pertinent that a detailed plan be drawn up: "to consider whether 
the only real remedy to the SIM [submarine] menace, viz blocking the SIM's in port, is 
really feasible, although no doubt very costly.,,110 The Section was reconstituted for the 
task with Jackson (then Admiral President of the War College) appointed as chainnan. 
A complex plan was submitted on 18th August, which elaborated on W. Fisher's and 
Churchill's proposals from May-July. Its objectives involved blocking all exits available 
to German submarines. The Elbe, Jade, Weser, and Ems would be blocked and the 
Baltic entrances closed. Assuming that the High Seas Fleet was in the Jade and other 
109 "C.N.S. Naval War Policy", Comments by the First Sea Lord, DOD, and DCNS on 
Winston Churchill's project for operations against Heligoland, Sylt, and Heligoland, July 1917, 
Jellicoe MSS. 48992., Volume 4., ff. 97-106; Jellicoe Papers v.2., pp. 174-9; Admiral of the fleet 
Earl Jellicoe of Scapa, The Submarine Peril, (London, 1931), pp. 63-6; FDSF vA., pp. 229-30. 
110 Orders from the First Sea Lord to Prepare Scheme (entailing blocking/mining operations 
in German waters and of German ports to contain the egress of submarines), "Shipping situation vis-a-
vis the Submarine Menace.", July 31,1917, ADM 137/2712. 
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surface units in the Elbe or Baltic, heavy warships had to be contained before the U-
Boats. This would be accomplished in interconnected stages: (I) seizing Heligoland, 
Wangeroog, and neutralising the Schillinghorn defences to ensure operations in the 
Jade; (2) blocking the Jade and Weser to isolate German vessels in the Baltic from the 
main Wilhelmshaven fleet; (3) blocking the Elbe; (4) mining the Ems. The blocking of 
the estuaries would be accomplished by the sinking of old concrete-filled pre-
dreadnoughts and cruisers (43 battleships, 43 cruisers). After closing the rivers, three 
lines of mines (21,000 mines--43 miles) would be laid between Wangeroog and 
Heligoland and Heligoland and the Eider River. The last phase of the North Sea 
operations involved the capture of Borkum and luist before the mining of the Ems 
Channel. An attack on Sylt was ruled out as it did not justify the large expedition needed 
to take the island. Its exits would instead be mined to prevent its use as a submarine 
base. III 
The plan's Baltic phase was equally complex. After establishing the North Sea 
obstructions, five separate mine lines would be laid in the Kattegat-Belts. A sixth line 
would be laid across the Sound, depending on Danish-Swedish attitudes. Due to the 
large areas involved and the deep water at the Sound's northern end, mines (7,500 "H" 
type) were a more effective barrier than block-ships. The entire operation hinged on 
maintaining: "a superior force to that which the Germans may bring against 
us."Advanced bases for supporting forces could be established at Kalo, Seiro, and 
Samso Bays contingent, however, on Danish permission. 112 These Baltic operations 
were hauntingly similar to Ballard's 1897 plan to seal the Belts and Sound to prevent 
the egress of Russian cruisers in a naval war against the Dual Alliance. I 13 
III Report by Admiral Sir Henry Jackson and Operations Division for Scheme of Operations 
to block North Sea and Baltic exits, August 18. General Appreciation, Part 1. And Appendices 1-1 I., 
17 pp. General Appreciation, Part II. "Attacks on Heligoland and Wangeroog. August 1917. 
Reference NID Plan 18., II pp., ADM 137/2712. 
112 Ibid., General Appreciation., Part I. 
113 Refer to Chapter 1, above; Ballard, "The Protection of Commerce During War", JRUSI, 
Volume XLII, April 1898, pp. 393-401. 
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The Planning Section made no recommendations either for or against their North 
SealBaltic proposals. Jackson was, however, concerned about the risks involved in 
placing the North Sea obstructions and taking HeligolandIW angeroog against the heavy 
German defensive network: " one of the best sheltered spots in Europe for keeping out 
an unwelcome intruder." 114 The Assistant Director of Plans and co-advocate of the 
1912-14 distant blockade strategy, Captain K.G.B. Dewar, concurred with Jackson, 
viewing the blocking operations and seizure of the islands as "impracticable". While 
the operations were not "impossible", Dewar felt, "I don't think we have the capacity 
to carry it out. The Admiralty and Staff are the weak links in the chain." I IS The Naval 
Staff and Jellicoe, rejected the entire plan for several reasons: (1) Flat-trajectory naval 
guns could not cover troop landings on Heligoland unless they closed to within range 
of the island's howitzers which was not a consideration (especially after the 
Dardanelles); (2) the Army rejected Wangeroog's seizure because of its proximity to the 
mainland; (3) block-ships could not be accurately placed under heavy fire from the 
German defences; (4) channels could be dredged around the open end of the block lines; 
(5) the Americans, French, and Italians were unwilling to provide the old warships 
needed for the operation; (6) the Baltic exits, "would still remain available for enemy 
use, as they could not be blocked without violating Danish and Swedish neutrality." I 16 
Responding to Jellicoe's request that the Grand Fleet also consider blocking 
operations, its C-in-C, Admiral Sir David Beatty, had his Second-in-Command, Admiral 
Sir Charles Madden, (l stBattle Squadron) investigate. l17 Madden's Operation "ZZ" also 
entailed closing the Baltic entrances and a close blockade on the Bight, minus 
Heligoland's and W angeroog' s seizure as advanced bases. Consisting of two stages, the 
plan required the assistance of Denmark, Sweden, and Norway and involved 
114 Report by Admiral Sir Henry Jackson .... ", August 18,1917., Introduction, ADM 
137/2712. 
lIS Dewar to Richmond, September 12, 1917, Dewar MSS. DEW/33., NMM. 
116 Jellicoe, Submarine Peril, p. 68; FDSF v.4., pp. 234-5. 
117 Jellicoe to Beatty, July 31, 1917, Jellicoe Papers v. 2 .. P 191. 
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establishing advanced bases and air stations ill their territories. The North Sea 
operations required Danish and Dutch cooperation since clearing a belt through existing 
minefields in the Bight and the construction of a 153-mile barrage (22,000 mines), 
necessitated bases on their territories. A Jutland airbase would help achieve air 
superiority over the Kattegat and North Sea debouches. The plan's first stage involved 
confining the High Seas Fleet and German submarines to their bases before the 
implementation of the blocking scenarios. Since there was "no great difficulty" in 
blocking the Belts, Sound, and Kattegat, the Baltic segment included laying temporary 
minefields at the southern end of the Belts and Sound to contain the German fleet and 
submarines. The Belts would then be blocked by booms/minefields at their narrowest 
points between: the mainland and Fyen, Fyen and Zealand, and lines east-west of Sam so 
Island. Five booms, reinforced with mines and block- ships, would be laid in the actual 
Belts themselves with two booms laid to protect the anchorages at Kalo Vig and Seiro 
Bay which would serve as advanced bases. Britain would lay 72 miles (12,000 mines) 
of nets/booms, with the Danes and Swedes expected to lay and maintain 90 miles (5,600 
mines) of obstructions. A secondary advanced base at Christiansand in Norway. similar 
to Fisher's 1907 proposal, was projected for the combined Franco-American fleet that 
would cover the Kattegat operations. 
Unlike the Baltic stage, the Bight's closure was "a very difficult operation." 
Hulks would be sunk in the main channels of the Ems, Weser, Jade, and Elbe, but 
serious problems included: accurately placing 200 block-ships in the estuaries, 
Heligoland's presence, the High Seas Fleet's proximity, and British main bases being 
located 200-300 miles from the scene of operations. Similar constraints affected laying 
minefields otTthe river entrances. Madden, accordingly, ruled out the block-ship option. 
A mine-net barrage would instead be laid outside Heligoland, beginning north of Sylt 
and ending west of the Ems. Existing minefields near the barrage and outside it would 
be swept to safeguard Grand Fleet movements and vessels maintaining the barrage. 
These sweeping operations were, however, compromised by the expected presence of 
up to fifty enemy submarines. Serious losses were anticipated even before the barrage's 
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construction. To alleviate the submarine threat, German bases at Zeebrugge and Ostend 
would be covered by Commodore (T) and Dover forces. 1I8 Madden's proposal, like 
other wartime offensive schemes, repeated aspects of pre-war planning such as Ottley's 
1905 mine blockade provisions and Ballard's 1912-13 proposals. His North Sea barrage 
mirrored Wilson's 1910-11 plans for a close investment of the Bight itself a variation 
of War Plan W.3.'s projected "watch" on the German rivers via a cruiser line running 
between Hom's Reef and Terschelling. 1I9 Operation "ZZ" again demonstrated the 
difficulties attending any Baltic operations in view of Scandinavian neutrality. 
Provisions to utilise Christiansand and other locales in Denmark and Sweden as 
advanced bases were, as noted, an integral part of the Royal Navy's strategic 
deliberations during the 1905-08 Scandinavian "status quo" debates. Christiansand's 
seizure as a British base in the event of a German invasion of Norway had been 
considered by the War Staff as late as October 1916. 120 
By 1917, operational realities and expediency conflicted with diplomatic 
considerations, especially as the Navy felt constrained by the Government's ambivalent 
attitude to the northern neutrals. Despite the Admiralty's desire to protect Norway's 
vital iron-ore shipments and its mercantile fleet from possible German actions, the 
Cabinet vetoed any moves that would destroy the status quo and alienate other neutrals. 
The Government's policy towards Holland and Norway apparently nullified a potential 
offensive strategy aimed at strengthening trade defences and bringing out the Gennan 
Fleet. 121 
Not only was Operation "ZZ", "one of great magnitude", its success depended 
118 Operation "ZZ"., Proposals of Admiral, Second in Command, Grand Fleet. HMS 
Revenge, 7 August, 1917.,27 pp. 2 charts., ADM 116/1936. (HSA 138), Secret Packs of the 
Commander-in-Chief Grand Fleet, 1914-1918, Volume LVI. Pack 0022. Operations. Section K. 
Strategical and Tactical Matters. Nos. 1-10. 
119 Refer to Chapters 4 and 6 above. 
120 FDSF vA., pp. 251-2. 
121 FDSF v. 4., pp. 246-54; Jellicoe to Beatty, with enclosure "Neutral Powers", December 
30, 1916, Jel/icoe Papers v.2., pp. 130-3. 
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on Denmark and Holland's negligible cooperation and "at least a benevolent neutrality 
on the part ofNorway and Sweden." Madden therefore viewed the blockade of Gennany 
as more of an "International and Military question" than a naval one. Since Gennany 
could overturn the closure of the BalticlNorth Sea by an invasion of Denmark and 
Holland, Madden stressed that the plan was redundant unless the alliance was widened 
and Holland and Denmark's defence assured. New developments in mines, hydro-
phones, aircraft, etc., may modify conditions to allow for a "close and continuous 
blockade" without the encumbrances of nets, booms, advanced bases, and neutral 
cooperation. He concluded that the submarine problem's "successful so I uti on" invol ved 
technological improvements rather than an endeavour to lay and maintain over 200 
miles of nets and mines. 122 His conclusions were ironic given the Admiralty's hesitant 
approval and reluctant cooperation in the American brokered Northern Barrage from the 
Orkneys to Norway after March 19] 8. 123 Passing Madden's proposal to Jellicoe, Beatty 
concurred in his Second-in-Command's assessments.124 There is no evidence that 
Jellicoe forwarded Madden's or the Planning Division's August studies to the Foreign 
Office or the Cabinet for their consideration of neutral cooperation in the blocking 
schemes. It would seem that, given his unenthusiastic approach to BalticfNorth Sea 
offensive campaigns, Jellicoe was content to let the Cabinet's position on the northern 
neutrals prevail. 
The 4 _5 th September Allied Naval Conference resolved the offensive blocking 
Issue. Called at the behest of the American naval representatives, the conference 
considered joint offensive measures against the submarine menace. Jellicoe presented 
the two alternatives then being considered: the Planning Division's August proposal and 
the American sponsored Northern Barrage. As explained to the Allied representatives, 
122 From the Admiral Commanding, First Battle Squadron to the C-in-C, Grand Fleet, "The 
Blockade of Gennany", August 7, 1917., No. 020115., ADM 11611936. 
123 Halpern, pp. 438-41. 
124 To the First Sea Lord, from the C-in-C Grand Fleet., August 13, 1917, (H.F. 00201796), 
ADM 116/1936. 
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the blocking operations against the U-Boats and Gennan fleet required 83 old warships 
to be sunk in the exits to the Bight. While the Allies could provide these vessels, the 
expenditure of cruisers would disrupt the convoy system then in the initial stage of 
development. Unprepared to sacrifice convoy integrity, the delegates dropped the 
blocking provision as a viable scenario. The second option was accepted despite 
Jellicoe's concerns that the 100,000 mines needed to close the Orkneys-Norway gap 
would be unavailable for some time even with increased American production. After 
Jellicoe's 22nd September approach to the US Navy Department, the mines were duly 
ordered with work commencing on the Northern Barrage in March 1918Y5 By mid-
October 1917, however, Russia's rapidly deteriorating situation forced another 
reconsideration of "The Baltic Project". 
The Admiralty'S attention was soon diverted to the unstable conditions in Russia 
following the March Revolution and the status of the Russian Baltic Fleet. Through the 
War Cabinet, Jellicoe urged the Russians to intensify their mining efforts in the eastern 
Baltic while Beatty despatched British battle cruisers to the western Jutland Bank in late 
April to keep the German Fleet out of the Baltic. The Admiralty's fears were realised 
when the Germans launched "Operation Albion"in October: a combined attack against 
Russian forces in the Gulf of Riga. Supported by two-thirds of the High Seas Fleet, 
German forces occupied Oesel, Moon, and Dago Islands bringing them into striking 
distance of the Russian naval base at Tallin (Reval) and the capital at Petrograd. 
Requests from the Kerensky government for assistance prompted Jellicoe to instruct the 
new Director of Planning (September 1917), Rear-Admiral Roger Keyes, to study a 
push into the Baltic, a' fa Churchill's and Fisher's 1914-15 proposals.126 
Keyes's report was not favourable. Without the High Seas Fleet's destruction 
and the preliminary blocking of the Elbe, any semi-permanent occupation of the Baltic 
was impracticable. To secure the North SealBaltic entrances two separate fleets were 
125 Report of a Naval Conference of Powers United Against Germany, September 4'1t and 5'1t 
J 9 J 7 Jellicoe MSS., 49034., fT. 1-20; Patterson, Jellicoe, pp. 194-6. , , 
126 FDSF vA., pp. 241-4; Halpern, pp. 213-22. 
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necessary, each equivalent to the Gennan Fleet in size. A raid into the Baltic was not 
"impossible" but was a "first magnitude" operation involving long, vulnerable 
communications lines. Aside from employing a large military expedition to take and 
hold Fyen, considerable mine sweeping was needed to clear the Belts. Moreover. any 
British fleet operating in the Belts would probably be subjected to "severe" and 
continual German air attack. Another difficulty was that to cover its heavy units and 
minesweeping, the Navy would have to withdraw its entire destroyer force from anti-
submarine work. Even if a British fleet made it through the Belts, it would have to 
contend with Fehmam's heavy defences and a net barrage east of the island. Keyes 
concluded that the risks were so considerable, "that it should not be attempted unless 
the advantages to be gained are worth the losses to be incurred." 127 
lellicoe accepted Keyes's arguments and the possibility for another Baltic 
campaign passed into obscurity.128 The only aid provided to the Russians occurred in 
late October when a light force, supported by the 2nd Battle Squadron and battle cruisers, 
made a small "demonstration" in the Kattegat. The Baltic issue was soon settled by the 
Bolshevik takeover in early November 1917. 129 Some, such as the head of the British 
Naval Mission to Russia, Admiral Victor Stanley, and Oliver (now Deputy Chief Naval 
Staff) supported the arguments by Keyes and lellicoe that a Baltic naval force would 
have its retreat cut off by the High Seas Fleet. Others, including the British public and 
press, were unimpressed with the Admiralty's decision to abandon the Russians and the 
Baltic theatre. 130 
127 Cover Minute and Memorandum by the Director of Plans, Rear-Admiral Keyes, 
"Operations in the Baltic", October 21, 23, 1917, ADM 137/2706, Plans Division War Records. 
(HSB 184) Suggested Baltic Sea Operations, 1917. 
128 Jellicoe, Submarine Peril, pp. 68-9. 
129 FDSF v.4., pp. 244-5. 
130 Ibid; Buchanan to Foreign Office, October 17-18, 1917; Minute by Oliver, DCNS, 
October 18, 1917; Memorandum by Naval Staff (Operations Division), October 20, 1917; Admiralty 
Memorandum for the War Cabinet, "Naval Situation in the Baltic", November 22. 1917, ADM 
137/1249, ff. 399,421-30,434-6,438,443-4. 
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Prominent amongst the latter group was Lord Fisher. By this stage a bitter critic 
of the outgoing Jellicoe (replaced by Admiral Sir Rosslyn E. Weymss as First Sea Lord 
on 26th December) and the Admiralty'S handling of the naval war, Fisher complained 
about the missed opportunities presented by Germany's "Albion" campaign. Writing 
to the former Civil Lord of the Admiralty, George Lambert, he lamented over a lack of 
"VISION" and the Admiralty'S failure to concentrate in the "decisive theatre", (i.e.) the 
Baltic. The German move into the Gulf of Riga: "was momentarily a magnificent and 
sure opportunity of destroying the Kiel Canal and wrecking therein the denuded German 
Fleet (which would have taken refuge therein), and our landing half a million men in 
Danish Schleswig-Holstein .... , seizing the North Sea entrance and marching on Kiel!" 
Commenting that his "plan", the Baltic project, was "perfected, precise, and certainly 
peculiar!", Fisher concluded, somewhat poignantly: "But it wanted the 'planner' to 
execute it!,,131 That last utterance, perhaps best encapsulated the main reason why a 
British campaign aimed at Germany's vitals in the Baltic never materialised during the 
First World War. 
It was ironic that the postscript to the Royal Navy's wartime offensive planning 
did not occur in the Heligoland Bight nor the confined waters of the Belts and Sound, 
but against two Belgian ports. Proposals to eliminate Germany's Flanders Flotilla 
operating from the Zeebrugge-Ostend-Bruges triangle were rife throughout 1916-17. 
The Dover Patrol, commanded by Bacon, fought an often desperate battle to contain 
German attacks on the Dover Barrage and U-Boat movement through the Channel to 
the Allied shipping lanes off the Western Approaches. 132 The crisis in the summer of 
1917 and the inability to attack the submarine pens at Bruges influenced Jellicoe's call 
for a land offensive in Flanders, resulting in the futile and horrendously costly Third 
t31 Fisher to Lambert, December 29,1917, FGDNv.3., pp. 497-8. 
132 Admiral Sir R. Bacon, The Dover Patrol, 1915-1917,2 Volumes, (London, 1919). see 
Volume I, Chapters 8-10 for Bacon's plans for attacks on Zeebrugge; H. Newbolt, Naval Operations 
v.5., pp. 36-42,45-8, 118-9,241-3; A. Temple Patterson, Tyrwhill of the Harwich Force, (London, 
1973), pp. 181-3; Keyes, Naval Memoirs v.2. pp. 127-34; Jellicoe. Submarine Peril, pp. 83-7. 
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Ypres (Passchendaele) campaign, July-October 1917. 133Jt had not been the only option. 
for Bacon had proposed an amphibious assault near Westende on the Belgian coast, vis-
a-vis proposals first explored in 1914, in conjunction with the Army's operations. 
Util ising large pontoons pushed by monitors, Bacon thought a successful landing would 
turn the Gennan flank. The failure of the Army to advance far enough, however, 
squashed the project. 134 
The overall situation was not aided by an fratricidal squabble between Bacon 
and Keyes, who rejected the fonner's plans as unfeasible in the Channel Barrage 
Committee. This contributed to Jellicoe's dismissal, although ostensibly the loss of two 
Scandinavian convoys in October and December, and a disappointing clash between 
British and Gennan light forces in the Bight on 17th November, were the reasons for his 
replacement by Weymss. Keyes, a Weymss partisan, soon replaced Bacon, a strong 
Jellicoe supporter, as commander of the Dover Patrol. 135 While the convoy system was 
slowly proving its effectiveness by early 1918, Keyes became obsessed with the 
blocking of Zeebrugge and Ostend to counter the strain German destroyer attacks had 
placed on the Dover Barrage. With the transport of American troops across the Atlantic 
slated for that summer, there was an urgent need to "seal in" as many German 
submarines as possible. 136 Keyes's final plan, "Operation Z.O.", was submitted to the 
Admiralty on 24th February 1918.137 In essence, it continued the North Sea blocking 
proposals previously examined throughout 1914-17. 
The planning, preparations, and implementation of the 220d _23fd April 
133 Richmond Journal entry, July 1, 1919, Portrait, p. 353. 
134 Bacon, Dover Patrol v. J, pp. 223-59; FDSF v.4., pp. 201-3. 
135 Patterson, Jellicoe, pp. 199-205; Corbett and Newbolt, Naval Operations v.5., pp. 178-
83,204; FDSF v.4., pp. 315-22, 347-8; Keyes, Naval Memoirs v.2., pp. 118-26, 135-47; Bacon. 
Dover Patrolv.2., pp. 401-13; P. Halpern (ed), The Keyes Papers, Volume I, 1914-1918, (London, 
1972), pp.416-39. 
136 M. Gilbert. The First World War, (London, 1995), p.417. 
137 The plans for Operation "Z.O." and Remarks by the Sea Lords are in: Halpern (ed), 
Keyes Papers ".1., pp. 460-78. Also refer to: Keyes, Naval Memoirs v.2 .• Chapters 17, 19. 
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Zeebrugge- Ostend raids, and their aftermath have been recounted elsewhere. 138 At best, 
the operations were only a temporary success. Operationally, they did not halt the 
continued egress of the Flanders U-Boats. The Ostend raid failed to block the harbour 
entrance, while at Zeebrugge the Germans merely dredged around the block ship 
obstructions. 139 And yet, the raid was significant as a practical demonstration of what 
may have been possible offensively. Zeebrugge represented, albeit on a minor scale, 
aspects of prewar plans which hitherto had only existed as paper theories or easi ly 
dismissed studies. In conception, the raid shared the same underlying premise as Bayly's 
1913-15 proposals to attack the Kiel Canal's western locks, aspects of the 1907-08 War 
. 
Plans (Plans C-D, W.3., Parts 1-2), Wilson's 1905-07 plans, Fisher's 1904-05 
"Copenhagen" schemes, and the NID's original July 1904 Elbe plan-all entailing a 
decisive strike at the enemy's strategically vulnerable areas. By 1917-18. however. 
strategic exigencies had shifted priorities away from "sealing" Germany's North Sea 
ports as a precursor to a Baltic campaign to the more immediate problem of containing 
the submarine threat. Fisher's lament in December 191 7 that there was a lack of 
"vision" and that "it wanted the 'planner' to execute it!", provides a clue to why, with 
the exceptions of the Dardanelles and Zeebrugge/Ostend, there was a general aversion 
to dangerous, but potentially decisive operations, throughout the war. 
At its core, Operation Z.O. mirrored conditions that would have arisen in any 
attempt to establish an advanced base off the GermanlDutch North Sea littoral, or in the 
Baltic-a mainstay in AdmiraltylNID war planning from Ballard's 1897 RUSI essay 
onwards, if not before. Ironically, while Jellicoe and other senior fleet officers may have 
decried the dangerous excesses of the "Baltic Project", Churchill's North Sea schemes, 
and other combined/inshore offensive plans, the need to overcome the real ities imposed 
by the mine and submarine prolonged and authenticated the very planning trend they 
138 Ibid., Chapters 17-26; Corbett and Newbolt, Naval Operatiom v.5., pp. 252-75; FDSF 
v.5., pp.45-66. 
139 Corbett and Newbolt, Naval Operations v.5., pp. 274-5; Halpern, Naval History, p. 
416. 
27l 
dismissed as impracticable. The question persists, if the prewar plans championed 
during the war were outdated, why then were they continually re-examined? As proven 
throughout 1905-09, the original plans developed against Germany took careful account 
of strategic, diplomatic, technological, and operational realities. Furthermore, the 
legitimacy of these assumptions was continually verified and tested in manoeuvres, 
ot~ exercises, and proven by the Admiralty'S procurement policies right into the 
irnm~diate prewar period. The very fact that these designs were consistently promoted 
and re-evaluated throughout 1914-1918 again confirms that there was an underlying 
validity to the offensive planning trend begun at the height of the Dual Alliance rivalry. 
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CONCLUSION 
The High Seas Fleet's anti-climactic surrender in November 1918 offset the 
search for offensive solutions to the North Sea stalemate and the submarine menace.' 
For some, the termination of hostilities had revealed congenital defects in the 
Admiralty's strategic system, especially poor preparation at the war's outset. Richmond 
cited weaknesses in the Navy's prewar educational and strategic policy for continuing: 
"the Doctrine of No Doctrine; so many officers so many ideas is the present Service 
rule. Hence, lack of preparation of war. as no one had clear & agreed upon \'iews as to 
how war would be conducted.,,2 The scuttling of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow on 21 51 
June 1919, was further proof that: "The wheel has come full circle: the Navy has ended 
as it began with unpreparedness." 3 Postwar reflections by those unaffiliated with the 
Admiralty's planning were equally negative. Stephen King-HalL a Grand Fleet 
lieutenant in 1914, compared the Navy to a "prehistoric Brontosaurus" at the beginning 
of the war: "a very big body with a very small brain."4 Such analogies of the 
Admiralty's prewar and wartime strategies ignore the reality that a carefully developed 
offensive policy was in place by 1912: the product of a planning trend initiated after 
1888, constructed throughout the 1890's and adapted to meet the case of a war against 
Germany by the NID, John Fisher, and the Admiralty beginning in 1902. 
Postwar critiques resurfaced in major studies oflate Victorian-Edwardian naval 
policy, fostering the impression that the Navy's pre-1914 and wartime strategic policy 
was non-progressive, with war planning haphazard at best.5 Fisher, for one, was chided 
as a "child" in strategic matters, a questionable assertion given the legitimate plans 
I FDSFv.5 .. pp.190-4. 
2 (Enclosure) Richmond to Haldane. February 15, 1919, Portrait. pp. 335-6. 
3 Richmond to C. Bellairs. June 23. 1919. Ibid.. pp.349-50. 
4 S. King-Hall, My Naval Life. 1906-1923, (London. 1952). p.23. 
5 Refer to Introduction. footnote 2. 
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created under his direction throughout 1905-1909 and the talented individuals 
associated with their creation, such as Ballard.6 This interpretation and other non-linear 
examinations ofthe Navy's strategic endeavours in the late-Victorian/Edwardian period 
focussed on specific questions and missed the impact of the NID and inter-related causal 
factors key to the entire planning process such as: the evolution of a historical 
movement dedicated to improving the Service's strategic thought and education. 
manoeuvres, procurement, and ScandinavianlEuropean power politics. The Admiralty's 
strategic transformation beginning with the NID's creation in 1887 to the end of the 
First World War was informed and innovative, continually evaluating the strategic. 
technological, and diplomatic realities involved in the formulation of plans designed to 
maintain Britain's traditional dominance at sea. 
Two developments were crucial for the establishment of planning after 1888: 
the NID's evolution into the Service's defacto staff and its link to the academic study 
of British naval history forged by Laughton, Philip Colomb, Bridge, and others in the 
1890's. The first provided the necessary formal structure in which strategic questions 
could be tackled and thrashed out through manoeuvres, war games, intelligence reports, 
and other exercises. The second formed the vital conceptual/theoretical framework for 
the creation of a definitive strategy based on the application of Britain's naval past to 
contemporary conundrums caused by advances in naval technology and, by 1905, new 
uncertainties in the European political arena. This symbiotic relationship fostered the 
emergence of a distinctive offensive strategy entailing a move from the "close" 
blockade to the observational ''watch'' on an enemy's main bases/ports, combined with 
decisive strikes against an adversary's sensitive points throughout the 1890's. As a 
response to the Jeune Ecole and the threat posed by French torpedo flotillas, this dual 
strategy was driven by two vital considerations: the deterrent factor, and should that fail, 
an offensive campaign to quickly terminate any conflict. Its goals were threefold: 
removing the threat posed by an enemy's main fleet by forcing it into a decisive neet 
6 Lieut-Commander P.K. Kemp, "War Studies in the Royal Navy", JRUSI. May 1966. p. 
151. 
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action; eliminating a guerre de course against Britain's overseas trade and allowing 
reciprocal attacks on an enemy's mercantile commerce; facilitating combined operations 
against an enemy's vulnerable areas, (i.e.) colonial possessions, bases. Variations on 
these seventeenth-early nineteenth century themes were re-examined and re-introduced 
to conform to technological change through the collaboration of the NID. the academic 
study of British naval history, and intellectual forums such as the NRS and RUSI. This 
trend towards "observational" blockade and inshore operations along an enemy's littoral 
via a system of advanced bases was confirmed as the Admiralty'S primafacie strategy 
in Ballard's 1897 RUSI essay, which also substantiated his inheritance of intellectual 
processes established in the late 1880's-early 1890's by Laughton, Colomb, and Bridge 
and maintained by DNI's affiliated with the historical revival such as Custance and 
Battenberg. 
The Admiralty's prewar planning was established not only by manoeuvres, 
exercises, intelligence reports, and other studies conducted after 1888, it was 
consistently legitimised and refmed by these factors until August 1914. Organisational 
and fiscal restrictions on the early NID impeded its ability to collate and process 
intelligence into contingencies. Linked to the historical themes identified by Laughton, 
Colomb, Bridge et aI., exercises became the only outlet for the department to consider 
the strategic/technological issues associated with the Anglo-French naval rivalry and the 
creation of what were, in effect, early war plans. Thus beginning in 1888, manoeuvres 
emulated the Admiralty's potential strategy against France. While the 1888 Manoeuvres 
revealed weaknesses in the "sealing-up" or "close" blockade concept, they enabled the 
evolution of that strategy into the "observational" blockade. Exercises conducted 
throughout the 1890's furthered the inter-relationship between the Admiralty's 
developing strategy and procurement (i.e. torpedo gunboats, Scouts, and early 
destroyers) and validated that the Navy's anti-torpedo-boat measures could sustain a 
"watch" on an enemy's bases. Studies evaluating the advanced base concept in the 
Mediterranean, indicated that the offensive forward base theme was a viable component 
in the NID/Admiralty's strategic formulations. By 1898, NID reports and Ballard's 1897 
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RUSI paper had confirmed the fusion of the observational blockade and the advanced 
base concept as the Admiralty's primary strategy. 
The 1900-1904 manoeuvres and NID reports also legitimised the Admiralty' s 
"observational" blockade strategy. Exercises, such as the September 1902 "Argostoli" 
evolution, demonstrated that the old "close/sealing-up" blockade circa 1888-89 was 
defunct and not the newer strategy developed as a derivative of Colomb' s "masking" 
category. The adoption of the observational blockade against France and Germany was 
confinned by the August 1904 Torpedo Craft Manoeuvres. Evaluating the NID's July 
1904 plan for a "watch" on the French northern bases, Germany's North Sea coast, the 
Skagerrak, and the blocking of the Elbe, these manoeuvres clarified that British fleets 
could conduct such scenarios and defend themselves against enemy flotillas operating 
near their bases. The August exercises also reinforced the link between strategy and 
procurement by serving as a "test bed" to evaluate the inshore capabilities of the new 
River Class destroyers. The manoeuvres verified the Admiralty's policy of providing 
the requisite vessels for its offensive strategy while familiarising British flotillas with 
likely operations in a potential war against Britain's newest threat. 
Strategic studies, intelligence reports, and war games conducted at the War 
College throughout 1902-06 provided the NID with valuable analysis to expand the 
observational blockade contingency against Germany. The War Division's evaluation 
of Gennan naval manoeuvres confmned that ancillary offensive strikes against the 
North Sea estuaries, the Canal, and Kiel could be successful. By late 1907, 
manoeuvres/exercises were simulating the first "official" war plans against Germany. 
Channel Fleet Tactical Exercises in June-July tested aspects of War Plan C/C 1 for 
"watches" on Gennany's western littoral and the Skaw to prevent High Seas Fleet 
sorties from its North Sea egresses. October ChannellHome Fleet manoeuvres mirrored 
Plan C's inshore "watch"on the Elbe and a distant observational blockade ofKiel from 
near the Skaw. Manoeuvres and Home and Channel Fleet reports in 1908-09 verified 
that aspects of the supplemental "W" series war plans were serious considerations. The 
July 1908 manoeuvres conformed to W.l. and W.2.'s proposals for a more distant 
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observational blockade of Germany's North Sea and Baltic exits. War Plan W.l.-W.3. 's 
recommendations for inshore "watches" were examined in Home Fleet flotilla exercises 
in October 1908 which simulated British efforts to curtail Gennan flotilla movement 
between the Weser, Jade, and Elbe. The emphasis on W.l.-W.3.·s projected operations 
along Gennany's North Sea littoral continued into 1909 as evidenced by studies on 
floti Ila fuel consumption rates and secret hydrographic tests off Jutland' s western coast. 
By the end of 1909, manoeuvres, related studies, procurement, and war planning had 
all defmed the direction of the Admiralty's strategic policy against Germany. 
Manoeuvres assumed a greater significance in the post-Fisher Admiralty. 
Combined Home/Atlantic Fleet exercises in April-May 1910 simulated both an East 
coast "flotilla defence" scenari07 and watches off Germany's western estuaries, 
indicating that the observational blockade, (i.e. War Plans W.l.-W.2.) remained at the 
core of Wilson's vague strategic policy. The War Staff's attempt to replace Wilson's 
contingencies with the untenable "Intermediate" blockade in early 1912 was rejected 
when the July-August Home Fleet Manoeuvres revealed weaknesses in the system's 
long, vulnerable cordons across the middle of the North Sea. The exercise confirmed 
Ballard and Kenneth Dewar's promotion of the 1907 distant blockade plan as the only 
viable solution to the War Staff's haphazard design. On the eve of the Navy's greatest 
test since the Napoleonic Wars, nlanoeuvres and planning had again verified the 
Admiralty's primary strategy. 
Admiralty procurement was a valuable adjunct to its strategic policy from 1888 
into the First World War. The torpedo-gunboat's introduction in the1880's to counter 
the French torpedo-boat threat indicated the Admiralty's commitment to a traditional 
blockade strategy against the Jeune Ecole. As the "close" blockade became a projected 
"masking" of French bases after 1888, the gunboat's inshore value was vindicated in 
the 1890-94 manoeuvres. The torpedo-boat destroyer's introduction in 1893-94 was a 
more blatant example of strategy-driven procurement initiated by the NID (Bridge) and 
7 Lambert. "Admiral Sir John Fisher and the Concept of Flotilla Defence", pp. 639-60; Naval 
Revolution. 
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the Admiralty Controller (Fisher). A derivative of the torpedo-gunboat for fleet defence 
and inshore flotilla operations offCherbourg and Brest, the 27 and 30 Knot destroyers 
were the materiel embodiment of the Admiralty's offensive strategy against France. 
Manoeuvres conducted after the destroyer's introduction proved valuable trials for the 
new type and revealed that they could protect a British fleet off an enemy's bases. By 
1898, the Admiralty's flotilla-orientated construction and the advanced base concept 
had improved the overall effectiveness of potential British offensive operations off 
French ports. 
Successful "watches" on an enemy's bases/coast were enhanced by the evolution 
of the torpedo-gunboat into the Scout Class cruisers and the early destroyers into the 
River Class after 1902. Proven in early service, the Scout's seaworthiness and all-
weather capability ensured their primary role as "parent" support vessels to British 
flotillas operating offensively off French northern bases. The same demands for 
endurance and sea handling were behind the 27-30 knotters' transformation into the 
first modem destroyer type, the River Class. With a larger displacement and higher 
freeboard, the new destroyers were superior to their predecessors when performing 
inshore duties offan enemy's bases. This was proven during the August 1904 Torpedo 
Craft Manoeuvres, the same exercise which confirmed that observational and offensive 
operations off an enemy's coast were the Admiralty's primary strategy against France 
and Germany. By Fisher's appointment as Service chief in October 1904, procurement 
had established the materiel basis for the Admiralty's offensive policy and laid the 
groundwork for new vessel types to complement an expansion of that strategy. 
Fisher's 1906-09 light cruiser programme affirmed the observational blockade 
strategy and procurement's continuing role in meeting the Navy's strategic 
requirements. Debate over a faster replacement for Scouts, torpedo-gunboats, and 
unannoured cruisers as "parent ships" for inshore flotillas led to a unanimous Admiralty 
Board recommendation that work on a new type commence in 1907. Coinciding with 
the Ballard Committee war plans and the ongoing Scandinavian "status quo" dilemma 
in early 1907, both the DNI (Ottley) and Fisher verified that the new cruiser type's 
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duties entailed observational and flotilla operations along Gennany's North Sea coast 
and in the Baltic. This drive to mate flotillas of more seaworthy destroyers with 
improved "parent" vessels for inshore/observational operations indicated that the central 
tenets behind the 1907 War Plans were accepted doctrine even before their completion 
or the supplementary 1908 "W" series. By 1909, the Board was creating a sizeable 
"mosquito fleet"g to pursue its North SealBaltic plans as detailed by the Ballard 
Committee. 
The final link between procurement and the Admiralty's strategic programme, 
though not conclusive, was the wartime construction programme associated with 
Fisher's "Baltic Project". Not originally intended for combined Baltic operations, the 
construction of monitors, shallow draught battle cruisers, and landing barges became 
increasingly connected to Fisher's renewed "Copenhagen" -like conceptions by early 
1915. Proven by his role as Controller and the destroyer's introduction in 1893-94. the 
adoption of new vessel types to meet the Admiralty's strategic requirements was not an 
unfamiliar concept to Fisher. The inter-relationship between procurement and strategy 
is a strong argument that offensive planning, as developed between the 1890's and the 
First World War, was consistently viewed by the Admiralty as applicable in the event 
of war. 
Another factor influencing the Edwardian Navy's strategic policy were crises in 
the European balance of power such as the Scandinavian neutrality /"status-quo" 
dilemma. Apart from Fashoda in 1898, pre-Entente Anglo-French disputes and naval 
"scares" were never really serious enough to precipitate a major conflict. By 1904, 
however, Wilhelmine Germany's aggressive foreign and naval policies were another 
matter. The High Seas Fleet's growth after 1902 9, overtures to Russia during the Russo-
Japanese War, and Wilhelm II's scheming to make the Baltic a mare clausum, clarified 
that Germany was Britain's most likely future foe and re-defined the Admiralty'S 
g DNt. C.L. Ottley, "The Strategic Aspects of Our Building Program. 1907.", January 7, 
1907, Richmond MSS, RIC/412/a3, NMM. 
9 Refer to Appendix II. 
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strategic preparations. Repeating strategic tenets developed against the Dual Alliance. 
Fisher's threats to destroy the German fleet at Kiel, assault the Canal, and invade 
Schleswig-Holstein in 1904-05 were not mere conjecture but were a deterrent to 
Germany's antagonistic foreign policy. Not designed as preventative strike scenarios, 
the NID's preliminary plans against Germany still gave the First Sea Lord the very 
offensive strategy needed to make his policy all the more effective. By June 1905, the 
Holstein-BUlow attempt to fracture the Entente prompted another re-assessment of the 
Admiralty'S strategic options, resulting in the Ottley-Wilson plans for a North 
Sea/Baltic blockade or offensive strikes against the Elbe, Kiel, and Schleswig-Holstein. 
The Moroccan crisis also gave Fisher the pretext for a demonstration of the Admiralty's 
strategic intentions with the Channel Fleet's Baltic cruise a reminder that the plans 
behind the threats were a distinct reality. If deterrence and diplomacy failed, the means 
were in place for a decisive strike against Germany's vitals. 
Norwegian independence and Russo-German machinations to exclude Britain 
from the Baltic (i.e. Bjorko) brought the question of strategic access into that sea to the 
forefront by mid-1905. The Admiralty's offensive contingencies against Germany were, 
in fact, potential hostages to any Scandinavian neutrality guarantee involving the Baltic 
entrances. When Norway clarified that its proposed neutrality clause included Denmark 
and Sweden in December 1906, Fisher took concrete steps to redefine the Navy's 
strategy: the Ballard Committee's 1907 War Plans. A significant departure from earlier 
plans, the distant blockade scenario, Plan AlAI, amalgamated the observational 
blockade theme, Ballard's 1897 RUSI essay, and Ottley's economic recommendations. 
Plan A's distant blockade of the North Sea averted the possibility that the Royal Navy 
may be excluded from the Baltic by a general neutrality arrangement. Not only did the 
plan correspond with the debate over Norway and neutrality, it was an innovative 
alternative should diplomacy fail to preserve unchecked British access to the Baltic. 
Plans C and D were likewise products of the Scandinavian neutrality dilemma: C, a 
British naval offensive against Germany's Baltic ports; D, a response to an invasion of 
Denmark via amphibious/naval strikes against Germany's communications. Should 
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either German action or a neutrality agreement close the Belts/Sound, D opened the 
Baltic to C's strike on Germany's eastern ports-a consummation of strategic themes 
dating back to the 1890's. 
Foreign Office appreciations of the Scandinavian neutrality issue confirmed the 
1907 War Plans' legitimacy. Renewed rumours of a Danish-German compact to close 
the Belts prompted Fisher to clearly outline the Admiralty'S strategic intentions to the 
Norwegians in February 1907. If Germany occupied Denmark, Britain would seize 
Christiansand to control the Skagerrak. His impetuosity belied the importance of 
Norway and the Belts to the Navy's primary contingencies: Plan A's northern blockade 
cordon and C's assault on Germany's Baltic tradelbases. Russia's proposed abrogation 
of the Aland Islands servitude and German overtures to extend the "status quo" to the 
North Sea in 1908 increased the Baltic entrances' questionable status. These issues 
confirmed the providence of the Ballard Committee designs and laid the groundwork 
for another extension of their basic axioms. The signing of separate North Sea/Baltic 
agreements in April 1908 maintained the "status quo" in the Baltic but did not assuage 
Fisher's concerns over the Belts and Sound. Accordingly, he and Slade implemented 
more war plans as supplements to the 1907 contingencies--the "w" series. Stimulated 
by the fallout from the "status quo" agreements, War Plans W.l. and W.2. were 
variations on earlier plans for a "distant" Heligoland Bight blockade with British 
flotillas off Germany's North Sea estuaries and "watches" on the SkagerraklKattegat 
supported by advanced bases off the Jutland Peninsula. Similar to Plan A in intent, these 
quasi-distant blockade variants provided an alternative to the possibility that the Baltic 
would be close~ by either a German invasion of Denmark or a Scandinavian compact. 
War Plan W.3. was a direct response to the Casablanca Crisis and Austria's annexation 
of Bosnia-Hercegovina in the Fall-Summer of 1908. Part Two of W.3. repeated Plans 
C-D by stressing elaborate combined operations to gain control of the Belts and a 
blockade of Germany's eastern ports, after the establishment ofa "watch" on the North 
Sea egresses. Like their predecessors, the "w" series reflected the importance of the 
Admiralty's primary strategy against Germany and the impact of European power 
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politics, not on the basic tenets of that strategy, but its continual maturation (i.e. the 
distant blockade). 
Technological change and disruptions in the European balance of power 
profoundly impacted the Admiralty's war planning after 1888. Apart from these external 
factors, however, it was officers associated with the NID and the scholarly study of 
Britain's naval past that maintained, modified, and evolved the Navy's strategic policy 
to meet the demands of an increasingly hostile world by 1902-04. The process was 
neither smooth nor easy given fiscal and organisational restrictions on the NID's ability 
to function as a true planning staff. And yet, it did, creating a viable offensive strategy 
against the Dual Alliance in the 1890's and then applying it for a potential war with 
Germany between 1902 and 1908. The chief reason for this successful transformation 
was the talent within the NID itself. The department's demise as de facto "staff' after 
the Fisher-Beresford fracas was a retrograde step away from an executive staff and the 
continued evolution of the Admiralty's war plans. Between 1909 and 1914, the Navy's 
strategic organisation suffered additional setbacks caused by: Fisher's autocracy; the 
Army's "continental" strategy; Cabinet indecisiveness; Wilson's continuation of the 
"warlord" dictum; the creation of a new, but ineffective staff system; and Churchill's 
amateurish meddling. The integrity and legitimacy of the Admiralty's more tenable 
plans however survived, kept intact and re-established by capable officers associated 
with the NID' s early war planning against Germany-the successors to the contextual 
historical truisms rediscovered by Laughton, Philip Colomb, Bridge, and Custance in 
the 1890's and early 1900's. 
The nature of the Admiralty's prewar planning was characterised by the two 
individuals most responsible for its strategic development into the First World War: 
Ballard, the pre-imminent intellectual strategist; and Fisher, the arch reformer, 
innovator, and organiser. Out of all the Admiralty's prewar planners: Battenberg, 
Hankey, Ottley, Wilson, Corbett, Richmond, and Kenneth Dewar, Ballard was by far 
the most influential. Inheriting the strategic maxims developed from Laughton and 
Colomb's historical work. he epitomised the dynamic and legitimate planning trend he 
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helped establish. His 1897 Gold Medal RUSI essay codified the observational blockade 
concept behind nearly all the Admiralty's plans into the First World War. "Vtt'orking with 
Custance and Hankey in the NID throughout 1902-05, Ballard adapted this strategy for 
use against Gennany as the precursor to an offensive strike in the Baltic-giving Fisher 
the actual operational plans to back up his "Copenhagen" deterrence policy inI904-05. 
Ballard's collaboration with Hankey and Ottley in 1906-07, resulted in the 
economically based and strategically viable Plans A and C which circumvented the 
Baltic's closure in a war with Gennany. These plans retained the traditional dictum of 
applying direct pressure on the enemy: the first through the "passive" distant North Sea 
blockade, based on the historical precedent of British operations against the Dutch in 
the seventeenth centuryIO; the second, an evolution of the trend begun in the latc 
nineteenth century, the NID's early operational plans for Gennany, and the Fisher-
Wilson "Copenhagen"strikes on Gennany' s Baltic bases/commercial ports should AJ A 1 
not attain its desired ends. As DOD in 1912, Ballard rehabilitated Plan A and, with 
Dewar's assistance, reconfinned it as the Admiralty's primary strategy in the coming 
conflict. With its preservation in mind, he and other officers in the War Staffand Grand 
Fleet deflected Churchill's attempts to resurrect the more untenable offensive designs 
from the Admiralty's prewar planning. Although these aspects of the dual strategy 
persisted into the war they were again tempered, as Fisher knew all too well, by the 
reasoned approach to operational planning established by officers such as Ballard in the 
pre-1909NID. Surprisingly, the latter's influence has been largely overlooked as has the 
true nature of the strategic course he helped implement and maintain. 
Intellectually divorced from the Service's historical-strategic revival in the 
1880's-90's, Fisher nonetheless understood the underlying principles behind the axioms 
rejuvenated by Laughton, Colomb, Ballard, and the NID. As First Sea Lord, he became 
not only a successful practitioner of those offensive concepts via his "Copenhagen"-
deterrent philosophy but realised the crucial link between the observational blockade-
10 Ballard, "Remarks on War Plans.", May 3, 1909, ADM 1/8997, p. 4; Chapter Three 
above. 
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decisive strike strategy and flotilla based procurement as evidenced by the integration 
of light cruisers and larger destroyers into his reform policies. He remained a strong 
champion ofthis strategy until internal opposition and external pressures to his policies 
forced him to retrench the First Sea Lord's prerogative over strategic matters; a move 
which retarded the other vital component to the Navy's intellectual progression -the 
creation of an effective naval staff system. Yet, despite Wilson's and Churchill's 
unprogressive tenures as "war lords", the offensive concepts from the late 1890's held 
on and matured, due to their timeless viability and the re-establishment of the planning 
continuum with Ballard's appointment as DOD in 1912. A testament to Ballard's 
talents, his Admiralty reappointment was attributable to Fisher's influence and the need 
to restore the planning trend developed in the NID's formative years and during his first 
period as First Sea Lord. The maintenance of this link was evident in the war's early 
years, long after the NID and Ballard had departed the scene. 
Fisher's "Baltic Project" typified his adoption of the historically-based trend 
established in the late nineteenth century. His earlier thoughts on deterrence and a 
decisive "Copenhagen-type" strike, were encapsulated in the "Baltic Project" but 
reflected the same cautious qualifications behind the planning conducted between 1906-
08. Aware of the advantages and disadvantages, Fisher knew that offensive amphibious-
naval strikes against Pomerania, Kiel, the Canal, and German Baltic trade (e.g. Swedish 
iron-ore), should only be implemented if the passive pressure of the distant blockade 
failed to appreciably effect Germany. Adopting an extensive mine blockade of the 
Heligoland Bight, as proposed by Ottley in 1905 and Ballard in 1912-13, as the safest 
expedient for the essential "sealing" of Germany's North Sea egresses, Fisher's entire 
plan was only an option if accepted after cautious study and was not a first strike 
contingency. As such, it retained the same meticulous and informed approach developed 
in Admiralty planning dating back to the Ballard Committee and before. While 
supporting the same strategic axioms as ChurchilL Fisher was aware of the original 
intent of the prewar planners, the war plans' liabilities, and their applicability to actual 
wartime conditions. Despite King-Hall's "small brain" analogy, the accomplishments 
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of Ballard, Fisher, and others associated with the Service's strategic development are 
final proof that for thirty years the Royal Navy's planning was legitimate. progressive. 
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